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
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THOMAS ALVA EDISON
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NEW JERSEY

A HISTORY

EDITOR-IN-CHIEF


IRVING S. KULL, A. M.

Professor of History, Rutgers University

VOLUME III

THE AMERICAN HISTORICAL SOCIETY, INC.
NEW YORK

1930



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CHAPTER XXXII.

ANTE-BELLUM POLITICS.

By B. H. Goldsmith, Historian and Author.

From 1844 to 1856 the State Elections in New Jersey were most vitally affected by the status of the Camden and Amboy Railroad. In their political sympathies and affiliations the directorate of the board of that corporation was allied to the Democratic party, and between that organization and the officers of the company an intimate relation existed. The friends of the railroad supported the claim that the Camden and Amboy was a New Jersey railroad, whose stock was largely owned by Jerseymen, whose officers were Jerseymen, in short a corporation organized by and for the interests of the State. The railroad had been constructed at great expense, it had revolutionized methods of transportation, was quick to grasp any new and useful invention tending to increase speed, or provide for the safety and comfort of its passengers. The "anti-monopolists" contended the railroad had entered every field of political activity, had extended, if not practically introduced, the use of money in elections, National, State and local, had distributed official positions among its favorites, creating a great "machine," and by throttling competition had prevented possible corporations from reducing rates charged for conveying passengers and freights.

Elections Under the New Constitution—The State and National elections in the autumn of 1844 had resulted in the triumph of the Whigs. New Jersey had cast her seven electoral votes for Henry Clay, of Kentucky, and Theodore Frelinghuysen of New Jersey. For President, Clay's majority in New Jersey was eight hundred and twenty-three. In this election the nomination of Theodore Frelinghuysen had stirred the people of the State. His unostentatious piety, his powers as an orator, his excellent judgment, had made him a conspicuous figure in State life. Serving as Attorney-General of New Jersey and as United States Senator, he had later become chancellor of the University of New York, and had been relied upon to sustain the Whig cause in the East, particularly as the Democratic administration had become unpopular.

The first election for Governor under the new constitution resulted in the choice of Charles C. Stratton by a plurality of 1,358 over his Democratic opponent, John R. Thompson. The Whig platform embraced the doctrine of protection to American manufactures, a protest against the extension of slavery by means of the acquisition of foreign territory, although recognizing the compromise of the Federal Constitution, and unaltering opposition to the Camden and Amboy Railroad Company. Whig candidates who appeared against Charles C. Stratton were Joseph Porter, Jesse Richards, William P. Robeson, John C. Smallwood, and General Peter I. Stryker, while the opponents of John R. Thompson were John Cassedy and Thomas G. Haight.

New Jersey in the War with Mexico—Two sons of New Jersey greatly distinguished themselves during the Mexican War. General Stephen Watts Kearny and Commodore Robert F. Stockton. The former, with a command of 1,800 men, largely composed of volunteers from the State of Missouri, marched across the alkali deserts to Santa Fe, New Mexico, which was occupied on August 18, 1846. Leaving Colonel Price in command of this town, General Kearny then moved onward to California with only one hundred dragoons and after a severe and almost fatal engagement with the Mexican forces at San Pasqual, reached San Diego.

In this conquest of California another New Jerseyman was destined to play a most conspicuous part. Already the Pacific squadron of the United States Navy, under Commodore Sloat, had captured Monterey, California, and Commander Montgomery had seized San Francisco. But it was reserved for Commodore Robert F. Stockton, who had succeeded Commodore Sloat in command, to occupy Los Angeles, the capital of California. To pacify the country Commodore Stockton, in September, had penetrated the interior, and in his absence Los Angeles again fell into the hands of the Mexicans. Joining his force of five hundred men to that of General Kearny, who reached California in December, the battles of San Gabriel and the Mesa River were fought early in January, 1847. Thus the Pacific slope of the Spanish West became annexed to the United States, and six hundred thousand square miles of territory were added to the public domain.

Commodore Stockton was born at Princeton, August 20, 1795, a grandson of Richard Stockton, one of the signers of the Declaration of Independence. He had a distinguished career in the United States Navy, which he entered as a midshipman in 1811. He served in the War of 1812, became a captain in 1838 and resigned in 1850. Much of his service was spent in the Mediterranean and on the coast of Africa, where he made treaties with the African chiefs. He also founded the colony of Liberia, subjugated West Indian pirates, abolished flogging on United States naval ships, served as United States Senator from New Jersey during 1851-53, declined the offer of the secretaryship of the navy and died at Princeton, October 7, 1866.

The declaration of war with Mexico aroused the military ardor of New Jersey. Although a generation had passed away since the State, in 1812, had responded to the call for volunteers, yet the continuous if not efficient organization of the State Militia had sustained a martial spirit. The war itself was generally popular in New Jersey, and received the commendation of the press. Thus the commencement of the struggle found New Jersey ready to respond to any demand upon her resources that the Federal Government should make.

Following an executive message to Congress, which was sent May 11, 1846, President Polk, on May 13, approved an act "providing for the prosecution of the existing war between the United States and Mexico." Under the statute the President was authorized to make a call for volunteers not exceeding fifty-thousand men, "who may offer their services either as cavalry, artillery, infantry, or riflemen," to serve for twelve months, while in addition the

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of the United States,*

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ANDREW K. HAY,
CHARLES E. ELMER.
EDWARD W. IVINS,
GEORGE H. BROWN,
DAVID THOMPSON,
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For Member of the House of Representatives,
WILLIAM PENNINGTON.

For Senator,
JAMES M. QUINBY,

For Member of Assembly,
JESSE WILLIAMS.

For Sheriff,
ELIAS N. MILLER.

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First, Second and Third Wards, Orange ; West
Orange and East Orange.**

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United States,*

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ALEXANDER G. CATTELL,
LEWIS MULFORD,
JOSEPH K. HULME.
JOSEPH THOMPSON,
VAN CLEVE DALRIMPLE,
CHARLES WEHLE.

For Member of the House of Representatives,
THEODORE LITTLE.

For Member of General Assembly,
CHARLES A. LIGHTHIPE.

For County Clerk,
CHARLES R. WAUGH.

For Sheriff,
FREDERICK W. RICORD.

For Surrogate,
WILLIAM H. WEBSTER.

For Register of Deeds,
PETER T. SPEER.

For Coroners,
GARRET SANDFORD,
ALBERT MATTHEWS,
GEORGE TAYLOR.

sum of ten million dollars was appropriated from the National treasury for military expenses.

Upon the volunteers fell the expenses of furnishing their own clothes, while the cavalymen were required to provide horses and "horse equipments." To Governor Charles C. Stratton, under date of May 19, came a requisition from the Secretary of War calling for one volunteer regiment of infantry from New Jersey, the number of men in each company to be limited to sixty-four. Instantly Governor Stratton issued a proclamation "calling upon the organized uniform companies and other citizens of the State to enroll themselves" in a company of infantry (riflemen) and a regiment of infantry (riflemen), under which call "many companies of the militia of the State offered their services, but none were accepted at the time."

The opening of the year 1847 found the people of New Jersey heartily in favor of the war, judged at least by the attitude of the Legislature in the passage of two joint resolutions. On January 28 the Legislature, in a preamble to these joint resolutions, stated that General Taylor's course "has been such as has commanded the admiration of his countrymen as well as to elicit praise from foreign nations, and we have seen with regret an attempt made to defame and detract from his hard earned reputation, gained by a life spent in the service of his country, in the War of 1812, in the swamps of Florida, and in the chapparals of Mexico." Therefore, it was resolved "that the skill, ability and indomitable bravery displayed in the Mexican War by General Zachary Taylor merit our warmest praise," and that the thanks of the Legislature were due him as well as to the gallant men who fought upon the fields of Palo Alto, Resaca de la Palma, and Monterey. On February 19 the Governor was authorized to procure and present, in the name of the State of New Jersey, four swords to four officers from this State—Captain William R. Montgomery, and Lieutenants N. Beakes Rossell, Fowler Hamilton, and Samuel G. French, of the United States Army.

A new military establishment was created on February 11, 1847, when Congress passed an act raising ten new regiments for the regular army. Under the law three companies were recruited for the 10th Regiment, commanded by Colonel Robert E. Temple. Under a presidential call for troops New Jersey was required, in April, 1847, to furnish five companies of infantry, to be organized into a battalion and rendezvoused at Trenton. Each company was to consist of eighty privates between the ages of eighteen and forty-five, and Captain Minor Knowlton, of the 1st Artillery, United States Army, was designated to muster in the volunteer force of New Jersey. Of the five companies but four were organized, nor was it until September 29, 1847, that the New Jersey troops left New York harbor on the ship "Senator" en route for Vera Cruz. Peace having been declared on July 4, 1848, the volunteers returned to Fort Hamilton on the 22d of that month and on August 3, 4 and 5 were mustered out. Of the 10th Regiment, Companies E, G, and H were raised in New Jersey, these, in May, 1847, being sent forward to Matamoras. Returning on the ship "Pharsalia" and the bark "General Taylor," these com-

panies were mustered out late in August, 1848. In the organization of the New Jersey battalion infantry volunteers Dickinson Woodruff was Lieutenant-Colonel, the First Lieutenant being Edwin Milford Bard and the Assistant Quartermaster Isaac W. Mickle. The Captain of Company A was Henry A. Naglee from May 17, 1847, to April 1, 1848, when he was succeeded by Assistant Quartermaster Isaac W. Mickle. Company B had for its Captains James Reynolds and Francis Harrison. The Captain of Company C was David McDowell and of Company D David Pierson.

In the 10th Regiment Infantry, United States Army, Company E had for its Captain Samuel Dickinson, while Joseph A. Yard was Captain of Company G. Owing to the death of Captain Joshua W. Collet, by reason of a duel, Samuel R. Drummer was subsequently elected Captain of Company H.

Of the New Jerseymen, officers in the United States Army and Navy during the war with Mexico, many attained great distinction and some served during the war for the preservation of the Union. Colonel Harvey Brown had been honored by brevet in the war against the Florida Indians, and was advanced in rank after the battle of Contreras and for "gallant conduct at the gate of Belen, City of Mexico." Israel Carle Woodruff, James William Abert, Robert Stockton Williamson, William R. Palmer, and Augustus Canfield later gained laurels as topographical engineers. Major Lewis Golding Arnold was brevetted for gallantry at Contreras, Cherubusco and Chapultepec, as were Captain Samuel Gibbs French for his conduct at Monterey and Buena Vista and Colonel William Reading Montgomery at Palo Alto and Resaca de la Palma. To Nathan Beakes Rossell was given the position of Major by brevet for his gallantry at Molino del Rey, while James Wall Schureman was honored with a First Lieutenancy for his services at Contreras and Cherubusco. After meritorious conduct at Chapultepec, George Clinton Westcott was brevetted Captain.

But it was not until the year 1858 that New Jersey, as a State, gave to the veterans of the Mexican War a tardy recognition of their services. On March 17 of that year, a decade having passed since the four companies of the New Jersey battalion sailed out of New York harbor, the official thanks of the citizens of New Jersey were tendered the officers, non-commissioned officers and privates, while the Governor was directed to issue commissions to surviving commissioned officers of the battalion in service at the termination of hostilities, conferring upon such officers a brevet rank of the next highest grade to that held by them respectively while in actual service during the war.

A Democratic Victory—The election for Governor which occurred in 1847 resulted in the choice of Daniel Haines, a Democrat, although the Whigs remained in control of the Senate and the House. Into the Whig State platform of that year no new "planks" of interest were introduced, except to charge that the Mexican War had been conducted by "politician officers who had never drilled a corporal's guard." Governor Haines succeeded in defeating his opponent, William Wright, by a plurality of 2,599. The other Whig candidates for the nomination were William P. Robeson and

John Runk. Following upon the heels of the State election came the presidential contest of 1848, when Zachary Taylor and Millard Fillmore, whom the Whigs had nominated for the presidency and vice-presidency, received the electoral votes of New Jersey. Taylor's plurality was 3,144.

The gubernatorial election of 1850 threw the entire political machinery of New Jersey into the hands of the Democratic party. Since 1844 the Whigs had controlled Legislature, while for the five years after 1850 the mastery of the Democratic party in the House and Senate was absolute. As a candidate the Whigs nominated John Runk, of Hunterdon County, other candidates for the honor being Joseph Porter of Camden, Thomas Jones Yorke of Salem, William N. Wood of Morris, Martin J. Ryerson of Passaic, and George H. Brown of Somerset, with William A. Newell of Monmouth County, this being the first appearance of that distinguished Jerseyman as a candidate for Governor. The nominee of the Democrats was George F. Fort of Ocean County, who after five ballots defeated his rivals, John Cassedy of Hudson, Jonathan Pitney of Atlantic, John Summerhill, Jr. of Salem, Isaac G. Farlee of Hunterdon, and Henry A. Ford of Morris. The Whig platform was mainly devoted to a reaffirmance of the policy of protection for American industries, while the Democrats advocated popular education, equal taxation and general in place of special legislation. Governor Fort succeeded in defeating Mr. Runk with a then unprecedented majority of 5,669. In 1852 the Democratic electoral vote of New Jersey was cast for Franklin Pierce for President and William R. King for Vice-President, defeating General Winfield Scott, the Whig candidate. Pierce's plurality in the State was 5,749. Hale, the "Free-soil" candidate for President, received but three hundred and fifty votes in New Jersey, his strength lying largely in New England, New York and Ohio.

The reestablishment of New Jersey in the Democratic column gave the Whigs but little hope for victory during the contest for the governorship in 1853. The success of the Democrats had been so pronounced that no less than eighteen candidates appeared as contestants for the nomination, requiring six ballots before the choice of the convention fell upon Rodman M. Price. These candidates were E. R. V. Wright, Thomas W. Arrowsmith, William C. Alexander, Phineas B. Kennedy, Alexander Wurts, Henry Hilliard, John Huyler, John Cassedy, John W. Fennimore, John R. Slack, Littleton Kirkpatrick, George Sykes, S. D. Canfield, Dr. John R. Sickler, T. W. Mulford, Daniel Barcalow, and John R. Darcy. The Democrats had a popular candidate and a popular platform, declaring their adherence to the "Monroe doctrine," favored the annexation of Cuba, general legislation, particularly that encouraging labor, the regulation of working hours for the young in factories, the extension of the rights of married women, the adoption of a wider plan for general education, and the construction of a railroad to the Pacific Ocean. The Whig convention had nominated Joel Haywood of Ocean County, other candidates being James S. Nevius of Middlesex, George H. Brown of Somerset, and William J. Shinn of Salem. Aside from agreement

with the Democrats as to the extension of the system of public education the Whig platform recommended internal improvements supported by the funds of the Federal Government. The most vital part of the document was an arraignment of the Camden and Amboy Railroad, stating that the claims of special privilege were inconsistent with a Republican form of Government, and closing a lengthy paragraph with a caustic attack upon corporations and monopolies. Governor Price's majority over Haywood was 3,782.

Railroad Development in New Jersey—In spite of the frequent and continuous attacks made upon the Camden and Amboy Railroad and the special privileges enjoyed by it, numerous other charters were granted by the Legislature during the decade of 1846 to 1856. Similar charters were also granted to several canal companies. In 1849 the Central Railroad of New Jersey was chartered. Its seventy-five miles, from Jersey City to Phillipsburg, when completed, cost \$20,077,208, or about \$26,770 per mile. In 1851 the Warren Railroad was chartered. Its sixteen miles, from Delaware to Changewater, cost over \$3,000,000 or about \$187,500 per mile. In the following year, 1852, the Camden and Atlantic Railroad received a charter for a line of fifty-nine miles from Cooper's Point, Camden, to Atlantic City, this line costing almost \$2,000,000 or about \$34,000 per mile. The West Jersey Railroad, from Camden to Cape May City, with eighty-one miles, was chartered in 1853 and cost about \$2,000,000 or almost \$25,000 per mile. The year 1854 saw the completion of the Camden and Atlantic Railroad, chartered in 1852, and also brought a charter to the Raritan & Delaware Bay Railroad, while the much attacked but powerful Camden and Amboy Railroad received an extension of its charter to 1888. The Union Canal Company, in 1856, came in existence through a charter from the Legislature.

Between 1844 and 1857 three counties were organized, Camden in 1844, Ocean in 1850, and Union in 1857, the last named having the distinction of being the last county to be organized in the State.

War Clouds Grow Darker—The year 1856 was momentous, not only in the history of the nation, but of the State. Disorganization was in the air; some predicted the dissolution of constituted government. The election of Pierce and King in 1852 had but postponed the evil day, while the struggle for Kansas and the success of the pro-slavery men in establishing their policy on the "virgin soil" had aroused the North. Men turned toward safety, yet knew not where to go. In New Jersey, as elsewhere, both Whigs and Democrats had temporized; both feared the fearful consequences of precipitating the conflict. As a political organization the Whigs were practically extinct. The end had come quickly, and had not been prolonged as in the death of Federalism. The "Compromise" of 1850, the deaths of Webster and Clay in 1852, the execution of the "fugitive slave law," the passage of the "Kansas-Nebraska" bill, had tended to weaken and finally destroy the party. The Democratic party, meanwhile, not only in New Jersey, but throughout the eastern portion of the United States, had become strong,

but unwieldy. It had assimilated most of the large body of immigrants. In the North the foreign element had already arisen to a degree of power in the councils of the party, and by enterprise and special aptitude had obtained partial control of the industrial situation. To the "old line Whigs," this new blood, assertive and energetic, was obnoxious. The specious plea was made that the nation's "institutions, liberties, and system of government were at the mercy of men from the monarchical countries of Europe." There was thus no apparent haven of refuge for the Whigs.

Beginnings of the Republican Party—In 1854, in the then distant State of Wisconsin, had been born a new party, which, having taken a part of the old name of its logical opponent, had swept eastward, and in two short years, by the use of "fusion" methods, had absorbed "Freesoilers," anti-Nebraska Democrats, Whigs, Abolitionists, and Native Americans. Thus it was that the Republican party entered the national contest.

In the month of June, 1856, upon the fifth, there had assembled in Trenton men of varying shades of belief, called, as its platform said, not as a mere party, but to represent "the great body of the patriotic, enlightened, and conservative people of New Jersey opposed to the present State and Federal administration." Of this new party, still without a name, but known as the "Opposition party," the chairman was William Lewis Dayton, who, as an "old line Whig," associate justice of the Supreme Court, United States Senator from New Jersey, a friend of the protective tariff, and opposed to slavery, had become a conspicuous figure in New Jersey politics. The State platform of the "Opposition" party, which was immediately identified with the Republican movement, was devoted to national issues. In general terms it charged the Democrats with improvidence and recklessness, that the Federal administration had violated the "Missouri Compromise," and had permitted "outrages" in Kansas. For the gubernatorial honors there were several candidates: Beach Vanderpool of Essex, Joseph Franklin of Gloucester, William Parry of Burlington, Ephraim Marsh of Morris, Dudley S. Gregory of Hudson, Charles S. Olden of Mercer, and David Ryerson of Sussex County. But the choice of the convention fell upon William A. Newell of Monmouth County.

The new Republican party in New Jersey embraced many of the Whigs, led by such men as Frederick T. Frelinghuysen and Abraham O. Zabriskie, while a conspicuous figure in the convention was John H. Jones of Camden, a recognized leader of the Native American or "Know Nothing" movement, a political organization so-called because its members, when asked about the organization and its secret ritualistic work, knew nothing of the existence of such a body. The Native American movement, whose support John H. Jones pledged to the Republican party in New Jersey, had arisen in Louisiana during 1841, and after a degree of success, incidentally electing a member of the House of Assembly in New Jersey during 1845, had declined in influence. In 1852 the movement again appeared in New York City, the entrance point into the United States of the mass of immigrants, and as a

secret society, with grips, signs, and passwords, in two years won in the elections in Massachusetts, New York, and Delaware. Southern Whigs also joined the party.

In New Jersey, during the session of 1855, the Know Nothings succeeded in securing a senator and six members of Assembly, in 1856 four senators and fifteen members of Assembly, in 1857 three senators, but no members of the lower house, and after that year disappeared from State politics, its principles, in part or in whole, being later advocated by a number of secret societies having extensive membership. Upon June 17, 1856, shortly after the assembling of the "Opposition" party of New Jersey, the Republicans met in Philadelphia and named as their vice-presidential candidate, William L. Dayton, chairman of the Trenton convention. With him was nominated John C. Fremont as the party's candidate for President.

Before the Democratic State convention of 1856 there were five candidates for the gubernatorial nomination. Three, William C. Alexander, Joseph C. Potts, and Charles Skelton, were from Mercer County, while John W. Fennimore was from Burlington and E. V. R. Wright from Hudson County. The choice of the convention was William C. Alexander. The Democratic platform represented the somewhat uncertain attitude of the northern members of that party concerning the entire question of slavery. While abolitionism was condemned the party did not advocate slavery, holding that it was the duty of New Jersey to avoid any course whereby it would appear to legislate for other States. Both the Kansas "outrages" and "extremists," either in the North or in the South, were condemned, while the Republicans were arraigned for their violent assaults upon Southerners. An invitation was extended to all "Old Line Clay and Webster Whigs" to affiliate with the Democratic party, which pledged itself to encourage agriculture, promote manufactures and the mechanical sciences, stimulate industry, and advance the cause of general education. The result of the national election gave James Buchanan and John C. Breckinridge, the Democratic nominees for President and Vice-President, a plurality in New Jersey of 18,605. Not even the name of Dayton could secure more than twenty-eight thousand votes in the State of his birth, while Fillmore, the nominee of the American party or "straight out" Whigs, had twenty-four thousand.

By the coalition of the Republicans and the American party Dr. William A. Newell was elected Governor over his Democratic opponent by a majority of 2,557. He was the first Republican Governor of the State.

Last Election Before the War—But one gubernatorial election remained ere the country was plunged into the horrors of civil war. The year 1859 found the Democratic party in control of the House of Assembly and the Senate, although their tenure was by bare majorities.

The Republican party had in the meantime effected a more perfect organization, and in its State convention of 1859 had a plethora of candidates. Charles S. Olden was nominated by Bergen, Mercer, Ocean, and Hunterdon Counties; Joseph Porter by Camden; Andrew K. Hay by Camden,



BURLINGTON

Yacht Fleet on Delaware River
Nook on Sylvan Lake

River Front
Sylvan Lake and Driveway

Ocean, and Warren; William K. McDonald by Essex; D. S. Gregory by Hudson; Ephraim Marsh by Hudson, Morris, and Warren; Edward Y. Rogers by Middlesex and Union; and J. W. Allen by Burlington County. The party platform was devoted to opposition to the federal administration, the support of a protective tariff, and a declaration against a revival of the African slave trade. As early as March of that year the Trenton "State Gazette" had declared the policy of the party would be opposition of "Nigger Driving Buchananism," "Loco Foco Extravagance," "Slavery Dictation and Slavery Extension," "Ballot Box Stuffing," "King Cotton," and the kind of tariff that makes "Mud Sills" of men, and favoring "Protection to American Industry." The policy delineated opposed filibustering and the taking of fees from debtors to be given an "Aristocratic Chancellor" that he might enjoy a salary of five thousand dollars per year, while government by the court of chancery and the forcible retention of State offices was also condemned. Charles S. Olden was nominated.

The Democrats, after five ballots scattered among seven candidates, selected Edwin V. R. Wright as their nominee for Governor. The platform declared against the revival of the slave trade, called for a union among the members of the party who had divided upon the question of the "Lecompton Constitution," and in general terms demanded equality among citizens. The remaining candidates were Thomas H. Herring, Alexander Wurts, Charles Skelton, Joseph C. Potts, George Sykes, Charles Sitgraves, and Peter D. Vroom.

The contest gave Charles S. Olden a majority of 1,601 in a total vote of 105,029, while the Legislature elected comprised a Democratic Senate, and a House of Assembly, in which there were thirty Democrats, twenty-eight Republicans, and two "Americans."



CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION PERIOD

By Charles M. Knapp, Ph. D.,

Professor of History, University of Kentucky.

Chapters XXXIII-XXXIX and XLI.

CHAPTER XXXIII.

FROM PEACE TO WAR.

The result of the National election known, the people of the North, irrespective of party, turned their anxious attention to the progress of events in the South. There was reason enough, surely, for thoughtful consideration. Were the threats of secession that had been made during the campaign merely campaign talk? Or did real danger actually threaten the existence of the Union? Would secession, if attempted, be confined to a State or two? Would it be restricted to Southern States? Would it effect any radical change or changes in the Federal Constitution, or in party alignments? Should any States secede, was the Federal Government to force them back into the Union? With such problems before them men watched with deepest interest, in the succeeding months, the progress of events in the South.

In South Carolina, the Legislature, which met on November 5 to choose presidential electors, continued in session until the news of Lincoln's election had caused a storm of disunion enthusiasm to sweep over the State. The Legislature thereupon called for the election, by popular vote, on December 6, of delegates to a State convention. The convention met on December 17, and on December 20 solemnly passed an ordinance of secession.¹

Meantime, in New Jersey, as the gravity of the situation became more apparent, various propositions looking to a peaceful settlement were offered. The *Newark Journal*² early expressed the views of the Breckenridge Democrats, in an editorial headed "The Union Already Dissolved—Can it be Re-united?" This editorial charged that the Union had been "broken by these negro philanthropists and office-seekers, who have nullified the Federal Constitution by the most obnoxious and overt acts"; the Union, it held, might be restored only by granting the slave-holders' demands.

The leaders of the Democracy in New Jersey conceived the idea of a State convention which should express the opinions of the conservative element in the State. The call invited "all national men in favor of Constitutional Union measures" to assemble in mass convention at twelve o'clock, December 11, in Trenton, at the State House, "to consider the condition of national affairs, and to concert such measures as may be advisable under the present crisis of our Republic." It was signed, for the Breckinridge and Lane element, by Edwin A. Stevens, John S. Darcy, David Naar, Benjamin Williamson, William C. Alexander, William Wright; for the Douglas and Johnson element, by Rodman M. Price, Joel Parker, Theodore Runyon, William Cook, Robert J. Chandler; for the Bell and Everett elements, by Joseph F. Randolph, Fred Betts, James Bishop, Charles D. Deschler, Peter S. Duryea, Samuel J. Bayard, and Commodore Robert F. Stockton.

¹ Cf. Rhodes, Vol. III, pp. 114-25, 197-206.

² November 27, 1860.

Examination of the call for the convention and of the signatures appended thereto shows that it was essentially the continuation of the Fusion movement begun with the conventions of July 25, and that it also had a party motive behind it, the reorganization of the Democratic party for the coming session of the Legislature. No Republicans sponsored the call. A committee of seven to prepare an address and resolutions was appointed, a majority of whose members had been Constitutional Union men. The committee consisted of Commodore Robert F. Stockton, Joseph F. Randolph, A. R. Speer, C. D. Deschler, S. J. Bayard, Rodman M. Price, and David Naar.

In the course of his remarks Commodore Stockton was reported by the *Newark Journal* on the following day as having voiced his opinion upon the issue of the day. "Accord to the South all the rights of property guaranteed by the Constitution and the laws and the decision of the Supreme Court in pursuance thereof. Let the nullifying personal liberty bills of the Northern States be repealed. All this the South has under the Constitution a clear right to demand." "Something must be done. What has been done must be undone." "New Jersey should supplicate the North to yield; and appeal to the South to wait." "If the North would do what is right, the difficulty would be brought to a happy conclusion". And with respect to the negro, he said in effect that the African race was not worth fighting over or for, slaves were being benefited by slavery and Christianity, were undergoing an apprenticeship; God meant that they should be returned home through the instrumentalities of the American Colonization Society; negroes were the most cowardly, most brutal, the most abandoned of God's creations. Mr. James Brooks, of New York, said that he came "to report the doings of the only state of the North which had exhibited its nationality, its patriotism and its freedom from sectionalism." A committee was appointed to confer with the other States upon the present state of National affairs.

The committee presented an address and resolutions.³ The former reviewed the prominent part New Jersey had played in the formation of the Constitution of the United States, and declared that the State had faithfully abided by the compacts and agreements she then consented to; that the Constitution was the result of concession and compromise; that New Jersey was still willing to make any proper concession which wisdom and patriotism might require; that

it is evidently proper that New Jersey should interpose, and by her conservative voice invite her sister States, as well as extremists of all parties and sections, to pause and deliberate, and consent to make one more patriotic effort in the preservation of the Union. . . .

Two of the resolutions may well be quoted in full:

Resolved, That the cause of the present portentous crisis is the actual and threatened interference on the part of the Northern agi-

³ The Resolutions are printed in *Annual Cyclopaedia*, 1861, p. 514, and *True American*, December 12, 1860.

tators with the rights and property of the people of fifteen States of this Union.

Resolved, That we see no remedy for this deplorable state of public affairs unless the North, in the most prompt and explicit manner, shall avow its determination to remove all political agitation for the abolition of slavery; shall repeal all acts designed to nullify or embarrass the faithful execution of the Fugitive Slave Law; shall consent to the citizen of the South enjoying the services of his domestic while temporarily sojourning here on business or pleasure; and shall accord to the South all the rights of property guaranteed by the Constitution and the laws, and the decisions of the Supreme Court in pursuance thereof.

Other resolutions followed, the most important being that which appointed five members of the convention to confer with other States and urge the necessity of the measures suggested.

The address was adopted, though not with the unanimous approval accorded to the resolutions, probably because it was considered to yield too many of the contentions of the South. It is well to note that neither in the address nor in the resolutions is there any recognition, or even mention, of the right of secession. The entire blame was placed on the North. A resolution offered by Oliver S. Halstead, Jr., a Republican, declaring that the North and the South had each committed wrong against the other, caused great disturbance, but was finally adopted.

Commodore Stockton, in a letter which was quoted in the "Annual Cyclopædia," Vol. I, p. 514, wrote thus after the convention: "If the South will only give us time, we will bring the North in entire and honorable fraternity with the South. We will save the Union if they will postpone action until spring. I have no doubt that the sentiment of the North will be practically in accord with our address". Commodore Stockton unquestionably was not alone in his views upon the situation. It is probable that he was influenced by his intimate knowledge of Southern conditions, Southern life and Southern thought, since he had married the daughter of one of South Carolina's wealthiest planters. But there were other influences as well that were local in character, that influenced Stockton as well as other Jersey men. The railroad interests of the Stockton family and others had no desire to see any interruption of the through traffic and trade between the South and New York and New England. Nor had the manufacturing interests in the Northeastern counties a desire to see any disturbance of their Southern markets. For generations the bulk of the carriages, saddlery, harness, and clothing manufactured in Newark had found its way to markets south of the Mason and Dixon line. Such social and economic interests had afforded many prosperous and prominent Jersey men opportunities to obtain a knowledge of the Southern point of view upon the questions at issue and an understanding of the real seriousness of the crisis that South Carolina had again precipitated.

As reports from the South after the November elections showed that the "fire-eaters" of that section were not satisfied with its results, opinion in the North developed along three distinct lines. Before the seriousness of the situation was fully appreciated, many maintained that, since the election had been held and the result had been obtained in a constitutional manner, the South was bound to submit to it. By December, a second opinion, promulgated by Horace Greeley, in the *New York Tribune*, obtained a wide but temporary following. He was willing to recognize the right of secession and to allow the Southern States to depart in peace. Finally, there were many who believed that the controversy might be settled, as in 1820 and in 1850, by a compromise between the two sections.

Congress assembled on December 3, and proceeded to debate the existing political crisis and to consider various schemes of compromise. The most important was that containing the constitutional amendments offered by United States Senator Crittenden, of Kentucky. The vital article of these amendments was that which proposed that slavery should be prohibited in all the territory of the United States now held, or hereafter acquired, situate north of latitude $36^{\circ} 30'$ In all the territory South of said line of latitude . . . slavery is hereby recognized as existing; and shall not be interfered with by Congress, but shall be protected as property by all the departments of the territorial government during its continuance. It was further provided that States should be admitted from the territory north or south of latitude $36^{\circ} 30'$ with or without slavery, as their constitutions might provide.⁴

The United States Senate appointed a committee of thirteen to consider the grievances existing between the two sections, and, if possible, to suggest a remedy. The House provided a committee of thirty-three, one representative from each State, for the same purpose.

In New Jersey, the situation was recognized as critical, even during the campaign; at that time one of the leading arguments against the election of Lincoln was the danger of secession. With the assembling of Congress and the opening of the debate there, the press of the State began to discuss the question editorially, in addition to printing dispatches from the South. The political position of New Jersey was peculiar. The parties in the State were about equally divided in numbers. New Jersey was the only distinctly Northern State that had cast electoral votes against Lincoln. The Democratic party, having featured compromise in the campaign, was now urging it again. The position in which the victorious Republicans in New Jersey found themselves was, to say the least, interesting. The "Opposition", after the election of Lincoln may be fairly referred to as Republicans, a majority of whom were conservative, a few radical.

The idea that the South might be allowed to depart in peaceable secession—the Greeley idea—was early taken up and endorsed, editorially, by the *Newark Advertiser*,⁵ under the caption, "Let Her Depart in Peace":

⁴ Crittenden's Resolutions are printed in full in Rhodes, Vol. III, p. 150.

⁵ December 6, 1860. Cf. also Rhodes, Vol. III, pp. 140-42.



Beach Front

CAFE MAY
Beach Avenue

Ocean Avenue

What if the States shall be separated? We now regard it, indeed, as a misfortune, beyond all ordinary conception, but should it occur, we are willing to believe that a wisdom greater than our own may overrule the event for the future welfare of the whole country.

On the other hand, the more radical Republican newspaper, the *Newark Mercury*, declared a little later,⁶ in a series of editorials, that the Republicans would stand by their principles, and would yield nothing to the threats of the secessionists. These statements were undoubtedly inspired by the action of the "Opposition" State executive committee, which met at Trenton on December 20. H. N. Congar, J. T. Sherman, and Thomas H. Dudley were members of this committee. Richard S. Field was the State chairman. The resolutions it adopted were finally published by the *Newark Advertiser* a week later. They were to the effect that the Republicans of the State were determined to maintain the federal constitution and the Union, and that they were decidedly opposed to any alteration of the one or any dissolution of the other; that they were prepared to abide by all the compromises of the constitution and by all laws passed in pursuance thereof; that it was their desire to preserve in the future, as in the past, the kindest relations with their Southern brethren. Yet the resolutions, which were addressed to the Republican Representatives in Congress from New Jersey, distinctly declared that they stood by the Chicago platform and could not become the propagandists of slavery.

With the adoption of such principles, which were, beyond question, absolutely opposed to any extension of privileges to slavery in the territories, the "Opposition" party of New Jersey declared itself unfavorable to any schemes of compromise which could be acceptable to the South. The editorial position of the *Newark Mercury* gained greater significance through the publication of these resolutions of the "Opposition" State executive committee, and may be regarded as voicing the Republican attitude on secession and compromise. Considered in connection with the stand taken by the Democratic factions in the resolutions of December 11, 1860, the action of the "Opposition" State executive committee shows that the committee accepted the challenge of the Democrats. The debate thus started was to be continued in the legislature throughout the approaching session.

In the Legislature, which assembled on January 8, 1861, at Trenton, the Assembly was believed to be controlled by the Constitutional Union (American) members, and the Senate by the Republicans, by one vote. When it came to organizing the Assembly, the Americans, as had been expected, voted with the Democrats, and elected Frederick H. Teese, of Essex County, Speaker. The Republicans in caucus agreed upon William F. Brown, of Ocean County, for President of the Senate. However, when it came to a

⁶ December 21-24, 1860. South Carolina seceded on December 20. The United States Senate Committee of thirteen was appointed on the same day; cf. Rhodes, Vol. III, pp. 155 ff.

vote, Senator Norcross, of Burlington County, though he had attended the "Opposition" caucus, voted with the Democrats, who thereby elected Edmund Perry, of Hunterdon County, President. The normal Democratic party of caucus strength in the Senate was thenceforth to be 11 votes. Senator Norcross' brother-in-law, J. S. Sleeper, was now elected by the Democrats Secretary of the Senate. Norcross' action caused great excitement; in Trenton he was burned in effigy that night, and the Republican caucus read him out of the party. Senator Norcross and the *True American* both defended his course by declaring that he had never been a Republican; that, in fact, the Republican party, as such, had never had any organization in the State of New Jersey; at any rate it had had no organization in West Jersey, whatever might be the case at the moment in East Jersey. Senator Norcross added that he was a member of the "Opposition" party in New Jersey, an old Henry Clay Whig, with American, not Republican, proclivities; the "Opposition" party was composed of Whigs, Americans, and moderate Republicans. He had, in fact, been elected to the Senate, in 1858, by the "Opposition" party.

After the organization of the two houses was thus completed, Governor Olden's annual message⁷ was received, and so much of it as related to slavery and national affairs was referred to a Special Joint Committee on National Affairs. Governor Olden was naturally a conservative. His message reviewed the steps by which the existing crisis had developed. He began by stating the reasons advanced for secession, first, that the non-slaveholding states had not recognized, been bound by, or obeyed the supreme law of the land—the Constitution, and the laws made under it—and, second, that the citizens of slave States are by others denied equal rights in the territories. In thus stating the justifications urged for secession Governor Olden undoubtedly had in mind the resolutions adopted by the convention held on December 11, 1860, at Trenton.

In answer, he declared the first not a fair charge against New Jersey; she had not sinned as charged. The second, he maintained, was a question belonging to the general government. He believed that the Southerners had done and said much that was unwise and uncalled for; yet, while admitting the sincerity of the radicals of the North, he thought they could with advantage devote their energies to reform in their own States. Upon the question of a Peace Conference⁸ he recommended that, if Congress should be unable to harmonize its views, the New Jersey Legislature should without delay adopt resolutions inviting all the States to appoint delegates, in such manner as could be most speedily and satisfactorily done, who should meet and endeavor to agree upon terms by which the Union might be saved. He continued thus:

⁷ The message is in *Assembly Journal, Appendix*, 1861, pp. 5-19; *Newark Mercury, State Gazette*, and *True American*, January 11, 1861; *Newark Advertiser*, January 9, 1861.

⁸ Cf. Rhodes, Vol. III, pp. 284, 290, 291, 305-08, 312, for a discussion of the Peace Conference.

We cannot believe it possible that such a convention would fail to agree on terms acceptable to a majority in all sections of the country and these terms could be presented to Congress as the united wish of the people of the States.

He prefaced these suggestions with a statement that New Jersey was perhaps not called upon to do more than to express her views. "The people of this State, beyond all question, stand as a unit in favor of the Union, and are prepared to defend it, and to make all reasonable and proper concessions to insure its perpetuity". That he was prepared to sustain the Union against secession is clear from his statement that Southern radicals, "who deem a Constitutional election of a President sufficient cause for dissolving the Union, do not desire to remain in it." His views received hearty approval from the *True American*.

It is clear, therefore, that Governor Olden was willing to make concessions for expediency, while he held tenaciously to conservative Republican principles. He was not yet willing to take the position of the more radical Republican members of the Legislature—that compromises must prove futile—nor was he willing to admit the right of secession. His was a middle of the road course. At this time such a course was supported, probably, by a majority of the members of all the political parties in the State. Among the Democrats there were some, like W. C. Alexander and Rodman M. Price, who were willing to admit the right of secession. Alexander, who had been Governor Olden's opponent in the gubernatorial contest of 1859, and had been supported by the New Jersey Democrats for the nomination for the vice-presidency in 1860, wrote as follows to A. Alexander Little, of Fredericksburg, Virginia, on January 16, 1861: "If you cannot find protection for your rights and property within the Union, I admit *ex animo*, that it is your right and duty to seek it beyond its pale."⁹

On January 18, Mr. Swayze, of the Special Joint Committee on National Affairs, reported to the Senate resolutions, framed by the Democratic majority of the committee, on the Governor's message. The resolutions were presently recommitted to the committee. They were reported again on January 22, and were ordered to a second reading; it was also directed that they should be printed in connection with the Crittenden amendments. On January 24 they came up for a second reading. The resolutions declared the Union not a mere compact or league and insisted that in the Constitution the spirit of compromise was fundamental; approved Crittenden's efforts, and his suggested amendments to the Constitution; and appointed Charles S. Olden, Peter D. Vroom, Robert F. Stockton, Benjamin Williamson, Joseph F. Randolph, Frederick T. Frelinghuysen, Rodman M. Price, William C. Alexander, and Thomas J. Stryker delegates to the Peace Conference, to be held on February 4, at Washington.

⁹ See *Newark Journal*, June 13, 1864.

The resolutions ran as follows:¹⁰

1. *Be it resolved by the Senate and General Assembly of the State of New Jersey*, That it is the duty of every good citizen, in all suitable and proper ways, to stand by and sustain the Union of the States as transmitted to us by our fathers.

2. *And be it resolved*, That the government of the United States is a national government, and the Union it was designed to perfect is not a mere compact or league; and that the Constitution was adopted in a spirit of mutual compromise and concession by the people of the United States, and can only be preserved by the constant recognition of that spirit.

3. *And be it resolved*, That however undoubted may be the right of the general government to maintain its authority and enforce its laws over all parts of the country, it is equally certain that forbearance and compromise are indispensable at this crisis to the perpetuity of the Union, and that it is the dictate of reason, wisdom, and patriotism peaceably to adjust whatever differences exist between the different sections of our country.

4. *And be it resolved*, That the resolutions and propositions submitted to the Senate of the United States by the Honorable John J. Crittenden, of Kentucky, for the compromise of the question in dispute between the people of the northern and of the southern states, or any other constitutional method of settling the slave question permanently will be acceptable to the people of the State of New Jersey, and the Senators and Representatives in Congress from New Jersey be requested and earnestly urged to support these resolutions.

Other resolutions requested Congress to call a convention of the States to propose amendments to the Constitution; urged the States to repeal all obnoxious laws; named the commissioners; specified the time and place of the convention; and directed that the resolutions be sent to the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and to the Governors of the States.

The Republicans tried to amend the resolutions, so that they should disapprove the Crittenden amendments, but were unsuccessful. Finally, a minority report, signed by Senator Quinby, and Messrs. Wheeler and Dobbins, of the Assembly, all Republicans, was offered as a substitute. It considered the Crittenden propositions "as a demand that the extreme opinions of the South should be incorporated in the Constitution." The signers of this report declared that they could make no concession or compromise with traitors levying war against the government, but were willing to establish a policy on the basis of the following propositions: I. No further interference with the peculiar systems of labor or domestic institutions of the States; II. Prompt repression of all armed invasions of any State or territory;

¹⁰ See Joint Resolutions, No. 1, *Acts of New Jersey*, 1861, pp. 539-541; *Annual Cyclopaedia*, 1861, p. 515. For the debates see *Assembly Journal*, 1861, pp. 170-200; *Senate Journal*, 1861, pp. 97-101.

III. Faithful execution of Federal fugitive slave acts, and repeal of State Legislation interfering with them; IV. Formation of State of New Mexico on the lines of the Missouri Compromise. They also offered a resolution to the effect that "the government is not a mere compact or league; and that the Constitution contains all necessary powers for the maintenance of its authority."

The minority report was rejected by the Senate, by a vote of 7 to 10, on January 24; Senator Norcross voted for it. The resolutions of the majority report were then ordered engrossed and to have a third reading. Under a suspension of the rules they were brought up for a final vote later in the day and were passed by a party vote of 11 to 6. Messrs. Buckley, Cook, Morris, Pierson, Quinby, and Reeve voted against them. In the Assembly the Senate joint resolutions were taken up first on Friday, January 25, in the morning. The debate continued all day; all efforts to postpone action and to adjourn failed. Amendments offered by the Republicans were voted down. Under a suspension of the rules, the resolutions had their second and third readings and were rushed to a final vote the same day. They were passed on the final vote by 31 to 11. In this vote appeared the full strength of the Democratic caucus. Governor Olden approved the resolutions on January 29, 1861. The reason for this haste was that the date set for the assembling of the Peace Conference, February 4, was now not far distant. United States Senator Ten Eyck, who had been elected in 1859, by the Opposition, in transmitting these resolutions to the United States Senate, refused to endorse them, on the ground that his State was demanding unconstitutional action!

The Republican minority in the Legislature had steadily opposed the resolutions and the plans for the Peace Conference. Throughout the debate no Republican had favored the Crittenden amendments. But on the question of the final passage of the resolutions in the Assembly many had failed to register their votes. That this was a political mistake they quickly realized, and on the next day they all tried to have their votes registered. Although they were defeated in the Legislature, and although Governor Olden supported the Crittenden compromise measures, the Republicans carried their opposition a step farther. A party caucus was held on January 29, as a result of which a pamphlet, containing the minority report and resolutions on the Crittenden compromise, signed by all the Republican members of the Legislature, was issued. A committee to present their views to Congress was also appointed.

During the debate upon the joint resolutions it was urged by some that the questions at issue should be referred to the people of the State, to determine at once, by a test vote, the sense of the people, instead of waiting for the Federal Government to act on Crittenden's suggestion. Governor Olden was supposed to favor the submission to the people of proposals similar to those known as the Crittenden Compromise.

Meantime, events in the South had been moving rapidly. By February 4, six States, South Carolina on December 20, Mississippi on January 9, Florida on January 10, Alabama on January 11, Georgia on January 19, and then Louisiana, had passed ordinances of secession and had taken steps toward the formation of the Confederate States of America. On February 1, a convention, consisting of delegates from these States, held at Montgomery, Alabama, adopted a provisional Constitution for "the Confederate States of America", chose Jefferson Davis, of Mississippi, as President, and Alexander H. Stephens, of Georgia, as Vice-President. The other slave States were invited to join the new confederation.

In the North the efforts for compromise of the questions at issue came to naught. The Republican party could not forego its opposition to the extension of slavery into the territories, since upon that issue the party had been founded. Nor did the South think it could well yield. The situation did not permit compromise. By such obstacles were the Committee of Thirty-Three, the Committee of Thirteen, appointed by the two branches of Congress, and the Peace Conference confronted. The people of the country as a whole undoubtedly desired peace and some compromise. But the leaders and determined minorities on both sides would not yield.

On his journey from his home in Springfield, Illinois, to Washington, for his inauguration on March 4, 1861, Abraham Lincoln passed through the State of New Jersey. After a visit in New York City, Mr. and Mrs. Lincoln started on the morning of February 21 for Philadelphia, in a special train over the Camden and Amboy Railroad. In Jersey City the President-elect was officially welcomed to the State by Attorney-General William L. Dayton. In Newark preparations had been made to give him a rousing welcome.

Mayor Moses Bigelow, introduced by Judge Cleaver, chairman of the local reception committee, in a brief speech welcomed Mr. Lincoln to Newark. Mr. Lincoln replied. A procession was formed, led by the official carriage in which were Mr. Lincoln, Mr. Dayton, Mayor Bigelow, and Judge Cleaver, chairman of the local committee of arrangements. Prominent citizens filled the more than twenty carriages which completed the procession, which proceeded down Broad Street. Crowds lined both sides of Broad Street, cheering and shouting encouragement to the city's guest, who was so soon to enter upon such tremendous tasks.

After this brief stop-over of less than one hour the special train consisting of engine and two cars conveyed the official party to Trenton. There again Mr. Lincoln was officially received, and went to the State House where he briefly addressed the members of the State Legislature, which was then in session in the Assembly chamber. Afterward he was the guest of the authorities of the State at a dinner and reception at the Trenton House.

From Trenton the President-elect proceeded by train to Philadelphia, where he was on the following day, Washington's Birthday, to hoist the

Stars and Stripes over Independence Hall. The welcome to Lincoln in New Jersey had been of the heartiest kind.

The possibility that coercion of the South might become necessary was recognized and seriously discussed in New Jersey during the winter. The advanced or radical Republicans met the question by publicly refusing to yield on the extension of slavery, and by stating that this issue could not be compromised. For a time, in December, the Abolitionists looked with favor on the proposition to remove the stain of slavery from the Union by allowing the slave States to depart in peace. But this idea did not long hold favor. In its stead was adopted the position of those Republicans who maintained that their policy was not coercion, but the enforcement of the laws. Yet there were many Republicans, like Governor Olden, and William Pennington, who hoped¹¹ until the very last that a solution for the crisis was to be found through compromise. The Democrats had campaigned in 1860 on the platform of "The Union," and now, while denying the right of secession and deprecating coercion, supported measures of compromise, which were essentially favorable to the South. A third element in the State was represented by those who regarded secession as already an accomplished fact, and were considering publicly what attitude New Jersey ought to take when the final break should come. This was the attitude of the *Newark Journal* and other papers that had supported Breckinridge in 1860. On December 19, 1860, in an editorial article entitled "Where Shall New Jersey Stand?" the *Newark Journal* argued that, if it should prove impossible to escape secession, New Jersey might join a Northern confederacy.

By so doing, she would lose her traditional position as a conservative State, her trade would disappear, and she would become the "Canada" of the negro. Again, she might stand alone. Finally, by joining a Southern Confederacy, New Jersey would be placed in a position of unexampled prosperity; her manufacturing would increase; Perth Amboy would become a great port, obviously, New Jersey would then be on the right side. Three days later it declared editorially, "The Southern Cause Our Cause." In January it claimed that nearly all the Democratic papers in New Jersey opposed coercion of the Southern States. The next day it urged the relief secession would afford to the consciences of the Abolitionists. The *Newark Mercury*, on February 11, quoted certain remarks as made by Judge David Naar at a banquet celebrating the opening of the Erie tunnel, that New Jersey was the only Northern State that gave the South her rights; secession was a fixed fact; there must be no coercion; the South had gone, and without her New York would be no more than a fishing village, and New Jersey but little better.

On April 4, 1861, the *Newark Journal* published two letters, the one addressed by a Mr. L. W. Burnett, of Newark, to ex-Governor Rodman M.

¹¹ Cf. Pennington's farewell speech before the House of Representatives, March 2, 1861; *Cong. Globe*, 36 Cong., 2d Sess., pp. 1432-33; Atkinson, p. 289. Pennington said that the report of the Committee of Thirty-three met with his cordial approval. He was willing to consider further propositions for compromise.

Price, the other Mr. Price's reply. The letters discussed what the attitude of New Jersey ought to be in connection with the existing crisis. They were clearly the result of a prearranged plan for definite propaganda. Mr. Burnett asked ex-Governor Price's opinion on two definite questions, which may be summarized as follows:

(1) Will there eventually be two permanent confederacies—the Northern and a Southern—the Southern comprising all fifteen slave states?; (2) In that event, what position will best accord with New Jersey's interest, her honor, and the patriotic instincts of her people?

Mr. Price replied at length. It is worth while to quote extensively from his letter:

I believe the Southern Confederacy permanent. . . . If we find that to remain with the North, separated from those who have, heretofore, consumed our manufactured articles, and given employment to a large portion of our labor, deprived of that reciprocity of trade which we have hitherto enjoyed, our Commerce will cease, European competition will be invited to Southern markets, our people be compelled to seek employment elsewhere, our State becoming depopulated and impoverished, thereby affecting our agricultural interest, which has not yet felt the crisis—commerce and manufactures being always first to feel political and financial embarrassments. But at last the blow will be felt by all; even now, the farmers' products are at ruinous prices in the West. These are the prospective results of remaining with the present Northern confederacy. Whereas, to join our destiny with the South will be to continue our trade and intercourse, our prosperity, progress, and happiness, uninterrupted, and perhaps in an augmented degree. Who is he that would advise New Jersey to pursue the path of desolation when one of prosperity is open before her, *without any sacrifice of principle or honor*, and without difficulty or danger; besides being the course and policy, in my judgment, most likely to reunite all the States under the glorious "Stars and Stripes"?

The action of our State will prove influential and, perhaps, potential, from our geographical position, upon the adjoining great States of Pennsylvania and New York; and I am confident that the people of those States, whose interests are identical with our own to a considerable degree, will, when they elect, choose also to cast their lot with the South. And, after them, the Western and Northwestern States will be found in the same balance, which would be essentially a *reconstruction of the Old Government*. What is the difference whether we go to the South, or they come to us? I would rather be the magnanimous brother or friend, to hold out the hand of reconciliation, than he who, as magnanimously, receives the proffer.

It takes little discernment to see that one policy will enrich us, and the other impoverish us. Knowing our rights and interests we dare maintain them. The Delaware River only separates us from the State of Delaware for more than one hundred miles. A portion of



Huddy Park

TOMS RIVER
Waterfront

View of Toms River

our State extends south of Mason and Dixon's line, and south of Washington city. The Constitution made at Montgomery has many modifications and amendments desired by the people of this State, and none they would not prefer to disunion.

We believe that slavery is no sin; "that Slavery—subordination to the superior race—is his natural and normal condition." Still, we might desire some change in that Constitution, which time may effect; but, as a whole, it is, in my opinion, the only basis upon which the country can be saved; and, as the issue between the North and the South has been a practical one (the question of territorial rights was immaterial, and, practically, nothing to us), let us, then, save the country—let us do that which is most likely to reunite the States, speedily and peacefully.



CHAPTER XXXIV.

THE RISE OF COPPERHEADISM.

Unfortunately for the country, the enthusiasm with which the people of the North responded to the President's call of April 15, 1861, to the defense of the Union did not continue long. At first there were more than enough volunteers for the army, and more than enough financial assistance was offered. Men seemed not to have time to consider whether the wisest thing was being done, the wisest policy adopted. The Union was attacked. It must be defended. The Confederacy must be overthrown in a few weeks.

When this did not take place at once, and State after State cast her lot with the Confederacy, men came to realize in part the seriousness of the situation. After the defeat at Bull Run, criticism of the work of the Republican administration made its appearance. Those who had during the winter opposed coercion of the seceding States were quick to seize the opportunity to justify now their earlier predictions.

To Union men all those in the North who sympathized with the South, who opposed the vigorous war measures of the administration, and who, considering it impossible to conquer the South, advocated peace, were copperheads. Politically they were those who composed the party opposed to the federal administration. The name, to be sure, was correctly applied only to those extreme opponents of the war who by their agitation seemed to give aid and comfort to the South. But to their political enemies all Democrats were copperheads. Although this was not an absolutely correct use, it is rather in the sense conveyed by this popular use that the term is to be here considered. Any criticism of the administration might be held to give aid to the South, and so to be copperheadism. Yet, though they criticized the administration during the first years of the war, and urged a change in its policies, the abolitionists were distinct from the copperheads. For the purposes of this discussion, therefore, the term copperheadism is applied to the opposition to the administration and the effort to reverse its policy. And it is to the movement before it was known as copperheadism that this chapter is chiefly devoted.¹

In New Jersey, as already suggested, criticism of the war policy of the administration showed itself early and grew steadily in importance and effectiveness. The State was favorable ground for its growth. The strength of the Breckinridge vote in 1860 indicates that there probably were many in the State who would look unfavorably upon any policy for coercion of the seceding States, and who would be willing to protest vigorously against such a policy, and hinder so far as possible, efforts to carry it out. The group led by ex-Governor Rodman M. Price, and supported by the *Newark*

¹ Rhodes, Vol. IV, p. 224. Rhodes states here that the term Copperhead originated in the autumn of 1862.

Journal, was ready to denounce the administration at the first opportunity. In June, the *Newark Journal* urged the circulation in the State of a petition to Congress to put an end to the existing civil strife.²

Indeed, the administration was not long in giving its opponents opportunity for criticism, through the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus³ in Maryland, by the President's direction. The outcry which followed in New Jersey maintained that the act of the President was clearly unconstitutional and illegal. Criticism and opposition to the administration and the war grew upon and around the claims that most of the steps taken by the administration for the suppression of the rebellion were unconstitutional and illegal. During June and July, the *Newark Journal* and other newspapers, continued criticism of the efforts of the administration, and urged resolutions and petitions to Congress to put an end, by means of compromise, to the existing troubles.

The Union defeat at Bull Run gave encouragement to all those in the State who, for one reason or another, were opposed to the war. Upon receipt of the news large numbers openly rejoiced, and celebrated the Southern victory.⁴ Peace meetings at different points in the State followed shortly. The first of any importance was held in Bergen County on July 30, at Schaalenberg. There, according to one report,⁵ an "immense and enthusiastic" peace meeting was addressed by Thomas Dunn English, of Fort Lee, Bergen County, New Jersey, and a Mr. Lawrence, of Rockland County, New York. The latter said that he was no secessionist, but that, if the South could not be coaxed back, he was ready to acknowledge it as a separate Confederacy. He predicted that similar meetings would be held throughout the Union. The resolutions adopted by the meeting declared that those present were "loyal to the general Government to the fullest extent of its limited and specified powers"; and that "loyalty to the Union is only compatible with strict fidelity to the Constitution, and that those who violate the provisions of the latter, even under the hypocritical pretense of preserving the former, are enemies to be confronted and resisted"; and that "this Union being based on the consent of the States and the goodwill of the people cannot be preserved by the bayonet and the sword of the soldier (and) the result of continued civil war can only be the permanent dissolution of the Union." They further laid the responsibility upon the anti-slavery fanatics, condemned severely the suspension of the writ of *habeas corpus*, and maintained that the whole course of the executive betrayed a settled purpose to destroy the rights of the states and individuals, and declared

² Cf. *Weekly True American*, June 21, 1861.

³ Cf. *Rhodes*, Vol. III, pp. 553-58.

⁴ See Smith, p. 196, where Smith says: "The sympathizers with the Rebellion had not anticipated such an outburst, and, with the exception of many Irishmen and women (more especially of the latter), and occasionally a defiant demagogue, relapsed into silence, until the national disaster at Manassas revived their hopes, sent them disporting upon the pavement, and exchanging congratulations."

⁵ The *New York Daily News*, August 1, the *New York World*, August 1, thought that about five hundred were present

that they were prepared to resist usurped power in every legal and rightful way that determined hatred of tyranny might suggest.⁶

This meeting was important since it was really the first move of those leaders who advocated peace, and since they there made clear their position. At other meetings, held in the State during August, similar sentiment was expressed. Thomas Dunn English was usually a prominent speaker at these meetings. Those who attended were not, however, all in sympathy with his views, so that the meetings generally terminated in disturbance.⁷ But by far the largest and most decided following of this peace movement was in Bergen County. *The State Gazette*, January 18, 1862, stated that secession was more open and rampant in Bergen County than in any other part of the State. A very large part of the population of that county were descendants of the old Dutch colonists, who had retained their identity.⁸ They were farmers, conservative, hostile to change, and were uninterested in the slavery question. The war disturbed their peace, and might take many from their homes for the army. They were therefore willing to listen to and believe such residents of the county as Price and English, and others whose business interests were really in New York City. On September 5, a secession flag was pulled down in Hackensack, and at Schaalenberg occurred a seizure of muskets belonging to an organization known as the "American Guard." The purposes of this organization were more or less mysterious. The peace meetings, however, soon merged into the political campaign and so lost their individual character.

Just at this time, too, the Democratic opposition press in the State, and in the North generally, became more outspoken in criticism of the administration. In consequence, the administration placed certain restrictions on the press,⁹ particularly on that in the border States. This was taken to be a warning to the newspapers generally in the North, and drew loud protests from all sides, since it was held to be an abridgement of the freedom of the press. Many of the newspapers were vigorous in their protests and criticism. But the *True American*, the Democratic State organ, in response to this general warning voluntarily suspended publication on August 24 of its daily edition, but continued its weekly edition. It resumed publication of the daily edition on October 7, 1861. Editorially, it clearly defined its position; it could not recognize secession; it opposed unconstitutional acts of the administration; and could not agree to the proposed fusion of the parties.

Commenting upon the disaster at Bull Run and the political situation, the *Weekly True American*, on August 14, 1861, had said:¹⁰

⁶ *New York Daily News*, August 1, 1861.

⁷ At a meeting at Middletown, Monmouth County, on August 29, English and Dr. Pitman were mobbed. A few days earlier Pitman had been hung in effigy at Freehold.

⁸ For the attitude of the Dutch in Eastern Pennsylvania in 1856, cf. Rhodes, Vol. II, p. 227.

⁹ Cf. Rhodes, Vol. III, pp. 553-54.

¹⁰ August 2, 1861. The news and editorial material in the weekly edition appeared first in the columns of the daily edition.

But there is an old maxim that "men must pay to learn," and it is to be hoped that the payment we have recently made will enable us to learn: First—that the National crisis we are suffering is not to be turned in our favor by overestimating our own strength and resources, and depreciating those of our enemies; Second—that blustering and braggadocio is not loyalty; Third—that a sense of justice and right and a regard for just principles is not treason; Fourth—that he who by act and deed is faithful to his country, obedient to its laws, regardful of his own rights as well as of the rights of others, although he may dissent from the policy of the existing government, is not a traitor; Fifth—that *free discussion is the only safeguard of a republican people*. These are useful lessons which if properly taken to heart will in a great measure recompense us for our defeat at Bull Run.

Later, the same paper declared that "secession is revolution,—nothing more, nothing less"; ". . . we question and have from the beginning questioned the policy of what is termed 'Coercion,' as a means to reunite the states and reestablish the Union; at all events, *certainly not until all other means have failed.*"

On August 23, 1861, the *True American* quoted and endorsed editorially an appeal in the *Camden Democrat* which had laid down principles and policies for the Democrats:

"All true patriots, of either Section, must desire peace; but, to be effective, it must be an honorable one, the terms of which are not to be dictated, but mutually agreeable. However, at the present time, such a peace is impossible; but, let the Democracy stand fast, prepared, at a fitting minute, to pour oil on the troubled waters and heal the dissensions of our common country. That fitting moment may be the hour of victory, when we pluck an olive branch from the very brow of Triumph.

"Meanwhile, in the midst of war, bankruptcy, and general distress, we have a great duty to perform for ourselves, our country, and our posterity. We must prevent the spread of pernicious doctrine—we must exercise vigilance to save the Constitution from being overridden by 'Higher Law' abstractions, and our institutions from being supplanted by irremediable evils. By tongue and pen and ballot, we must protest against the subversion of the civil by the military authority. We must insist upon the enjoyment of the sacred privilege of writ of *Habeas Corpus*—the only safeguard of popular freedom. We must oppose the creation of a large standing army, and an unnecessary public debt. We must rebuke the substitution of paper for specie currency. We must object to any unconstitutional centralization of power in the hands of the Federal Government, as dangerous to our liberties—and we must resist by all constitutional means the freeing of four millions of Southern slaves, as inimical to the welfare of Northern white labor, and ominous to the whole country.

"Democrats! These things we must do, war or no war. The hour of peace has not probably arrived, but unless we can enjoy our Constitutional rights,

preserve the institutions of the country, and prevent administrative usurpation, the result of the contest is of but little moment."

In this statement a platform for the Democracy is given for the political campaign just opening. The attitude of the Democratic party in New Jersey toward the Federal Administration is thereby made clear. Such a statement endorsed by the party organ must be considered of importance. This was in the last issue of the *Daily True American* before it suspended publication. The weekly edition, which continued, stated that it would refrain in the future from party comment.

Other newspapers went further in their criticism and in their statement of principles. On September 25, the United States Grand Jury for the district of New Jersey, sitting at Trenton, with Ephraim Marsh as chairman, brought in a presentment against the *Newark Journal*, the *Warren Journal*, the *Hunterdon Democrat*, the *New Brunswick Times*, the *Plainfield Gazette*, and the *Hackettstown Gazette*. Other newspapers which were generally charged with showing their secession proclivities were the *Paterson Register*, the *True American*, *Sussex Register*, *Belvidere Journal*, *Newton Herald*, and the *Republican Farmer*. Similar action had been taken in August by a Federal Grand Jury in New York and the Republican press urged the subject as one for investigation by the September term of court. After a statement of general principles, the presentment continued:

"The Grand Inquest, therefore, after candid and careful examination, express their belief that the newspapers above mentioned, and the editors and the proprietors thereof have been acting, either willfully or ignorantly, as enemies of the country, more dangerous than open foes, and have rendered themselves liable to judicial proceedings. And yet, in view of the recent overwhelming expression of popular opinion in favor of the most vigorous measures of the government to surpress rebellion and to punish all who aid or sympathize with it; and observing the consequent change of tone in most of these publications, they consider their duty in this behalf sufficiently discharged by this presentment."

It further requested all loyal citizens to withhold all public and private patronage from all newspapers "which do not hereafter give their unqualified support to the National Government in the prosecution of the war," and added "that the Court be requested to cause this presentment to be entered on the Minutes, and that it be published."¹¹ The presentment of the Grand Jury therefore accomplished little in directly suppressing the publication of material disparaging to the administration and opposing the conduct of the war. Rather did it spur the Democratic press to greater efforts in the campaign.¹²

¹¹ The presentment is quoted in full in the *Weekly True American*, October 4, 1861, and the *State Gazette*, September 26, 1861.

¹² The *True American* resumed publication on October 7. The *True Democrat* (Hunterdon) had been suspended on September 23.

The questions of the freedom of speech and of the press, of arbitrary arrests, and of the suspension of the writ of *habeas corpus*, a procedure which had stirred the people of New Jersey when it had occurred in Maryland and elsewhere, took unusual prominence in the political discussions in New Jersey during the period of the State elections in 1861. As political issues they were to retain importance in the State until the close of the war. This was due in large part to one case, involving them all, which arose just at this time.

Prominent at the peace meetings about the State was Colonel James W. Wall, of Burlington. He had long been active in the Democratic party; in 1860 he had been elected a delegate to the Charleston convention; during that campaign he had supported Breckinridge. In numerous addresses and published letters, he supported the Southern viewpoint and stressed the responsibility of the Abolitionists and the "Black" Republicans. Colonel Wall was a member of the editorial staff of the *New York Daily News* and a frequent contributor to the *Newark Journal*. His voice was one of the first to be raised in criticism of the Lincoln administration.

Late in August the government seized copies of the *New York Daily News* at Philadelphia, and elsewhere, in effect suppressing the sale of that newspaper, and others. This was done at the direction of Postmaster-General Montgomery Blair. Colonel Wall, in a letter addressed to Blair,¹³ undertook to defend the right of the proscribed newspapers to print what they pleased. In view of Wall's connection with the Democratic party in New Jersey during the next few years his views at this time are worth notice:

"You, by such an edict, have assumed to dictate to me what political newspapers I may receive. Where do you derive your power? You have just as much right to declare what religious works I may receive. If I am in favor of peace, I have a right to be, and I will work for it, write for it, pray for it, do anything but fight for it in the face of all the imperial ukases that may be sent forth from Washington. If this war must go on, it must be waged constitutionally. Wage it against the enemy south of the Potomac, and not against the peace-loving citizens of the North, whose only crime is loving the old constitution so well that they cannot possess their souls in patience when they behold the far-famed 'higher laws' substituted in its place."

Blair replied,¹⁴ and said in explanation that he had not thought the papers very dangerous, though the objects of the papers were traitorous; that, nevertheless, the demand of the people that they should not be aided in these objects by the machinery of the government could not be disregarded, though he himself did not apprehend any serious effect from such writings. The newspapers printed the correspondence, and commented upon it according to their respective politics.

Suddenly, on September 11, on order of Secretary of War Cameron, a United States Marshall arrested Colonel Wall in Burlington, and took him

¹³ For this letter, dated August 26, 1861, see the *Newark Journal*, September 5, 1861.

¹⁴ Under date of August 31: see the *Newark Journal*, September 5.

to New York. There he was confined in Fort Lafayette until September 24, when, having taken the oath of allegiance to the United States, he was released. No explanation of his arrest or of his release was forthcoming from the federal officials. The excitement in the State created by this arrest was intense. All the critics of the administration were confirmed in their attitude, and many new ones were created by this arbitrary attack upon the freedom of speech and of the press. The arrest was ordered from Washington, and the writ of *habeas corpus* was of course useless. Wall was a member of an old New Jersey family, prominent in the history and the politics of the State. His father, Garret D. Wall, had served a term in the United States Senate, 1835-41, had supported President Jackson on nullification, and had declined the governorship after being elected in 1829. Colonel Wall's arrest and imprisonment were to the Democrats almost an insult to the State. By administration supporters, he was, however, termed a degenerate son. He returned to Burlington on September 27, and was hailed as a martyr. A reception was given him. A torch-light procession preceded him to his home, where he addressed the crowd at length. Here he stated, "*I have not been able to learn what those charges are.*" "*I have in vain demanded of the Government the nature of the charges, and claimed the constitutional privilege of being informed of the nature and cause of the accusation, and to be confronted with the witnesses against me.*" But up to this time the grave could not have been more silent."¹⁵ Colonel Wall's imprisonment and the presentment by the Grand Jury, occurring as they did together, early in the political campaign, crystalized the issues for the Democracy, and intensified the opposition to the policies of the federal administration and criticism of them.

The proposal that party animosities should be laid aside and that all parties should unite in a movement for a Union ticket and a platform of unqualified support of the administration early met with opposition in Democratic circles. Long before the movement was launched in New Jersey, and when the Republican and the People's conventions were in session elsewhere, the *Weekly True American*, on August 16, 1861, negatived the plan in the following words:

" . . . Therefore, let the war worn banner of the Democracy in every State of the Union be thrown to the breeze, and under its broad folds let every conservative, Union-loving man array himself, and then there may be some hope for the preservation of the Government and the restoration of the Federal Constitution and laws in every State of the Union."

Offers to unite upon a ticket the *True American* considered only an indication of Republican weakness.

The Democratic party declined to join in a Union movement either in the State or in the local elections.¹⁶ Its candidates supported the Constitution and the war, while denouncing the policies and the acts of the government. Some Democrats, mainly former supporters of Stephen A. Douglas, left the

¹⁵ See *Weekly True American*, October 11, 1861.

¹⁶ *Weekly True American*, October 7, 1861.



CAMDEN

Broadway and Kaighn Avenue
Battery B Armory

Christopher Columbus Statue
Broadway, Showing Broadway M. E. Church

Democratic ranks and joined the Union movement. Their numbers, however, were not large, nor were they prominent. Party lines were so definitely drawn and party organization was so thorough in New Jersey that the great majority of Democrats voted for the candidates of the party whose organs so frankly opposed the administration's handling of the situation. But, though the press and some of the leaders might desire radical measures, the rank and file of the party were solidly opposed to secession. They supported the war, but hoped that the Union might be restored by other means. The campaign, aside from local contests, was for the election of members of the Assembly, and for State Senators in a few counties. It was, therefore, not very exciting. The enthusiasm of April had waned, and the fusion Union movement did not win support. Colonel Wall's arrest and imprisonment was the most prominent factor in the campaign. The result of the election in November was not entirely unexpected. The Newark charter election in October had returned Mayor Bigelow, a Democrat, by an increased majority. In the contest for the Assembly the Democrats made a slight gain, enough, however, to assure control of the Assembly. In the total vote for members of the Assembly they had a majority of about 8,000.

The result of the Senatorial contest seemed to indicate that the Democrats would control the State Senate by one vote. In Burlington County, Norcross had been succeeded by a Democrat. Complications, however, soon appeared. The Legislature assembled on January 14. The party caucuses met in the morning. Senator Joseph T. Crowell, of Union, refused to go into either caucus. During the extra session of the Legislature, Crowell,¹⁷ who had been elected in 1860 by the Democratic fusion, came out strongly in support of the war and of the Union. He and Edward C. Morse, then Senator from Sussex, refused to obey the Democratic caucus, and gave active support to the measures recommended by the Governor; they demonstrated their devotion to the Union by voting for every measure calculated to give efficient aid to the government in its struggle with rebellion. For his stand, Crowell was denounced by Democratic leaders and journals, and formally read out of the party. In the fall election he had supported the Union candidate in his county for the Assembly. In view of his position, the Republican and Union members of the Legislature, in themselves a minority, agreed upon Crowell as their candidate for President of the Senate. He refused to commit himself to either party.

When the Senate met in the afternoon, the Republicans nominated Mr. Crowell for President of the Senate. On the Democratic side, Mr. Budd, of Morris, and Mr. Reckless, of Monmouth, were nominated. On the first ballot the vote stood: Crowell, 10, Budd, 7, Reckless, 3, with Crowell not voting. On the seventh ballot Crowell nominated and voted for Mr. Veghte, of Somerset. The voting continued, and the Senate adjourned after the sixteenth ballot had failed to end the contest. When the Senate met next

¹⁷ See the *State Gazette*, January 18, 1862.

day, Mr. Crowell voted for himself on the seventeenth ballot,¹⁸ and was elected. On January 15, before the balloting was resumed, Crowell thus stated the situation: "The Senate is so constructed that no Senator can be chosen presiding officer except by obtaining votes from some of his political opponents or voting for himself. . . . No member of the Democratic party can be chosen except by the aid of his own vote, or by a vote of a Republican." During the balloting no Democrat voted for Mr. Crowell; Budd and Reckless voted for each other. For the other offices of the Senate, Crowell supported the candidates of the Democratic caucus. The Assembly was organized by the Democrats, who elected Charles Haight, of Monmouth, Speaker.

The *State Gazette*, on January 18, 1862, thus reviewed the Union movement in New Jersey:

In the State the Union movement was received with favor in many counties. The Republicans dropped their party organizations and invited Union Democrats to unite with them. They nominated Democrats in many districts—at least one-half the Union candidates belonging to that party, although the proportion of Republicans in the Union organization was, probably, more than ten to one. How the attempt succeeded, or rather failed, we all know. To the House of Assembly five members were elected as Union men, over the regular Democratic nominees. Of these, all, except Mr. Stevens, of this city [Trenton], and Mr. High, of Union, went into the Democratic caucus and thus bound themselves to a strict party course in their action in the House. Practically nothing was gained by their election to the Union Cause. . . .

It is currently reported that Mr. Crowell declared in advance that he would vote for nobody who was not a Democrat, and this pledge he carried out. We are not complaining of this, but it should teach our Republican friends that the destruction of their party can only have the effect of placing the State and the Nation in the hands of the Democrats, leaving the administration to rely for support on its bitterest and most inveterate enemies. As Democrats will yield nothing for the sake of the Union, a union is impracticable, and Republicans must look to their own party for any efficient support to the administration and the Union. If our representatives, elected by Republican votes, choose to fritter away our strength by feeding our enemies, and to disgust the most active and efficient men of the Republican party by taking to their embrace the men who have labored hardest to defeat them, so be it, but they will find that the result of this policy will be to place the Democracy in power and to keep them there.

The Republican party organ thus considered the Union movement to have been a mistake and a failure from the Republican party viewpoint. In the campaign the Unionists had been guided by expediency in their selection

¹⁸ See the *Weekly True American*, January 17, 1862.

of candidates, who, when the test came, placed party before the Union. In the final contest in the Senate, the Republicans gained a president who supported the administration, but lost thereby all chance of dividing with the Democrats the organization of that house. The session of the Legislature produced no action of note, nor did national affairs receive much attention. The situation existing in the Senate was certainly in part responsible. Yet some interesting questions came up for consideration.

Colonel Wall was still uncertain as to why he had been arrested and confined in Fort Lafayette. Therefore, on January 16, at the first opportunity, a memorial from him was introduced in the Assembly,¹⁹ requesting that the Legislature instruct the United States Senators and the Congressmen from New Jersey to demand of the Secretary of War the reasons for his arrest. It was referred to the Judiciary Committee, which reported, on February 20, that the United States had violated its laws, and that Colonel Wall was entitled to redress, but that the Legislature had no jurisdiction, and that Colonel Wall's remedy was to bring action in the State courts against the Secretary. The report was accepted, and the matter was dropped, so far as the Legislature was concerned. Wall, however, continued to make addresses around the State upon the Constitution, and the administration's violation of its provisions.

The Legislature during the session took no stand in opposition to the Federal Government. On the other hand, it did not voice enthusiastic support of its policies. On March 27, in the closing hours of the session, the Committee on Federal Relations reported to the Assembly resolutions which approved the President's course and his conduct of the war, thanked the State's volunteers, and the Governor and other State officers. They further pledged support to the President to crush out the rebellion, and bring the seceding states back into the Union. The Legislature adjourned the next day without taking action of any sort on the report or the resolutions,²⁰ a fact which is significant of the attitude of the Democratic majority toward the administration and the war.

During the session some attention was given to the negro problem arising from the war. Among the Democrats a good deal was said about a large influx of negroes from the South into the State. They saw in this a great danger, a feeling which they expressed through petitions addressed to the Legislature,²¹ advocating the passage of a law to prevent an influx of the colored race into the State. But no action was taken.

The first move in the Gubernatorial campaign of 1862 was made in May. On May 27, Richard S. Field, chairman of the Republican State executive committee, and Joseph C. Potts, a former prominent Democrat, addressed a public meeting in Trenton, which was called to launch a Union party,

¹⁹ It was presented also in the Senate, by Mr. Reckless. For the report of the committee, and a summary of the memorial, see *Assembly Journal*, 1862, pp. 327-30.

²⁰ For the report, see *Assembly Journal*, 1862, p. 673.

²¹ *Senate Journal*, 1862, pp. 34, 41, 50, 92, 116; *Assembly Journal*, pp. 216, 218.

whose members, irrespective of their former party affiliations, should support the administration. It was the idea which had resulted so disastrously the year before. The plan did not receive an enthusiastic endorsement from the Republican journals.²² The *Newark Mercury* declared that the movement had not the confidence of the people and so could not succeed, and that the Republicans had formally determined not to abandon their organization, but that they would, however, cooperate cordially with all who sought to sustain the administration. The *Jersey City Courier and Advertiser* voiced similar sentiments, saying that "there is to be no surrender of the Republican party, nor its principles, to the wishes of designing office seekers."²³ The attitude of the Republicans was thus in line with that expressed in January by the *State Gazette*, when it declared the Union movement of 1861 a sad failure. However, the suggestion, though depreciated by many Republicans, gained favor during the summer. The call for the convention stressed the idea of non-partisan support of the National Government in its efforts to crush the rebellion.

The convention, which assembled on August 21, was harmonious. In spite of the unfavorable reception which the Field-Potts Union movement received when it had been launched in May, it now prevailed in Republican circles. Richard S. Field, of Mercer County, was chosen permanent chairman of the convention. In his remarks on assuming the chair he struck the keynote of the convention and of the Union-Republican campaign in the State.²⁴

This is a convention composed of delegates chosen by the friends of the National administration in New Jersey—by those who cordially desire to sustain the policy and strengthen the hands of the President—by those who are resolved to maintain the Union at all hazards, and against all enemies, at home or abroad—by those who are in favor of suppressing the rebellion by blows, and not by compromise with treason.

The choice of the convention for Governor was Marcus L. Ward, of Newark. The names of Ephraim Marsh, F. T. Frelinghuysen, ex-Governor Newell, and Joseph T. Crowell were placed before the convention by their county delegations, but were withdrawn, and Mr. Ward was nominated by acclamation. The candidate had not previously held political office, but had been a successful merchant in Newark. At the outbreak of the war he had devoted his time and efforts to aiding families of the soldiers, in helping them in the field, and particularly in assisting the wounded. The army hospital in Newark was known as the Ward Hospital. His efforts in behalf of the soldiers had already made him popularly spoken of as "The Soldier's Friend." This fact made him an available and desirable candidate to head

²² The *State Gazette*, May 28-31, opposed throwing aside the Republican organization.

²³ See the *Weekly True American*, June 6, 1862.

²⁴ *Newark Advertiser*, August 22, 1862.

the Union ticket. Mr. Cortlandt Parker, speaking before the convention, touched upon Ward's politics, and said that he was an "Old Line" Whig of the Henry Clay school, one of those who revered the Constitution and the Union, and that "he had been devoted to Republican principles ever since the organization of that party."²⁵ Other addresses were made by Joseph C. Potts, United States Senator J. C. Ten Eyck, Joseph P. Bradley, and Charles W. Jay.

The platform²⁶ adopted made no mention of State issues. The resolutions denounced in scathing terms the rebellion, expressed the loyalty of New Jersey, endorsed the administration, and set forth gratitude to the Union soldiers for their services on Southern battlefields. If the position of the convention needed further exposition, it was effected through the letter of notification to Mr. Ward, and his reply. The preservation of the Union was made the primary issue for the campaign by this Union-Republican convention.²⁷ The platform and the candidate demonstrated the influence of Messrs. Field and Potts among the friends of the administration.

The Democratic State convention met on September 4. Interest centered in the nomination for Governor, since in Democratic circles it was confidently asserted that whoever obtained the nomination would be elected in November. Trenton was thronged with delegates on the eve of the convention. Report had it that ex-Governor Peter D. Vroom could be nominated, except perhaps for his age, or William C. Alexander, Governor Olden's opponent in 1859, but Alexander steadily refused to be considered. Theodore Runyon and Moses Bigelow, of Essex, were expected to divide the delegations from the northern counties, while Joel Parker, of Monmouth, was thought to have only an outside chance.

Hon. John T. Stockton, appointed United States Minister to Rome by President Buchanan, reported the platform for the committee on resolutions.²⁸ In view of their importance as indicating the position of the Democracy in New Jersey upon the current national issues, most of the resolutions of the platform are given here, in full:

1. *Resolved*, That deploring the demoralizing tendency of the Higher Law teachings of the Republican party, we feel impelled to

²⁵ The *Weekly True American*, September 12, 1862, discussing this quotation, held that on that ground Ward would be defeated.

²⁶ See *Annual Cyclopædia*, 1862, p. 643.

²⁷ For the letter to Mr. Ward see the *Newark Advertiser*, August 30, 1862:

"It is our pleasant office to inform you of your nomination by the Republican-Union Convention, held at Trenton on the 21st. inst., as the candidate of the friends of the National Administration and all others in New Jersey who desire the maintenance of the Union and the Constitution, for the office of Governor for the term next ensuing. . ."

The following is from Mr. Ward's letter of acceptance, August 30, 1862, printed in the *Newark Advertiser* of August 30:

"The Federal Union must be preserved; the authority of the Constitution must be vindicated; the Government must be sustained. This is the one sentiment that should pervade every heart; and it seems to me that no other declaration of principles is in place at this time. We must ignore party lines, and party issues, until it is determined whether we are to have a country or not, in which to debate them."

²⁸ For the convention, cf. the *State Gazette*, and the *True American*, September 5, 1862.

reiterate our faith in the doctrine that *Constitutional Law* is the only true basis of Executive action, in peace or war.

2. *Resolved*, That in the present exigencies of the country, we extend to the National Administration our most cordial support for the speedy suppression of the rebellion by all Constitutional means, and that the party stands, as it ever stood since the formation of the Government, for the Union, the Constitution, and the enforcement of the Laws.

3. *Resolved*, That as in establishing the Constitution the people reserved to themselves all powers not delegated to the Government, therefore all assumptions of power by the administration, whether in the suspension of the writ of *habeas corpus*, arrest and imprisonment without due course of law, or restrictions of the freedom of speech and of the press, are dangerous infringements of the Constitutional rights of the people, only to be patiently borne by the hopeless serfs of an irresistible despotism.

4. *Resolved*, That while we enter our solemn protest against the reckless extravagance, infamous speculation and political outrages of which the party in power is guilty, and while we deprecate the horrors of civil conflict now raging, we still hold it our duty to advocate the use of every Constitutional means to the extent of the full power of the Government, for the suppression of the rebellion, the vindication of the authority of the "Constitution as it is and the restoration of the Union as it was."

5. *Resolved*, That we do entirely reject and abhor the idea that, as an object of the present civil war, any purpose of emancipation of the slaves shall be thereby promoted or at all regarded; and that the language recently used by the *Washington Republican* that the *farce* of restoring the Union of the States is about played out, is utterly infamous and deserving, as it will receive, the most solemn and severe condemnation of all true patriots.

7. *Resolved*, That to the candidate this day nominated we pledge our united support, believing that the political triumph of the Constitutional Democracy in the coming election will have a powerful effect in terminating the rebellion and restoring peace, prosperity and happiness throughout the land.

On the first ballot Bigelow, led, with 108 votes; Parker had 94, in a total of 557. The remaining votes were scattered among Peter D. Vroom, Charles Skelton, Alexander Wurts, Joseph N. Taylor, J. R. Sickler, Robert Adrain, Benjamin Williamson, Jacob R. Wortendyke, R. M. Smith, and Phineas B. Kennedy. On the fourth ballot Parker was nominated, receiving 409 votes. Bigelow had 117 votes, and Skelton 28.

The nomination of Joel Parker proved a popular one. A lawyer of experience and ability, he had been prominent in the Democratic party for some years. At the commencement of the war he was a Brigadier-General of the New Jersey Militia. He had supported the Union and the adminis-

tration in its efforts to suppress the rebellion, though remaining a Democratic party man. His nomination²⁹ was in effect a victory for the conservative element in the party that opposed the rebellion, denied the right of secession, demanded that the seceding states return to their allegiance and submit to the Constitution, yet considered that the administration had not conducted the war successfully or in accordance with the Constitution. This element was not in sympathy with those in the party who favored an immediate peace, entailing recognition of the Confederacy.

The campaign was warmly contested. The issues were discussed and debated all over the State. The Republicans stressed the Union, the enforcement of the laws, and the suppression of the rebellion, and justified the measures and actions of the administration as necessary for the suppression of the rebellion. President Lincoln's emancipation proclamation of September 22, a policy already in the air at the time of the Democratic State convention, and commented upon in the Democratic platform, drew from the Democratic State central committee an address in October to the voters in the State. It held that, "whether emancipation is to be considered as an object of the war or as a means of carrying it on, it is clear subjection of the civil to the military authority," and urged that, "while we fight secessionism in the field, we must fight abolitionism and radicals at the ballot box."³⁰

Emancipation was not popular even in the Union-Republican ranks. Abolition doctrine had never possessed influence or strength in the State. Radical Republicanism was not popular. We have seen how the dominating influence in the party lay in support of the Union. Under the leadership of Richard S. Field and Joseph C. Potts this idea had dominated the Union-Republican convention. Now, unquestionably, Lincoln's emancipation policy brought loss rather than gain of votes in New Jersey. In the campaign the Union-Republican party was placed on the defensive. Its supporters might urge Mr. Ward's loyalty to the government and his untiring devotion to the interests of the soldiers and their families, but these things, though they won for him great personal popularity, could not elect "The Soldier's Friend" against the storm of criticism which in the North, outside of New England, overwhelmed the administration. In thus failing to endorse the acts of the Lincoln administration, New Jersey was not alone. In the October and November elections, the States of New York, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Illinois, Indiana, and Wisconsin also declared against the party in power. In the Congressional elections the Democrats also made conspicuous gains, though not enough to give them a majority in the House.³¹

In their campaign the Democrats attacked particularly emancipation.

²⁹ The *State Gazette*, September 6, 1862, considered Parker's nomination a defeat for Breckinridge secession sympathizers, the followers of Chauncey Burr, and the *Newark Journal*.

³⁰ *Weekly True American*, October 31, 1862.

³¹ Cf. Rhodes, Vol. IV, pp. 163-67.

They termed it unjust and impolitic, fanatical and unconstitutional.³² And in connection with it they discussed the favorite Democratic catchword, "The Constitution as it is and the Union as it was." To the application of this principal, emancipation raised a distinct obstacle. As New Jersey Democrats understood this phrase in their platform, it implied that, after the rebellion had been suppressed, the states should possess their former status; that the status of slavery should remain unchanged; that the war was not waged for conquest or subjugation, or to overthrow or interfere with the rights or established institutions of the Southern States, but to maintain the supremacy of the Constitution and to preserve the Union; there should be no more violation of the Constitution in war time than in time of peace.³³

But, important as these factors were, the third resolution of the Democratic platform contained that which made the most direct appeal to New Jersey voters. The protest there made against the "suspension of the writ of *habeas corpus*, arrest and imprisonment without due course of law, or restrictions of the freedom of speech and of the press," referred to the arrest and imprisonment of Colonel James W. Wall in the previous autumn. The radicals in the party had not forgotten the incident, but made much of it whenever occasion offered. It had figured decisively in the local elections of 1861; in 1862 it was the principal factor in rolling up the unusually large Democratic majority.³⁴ The Newark charter election on October 16, in Mr. Ward's home city, presaged the November result, for the Democrats carried 11 of the 13 wards and elected all but 4 members of the Board of Aldermen, by majorities of 2,000 to 3,000. In November, Parker carried the State by 14,597, in a total vote of 108,017.³⁵ This unusual sweep carried even the second congressional district for the Democrats; this gave the Democrats 4 of the 5 members in Congress. Starr, in the first district, was the only Union-Republican candidate elected, and by a greatly reduced majority. Both branches of the Legislature also were safely Democratic, assuring the election of a Democratic United States Senator.

The result was a subject of great rejoicing by the Democrats in New Jersey. The *True American* said editorially on November 7, 1862:


The people of New Jersey on Tuesday last recorded a verdict which cannot be mistaken or misunderstood. They have declared that the administration party is guilty of violating the Constitution in its attempts to suppress the liberty of speech and of the press; that it is guilty of the same offence in its violation of the personal liberty of

³² The *Weekly True American*, on September 26, 1862, said that the issue was put squarely before the people. On October 17 it continued thus: "Democrats, we have the Republicans on the hip. They are scared to death at their own proclamation freeing the negroes. Put it at them, and either make them pledge themselves against it or suffer the defeat their duplicity deserves. . . . If he is for the Constitution and against making this war the means of freeing negroes without regard to the enforcement of the Constitution as it is, then he is a loyal Union man, if not, let him be ranked as a rebel against the Constitution."

³³ Cf. Rhodes, Vol. IV, p. 167.

³⁴ Cf. Rhodes, Vol. IV, p. 165.

³⁵ The total vote in 1859 was 105,029, and Olden's majority 1,601.



Sheldon T. M.

the citizen and the tyrannical exercise of power in loyal States, under the false pretext of a "military necessity"; that it is guilty of the intention to pervert the purpose of the war now prevailing, from its original intention of subduing the rebellion and restoring the Union as it was, into a war for the emancipation of the slaves in the Southern States, and that it is guilty of a wasteful and corrupt expenditure of the public moneys, and of fraud and speculation.

The Democracy celebrated the victory by a banquet⁸⁶ in Newark on November 19. In a letter regretting his inability to attend, Governor-elect Parker discussed the election. He said:

In celebrating the recent victory it should be recognized as a conservative triumph, achieved by the Democratic party aided by conservative men recently belonging to other organizations. . . .

While the people demand that they who are in rebellion against the government should return to their allegiance and submit to the requirements of the Constitution, they have also emphatically said that the war should be conducted in accordance with the Constitution and without a violation of its provisions. . . . That resolution (the third resolution of the platform) fairly presented an important question. It was made a prominent issue, and was discussed in every city, town and village of the State. The people by a decisive majority sustained the resolution. In view of antecedent and concurrent circumstances, the decision of the people had a significant meaning, and should be respected. . . .

The result of the election plainly teaches that the war should be prosecuted for the purposes declared in the resolution of Congress, adopted soon after the commencement of the rebellion, and not for the mere purpose of emancipating one race or exterminating another.

Such was the interpretation of the election of 1862 by a conservative Democrat about to become the Governor of the State. Sentiments of a more radical nature were voiced in a letter read from Colonel James W. Wall, and in response by C. Chauncey Burr to the toast "The doctrine of State rights—the cornerstone of American liberty."

It is clear that there existed at this time in the Democratic party in New Jersey three factions. A few Democrats, such as Joseph T. Crowell, Edward C. Morse, and Joseph C. Potts, were "War Democrats," loyal to the Union; they supported President Lincoln's administration at the polls, and coöperated with the Republicans in Union movements.

A second faction consisted of the regular Democrats. These Democrats refused to recognize the fact of secession. They outwardly professed complete devotion to the Union, but criticized the conduct of the war. They were desirous of keeping the party organization intact. Criticism of the purpose and the acts of the administration was unquestionably a legitimate

⁸⁶ *Weekly True American*, November 28, 1862.

means to that end, so long as it did not seek to hinder a vigorous prosecution of the war, but sought to correct abuses of power, and to secure a more efficient administration of the Government. The position of the regular Democrats was a fair one. Some members of the "Opposition" party of 1860 were unquestionably in sympathy with their position.

But the third, or radical, faction of the Democracy was not content with a dignified criticism of the conduct of the war and of the acts of the administration. Its members really sought to bring the war to an immediate close, through negotiation. Despite protestations to the contrary, they wished to restore peace through recognition of the Confederacy, since a cessation of hostilities, which they desired, could have been interpreted in only one way by the South. How the Confederacy could have accepted any offer of mediation which did not recognize its independence, it is difficult to see.

This radical element in the Democratic party in New Jersey was strong. Those who, in the first months of 1861, had desired to have New Jersey secede and enter the Confederacy, were now avowed radical leaders. The administration's policies of arbitrary arrests, suspension of the writ of *habeas corpus*, and emancipation incensed the advocates of the states' rights theory in which most Jerseymen had been taught to believe. In no other Northern State had there been, perhaps, more economic or other reasons for sympathy with the South in 1860-61, or more actual advocates of secession.

The Democracy was soon to have complete control and responsibility for the acts of the State. The endorsement of the party was overwhelming. But was it an endorsement of radical or of conservative policy? Which faction would direct the action of the State in the months to come?

To the radical Democrats at this time there came to be applied the term Copperheads,³⁷ which apparently originated in the autumn of 1862. The Union men applied it to those who, adhering strictly to the Democratic organization, strenuously opposed all the distinctive war measures of the administration and of Congress, and who, deeming it impossible to conquer the South, were therefore earnest advocates of peace. On that basis not all Democrats were Copperheads, but in practice all were so designated by the supporters of Lincoln's administration. In New Jersey such Democrats as were represented by the *Newark Journal*, with Fuller, Wall, Holzman, Price, and Burr as their spokesmen, were Copperheads. With the opportunity now theirs, they intended to make, if possible, New Jersey a light shining in the darkness of "Black" Republicanism.

³⁷ See Rhodes, Vol. IV, p. 224.



CHAPTER XXXV.

THE PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN OF 1860 IN NEW JERSEY.

The political situation in New Jersey at the opening of the Presidential campaign was full of uncertainty. In the previous November the "Opposition" party had elected its candidate for Governor, Charles S. Olden, by a small majority. Both Houses of the Legislature of 1860, however, were to be organized and controlled throughout the session by the Democrats.

In New Jersey, as in Pennsylvania, where the People's party flourished, the name "Republican" was unpopular. Furthermore, the effect that the gathering storm at the South would have upon the politics of the State was difficult to foretell, since, in a sense, New Jersey considered herself a border State. Further, public opinion in the State now, as in the past, upheld strongly the doctrines of states' rights. Such circumstances placed the State of New Jersey in the doubtful column for both the Republican and Democratic parties in the Presidential campaign just opening. The Republicans later, at Chicago, showed that they considered New Jersey as well as Pennsylvania doubtful ground by adopting for their particular cases a special tariff plank. New Jersey would be necessary to the Republicans should either New York or Pennsylvania go Democratic.

In the previous Presidential campaign in 1856 the Democratic party had been able to present a solid, unbroken front to the "Opposition" party, which in turn had agreed only upon the selection of the Gubernatorial nominee, William A. Newell. In the intervening years, coalition and practical union of the American and Republican elements which in 1856 supported Fillmore and Fremont, respectively, were effected. Governor Newell represented and upheld the main special issues of both factions so well that in 1860 there existed a strong, united "Opposition" party definitely in alliance with the National Republican party. The election of Governor Olden in 1859, who was a conservative and who had not been prominent politically since 1850, tended to strengthen the "Opposition." The election of William Pennington to the Speakership of the United States House of Representatives, had further led the Conservatives to look with less disfavor upon the Republican program. There remained a few "straight-out" Americans, who, however, were no longer in sympathy with the Republican or "Opposition" party, but were rather to be found now working with the Democratic party organization.

Whereas in 1856 there had been unity and strength in the Democratic party in New Jersey, there now existed chaos. Continued success in State contests and a large following had led to factional struggles for favor and for control. The attitude of the party toward the question of slavery in the territories led to the growth of factions within its ranks. The Kansas muddle

caused a bolt in the third and fourth Congressional districts comprising the counties of Warren, Hunterdon, Somerset, Middlesex, Sussex, Morris, Passaic, and Bergen, over the issue of the party's attitude toward the Lecompton Constitution, which the pro-slavery men in Kansas, and in Congress, had sought to provide for that territory. The bolt had been successful: New Jersey's delegation in the House of Representatives in 1860 consisted of three "Opposition" members, and two "Anti-Lecompton" Democrats,—Messrs. Garret B. Adrian, and Jetur R. Riggs. The problem before the Democratic leaders was that of restoring harmony in their ranks.

Unfortunately for the Democratic leaders there were no State contests falling in the year 1860, so that the issues of the campaign were primarily of national character. Members of the Assembly and one-third of the members of the Senate were, indeed, to be chosen, but those contests were rather of local importance. The campaign was to be waged hotly, for the selection of five Presidential electors and five Representatives to Congress. Popular opinion placed New Jersey with Connecticut, New York, and Pennsylvania in the list of doubtful States.

So far as New Jersey was concerned the results of the electoral contest justified the predictions of the commencement of the campaign, for the electoral vote of New Jersey was to be divided, Douglas receiving three and Lincoln four, a situation which seldom has occurred in the electoral college since the formation of national party organizations. This fact alone would have made an account of the campaign interesting, but the great crisis which was swiftly to follow makes it even more interesting and significant.

The first steps in the Presidential campaign were taken by the Constitutional Union party. In response to a letter telling of the formation of this party at a meeting in Washington on December 19, 1859, a meeting preliminary to the organization of the Constitutional Union party in New Jersey was held at Trenton on January 16, 1860. The presence there of J. W. Allen, Peter I. Clark, W. K. McDonald, and others indicated that the movement was addressed to, and appealed to, the older leaders of the "Native American" and Old Whig wings of the "Opposition" party of the 'fifties. A State Executive Committee was appointed and a call for a State Convention to select delegates to the National Convention of the party was issued.

The convention met in Trenton, on February 23, and was called to order by Joseph F. Randolph, an old Whig, later a "Native American." The resolutions that the convention adopted advocated a simple platform, "The Union, the Constitution, and the enforcement of the Laws." The convention chose Joseph F. Randolph and James Bishop as Senatorial delegates to a national convention called to meet on May 9, at Baltimore. The *Newark Mercury*¹ declared that the movement had little strength and that the party

¹ February 23, 1860. The *Newark Mercury* was the leading radical Republican newspaper in the State. It was started in 1848 and continued until 1862; at this time it was controlled by H. N. Congar. The *Newark Journal* had been started in 1857, and was, in 1860, edited by E. N. Fuller. It advocated southern policies, and during the war Fuller was arrested on the charge of inciting insurrection.

purposed to ignore the slavery issue; it also believed that there was no room for a third party of this sort. The *Newark Journal* of the same date said the convention was composed of those who carried on the Fillmore campaign of 1856, and that the party had few young men.

On May 9, the Constitutional Union party met at Baltimore in National Convention. The delegates were for the most part the older politicians, mainly old Whigs, who, thoroughly alarmed at the growth and bitterness of the sectional controversy, were seeking a remedy for the trouble. They were honest and patriotic; they loved the Union as the great Whig leader and compromiser, Henry Clay, and Daniel Webster had loved the Union, but the brief platform which they adopted—"The Constitution of the country, the Union of the States, and the enforcement of the Laws"—made no appeal to the determined opponents of slavery. On the second ballot the convention unanimously nominated John Bell, of Tennessee, for President, and Edward Everett, of Massachusetts, for Vice-President. Joseph F. Randolph, James Bishop, J. E. Peyton, Peter I. Clark, S. G. A. Van Lain, and J. A. Williamson were the delegates to this National Convention from New Jersey.

The "Opposition party of New Jersey" was the next actively to enter the campaign. The call of its State Executive Committee, issued on January 16, summoned a State Convention to meet at Trenton on March 8, to select delegates to the National Convention of the Republican party at Chicago. The convention met, and various committees were appointed. The names of proposed delegates to the National Convention reported by the proper committee were approved. Among the delegates were Frederick T. Frelinghuysen, who was later to be elected United States Senator, Ephraim Marsh, who had been president of the American party National Convention which had nominated Fillmore in 1856, former Governor William A. Newell, Thomas H. Dudley, James T. Sherman, Edward Y. Rogers, Jonathan Cook, Providence Ludlow, Horace N. Congar, editor of the *Newark Mercury*, Denning Duer, and Marcus L. Ward, who was to be elected Governor in 1865.

Suggestions were offered by several members of the convention that the delegates to the National Convention be instructed to support, as nominee for the Presidency, William Lewis Dayton, former United States Senator from New Jersey, and the nominee, in 1856, of the Republican party for the Vice-Presidency. However, the convention finally determined not to endorse any candidate. Resolutions were adopted declaring that "The Opposition Party of the State of New Jersey" was opposed to the extension of slavery by the power and influence of the general government; that the party "condemns most unreservedly assaults by citizens of one State upon the peace, rights and local institutions of any State or Territory,"² and that "the attempt at Harper's Ferry to subvert, however partially, the institution of slavery in that State, was an ultra violation of our principles as of the rights and dignity of that State." Throughout the sessions of this convention harmony seems to have been the noticeable characteristic.

² This refers to John Brown's raid on Harper's Ferry in October, 1859. See Rhodes, Vol. II, p. 383 ff.

New Jersey was represented in the Republican National Convention which was in session at Chicago on May 16, 17 and 18 by twenty-eight delegates, with fourteen votes, twice the number of her electoral votes.

When nominations for the Presidency were in order, Mr. Thomas H. Dudley, of the New Jersey delegation, presented to the convention the name of her favorite son, William Lewis Dayton. Upon the first of the three ballots that were taken, the fourteen votes of the State were cast for Mr. Dayton. These, it must be admitted, were the only votes cast for the party's candidate for the Vice-Presidency in 1856. On the second ballot, he lost four votes to Seward, which aided in placing the latter in the lead on that ballot. On the third and last ballot, Seward gained one more vote from the delegation, so that he had five votes from New Jersey; eight were now cast for Lincoln; one delegate remained loyal to Dayton. The vote upon the third ballot was Seward, 184½, Lincoln, 231½, and all the rest 99½. Before the vote was announced many changed their votes to Lincoln. Abraham Lincoln, of Illinois, was thus the nominee, and an eastern man, Hannibal Hamlin, of Maine, was nominated for the Vice-Presidency.³

Although Lincoln received support from the New Jersey delegation only upon the third and final ballot, nevertheless New Jersey delegates played an important, if not vital part in his nomination. New Jersey, was, as has been noted, one of the doubtful States, and so doubly important to the Republican party, which, as a party of Western origin, militant upon the issue of the status of slavery in the territories of the United States, needed to win support in the more conservative parts of the east. New Jersey and Pennsylvania were conservative toward national issues. Pennsylvania and one other State must be carried to insure the election of a Republican President. Aggressive Abolitionist doctrine was nowhere popular with the Republicans of the State of New Jersey.

In New Jersey and other doubtful States, Seward was weak, for the reason that he was regarded as the exponent of radical element of the party. His "irrepressible-conflict" speech of October 25, 1858, at Rochester, New York, had done much to lessen his availability. Lincoln's "house-divided-against-itself" declaration ought also to have likewise precluded his nomination, but in reality did not. Seward had avowed the higher-law doctrine—a position from which Lincoln especially held himself aloof. Again, Seward was especially objectionable in Pennsylvania and New Jersey from having been outspoken against the Know-nothing movement, which had been strong in both States. In New Jersey thus the former American element opposed Seward. Yet Seward's efforts to explain away his earlier "higher law" utterances had gained him some following in the northern part of the State, particularly through the support of Horace W. Congar and his newspaper, *The Newark Mercury*.

It has been maintained by Charles P. Smith in his *Reminiscences* that he originated the Dayton movement in West Jersey to head off an attempt

³ See Rhodes, Vol. II, pp. 456-73.

by the Republicans of East Jersey to swing the delegation to Seward. The delegation, although it had not been formally instructed to support Dayton, did so unanimously upon the first ballot. Prior to the balloting a meeting of a committee from the doubtful States—New Jersey, Indiana, Illinois, and Pennsylvania—was held at which an agreement to support Lincoln as against Seward was made.

Lincoln's nomination proved satisfactory to the rank and file of the "Opposition" Republican party in New Jersey. The *Newark Mercury*, commenting upon the convention, gave a hearty endorsement to Lincoln, while admitting that its first choice had been Seward; it entered the campaign at once and backed Lincoln vigorously.

The Democratic State Convention called to select delegates to the National Convention called to meet at Charleston on April 23, assembled at Trenton, on March 28, approved the Cincinnati platform of 1856, and instructed the delegates to present to the convention the name of William C. Alexander, its nominee for Governor in 1859, as a candidate for the Vice-Presidency. The resolutions also urged the delegates to cast a united vote, but did not instruct them to that effect. It was evident that there was not harmony within the party ranks. The followers of Douglas urged the convention to instruct the delegates to vote for Douglas, or to endorse his candidacy, but were out-manoeuvred. The *Newark Mercury*, in commenting upon the convention, said that the Democracy in the State had won a thorough victory over Douglas, and that the advocacy of Alexander showed that it wanted a Southern candidate. The platform upheld popular sovereignty however.

The desire for harmony in the delegation and the wish that it should cast a united vote at Charleston proved to be insufficient to effect this result. Early in the convention, during a roll call of States, a dispute arose within the delegation as to whether the New Jersey delegates had been instructed to vote as a unit. The chair, called upon for an opinion, held the recommendation of the State Convention was equivalent to instruction. From this ruling an appeal was taken, and the chair was overruled by a vote of 145 to 151. Thereafter, the vote of the delegation was split upon all questions. Thus, upon the question of the adoption of the majority and minority reports submitted by the platform committee, the New Jersey vote was split, the delegation casting five votes for the minority report, which was adopted 165-138, signed by the New Jersey member, Benjamin Williamson, which reaffirmed the Cincinnati platform of 1856, and two against it. In substance, it asserted that the Democratic party was pledged to abide by the Dred Scott decision, or any future decision of the Supreme Court on the rights of property in the States or territories. Two votes were cast, however, for the majority report which declared that the territorial legislature has no power to abolish slavery in a territory, to prohibit the introduction of slaves therein, or destroy the right of property in slaves by any legislation whatever; and that it was the duty of the Federal Government to protect, when necessary, slavery in the territories. Two of the thirty votes from the free States for

this pro-slavery platform thus came from the New Jersey delegation. This delegation was composed of William Wright and James W. Wall (absent), later to be elected United States Senators, Benjamin Williamson, John C. Rafferty, Samuel Hanna, John L. Sharp, George F. Fort, David Naar, Albert Speer, Joshua Doughty, Robert Hamilton, John Huyler, Samuel Westcott, and Jacob Van Arsdale.

The adoption of the minority report which was satisfactory to Stephen A. Douglas, of Illinois, the only candidate who could now hope to have the support of the Northern Democracy was followed by the withdrawal from the convention of the delegations from Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, South Carolina, Florida, Texas, Georgia, and Arkansas. The convention, however, proceeded to ballot after having reaffirmed the rule requiring that two-thirds of the whole electoral vote was necessary to nominate. After fifty-seven ballots had been taken, during which Douglas had several times received $152\frac{1}{2}$ of the 303 votes of a full convention which under a majority rule would have been sufficient to nominate, the convention adjourned to meet at Baltimore on June 18. Throughout the balloting the seven votes of the New Jersey delegation were cast for James Guthrie of Kentucky.

When the convention reassembled at Baltimore on June 18, New Jersey was represented by a full delegation. But the admission of Douglas delegates to seats in the convention in place of the delegates who had withdrawn at Charleston, was followed by the withdrawal of most of the delegates from North Carolina, Tennessee, Kentucky, and Maryland. Then the convention proceeded to ballot. When Douglas had received all but 13 votes on the second ballot, he was by resolution declared nominated, on the ground that he had received the votes of two-thirds of the delegates present. Senator Benjamin Fitzpatrick, of Alabama, was nominated for Vice-President, but later declined; the national committee then nominated Herschel V. Johnson, of Georgia, for the position. During the balloting for the candidates only two and one-half votes from the New Jersey delegation were cast, and those were for Douglas, nevertheless, New Jersey was not represented at the convention of delegates who seceded from this convention, or at the convention held by those who had seceded at Charleston.

The seceders from the Democratic convention joined immediately by most of those who had seceded from the Charleston convention, who having met already at Richmond, Virginia, and adjourned to Baltimore, met at once in another hall in Baltimore, and adopted the Southern pro-slavery platform offered at Charleston. The convention nominated John C. Breckinridge, of Kentucky, and Joseph Lane, of Oregon, for President and Vice-President.

As a result of these conventions, three national parties were in the field against the Republican party; the dividing issue was the question of State extension of slavery into the territories.

In New Jersey the situation was critical for the Democratic party, since both Breckinridge and Douglas had strong individual support, and the Constitutional Union strength for Bell was unknown. The uncertainty existing in Democratic councils is evident from the attitude of the party press.




STATE HIGHWAY ROUTE 9
Bloomsbury to West Portal, Warren and Hunterdon Counties



STATE HIGHWAY ROUTE 18
Lemoine Avenue Extension, Bergen County



STATE HIGHWAY ROUTE 5
Morristown to Convent, Morris County



STATE HIGHWAY ROUTE 6
Budd Lake to Hackettstown, Morris County

The nominations at Baltimore were made on Saturday, June 23. On June 25, *True American* regretted the nomination of two separate tickets and for the time being announced that it would refrain from taking sides until a majority of the Democrats of the State should declare for one or the other. In the issue of the next day the editors placed the names of Stephen A. Douglas, of Illinois, and Benjamin Fitzpatrick, of Alabama, nominated at Baltimore, at the head of the editorial columns. In so doing they declared that they believed that Douglas would possess greater strength in New Jersey, but showed that they were more interested in obtaining a Democratic victory in the State than in political principles, by saying that their final attitude would be controlled by the action of the Democratic State Convention. Two tickets, they thought, would assure the State to Lincoln. On June 26, the *Newark Journal* placed the names of Breckinridge and Lane at the head of its editorial columns, but hoped that the Democrats in the State might yet unite, and suggested a joint electoral ticket.

The next day, the *True American* suggested that the Democrats should run single tickets for either candidate preferred in each State, believing that thereby the four tickets would at least throw the election into the House of Representatives. Clearly, the Democratic press of the State was divided upon the candidates, but looked to the State convention to bring back unity to the party.

The Democratic State Executive Committee met as soon as possible, and issued a statement, under date of July 16, signed by Nehemiah Perry, the chairman, recommending

to the Democratic convention which is to assemble at Trenton on the 25th of July, the appointment of a "Single Electoral Ticket," to be composed of four friends of Douglas and Johnson, and three friends of Breckinridge and Lane (or any other combinations) which ticket may be headed by the names of the respective candidates, according to the preferences of the voters, with the understanding that the Electoral vote of the State of New Jersey, if this ticket should be successful, shall be cast for either set of candidates, whose names shall appear on a majority of the tickets throughout the State; provided, however, that if the vote of the State will elect either candidate, then it is to be thrown to effect this result, irrespective of the popular strength of either wing of the party.

Both factions, then, at this time sought harmony.

Prospects were bright for fusion when three State conventions met in Trenton on the same day, July 25—The Democratic State Convention, at the State House; the Douglas and Johnson convention, at Temperance Hall; and the Bell and Everett Constitutional Union Convention, at Dolton's Hall. The Democratic State party organization had by this time come under the control of the Breckinridge wing of the Democracy, an indication of the existence of pro-slavery, Southern sympathy in New Jersey. The Anti-Lecompton Democrats, who now as then, were supporting Douglas, had

been an insurgent faction. It was recognized that the defection from the party of those with Southern sympathies would make sure the party's defeat in the State. The opposition had elected Olden Governor in 1859, so that there was need for every possible vote. The Southern vote was not absolutely essential to Democratic success in the campaign.

The committee adopted the following resolutions.

Resolved, That the Democratic party of New Jersey, in convention assembled, do hereby reaffirm the Platform of Principles adopted by the National Democratic Convention in 1856 and readopted in 1860.

That the electors nominated by the Convention are instructed to cast the electoral vote of New Jersey so as to defeat Lincoln and Hamlin, and to secure an election, if possible, by the people of a President and Vice-President from one of the nominations of the Democratic or Union parties.

That we call on the Democracy of New Jersey to support the electoral ticket, and invite the cordial coöperation of all conservative men.

The Breckinridge convention then appointed a committee to make, if possible, an arrangement with the Douglas convention and the Constitutional Union convention whereby a union electoral ticket might be placed in the field. Separate electoral tickets, however, had been selected, but an agreement was reached with the supporters of Bell and Everett by which a Union ticket was named, as follows: Edwin A. Stevens, Peter D. Vroom, James R. Sickler, as Breckinridge electors, and C. G. McChesney, Peter I. Clark, Benjamin Williamson, and William K. McDonald, as electors pledged to Bell and Everett. It was expected that two of the latter four would be replaced by friends of Douglas.

The Constitutional Union party in New Jersey was composed in the main of old Whigs and Democrats who placed the Union of the states above sectional interests. They were not in sympathy with the extremists either in the South or in the North. The election of a Republican as President meant to them a great danger to the Union. The majority of the party had probably been Whigs, and members of the "Opposition" of 1856 and 1859; yet they now joined the Fusion movement, to defeat Lincoln and to preserve, they believed, the Union.

The Douglas convention met, adopted resolutions, nominated a separate electoral ticket, and adjourned, almost before the other conventions had fully organized. The resolutions endorsed Douglas and Johnson as the candidates of the National Democratic party, reasserted the doctrine of squatter sovereignty, and declared that this party could form no alliances with any sectional party. This was in line with the resolutions of the Douglas national executive committee that declared that no compromise was possible. These had been printed in the *New York Herald*, of July 19. The pertinent part of the resolutions runs as follows:

That the National Democratic Party now is, as it ever has been, devoted to the preservation of the Union of the States, and because of its devotion to that great object—to the equality of the States and the inherent rights of man—it can form no alliances with any sectional faction like the Lincoln party, which seeks to place the Union entirely under Northern domination, nor with the Southern sectional faction, headed by Mr. Breckinridge, which declares the rights of property superior to any personal rights of free men, and which avows its purpose to be to precipitate upon us all the evils of disunion unless a southern faction is permitted to rule the whole Union.

Further, President Buchanan's attempts by the exercise of executive patronage to secure the succession to the presidency, or to prevent the free exercise of the will of the people in the choice of their rulers, and the efforts directed by the administration to the defeat of Douglas and Johnson were thoroughly condemned. This denunciation of the President was particularly bitter because of his success in controlling some of the delegates from New Jersey to the Charleston convention.⁴ The sixth resolution of the platform (offered by James M. Scovell, of Camden) characterized "the personal interference of the President of the United States with the action of the people in their choice of his successor, as at once derogatory of the position he occupies, and dangerous to the liberties of the people." The men nominated as presidential electors on this ticket were William Cook, Joel Parker, Theodore Runyon, A. W. Nash, Joseph Vliet, Moses Wills, and Thomas N. McCarter. Contrary to Democratic hopes, the uncompromising position taken by the Douglas convention seemed to render fusion impossible.

Meanwhile the supporters of Lincoln in New Jersey were jubilant, since it appeared to be generally conceded that, unless fusion of the opposing factions should by some chance take place, Republican success in the State in November was certain. The "Opposition" State Convention met in Trenton on August 8 in response to a call inviting the friends of Lincoln and Hamlin to select delegates to a convention. The term Republican did not appear in the call, a fact with which their Democratic opponents taunted them. It was customary to refer to the friends of Lincoln and Hamlin as "Black Republicans." The convention approved the Chicago platform, endorsed Lincoln and Hamlin as the candidates, nominated as electors Joseph N. Hornblower, Andrew K. Hay, Charles E. Elmer, Edward W. Ivins, George H. Brown, David Thompson, Isaac W. Scudder, and adjourned. It was in session little more than an hour. In its harmony and quiet confidence it was in marked contrast to the conventions of its opponents.

As the November election approached, the Democratic factions made a last effort to obtain victory through a fusion. On October 26 a meeting was held at the Astor House, in New York City, which was attended by the chairmen of the New Jersey Douglas, Bell and Breckinridge State Executive committees, and by representatives of the respective National committees. As a

⁴ See *True American*, July 26, 1860; Rhodes, Vol. II, p. 450.

result of the meeting a proclamation was drawn up and issued, signed by Rodman M. Price (a supporter of Douglas and Johnson), Joseph F. Randolph (a supporter of Bell and Everett), and Charles Sitgreaves (a supporter of Breckinridge and Lane)—the respective chairmen of the State Executive Committee—stating that the Union electoral ticket had been withdrawn, and a Fusion ticket substituted. Needless to say, this was a great stimulus to the Democratic campaign and a blow to the Republicans. But for the latter there appeared a silver lining to the threatening cloud when it was announced a few days later that the Douglas party rejected the Fusion ticket, and was determined to support its own nominees. On October 30, at the call of Jacob Vanatta, member for New Jersey of the National Executive Committee of the Douglas Democracy, a meeting of representative members of the Democracy had been held, at which it was decided to support its own nominees. This, however, did not prevent the majority of the Douglas adherents from voting for the Fusion ticket, since the names of the three Douglas electors—Cook, Parker and Runyon—appeared on that ticket. The *Morristown Banner* and the *Hackettstown Gazette* at once repudiated the fusion. Similar fusion movements were undertaken in New York and Pennsylvania.⁵

The attempt at fusion in the Democratic ranks was made too late to give complete success in the election, yet at the same time too late in the campaign for the Republicans effectually to counter. The campaign, up to this time quiet, now became more active. It was featured by parades, numerous meetings, and torch-light processions in the cities. A notable feature of the parades was supplied by the uniformed marching clubs, the "Wideawakes," who supported Lincoln. The Fusion speakers concentrated all their efforts against Lincoln and the "Black Republicans," to whom they ascribed all the troubles of the country. Great emphasis was placed in the northern cities upon the effect that the withdrawal of southern trade which, it was maintained, was sure to follow Lincoln's election, would have upon the industries of the State and its workingmen. Greater point was given to this argument by the fact that the industries of the State had not yet recovered from the financial depression of the previous years, and there was consequently now much distress among the working classes.

But the most effective argument against the Republicans was the charge that, if Lincoln should be elected, secession by the Southern States would inevitably follow. This idea was stressed by the Fusion speakers. The alleged sectional character of the Republican party and the gravity of the crisis formed thus the basis for the Fusion movement in the State.

The Republican campaign was featured, as has been said, by the parades of the "Wideawakes," and perhaps by a false confidence in the result of the election. As already noted, New Jersey was a doubtful State, and especially necessary to the Republicans, should New York or Pennsylvania go Democratic. The former "Opposition" found itself now the center of attack from all sides. It was not "abolition" enough for the extremists; yet such prin-

⁵ See Rhodes, Vol. II, pp. 190, 497-500.

ciples were universally ascribed to it by its opponents. The tariff issue, which had been framed by the Chicago convention with direct reference to New Jersey, was a prominent subject in the campaign. Manufacturing interests, which were increasing so rapidly, were keenly concerned to secure protection for themselves against foreign competition. In New Jersey and Pennsylvania, protection figured as an issue as it did in no other states in the Union.⁶ The issues generally stressed by the canvass of the Republican party here and elsewhere were opposition to the extension of slavery into the territories and opposition to the slave trade; the party also voiced a protest against the policy of Presidents Pierce and Buchanan, who had used executive influence invariably against the anti-slavery issues.⁷

When the election actually came, so close was the vote in the State that for several days neither Democratic nor Republican papers ventured to declare definitely the result. The *True American* thought at first that it was a Republican sweep, but said the results would not be definitely known until the State canvassers should meet on November 27. The *Newark Advertiser* would venture nothing further, and only the *State Gazette*, after several days, stated the probable result. The official canvass showed that the three electors whose names appeared upon both the Fusion ticket and the Douglas ticket—Cook, Parker, and Runyon—had received 62,869, 62,388, 62,309 votes respectively, and so had been elected, but that Hornblower, Elmer, Ivins, and Brown had each obtained larger totals than the other four Fusion electors. Hornblower received the highest Republican vote, 58,346. The independent Douglas electors obtained only enough votes to defeat the four Fusion men; Nash, with 6,905 votes, had the highest total.⁸ In New Jersey Lincoln thus

Fusion.		"Opposition"—Republican		Douglas.	
Cook	62,869	Hornblower	58,346	Nash	6,905
Parker	62,388	Hay	58,316	Wills	4,856
Runyon	62,309	Elmer	58,335	Vliet	4,891
Wurts	56,022	Ivins	58,342		
Vroom	58,022	Brown	58,336		
Condit	57,552	Thompson	58,322		
Brewer	57,770	Scudder	58,324		

Stanwood, Vol. I, p. 297, gives the vote as: Lincoln 58,324, Douglas 62,801.

received four electoral votes, and Douglas three, of his total of twelve. New Jersey was thus the only free State which did not give her entire electoral vote to Lincoln in 1860. The ten counties carried by Lincoln were Passaic, Morris, Mercer, Ocean, Burlington, Salem, Gloucester, Atlantic, Cumberland, and Cape May, all but the first three in the southern half of the State.⁹ In the congressional elections Essex County went Republican, Passaic Democratic.

⁶ See Rhodes, Vol. II, pp. 479-81. The importance of the tariff in Pennsylvania and New Jersey in 1860 is there shown by references to the leading newspapers of the country.—Governor Newell, in his annual message of 1858, advocated a steady protective tariff; so also did the "Opposition" convention of 1859. The Democratic State Convention of March 28, 1860, endorsed a tariff favorable to home manufacturers.

⁷ For a discussion of the platform, cf. Rhodes, Vol. II, pp. 464-65.

⁸ The *True American*, November 28, 1860, gave the results of the official State canvass as follows:

⁹ In 1859, Olden had carried Essex, Somerset, and Middlesex, which were now lost; but Morris was gained.

The *Newark Journal* hailed the outcome of the election as showing that "New Jersey" was true to the Constitution. The *Newark Mercury*, November 9, in explaining the partial success of the Fusion ticket, said that the result was due to the proximity of New York and Philadelphia, the great centers of Southern trade (this influence, it argued, was powerful in New Jersey itself), whose money had affected New Jersey politics,¹⁰ and to the lack of an efficient straight-out Republican organization; it added that too much reliance had been placed by the Republicans on the division of the Democratic ranks, and that the Fusion ticket had been presented so late in the campaign that there had been no time to organize effectively against it. Finally, the *Newark Mercury* looked upon the American (Constitutional Union) vote, about 5,000, as representing the strength of those whose one thought was of opposition to Republican doctrine. Horace Greeley's estimate¹¹ of the strength of the parties contributing to the Fusion vote in New Jersey in 1860 is probably approximately accurate. He estimated the Douglas strength as 30,000, that of Breckinridge as 30,000, and Bell's as 2,801.

One commentator upon the results of the election says: ". . . 56,237 votes were polled for Breckinridge, indicative of the prevalence of 'Southern' sentiment in New Jersey."¹² Such a statement is not a just inference from the campaign and its results. Certain it is that, of the Democratic electors, only the Douglas electors were successful; it is clear, too, that part at least of this faction had been willing to agree to the arrangement of a Fusion ticket. A reliable estimate of the strength the Douglas men threw to the Fusion movement is, however, difficult to make. It is also well to remember that with respect to the candidates for representatives in Congress there was no division in the Democratic ranks in New Jersey. In the first and second Congressional districts, the "Opposition" candidates, Messrs. Nixon and Stratton, won, by 1,106 and 1,428 votes respectively; in the third and the fourth, the Democrats, Steele and Cobb, won by 2,405 and 1,078 votes respectively; in the fifth district, comprising Hudson, Union, and Essex Counties, Nehemiah Perry, Chairman of the Democratic State Executive Committee for 1860, defeated William Pennington, then Speaker of the House of Representatives, by a majority of 394. Atkinson, p. 239, discussing Pennington's defeat, says that "Newark's interest in the South cost Mr. Pennington the comparatively few votes which defeated him." Mr. Perry was "long and creditably identified with the manufacturing industries of Newark"; "Newark had material reasons for being kindly prejudiced towards the South." Atkinson quotes from an open letter, issued by Pennington's friends, as follows:—" . . . his (Pennington's) friends wish to express their thorough and hearty contempt for that band of mercenary and unprincipled men, engaged in Southern trade, who have been foremost in producing this result. . . . If they had been slaves themselves, and every

¹⁰ Cf. Rhodes, Vol. II, p. 499, for these conditions as existing in New York.

¹¹ *American Conflict*, Vol. I. p. 328; see also *Newark Mercury*, January 11, 1861.

¹² Lee, Col. IV, p. 164.

morning had been lashed into humility, they could not have worked more heartily to carry out the wishes of their Southern masters." In the total vote polled in the five Congressional contests the Democrats had a majority of 1,247.

In the contest for the Assembly, the Democratic party improved its position slightly, electing 32 Democrats and Constitutional Union men, and so being assured of power to control the organization of the Assembly. In the Senatorial contests, the Republicans gained two seats; the Democrats thus had ten members, opposed to four "Opposition" and seven Republican members. It appeared as if the Senate would be organized by the Republicans.

The election still left a chaotic political situation in New Jersey. If we accept Greeley's estimate of the strength of the several elements in the State, we discover some interesting points. We see that the Republican National ticket obtained over 58,000 votes, twice the number received in 1856, and that the Republican element was the strongest political unit in the State. Further, it must again be noticed that the Republican party itself did not conduct the campaign in 1860 in New Jersey.

The Republican campaign in New Jersey, then, was carried on, in effect, by the "Opposition" party of New Jersey, which endorsed the Republican platform and the Republican candidates, though keeping its own distinct local name. That the "Opposition" party of New Jersey was independent of the National Republican party is clear from contemporary newspaper comment, from the resolutions of the party in convention, and from the following extract from the call for the Republican National Convention¹³ at Chicago: "The Republican electors of the several states, the members of the People's party of Pennsylvania and of the Opposition party of New Jersey, and all others who were willing to coöperate. . . ." James T. Sherman, of New Jersey, signed this Republican call. This situation¹⁴ was undoubtedly due to the fact that the "Opposition" party had had standing and organization in New Jersey for some years. As already noted, the use of the term "Opposition" as a party name dates from the final break-up of the Whig organization in the early 'fifties. Gradually, thereafter, the opponents of the Democratic majority in the State Legislature came to be referred to as "the Opposition," so that the term, having acquired general acceptance in the political circles of the State, was formally adopted by a State Convention in 1856, when the anti-Democratic parties, having separate national tickets in the field, agreed to a fusion in the Gubernatorial contest, under the name of "The Opposition Party of New Jersey." The party was successful then, and again in 1859; in the meantime it sponsored candidates for the State Legislature and for Congress.

The readjustment of parties which took place after 1856 thus left only two influential parties in the contest of 1859, the "Opposition" party and the

¹³ See Republican National Conventions of 1856, 1860, 1864, p. 83. (Reported by Horace Greeley.)


¹⁴ The same conservatism of most of those who later became Union-Republicans in the State created the similar "People's Party" in Pennsylvania.

Democratic party. The followers of Fillmore in 1856, that is the old-line Whigs and Native Americans, disappeared either into the "Opposition"-Republican or into the Democratic ranks. How completely this took place we see from Greeley's estimate that the Constitutional Union party in New Jersey contributed only 2,801 votes to the Fusion ticket of 1860. The Bell and Everett movement, therefore, must have become almost negligible in New Jersey. Consideration of the Democratic vote in the election shows that the Breckinridge and Douglas supporters were about equally numerous. Yet it is to be noted that the Breckinridge leaders had from the outset controlled the party machinery. Plainly, too, many of the Democratic leaders held Southern views on slavery and its extension. This was noticeable in the delegation at the Charleston Convention and again in the convention at Baltimore. To the doctrine of states' rights New Jersey Democrats were still most devoted. Nor were they alone upon this question, since to many in the "Opposition" it was scarcely of less importance. The significance of these facts will become clearer as we view the events of the succeeding years.






SACKING OYSTERS FOR SHIPMENT, BIVALVE



TAKING UP OYSTERS AT BIVALVE



LAYING OUT OYSTERS AT BIVALVE



CANNING RAW OYSTERS AT PORT NORRIS

CHAPTER XXXVI.

THE PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN OF 1864 IN NEW JERSEY.

The Presidential campaign in New Jersey was ushered in by the Union State Convention to select delegates to the Union National Convention, which was to assemble at Baltimore on June 7. The Union State Convention, which met on May 12, at Trenton, was harmonious. The resolutions adopted endorsed the administration, and denounced the last Legislature for not providing a way for the soldiers in the field to vote. The delegation to the National Convention was pledged to the support of Lincoln. In the selection of delegates the character of the party as a Union party was emphasized, by the choice of Joseph T. Crowell, of Union, and James M. Scovel, of Camden, as two of the Senatorial delegates, or delegates at large, both of whom, when they entered the Legislature, had been Democrats. Ex-Governor Newell and Marcus L. Ward were the other Senatorial delegates.¹

The Democratic State Convention met a week later, May 18, and chose as Senatorial delegates A. Browning, John P. Stockton, Theodore Runyon, and Daniel Holsman. The resolutions adopted declared the firm attachment of the Democracy to the Constitution; that Constitutional law was the only true basis of executive action in war as well as in time of peace; that the necessary step to restore prosperity to the American Republic was to overthrow the administration through the ballot box. The formulation of the platform it left to the National Convention of the party. The delegation was not instructed as to the candidate, but the name of General McClellan was greeted with cheers. The latter was now residing at Orange, New Jersey, and so was almost certain to have the support of the Democratic party in the State.

The Union National Convention met at Baltimore on June 7. In spite of some dissatisfaction with Lincoln which had obtained among the leaders previous to the convention, he was nominated, amid great enthusiasm, on the first ballot. Those who were dissatisfied with President Lincoln and were desirous of maintaining the single term tradition had met on May 31, at Cleveland, Ohio, and had nominated John C. Fremont and John Cochrane, of New York. The prospect was at this time for a divided Union party.

The Democratic National Convention had been called to meet after the Baltimore convention, on July 4. The purpose of the delay had been to gain a better opportunity to size up the situation. It was admitted that much would depend on the military situation as the canvass progressed. Early in May a suggestion for the further postponement of the convention gained support, and the date was changed to August 29.

¹ Cf. the newspapers of May 13, 1864, the *Newark Journal*, *Newark Advertiser*, *State Gazette*, and *True American*, for accounts of the convention.

The Democratic National Convention assembled at Chicago on August 29. Governor Seymour, of New York, and Clement L. Vallandigham, of Ohio, were the recognized leaders respectively of the Conservative and the Copperhead wings of the party. The former was committed to the nomination of McClellan. Before the convention assembled it was reasonably certain that McClellan would be nominated, in spite of opposition from the peace Democracy. The latter considered the issue now to be the continuation of the war or immediate peace. Thomas Dunn English, in an open letter² to the New York Peace Convention, meeting at Syracuse, wrote that the sentiment of the Democracy was in favor of closing, at the earliest possible moment, and in any honorable way, "this useless and wicked war," and stated that he was personally opposed to the nomination of McClellan; he wanted a Democratic statesman of long standing, not a mere personal nomination. With the more conservative element of the party, that is, with those who would not consider the possibility of secession, the candidacy of McClellan was most popular. In the previous December the *Jersey City Standard* and the *Paterson Register* had advocated his nomination.

Hon. John P. Stockton nominated McClellan as the candidate of New Jersey, and he was chosen on the first ballot. The New Jersey delegation voted unanimously for him, though some of the delegates had other preferences.³ George H. Pendleton, of Ohio, was nominated for Vice-President. The nominations were received with enthusiasm by the Democrats. In was considered a strong and popular ticket.

The vital plank of the platform which the convention adopted was more satisfactory to the peace Democracy than was the candidate. This was adopted through the efforts of Vallandigham, and ran as follows:

Resolved, That this convention does explicitly declare, that after four years of failure to restore the Union by the experiment of war, justice, humanity, liberty, and the public welfare demand that immediate efforts be made for a cessation of hostilities, with a view to an ultimate convention of the States or other peaceable means, to the end that at the earliest practicable moment peace may be restored on the basis of the Federal Union of the States.⁴

Reference to Senator Holsman's resolutions, proposed in the New Jersey Legislature, January 13, 1863, shows that the platform of the Copperheads in New Jersey in 1863, differed little from that finally incorporated in the Democratic National platform of 1864, by Vallandigham.

Whatever support the candidate might have taken from Lincoln was discounted by Vallandigham's resolution, which the Unionists soon reduced to, *Resolved*, That the war is a failure. C. Chauncey Burr voiced his senti-

² Dated August 13, 1864; it was quoted in the *Newark Journal*, August 22.

³ Cf. letter of E. N. Fuller, August 28, from Chicago, to the *Newark Journal*, printed in the issue of September 1, 1864.

⁴ See Rhodes, Vol. IV, p. 523; *Annual Cyclopædia*, 1864, p. 793.

ments in Chicago while the convention was in session: "We had no right to burn their wheatfields, steal their pianos, spoons, or jewelry. Mr. Lincoln had stolen a good many thousand negroes; but for every negro he had thus stolen he had stolen 10,000 spoons. It had been said that, if the South would lay down their arms, they would be received into the Union. The South could not honorably lay down her arms, for she was fighting for her honor. Two millions of men had been sent down to the slaughter-pens of the South, and the army of Lincoln could not again be filled, neither by enlistment nor by conscription. If he ever uttered a prayer, it was that no one of the States of the Union should be conquered and subjugated."⁵

The Democratic campaign in New Jersey during the summer was devoted to proving the necessity of defeating the administration, and to personal abuse of the President, now a candidate for reelection. The *Newark Journal* (June 1, 1864), continually referred to the President as the "smutty joker." The newspapers that had supported Governor Parker during the winter advocated the nomination of General McClellan and urged the necessity of supporting the Government, and of the continuance of the war until the South should be willing to return to the Union through negotiation, or as the result of utter defeat. The organs of the peace Democracy, however, advocated peace as soon as possible, and by any means. *Newark Journal*, June 1, 1864, said ". . . we say that, unless the war shall speedily cease, not the South will be conquered but the North." "That the South will in the end win her independence is admitted by every reasoning man whose judgment has not been smitten blind by the paralyzing stroke of prejudice." This with them took the additional form of denouncing the draft, and thereby discouraging enlistments. The *Newark Journal* became so outspoken in its criticism that the Federal authorities took steps to control its utterances. In this action, the doctrine of the freedom of speech and of the press became involved. Previously, the press of the State had been much worked up over the seizure by the administration of the offices of the *New York World* and the *New York Journal of Commerce*, and the arrest of their editors⁶ on May 18. This action had been vigorously and justly condemned by the press of both parties.

On July 19, President Lincoln issued a call for 500,000 men to be raised by draft. The men were needed to fill the gaps made by Grant's Wilderness campaign, and Sherman's campaign against Atlanta. The draft had been expected. The *Newark Journal* had for some days commented on the uselessness of the struggle. On July 19, it published editorially the following, in the same issue with the President's proclamation for troops:

FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND MORE.

It will be seen that Mr. Lincoln has called for another half a million men. Those who desire to be butchered will please step forward at once. All others will stay at home and defy Old Abe and his minions to drag them from their families. We hope that the

⁵ See Greeley: *American Conflict*, Vol. II, p. 667.

⁶ See Rhodes, Vol. IV, pp. 467-68.

people of New Jersey will at once put their feet down and insist that not a man shall be forced out of the State to engage in the abolition butchery and swear to die at their own doors rather than march one step to fulfill the dictates of that mad revolutionary fanaticism, which has destroyed the best government the world ever saw, and would now butcher its remaining inhabitant to carry out a mere fanatical sentiment. This has gone far enough *and must be stopped*.

Let the people rise as one man and demand that this wholesale murder shall cease.

On the next day (July 20) it spoke of a grand anti-draft organization which was to be formed at an early date, and hoped that a great protest would go from Newark, enough to cause the administration to pause and reflect. The editorial of July 19 was copied by the press generally. The *Somerset Messenger* and the *Bergen Democrat*, by their general tone, seemed to approve it.

The *Newark Journal*, in its editorial of July 19, had been merely a little more definite than usual in its remarks upon the war. The Federal officials now took action. On July 21, E. N. Fuller, the editor of the *Newark Journal*, was arrested, charged with intent of counseling persons to resist the draft, and of inciting insurrection against the authority of the United States. Two warrants were issued by Staats S. Morris, United States Commissioner, and signed by United States District Attorney A. Q. Keasbey. Two citizens of New Jersey preferred the complaint,⁷ which was said to have been made at the request of General John A. Dix, commanding the department of the East, with headquarters at New York City. The complaint against Fuller was that he had violated section 25 of the Act of March 3, 1863 (the Conscription Act), by counseling persons to resist the draft of men enrolled under the act, and that, under section 2 of the Act of July 17, 1862 (the Confiscation Act), he was guilty of the crime of inciting insurrection against the United States. The editorials of July 19 and 20 were cited as the evidence. He was released under \$7,000 bail, to appear before the next term of the United States District Court, which was to meet in September. On August 10, Orson C. Cone, editor of the *Somerset Messenger*, was arrested, at the request of General Dix, charged with violating sections 12 and 25 of the Act of March 3, 1863. He was held in \$500 bail. Eben Winton, editor of the *Bergen Democrat*, arrested on similar charges, was held in \$2,000 bail. Cone and Winton had reprinted in their papers the *Newark Journal* editorials, and had appeared to endorse them. Winton had succeeded C. Chauncey Burr as editor, in 1862. John P. Stockton and Theodore Runyon acted as counsel for the accused. The grand jury of the United States District Court for New Jersey brought in an indictment⁸ against Fuller, but failed to indict Cone or Winton. The grand jury

⁷ For the complaint, see the *Newark Journal* and the *Newark Advertiser*, July 23, 1864.

⁸ September 20, 1864. The penalty under section 25 of the Act of March 3, 1863, might be ten years imprisonment, or a fine of \$10,000, or both; under section 2 of the Act of July 17, 1862, a fine of \$500, or imprisonment for not over two years, might be imposed.

was charged by Judge Richard S. Field. The case came before the court in October but, by agreement, was postponed until the January term of the court. The case was, of course, important, but the peculiar interest in it was due to the method now taken by the administration to control or suppress opposition to itself and the war. This must be attributed to the unfortunate results attending the earlier policy of arbitrary arrest and imprisonment, particularly in New Jersey, in the case of Colonel James W. Wall, and in Ohio, in the case of Vallandigham. Both cases had reacted to the political disadvantage of the administration. Colonel Wall had been arrested by order of Secretary of War Cameron, for a cause never assigned, Vallandigham by the military on order from the commander of the department of Ohio. At this time, however, a regular civil action, as prescribed by law, was brought against the accused by a United States District Attorney, at the request of the commander of the military department. The method could not be attacked as the method adopted in the earlier cases was assailed. This change of procedure was due to an acknowledgement of the position which public opinion in New Jersey had taken upon arbitrary arrests in 1862, which led to the passage of the Act of March 3, 1863, which was now followed.⁹ The Democracy might well congratulate itself. Even the Union press heartily approved the action, and the method taken.¹⁰

The case against Fuller, then, was one of alleged sedition, through discouragement of enlistments and inciting insurrection. The defense offered by Fuller, and the press of the peace Democracy, was that the action of District Attorney Keasbey and General Dix was an interference with the freedom of the press. The *Newark Journal* kept up its opposition to the war, and in the same general tone, claiming that the war was a failure. On August 2, 1864, it said: ". . . is it too much to say that the failure of this army to accomplish its purpose is the failure of the war?" "It is a great truth, that Abe Lincoln's administration *can never conquer the South*." It went on to ask the citizens of New Jersey whether they should yet furnish money and men to continue the war.

Coming as it did in late July and August, 1864, before the Democratic National Convention, the arrest of Fuller, Cone and Winton served as Democratic material for the campaign. The earlier procedure of the administration was recalled, and the interference with the freedom of the press was dwelt on at length, but there was now no arbitrary arrest in New Jersey to criticize. The Union newspapers intimated that Fuller was disappointed, in that summary arrest and imprisonment in Fort Lafayette had been denied him. Before his arrest and afterwards, he said, editorially, "If this be treason, let it be treason." He seemed to court interference. But the issue of arbitrary arrest had been removed. In the presidential campaign the case probably had little effect, because of the way in which it was handled, though it did furnish

⁹ It had not been followed in the Vallandigham case; cf. Rhodes, Vol. IV, pp. 247-52.

¹⁰ See *New York Tribune*, July 23, 1864.

a theme for meetings of the peace Democracy.¹¹ By the time the case came before the court for trial, the military and political situation had so changed that the decision attracted comparatively little attention.

When the case came up before Judge Field, on February 15, 1865, in the United States District Court, by agreement of counsel, the defendant addressed the court as follows:¹²

May it please the Court—in withdrawing the plea which I have heretofore pleaded and substituting one which by its terms admits culpability, I beg leave to say that in acts charged to me under the indictment, I have never been moved by seditious intentions, I have never designed to favor mob law, or to incite insurrection, and I have at all times supposed that in my public writing I was entirely within the just limits of liberty of speech and of the press. Under the circumstances of the case, I deem it proper, with this explanation, which is due to myself, to take the advice of my counsel, and retract my plea, and plead guilty; nor need any apprehension be entertained that I will in the future interfere with the action of the military authorities by publication or otherwise.

The United States District Attorney Keasbey then addressed the court, and said that Fuller's statement, in which he now admitted guilt, modified his view of the case, and that the law had been in great part vindicated. He suggested, therefore, a light penalty. Judge Field imposed a fine of \$100 and costs, and volunteered the information that, had the defendant come to court determined to resist, he would have imposed the extreme penalty. The decision in the case came so late in the war that it had little effect toward controlling the seditious utterances of the Copperheads of New Jersey. The *Newark Journal* was their principal newspaper in the State, their only daily; the *Bergen Democrat* was just as violent, but local in its influence. These two papers printed in full the speeches of the Copperheads, many of whom were connected with their editorial staffs, and echoed editorially their seditious utterances. For in the campaign of 1864 many of the Copperhead speeches were clearly seditious.

The more conservative Democratic opinion during the presidential campaign upon the national situation was expressed by Governor Parker in an address at Freehold, on August 20. The conservative Democrats desired Lincoln's defeat just as much as the Copperheads did, and they desired peace, but with the restoration of the Union. Of the latter, however, they were not hopeful under the administration. Governor Parker set for himself three topics: I. What is the present condition of the country? II. What brought the country to its present unhappy condition? III. By what means can it be

¹¹ The *Newark Journal*, July 30, 1864, printed long speeches on this theme by C. Chauncey Burr and Edward N. Fuller. The occasion was the presentation of a sword to Fuller by some of his friends in token of his defense of the Constitution, and of the freedom of the press.

¹² For the address, and for comment on the case see *Newark Journal* and *Newark Advertiser*, February 16, 1865.

restored to its former condition of peace, union and prosperity? With respect to the condition of the country he was most gloomy and pessimistic. The solemn provisions of the Constitution were made to yield, he said, to what is called "military necessity, which means the arbitrary will of a single individual, fallible as ourselves." The war, he held, had been perverted from one for the Union to a political war, a war for emancipation and for the destruction of states' rights. Thus he accounted for the general despondency and the difficulties of recruiting, and answered his second question. The Crittenden compromise, he held, would have been a fair settlement, and would have prevented war. The Republican party leaders had opposed it. Hence, to the Republican party belonged the sole responsibility for the war; that party was the sole difficulty in the way of an amicable adjustment.

Under his third heading Governor Parker stated that the ballot box and the defeat of Lincoln were the hope of the country to regain prosperity. He then discussed what the National Democracy ought to do when it regained power.

. . . They ought to commence by undoing almost everything that has been done at Washington during the last three years. They ought to unmuzzle the press, take the lock off the mouths of men, and restore in its pristine purity that great writ of right, the *habeas corpus*. They ought to open the doors of military prisons crowded with citizens incarcerated without formality of trial and set the prisoners free; they should repeal all acts of Congress that infringe on the proper jurisdiction of the State courts; they should make short work of the indemnity act, and give every man who has been aggrieved the opportunity to test the legality of his imprisonment in a court of justice. They should repeal the Conscription Act, and if troops are needed for the United States service they should be raised by the States through their own agents. They ought to repeal the Confiscation Act and wipe out all proclamations of emancipation and reconstruction,¹³ and all test oaths that support executive decrees past, present, and to come, and the only oath they should require is the support of the Constitution and the laws. Having gone back to where we stood before the war began, and having put the Government once more in the right, the way would be open for terms of peace. . . .

The Democracy would not be strenuous on merely formal points; in what manner terms should be proposed, and by whom; whether informal meetings of citizens who are cognizant of the views of those in power should prepare the way for negotiation; whether commissioners should be appointed by the General Government, or whether there should be an armistice and convention of states. They should not stand on technicality or etiquette in the midst of suffering and death if an honorable and lasting peace should be within their grasp. I am in favor of whichever of these modes will bring peace and the Union the soonest. The difficulty now is that the parties

¹³ See also Rhodes, Vol. IV, p. 184.

cannot be brought together in consequence of impossible terms being insisted upon in advance. The success of the Democracy would bring the belligerents face to face; an honest effort would be made to agree upon fair terms and that would be a step in the right direction, even if the effort should prove unsuccessful. . . .

On what terms would the Democracy negotiate with a view to peace? They would not insist upon the abolition of slavery as a condition. . . . But there is one thing the Democracy would insist upon, and that is the union of the States. . . . The Democracy would recognize the sovereignty of states within their proper sphere, under the Constitution of the United States, but they would insist upon the recognition of an obedience to the Federal Government in all matters pertaining rightfully to its jurisdiction. But will the rebellious States agree to the terms of peace on the basis of the Union? Recent events indicate they will. It is certain that if we make no attempt to negotiate we shall never know what can be accomplished. . . .


The remarks of the Governor expressed adequately the opinions of the majority of the Democrats of the State, which were not those of the *Newark Journal*. Yet the latter endorsed the speech.¹⁴ The attitude of the Copperheads was, at the least, that expressed by Vallandigham's resolution in the Democratic national platform. Governor Parker's speech was by far the most important of the campaign in New Jersey. The *Newark Journal* approved the tone of the Governor's address, but criticized him for supporting the war. It thought he could have pursued a course more consistent with the dignity of a sovereign State.

After the Chicago convention, a division in the Democracy was threatened. General McClellan was at his home in Orange, New Jersey, when the news of his nomination was received. That evening he was serenaded by a large crowd from Orange and Newark. The Democracy of New Jersey was enthusiastic. McClellan's letter of acceptance¹⁵ of September 8, however, threatened to cause trouble, for in it he repudiated that resolution of the platform which the peace Democracy, only with great effort, had carried through the National Convention. The *New York Journal of Commerce* repudiated McClellan. This action, however, the *Newark Journal* did not follow, as it might have been expected to do. In its issue of September 10, it printed a statement signed by the editor. In this Fuller maintained that McClellan had no power to amend or modify the platform adopted by the party in convention assembled. It was preposterous to think that McClellan had repudiated the platform. The *Newark Journal* would support McClellan.


The campaign became more active; the Democratic factions buried their differences; war Democrats and Copperheads worked together, held by party tradition and common desire to defeat the administration. Meetings were held everywhere. We find Mayor Theodore Runyon, Hon. John P. Stockton,

¹⁴ August 22, 23, 24.


¹⁵ Cf. *Annual Cyclopædia*, 1864, p. 794.



SHELLS RETURNED TO WATER IN SPRING—OYSTERS SPAWN ON THEM
IN JULY



DREDGING OYSTERS, DELAWARE BAY



SHIP JOHN LIGHT, DELAWARE BAY—NOTABLE TO SAILORS



LAUNCHING OYSTER BOAT OF THE BEST DESIGN AT GREENWICH

and Fernando Wood addressing a political meeting at Newark on September 27; and Governor Parker, Thomas Dunn English and Fernando Wood speaking from the same platform at Hackensack on September 29. The presence of Fernando Wood at these meetings, and at others, is interesting, and significant of the influence of New York Copperheads in New Jersey politics.

The Democratic State Convention¹⁶ met at Trenton on October 6. Resolutions were passed endorsing the national nomination, the Chicago platform, and McClellan's letter of acceptance. The platform and the letter might not agree, but the endorsement of both was the price of party harmony. After nominating the electoral ticket the convention adjourned.

The political situation, which in midsummer had been distinctly unfavorable to Lincoln and the Union party, changed as the campaign progressed, primarily as the result of the change in the military situation. As November approached, Lincoln's election seemed certain. But the reaction in his favor which came in most of the States was not strong enough in New Jersey to win that State from her Democratic allegiance. McClellan, as had been expected, carried the State by a popular majority of 7,291. The vote was: McClellan, 68,014, Lincoln, 60,723. In 1862 Parker had carried the State by 14,597. Lincoln received 212 electoral votes; McClellan received 21—the seven of New Jersey and the votes of Kentucky and Delaware.

In the State and Congressional contests the Union party made slight gains. In the First Congressional District, the Union party reëlected John F. Starr, and ex-Governor Newell carried the Second District. The Democrats carried the third, fourth and fifth districts. The contest for the State Legislature was keen because the incoming Legislature was to elect a successor to United States Senator Ten Eyck. The strength of the two parties in the Senate remained the same, 13 to 8. In the Assembly, the Union made such gains that a tie would probably exist. This result foreshadowed complications in the election of a United States Senator by the next Legislature.

After the election of 1864 the issues raised by the peace Democracy ceased to be of primary importance. Plans for peace and Reconstruction came into prominence during the winter. It was now clear to all that peace could not be far distant. The Confederacy still existed, was still defiant but it was almost exhausted. Sherman's capture of Atlanta, and Sheridan's successes in the Shenandoah Valley during September and October had assured the election of Lincoln. They proved clearly that the war was not a failure. The peace Democracy died with the close of the war. What strength it really possessed in New Jersey in 1864 it is impossible to say. Probably it was considerable, for it had determined and capable leaders. Yet it is probable, also, that the Democracy owed its victory in New Jersey in 1864 to the wise and able executive policy of Governor Parker, and to the personal popularity of General McClellan in his adopted State.

¹⁶ For an account of the convention, cf. *Newark Journal*, October 7. The Union State convention was held on September 22.

CHAPTER XXXVII.

NEW JERSEY AND STATES' RIGHTS DURING CIVIL WAR.

From the preceding chapters it has been evident that there were many in New Jersey who had urged in opposition to measures of the National and State administrations the argument that they were unconstitutional, and in fact constituted violations of the reserved rights of the States. We have seen how this issue was effectively used to bring about the Democratic victories in the elections of 1861, 1862, and 1863, and the election of Democratic United States Senators by the Legislature of 1863, and the passage by the same Legislature of Copperhead resolutions seeking an immediate peace under conditions which could have been secured only through the recognition of the independence of the Confederacy.

But in the main the assertion of States' rights down to 1864 had been vociferous only, and had caused merely annoyance to the National Administration of Abraham Lincoln. Then, however, there arose a situation in New Jersey which caused marked inconvenience to the administration politically and more to the Secretary of War, Edwin M. Stanton, in hindering the movement of troops and supplies across New Jersey to the front. This all had its origin in the Camden and Amboy Railroad's monopoly of direct transportation across the State. An effort to break this monopoly by an act of Congress was the occasion for vigorous protest from New Jersey.

On March 24, 1863, Governor Parker addressed to the Legislature a special message,¹ one of protest, calling attention to a measure then before Congress which, he felt, would affect vitally the interests of the State of New Jersey. This was a bill which proposed to make the Raritan and Delaware Bay Railroad a post and military road. Apparently this was a simple measure, one which should not have called for protest by the Governor and the Legislature of New Jersey. Yet such was the relationship existing between the State of New Jersey and the Delaware and Raritan Canal Company, and the Camden and Amboy Railroad Company (generally known in the State as the Joint Companies) that Governor Parker considered that the passage by Congress of the bill in question would be an insult to New Jersey, and an infringement of the sovereignty of the State. In this stand the people of the State, irrespective of party, agreed with the Governor. All the other States of the Union were with one accord denouncing New Jersey's position and urging Congress to pass the bill and force New Jersey to test in the Supreme Court the constitutionality of the law. To them it seemed that New Jersey, through the Camden and Amboy Railroad Company's monopoly, was, for her own individual advantage, taxing the whole Nation. For a clear understanding, however, of the political importance of the question, as Governor Parker placed it before the Legislature, and to realize how the interests of

¹ Cf. *Assembly Journal*, 1864, pp. 382-93; *Senate Journal*, 1864, p. 480.

New Jersey now set her in opposition to the administration and to the North, we must look briefly into the history of the Camden and Amboy Railroad, and its political influence in the State.

When the plan for a railroad across the State was first projected, it was deemed necessary, in view of the magnitude of the undertaking and the financial risk involved, to assign to the projected company certain exclusive privileges. In the charter finally granted to the Camden and Amboy Railroad Company it was, therefore, guaranteed by the Legislature of New Jersey

that it shall not be lawful at any time during the said railroad charter to construct any other railroad or railroads in this state, *without the consent of the companies*, which shall be intended or used for the transportation of passengers or merchandise between the cities of New York and Philadelphia, or to compete in business with the railroad authorized by the act to which this supplement is relative.²

Thereby a monopoly of all railroad transportation across the State of New Jersey between these two industrial centers was legalized. In time, when railroad transportation ceased to be an experiment, interests other than the Joint Companies attempted to enter this lucrative field, but were stopped by this monopoly, granted in 1832. In return for the monopoly the Camden and Amboy Railroad Company was required to pay, as a transit tax, ten cents for each passenger and fifteen cents for each ton of freight carried between the two cities. Stock in the Joint Companies was also given to the State. By 1860 the annual revenue accruing to the State from the Joint Companies—about \$200,000—was sufficient to meet the ordinary expenses of the State Government.³

A transit or tonnage tax levied by a State was not unusual in the early days of railroads. But the Camden and Amboy monopoly was unique in that it was a railroad transportation monopoly maintained by a State on a route of interstate commerce. Had it been on any but the main route between the National Capital and the two great industrial centers, Philadelphia and New York, as well as New England, and had its rates not been so high, it would never have been subjected to such universal condemnation. It is not strange that, through the benefits derived by the State from the monopoly, New Jersey could boast that her citizens enjoyed the lowest taxation in the Union, and that her citizens should resent any move which would injure the prosperity of the Joint Companies.

The Legislature was continually the scene of political struggles between the rival railroad interests in the State. The Camden and Amboy Railroad Company, with its ally, the New Jersey Railroad and Transportation Company, controlled the through route from Jersey City, via Newark and Trenton, to Philadelphia, and also most of the small roads in the southern half of the State. The effort was always making for the chartering of short local

² Act of March 2, 1832.

³ The only direct state tax levied in New Jersey before 1860 was in connection with the school tax.

lines which should ultimately be connected into one system paralleling that of the Camden and Amboy Railroad Company. There was another line crossing the State, with connection with the West and the South—the Central Railroad of New Jersey—running from Elizabeth, via Easton and Harrisburg. The Joint Companies, already in high favor with the Democratic party, obtained from the Democratic Legislature in 1854 a supplement to the Act of 1832, whereby the monopoly of the Camden and Amboy Railroad Company, which was to expire in 1859, was extended to 1869, and in return the monopoly of the Delaware and Raritan Canal Company, due to expire in 1881, was also made to expire in 1869. This arrangement was put through in spite of vigorous opposition.

Such was the situation when the war broke out. As a result of the geographical location of the State of New Jersey, the Camden and Amboy Railroad was now placed in a threatening position with respect to the Federal Government. Even under friendly management this railroad might well be unable to perform the service which inevitably would be required of it. Troops and supplies were, of course, routed also via Harrisburg, though the distance to be traversed and the time required were greater.

The Joint Companies, at the outbreak of the war, responded loyally to the demands made upon them, as indeed they did throughout the war. In fact, they placed at the disposal of Governor Olden large sums of money upon which he was able to draw temporarily in order to secure equipment necessary for early movement of the first State quota. The Camden and Amboy monopoly soon, however, came into collision with the War Department and the administration. In 1854 the Legislature had granted a charter to the Raritan and Delaware Bay Railroad Company, which authorized the building of a line from Keyport to Tom's River and May's Landing. Part of the road was constructed, but, being unprofitable, was sacrificed to New York interests which entered into an agreement with the Camden and Atlantic Railroad to run cars direct from Keyport to Camden. But, before construction was completed, the Camden and Amboy Railroad brought action for a preliminary injunction. This was denied by the court, which held, however, that the complainants, by virtue of their contract with the State of New Jersey, were entitled to the protection of the Court of Equity in the enjoyment of that franchise; but that the incorporation of the two railroads—the Raritan and Delaware Bay Railroad Company and the Camden and Atlantic Railroad—was not in violation of the Camden and Amboy franchise. The court went on to say that there was a legitimate purpose for which those roads might be used—the transportation of freight and passengers to and from points and places within the State of New Jersey along the line of the prospective roads, and between those points and the cities of New York and Philadelphia; if used, however, for service between the latter cities there would be cause for action.⁴

⁴ For the opinion of the court see the *Weekly True American*, August 22, 1862. The case is reported also in 14 *New Jersey Equity*, 445-49, 15 *New Jersey Equity*, 13-22. The injunction issued in 1863 is reported in 16 *New Jersey Equity*, 321-82.

This cause the Secretary of War soon furnished by authorizing the transportation by the Raritan and Delaware Bay route of soldiers, horses and freight. This was continued from September 1, 1862, to January 1, 1863. The Camden and Amboy Railroad sought an injunction, and an accounting from the War Department to it for transportation which, it maintained, had been furnished illegally to the War Department by the Raritan and Delaware Bay Railroad Company. The case was finally argued in the Court of Chancery in November and December, 1863. The court, in a decision rendered on February 3, 1864,⁵ granted the injunction to the complainants and referred the question of damages to a master in chancery.

Meantime, the whole question had been transferred to the halls of Congress, and old schemes for another direct postal or military route between New York and Washington, authorized by Congress under its power to establish military or post roads for the use of the Nation at large, had been revived.⁶ A complicated bill was introduced into the United States Senate,⁷ declaring the Raritan and Delaware Bay Railroad a postal route. The Postmaster-General and the committee on post offices and post roads reported that by general statute all railroads were already post roads. The Senate then refused to consider the bill. A new bill was reported to the House of Representatives from the committee on military affairs, on March 9, 1864, which proposed to legalize the Raritan and Delaware Bay Railroad, since it had rendered military service by carrying troops between New York and Philadelphia, and necessity required it as a military road. The bill was recommended by the House committee on military affairs. Two weeks later, Governor Parker sent to the Legislature of New Jersey his special message, referred to above.

The decision rendered by the court, on February 3, 1864, upholding the monopoly, was strictly legal and unassailable, but to the country at large the attitude of the State seemed selfish and unpatriotic in the extreme, in upholding at a crisis in the life of the Nation a monopoly⁸ for its own profit, particularly since the rates on the Camden and Amboy Railroad were high⁹ and the service was inadequate to the unusual demands made upon it. It was felt that New Jersey was taxing and restricting the commerce of the Nation to pay the expenses of its own government. But the doctrine of the general good, which obtains today, did not then appeal to New Jersey. The proposed bill was generally supported throughout the States and the attitude of New Jersey was condemned. The debate in Congress covered the whole question.

⁵ *State Gazette*, February 3, 4, 1864.

⁶ See the *Weekly True American*, December 13, 1861, for a quotation from the *Newark Advertiser* containing a memorial on this subject from the New York Chamber of Commerce.

⁷ Cf. *State Gazette*, February 10, 1863.

⁸ Fite, *Social and Industrial Conditions in the North During the Civil War*, pp. 169-75, discusses the Camden and Amboy monopoly during the war.

⁹ The following railroad tariffs, in effect at this time, may be compared with each other: New York to Rhinebeck, New York, 91 miles, \$1.80; New York to Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, 90 miles, \$3.00.

The *State Gazette*, on January 29, 1864, discussing editorially from time to time the measures aimed to break the monopoly, thus stated its attitude:¹⁰

By the act of 1854, the monopoly privileges will expire in 1869. While they exist, we are in favor of compelling the Joint Companies to fulfill, to the letter, their contract with the State. We also consider it only just that the State should keep its agreement with the companies. If an attempt is made to violate this agreement by either of the contracting parties, we will not be found backward in defending the rights of the people and of the State. Until that time arrives, or until the Companies ask for an extension of their privileges, we do not deem it necessary to agitate the question.

The *State Gazette* took the same ground against the proposed bill in a long editorial published on March 3; it held further that the bill involved interference, unwarrantable, in New Jersey's jurisdiction over internal improvement.

Governor Parker's special message on the legislation pending in Congress discussed two main points: *First*, would the proposed action of Congress, if consummated, affect the pecuniary interests of the State? *Second*, and *chiefly*, would such action infringe upon the sovereignty of the State? The first he considered of less importance than the principle involved. It was the duty of a sovereign State to protect and defend its sovereignty by every lawful means, and to transmit unimpaired to posterity all her rights as they were received from the fathers. He continued thus:

In the exercise of her rightful powers she may build, maintain, and manage lines of public travel within her territory, or she may grant to others the right to construct such works, under such regulations and upon such conditions as she may see fit to impose. When the States entered into the national compact, they yielded to the General Government the right to establish post roads for the conveyance of the mails, and the power to construct military roads in the time of war for the transportation of troops; but even these roads must be operated by the Government, and not through the agency or for the benefit of private corporations. A law of Congress proposing to exceed the powers granted by the States, infringes upon their reserved rights and detracts from the State Legislatures a portion of their rightful authority. The roads which Congress proposes to invest with such extraordinary powers are already post routes; and the President has been authorized by law to use any railroad in the country for military purposes. Therefore no additional legislation is needed to make the roads post or military routes; nor has any been asked for by the President, the Secretary of War, or the Postmaster General.

The *third* section of the bill declares the real object of its originators, which is to empower the companies, therein named, not merely to carry the mail, or convey troops and munitions of war, *but to transport goods, wares, and merchandise of all descriptions, and pas-*

¹⁰ See also *Weekly True American*, August 22, 1862; *State Gazette*, January 19, February 7, 10, 1863, January 8, 11, February 4, March 2, 3, 4, 1864.

sengers, between New York and Philadelphia, notwithstanding any law of the State to the contrary. . . . If such a law be valid, the Legislature of the State is a powerless body, and our citizens must hereafter beg Congress for the privilege of constructing works of public improvement on our own soil. The passage of such an act (although of no binding force because unconstitutional) would be an insult to the people of New Jersey. It would take the creatures of our law, now under the ban of judicial injunction for violation of our statutes, and in direct opposition to the decision of our courts, attempt to make them independent of, and superior to the power that created them. Such action deserves, and should receive, the strongest legislative remonstrance. Let it be distinctly understood by those who would inflict this wrong and indignity upon our State that, while New Jersey will comply with every legal obligation, and will respect and protect the rights of all, she will not permit any infringement of her rights without resorting to every lawful means to prevent it.¹¹

On the same day, March 24, 1864, resolutions of protest addressed to Congress were introduced into the New Jersey Senate.¹² These were passed by a vote of 17 to 2, and were agreed to unanimously by the Assembly. The resolutions condemned any special legislation by Congress aimed at New Jersey alone as a "wanton insult to the dignity of the State."

The result of the whole agitation was, for the period of the war at least, a victory for the State. The Camden and Amboy Railroad's charter was upheld; the Raritan and Delaware Bay Railroad Company was enjoined from carrying through business and was compelled to settle with the Camden and Amboy Railroad for what through business it had transacted. Finally, after the war, Congress passed a general law,¹³ applying to all States, which asserted that it was unlawful for any continuous railroad to carry goods and passengers from State to State and to charge for the same.

The problem presented during the war by this monopoly of railroad transportation across the State of New Jersey shows clearly another phase, perhaps the basic conception, of States' rights doctrine as held in that State. The monopoly question in itself possessed a most interesting history. Eventually the injunction was carried by both parties, on appeal, to the Court of Errors and Appeals of New Jersey, and the order of the Court of Chancery was sustained.¹⁴ The facts were all presented here. In the debates in Congress upon the Act of June 15, 1866, all the facts, the law, and the precedents were thoroughly reviewed. This act authorized only lines already in existence to engage in interstate commerce, and was not a general authorization for new roads to start construction without a charter from a State. The debate in Congress emphasized the fact that this act was designed to meet the situation

¹¹ Cf. *Newark Journal*, March 25, 1864; *State Gazette*, March 26, 1864; *Senate Journal*, 1864, pp. 610-13.

¹² For the text, cf. *Senate Journal*, 1864, p. 621.

¹³ United States Statutes at Large, 39th Congress, 1st session, Chap. CXXXIV (Act of June 15, 1866).

¹⁴ *New Jersey Equity* 546-75. See also Prentice, E. P.: *The Federal Powers Over Carriers and Corporations*, pp. 208-09.

in New Jersey, and that the shift to a general from a specific statute was made to obtain support for the measure, which had been under discussion since 1863. Other bills seeking the incorporation by Congress of another railroad route from Washington to New York languished in Congress until 1869, when the Camden and Amboy monopoly came to an end through the expiration of its charter.

In one sense, this whole affair was merely a chapter in the growth of Federal control of interstate commerce. It was, however, more than that, since it appeared to many that New Jersey was furnishing aid to the South and giving further evidence of disloyalty to the Government, disloyalty similar to that which had been displayed by the preceding Legislature. The bill proposed in Congress, however, met with universal condemnation within the State. We have seen that even the *State Gazette*, the administration organ in the State, supported the monopoly, and regarded the measures proposed in Congress as an infringement of the rights of the State.

The political aspects of the affair were unfortunate for the administration in that it appears to be another interference with State and individual rights. Even among the Unionists the bill proposed in Congress was unpopular, and was vigorously denounced by their party press. It was not an auspicious beginning for the approaching presidential contest in the State. Further, the political influence of the monopoly was not inconsiderable in New Jersey. The *State Gazette*, January 19, 1863, predicted that the passage of the bill by Congress would make new and powerful enemies for the administration. We have seen that the supplement to the charter of the Joint Companies was secured through the Democratic party. This understanding between the Joint Companies and the Democratic party still continued. Many of the railroad officials stood high in the party's councils. In January, 1863, General William Cook, chief engineer of the Camden and Amboy Railroad Company, had been a candidate for United States Senator, in the Democratic caucus. Throughout the war the influence of the Joint Companies in the councils of the Democratic party, while distinctly loyal, was not thrown in support of the administration after the ebbing of the first enthusiasm at the outbreak of the war. It must, of course, be understood that the railroad did not openly give its support to the Democracy. The railroad lobby used that party primarily, but it did not hesitate to use whatever other influence it could exert to favor for public office Americans, Whigs, Republicans, or Unionists who might be favorable to Camden and Amboy Railroad schemes.

This whole incident served to keep alive the hostility existent in the State towards the administration. It is difficult to see how, under the circumstances set forth above, the railroad interest in politics (which is admitted to have been influential in this era) could have been friendly to the administration. The attempted infringement of the States' rights was, of course, kept prominent during the campaign. The outlook in May for the Unionists in the presidential campaign was, therefore, not promising, though locally they had bettered their position by supporting as warmly as the Democrats did the resolutions of protest addressed to Congress.



COOPER HOSPITAL, CAMDEN



ELKS' HOME AND Y. M. C. A., CAMDEN

CHAPTER XXXVIII.

THE UNION-REPUBLICAN MOVEMENT IN NEW JERSEY.

We have seen that the Constitutional Union party in 1860 in New Jersey disappeared into the ranks of the Democratic party during the months when the southern States were seceding, since it was opposed, above all else, to Republican doctrines. By the time of the opening of hostilities it had ceased to exist. Hence we have to discuss in this chapter the origin and the growth of a new movement, a movement which had for its central idea the defence of the Union and the suppression of the rebellion, and support of President Lincoln's administration in its conduct of the war. We have seen also, how the enthusiasm and the indignation which attended the outbreak of the war for a time overshadowed the traditional controversies of the opposing political parties. For a few days, at any rate, there existed in the State, it might be said, only one political party, and a helpless minority. Yet, although men supported the war, it was perfectly possible for them to differ over its conduct. Disagreement on that issue led speedily to the consideration of the advisability of continuing the war. By mid-summer of 1861 both questions were under discussion in New Jersey. Further, until the close of the war, the political contests in the State centered in these two general and basic questions—the conduct of the war, and the advisability of continuing it.

In the special session of the Legislature, in May, 1861, both political parties responded to the calls of the administration for support in its efforts to suppress the rebellion. During the month that followed little change in the attitude of Democrats was to be noticed. But when, contrary to expectations, the rebellion was not suppressed in a few days, and when disaster at Bull Run indicated that the struggle would be one of years and not of months, the latent hostility to the war and to the administration showed itself, and criticism broke forth. The party alignments again appeared. The "Opposition"-Republican party naturally defended the administration; the Democrats opposed its policy and denied the constitutionality of certain of its acts. The radical, or pro-southern wing of the Democracy, as represented by the *Newark Journal*, went further; it opposed the war, and called for peace.

In the present chapter we have to discuss the political career of that element in New Jersey which, during the war, supported the administration of President Lincoln. Having gained a partial success in the presidential contest of 1860, the "Opposition" party of New Jersey—the ally and representative of the National Republican party—practically ceased to exist. Its candidate, a Republican, was now President. Many Republican or "Opposition" newspapers declared that the "Opposition" party was dead, that it was now the Republican party, though no formal action to that effect had been taken by a party convention. Such was the situation during the summer of 1861.

As the fall elections of that year approached, and criticism of the Republican administration increased and gathered strength, the friends of the administration considered their political situation, and pondered the formation of an organization which should possess some strength in the approaching State and local contests. Members of the Assembly, seven State Senators, and local officials were to be elected. In New Jersey, as we have seen, the name Republican was deemed a political liability rather than a political asset. In State and local contests the Democrats had, during the preceding decade, been, in general, successful. Now, however, national issues were of primary importance, and the old "Opposition" leaders strove to make the utmost use of them.

The first step toward a general State movement to organize the supporters of the administration was taken at a mass meeting in Newark, on September 21, 1861. At this meeting, what the Democratic press termed the "Union-No-Party-Party" was launched by resolutions presented by Joseph P. Bradley, later to be appointed a justice of the United States Supreme Court by President Grant. The resolutions declared

that in the present contest for the existence of the Union, we should recognize no party, believing it to be the solemn duty of every patriot to lay aside party names and party prejudices, and rally to the support of the Government, until rebellion shall be crushed and treason annihilated, and that the nomination of candidates for any office on party grounds tends to excite a strife which cannot fail to be productive of evil in the present unhappy condition of the country.

They declared also that

when the Government shall be rescued from danger of annihilation, then only will it be time to remember our party names; . . . in arresting and securing those who aid and abet the cause of our enemies, and suppressing seditious and treasonable publications, the Government exercises only the ordinary right of self-preservation, and power which is implied in the right to resist and suppress internal war; . . . all Union-loving men who feel that all party considerations should be ignored . . . should organize themselves for promoting and carrying out such sacred object (that is, sustaining the Government), and for thwarting and overruling the insidious acts of those who profess a desire for honorable peace, but who are ready for a dishonorable surrender of the integrity of their country; . . . that a Committee of Seven be appointed to inaugurate such an organization throughout the State.¹

Speeches were made by F. T. Frelinghuysen, William Pennington, and others; a resolution was adopted calling for a "Union County Convention" for the nomination of county officers in Essex County. The committee appointed consisted of Joseph P. Bradley, J. R. Weeks, G. DeWitt, W. A. Righter, Marcus L. Ward, C. B. Guthrie, D. M. Wilson, and T. T. Kinney.

¹ The account given above is based on that in the *Weekly True American*, September 27, 1861. The resolutions are printed there in full.

Such was the inception of the Union movement in 1861. The Democratic press, in commenting upon the Newark meeting, maintained that in such a movement all political parties should have been fairly represented (all prominent Democrats of Newark had been excluded from speaking at the meeting), and that the politicians of no one party should have been allowed to employ such a movement as a mere electioneering scheme for their own benefit.

The new organization was not thoroughly perfected throughout the State. For example, in West Jersey, where the counties were generally sure of returning "Opposition"-Republican majorities, little effort was made in its behalf. But in the northern counties, where the Democratic strongholds were, much effort was expended. The *Weekly True American*, November 1, 1861, cites notices from Republican newspapers of Republican conventions in Salem, Passaic, and other counties. In the Newark charter election on November 8, 1861, in which Mayor Bigelow was a candidate for reelection, his opponent, C. L. C. Gifford, a former Democrat, who ran on the "People's Union" ticket, was severely defeated. Bigelow's majority, 1,737, was double his majority in 1859. In the contests for the Assembly, in November, the Union movement showed a loss. Passaic County was the only county in the northern half of the State which the Union party carried. The Democrats showed a small gain in the Assembly, and gained one seat in the Senate; they had majorities in both branches of the Legislature. In the total vote for members of the Assembly the Democratic majority was over 8,000. The Legislature of 1862 contained, in the Senate, 10 Republicans, 11 Democrats, in the Assembly, 35 Democrats, 22 Republicans, 2 Union members, 1 Fusion member.

So closed the Union movement of 1861. It was, as has been said, not thoroughly organized, and in fact figured only in counties where the Republicans were in a minority. No general organization was perfected, nor was any State convention held. It necessarily, therefore, possessed little unity, since it consisted essentially of independent local campaigns. But this had been characteristic in New Jersey of campaigns other than presidential and gubernatorial. Support of the administration and of the war was not at this time strong enough to counteract the dissatisfaction aroused in the State by arbitrary arrests and by restrictions upon the freedom of the press.

The developments in the organization of the Legislature of 1862 were not satisfactory to a large number in the Union party. The nomination or endorsement of "War Democrats" by Union-Republicans did not, from a party standpoint, work out well, since these Democrats went into the Democratic caucus. How the conduct of the Republican party in New Jersey was viewed outside the State, in some quarters at least, may be seen from the following remarks of Horace Greeley, quoted, from the *New York Tribune*, by the *Weekly True American*, June 6, 1862.

The Republicans of New Jersey are too generally timid, bolting, shameful in the proclamation of their principles. They have tried to beat the Democrats by being as like them as they could, and are under

foot, of course. . . . The Republicans of New Jersey—we speak of their leading politicians and presses—have pursued a mistaken policy from the start. They have tried to overbear Pro-Slavery Democracy with Pro-Slavery Republicanism—a policy that never wins, because it never ought to. . . . Fearing to attack slavery they have surrendered their State into the hands of slavery's tools and parasites like Wall and Cobb and Perry and Naar.

The election of Joseph T. Crowell as president of the Senate, while unwelcome to the peace Democracy, did not reward a deserving Republican. It is not strange, then, that many Republicans became disgruntled and publicly regretted the Union movement of 1861, and spoke against a continuation or revival of the Union party for the gubernatorial campaign of 1862. However, the chairman of the "Opposition"-Republican State Committee, Richard S. Field, and Joseph C. Potts, a Union-Democrat, early injected a Union party movement into the campaign. Though then unfavorably commented upon in the Republican party press, it later gained support. In other states, in 1861, Union party movements had been more successful, and it became evident that they would be continued there. Clearly, the issue must be the defence of the Union and of the policies of the administration. In New Jersey then, some felt that proper organization and a popular candidate might bring success.

Such a candidate was Marcus L. Ward, of Newark. His charities and benevolences, and his devotion to the needs of the soldiers and their families since the outbreak of the war had endeared him to great numbers, and had made him a prominent figure in the ranks of New Jersey Unionists. That he was said to have been a member of the Republican party since its organization qualified him as a party man. With such a candidate for the nomination, Field and Potts controlled the convention which met on August 21. Harmony prevailed in the party at the opening of the campaign. A straightout Union-Republican party was organized, and entered the campaign pledged to support the administration and the war. The *Newark Advertiser*, August 22, 1862, notes that "the convention of the friends of the National Government, called under the auspices of the Republican State Committee, met yesterday." Emancipation was under discussion at the time, so that the proclamation of September 22 was not opposed to the party's stand.

It may be noted here, however, that Governor Olden's attitude towards the emancipation proclamation is decidedly significant, because his action was received with the greatest enthusiasm by many in the Union-Republican ranks. He showed his attitude under the following circumstances. Before the battle of Antietam was fought, a conference of governors had been called, to meet at Altoona, Pennsylvania. They met, however, after the emergency had passed. Twelve of them went on to Washington and presented to President Lincoln an address, afterwards signed by seventeen governors. Governor Olden, however, together with the governors of Delaware, Maryland, Kentucky, and Missouri, dissented from that portion of the address which said,

"We hail with heartfelt gratitude and encouraged hope the proclamation." The Union-Republicans of New Jersey probably neither heartily approved nor vigorously opposed emancipation. But as an act of the administration necessary or advisable in bringing the war to a speedy close, they accepted and defended it. The Union-Republicans approved the proclamation on the ground that it was a penalty on the rebel slave-holders, who, though warned, had refused to return to the Union.² Emancipation was a means, not an end in itself. The *Newark Journal*, January 3, predicted that the proclamation would prove not at all damaging to the South, but that it was rather a firebrand thrown into the councils of the North.

The situation in the State proved too much for the new party. The Emancipation Proclamation caused much dissatisfaction even among Union men. Abolition doctrine, as we have seen, never had flourished in New Jersey, nor was it popular now. Many persons had themselves legally held slaves in New Jersey. The administration's policy of arbitrary arrest and imprisonment had provoked, particularly in the case of Colonel Wall, wide-spread criticism in the preceding year, and that criticism was the issue chiefly stressed by the Democracy in the New Jersey campaign of 1862. Though the Union party made a vigorous campaign, it was overwhelmed in the election. Made up of a majority of the former "Opposition"-Republican party, it had gained few supporters from the Democratic ranks. Interesting light upon the organization of the Union-Republican party and upon this campaign is thrown by the following passage from an interesting manuscript entitled *Personal Reminiscences*, by Charles Perrin Smith. On page 241 Smith says:

Fully alive to the importance of the contest, I spared no effort. For the first time, probably, in the history of the politics of the State, I attempted, single-handed, to effect a perfect organization. With great care, and immense labor, I selected a Committee of three in each ward or township of the State, and supplied them with special instructions, poll books, etc. If means were raised to aid in meeting the expenses of the campaign, they were used by parties, and for purposes of which I had no knowledge. Had I received the coöperation to which I was entitled, our gubernatorial candidate, Mr. Ward, would have been elected. As some offset for his defeat, I sought to make him President of the Union State Convention of 1864. I also advocated the propriety of placing him upon the Union State Electoral Ticket.

On page 405 Smith declares that Parker was elected mainly through the absence of a large proportion of the Union party in the ranks of the army. By the campaign, however, the Union-Republican party has been established as defender of the policies of the National administration. To its defeat in 1862 the general dissatisfaction with emancipation, the Confiscation Act, and military defeats contributed in New Jersey, as in other states. Joseph C. Potts and Richard S. Field, chairman of the State Executive Committee of the

² See the *State Gazette*, January 3, 1862.

"Opposition"-Republican party, had in a sense revived the Union Party movement of 1861, and had organized this new Union-Republican party in 1862. Together with Charles P. Smith they had carried on a vigorous, but unsuccessful, campaign. Smith was serving in his second term as clerk of the Supreme Court of New Jersey. Field's efforts for the new party were recognized by Governor Olden, who appointed him United States Senator to fill temporarily the vacancy due to the death, in September, of Senator John R. Thomson. They were further recognized by his appointment, later, by President Lincoln, as judge of the United States District Court for the district of New Jersey. Potts had been a Douglas Democrat in 1860; he now supported the administration.

During the winter there developed a movement, ostensibly non-political, which was to exercise a marked influence upon the fortunes of the Union-Republican party, in New Jersey as well as nationally. This was the organization of the Union Leagues.³ The Union League in Philadelphia was organized in December, 1862. In New Jersey the movement appeared later; it was apparently stimulated there by the action of the Legislature of 1863 on the peace resolutions. Prominent in the organization of the Trenton Union League was Charles P. Smith. Union League clubs were organized in most of the cities and larger towns. Their object was to furnish a rallying point for all who were for the preservation of the Federal Union.⁴ Club rooms were generally opened. The *State Gazette*, March 23, 1863, declared that the "Union League was not a secret society, nor a political party." However, the leaders of the Union-Republican party were the leaders of Union League clubs, and the speakers at their public meetings. The League clubs may have been the means of attracting some of the Union-Republican party, but at any rate they did good service at a very critical time in lending support to the Union-Republican party and to the administration in the conduct of the war. The enthusiasm attending the new movement was particularly helpful in New Jersey. In the utterances at the Union League meetings we find most readily the attitude of the supporters of the administration upon National and State affairs.

A mass meeting⁵ was held on April 16, in Trenton, by the Royal National League, as the result of a call to the "loyal citizens of New Jersey, without distinction of party." It was well attended by men from all parts of the State. The Hon. Thomas H. Herring, a loyal Democrat of Bergen, was president of the meeting. Frederick T. Frelinghuysen was one of the speakers. He asserted that the peace resolutions of the Legislature did not express the

³ See Rhodes, Vol. IV, pp. 241-42. "Union Leagues" and "Loyal National Leagues" were designations of the same movement.

⁴ See the *Weekly True American*, March 20, 1863, for the account of the organization meeting of a Union League at Burlington, on March 16. The resolutions which the meeting adopted called upon all supporters of the Government's policy of suppressing the rebellion by force of arms to unite in the organization of a Union League. Men of all political parties were invited, provided they supported the Government. Scovel and Potts addressed this meeting, and denounced the acts of the State Legislature.

⁵ *State Gazette*, April 17, 1863.

feeling even of the greater part of the Democracy of New Jersey; declared that the South must be subdued by main force; and expressed his conviction that Governor Parker was loyal and patriotic and would enforce the laws of the State and of the Government. The resolutions adopted condemned the peace resolutions of the Legislature, and upheld the administration, maintaining

That the right of a nation struggling with insurrection, to possess, appropriate, and use, whatever element of strength may adhere in the adversary, is an intrinsic, necessary right, sustained by reason as by all accepted rules of war.

By such expressions of opinion the Union Leagues accepted the acts of the administration, and endorsed its policies. Through the Union Leagues, the Union-Republican party, now almost without official influence in the government of New Jersey, was able to rally support to the National Government, and to interest public opinion so that it might be directed against the program of the peace Democracy. The Democracy controlled the Governor, both branches of the Legislature, four of the five Representatives in Congress, and one United States Senator, as well as the local patronage. There was left to the Union-Republican party only the Federal patronage within the State.

A committee appointed by the Union mass meeting at Trenton, on April 16, now undertook to form a State-wide organization. This was effected by the formation of "The Loyal National League of New Jersey," at a convention at Trenton on June 10.⁶ Ex-Governor Olden was elected president, and Thomas H. Herring vice-president. A State central committee of correspondence was appointed. Each county was represented in the State organization. The call for the organization declared that it should include all the loyal men of the State, and should redeem New Jersey from the stain of the disloyalty fixed upon her by the resolutions of the late Legislature. The emphasis laid on the last-named matter was a decided stimulus to the movement, since it gave the National Union League in New Jersey a positive local aim, not merely the negative aim of defence of the acts of the administration. An address to the people authorized by the convention recommended the Loyal National League to all true men in the State, and announced that it was the intention to establish Leagues in every county and town. As a matter of fact, a political party was organized under this new guise. Or, perhaps, it might be more accurate to say that the formation of the Loyal National League was a reorganization or revival of the Union-Republican party of New Jersey after its defeat in the last elections. Such, at least, was the practical result, since the Loyal National League was to serve as the mainstay of the administration in the campaigns of 1863 and 1864 in New Jersey. The branches of the League gradually became political party associations. There were periods when the interest in the League lagged, and its organization failed; at such times the League was kept alive only by the efforts of the Union-Republican party leaders.

⁶ *State Gazette*, June 11, 1863

As the movement gained strength, the Democratic papers denounced it, and expressed regret at its federalizing tendencies. At the same time they reminded those who were subscribing to the oaths of the Union Leagues that the Constitution of New Jersey contained a provision defining treason against the State of New Jersey.⁷

In the legislative session of 1863 the Union-Republican members were in a hopeless minority. Both Senate and Assembly were Democratic. Since the Governor, too, was a Democrat, that party's control of the State Government was complete. The Union-Republican strength was small in both branches of the Legislature. To be sure, the Union minority, aided at times by the more conservative Democrats, led by Senator Randolph, were able to modify the Copperhead program. But after all, then, as throughout the war, the Union-Republican party was an opposition party in New Jersey politics. It could not hope to carry through any proposals of its own, or to hinder any legislation upon which the Democratic caucus had agreed. An example in point is the bill to allow the soldiers to vote in the field, which was proposed during the session of 1863. While it is probable that provision for the soldiers in the field to vote could constitutionally have been effected only by amendment of the State Constitution, yet the failure to start some procedure whereby the soldiers' vote in the field would eventually have been provided for is to be laid at the door of the Copperheads, who clearly desired the soldiers to have no connection with the elections.

The selection of two United States Senators lay entirely with the Democratic caucus. The Union-Republican caucus conferred an empty honor on Richard S. Field when it nominated him against Colonel Wall, and on William A. Newell, when it named him against William Wright.

In the Legislature the Union-Republican opposition to the various peace resolutions would in itself have been ineffective to temper those offered by the Copperheads. But the peace resolutions which were finally embodied in the majority report of the Joint Committee on Federal Relations showed the understanding between Senator Randolph and the Union-Republican minority. However, this did not prevent the introduction of a minority report, too, signed by the Union-Republican members of the committee, which endorsed without reserve the administration.⁸

Various resolutions endorsing the administration's conduct of the war, offered by the Union-Republican members of both houses, were referred without debate to the Joint Committee on Federal Relations. Those offered by James M. Scovel, on February 5, while expressing the same thought as the others, are of peculiar interest, since Scovel was one of the few Democrats in the Legislature, of for that matter in the State, to be found supporting the administration's conduct of the war. His resolutions, according to the *State Gazette*, February 6, 1863, ran as follows:

⁷ Article I, paragraph 14. This was the Constitution adopted in 1844.

⁸ For the minority report of the Joint Committee on Federal Relations, February 19, 1863, see the *State Gazette*, February 20, 1863.



HORTICULTURAL GARDEN, BRIDGETON WATER WORKS



MOORESTOWN COMMUNITY HOUSE GARDEN

Resolved, That the unparalleled events of the past two years have revealed to the citizens of the United States, beyond question or the possibility of doubt, that a peaceful reconciliation upon the form of our Constitution is repelled and scorned by every State now in rebellion, and that secession means treason, and in the hearts of its sympathizers, North and South, means war against our country and the disintegration of our Nation.

Second—That the citizens of the United States in the State of New Jersey, believing it the duty of every good citizen to sacrifice ease, estate, applause, and life itself to the sacred call of our country, now declare their unalterable determination to sustain the Government in its efforts to maintain the honor, the integrity, and the existence of our National Union.

Third—That no differences of political opinion, no badge of diversity, upon points of party distinction, shall restrain or withhold us in the devotion of all we have or can command to the vindication of our Government, the maintenance of its laws, and the defence of the flag of our country.

Scovel's attitude was certainly clear-cut. To him secession was treason, and meant disintegration of the Nation. In the debate in the Assembly on March 17, Scovel advocated the adoption of the minority report of the Joint Committee on Federal Relations. He spoke at length, incidentally recounting the history of the Democracy since 1860.

But, as had been pointed out, the Union-Republican opposition to the program of the Democratic caucus was up to this date ineffective. The Union-Republican party, however, through the press and the Union Leagues, then in process of formation throughout the State, did arouse and influence public opinion on the peace resolutions. In Democratic circles the peace resolutions of the Legislature did not have universal support. The debate on the resolutions revealed the Copperhead desire for effective opposition to the "unconstitutional acts of the administration." Further, there was a proposal before the Legislature that the State Militia should be organized and enlistments for it should be made, to the number of 40,000. In his remarks at the organization of the Union League at Burlington,⁹ Mr. Scovel referred to this proposal and to the fact that it was alleged by its supporters that the purpose of a pending appropriation bill contemplating a loan of \$1,000,000 was to gain money to arm these 40,000 state troops, as needed to defend New Jersey against threatened invasion by New York and Pennsylvania. Scovel denounced the bill as a proposal of those who were eminently disloyal. Here, he declared, was Copperhead conscription of 40,000 at a single stroke. Such discussion shows the way in which the Union-Republican party met the passage of the peace resolutions. The reaction against the Copperhead program, stimulated by the Union Leagues, was immediate and productive of some positive results. The most important result was the introduction, on March 24, almost within a week, by Senator Randolph of his resolutions, which, referring to

⁹ March 16, 1863.

charges similar to those made by Scovel, denounced such an interpretation of the Democratic platform, and embodied a direct repudiation of the Copperhead interpretation of the peace resolutions as made by Holsman and English during the debate. The Union-Republican party, through its appeal to public opinion, made in this connection its most important contribution to New Jersey politics during the legislative session of 1863.

In the political campaign of 1863 the Union-Republican party opposed the Democracy upon the issue of the Union. Its opposition, however, lacked coherence, since no State convention of the party was held. Local county conventions made the nominations for the Legislature. In some instances Democrats were nominated by the Union-Republican party, the only test of party being fidelity to the Union. The greatest interest in the senatorial contest centered in Camden County, where James M. Scovel, a war Democrat, was a candidate on the Union-Republican ticket. His opponent was John R. Graham, an employee of the Camden and Amboy Railroad. The *State Gazette*,¹⁰ however, thought the railroad would not interfere in the canvass. The *Newark Mercury* was not so optimistic. After a sharp contest Scovel was successful.

The Union-Republican campaign was not, however, in general, enthusiastic or successful. The victories of the armies in July did not materially aid the party campaign. The *State Gazette*¹¹ took the friends of the administration to task for being idle. At an earlier date,¹² it had charged that the Union League movement had been allowed to lapse, and that it was important only in the cities. It must be noted, however, that the Union Leagues furnished the chief support to the local efforts of the party. The early enthusiasm of the Union Leagues had unquestionably waned, but the Leagues still exercised a potent influence upon Union-Republican politics in New Jersey. The results in November showed that the balance of public opinion in New Jersey remained opposed to the administration and to the war.

The Union-Republican members of the Legislature of 1864, still a distinct minority, exercised even less influence upon legislation than the Union-Republican members had in the preceding session. The Senate contained 14 Democrats, 7 Union members, the Assembly 40 Democrats, 20 Union members; the Democratic majority on joint ballot was 27. It is true, however, that aside from the question of the soldiers' vote, and the resolutions of protest over the proposed federal interference with the arrangements existing between the Joint Companies and the State of New Jersey, nothing of political importance was acted upon by the Legislature. Upon the Camden and Amboy Railroad question, Union-Republican opinion coincided with that of the Democracy. Loyalty to the doctrine of States' rights, inherent in New Jersey political theory, showed itself stronger than the loyalty generally existing between State and Federal organizations. In the study of New Jersey politics this peculiar attitude must always be reckoned with. In part it may serve to

¹⁰ October 20, 1863.

¹¹ October 9, 1863.

¹² October 1, 1863.

explain the phrase long current, and familiar still, that New Jersey lies outside the Union. However, had the Union-Republicans taken any other position upon the railroad issue, the party strength might well have been further impaired.

Upon the proposition, inherited from the preceding session, to provide by law that the soldiers in the field should be able to vote in the State and Federal elections, the Union-Republicans had to contend with what appeared to be a clear constitutional prohibition. In 1863 they had obtained an opinion from Attorney-General Frelinghuysen favorable to the constitutionality of a proposed bill. This, however, came so late in the session that the Democrats were able, in the rush of the closing hours of the session, to side-track the bill. The well-conceived plan to gain, through the force of public opinion and pressure upon the Legislature, the passage of the bill by the Legislature of 1864 failed. As has been said, the soldiers' vote was not looked on favorably by the peace Democracy. Soldiers serving in the field, most of them voluntarily, as in the case of the soldiers from New Jersey, might well be Democrats, but they were not likely to be favorable to a party which sought to prevent the very thing for which they were fighting, the suppression, through force of arms, of the Confederacy. Mr. English's pet bill, to prevent the military from appearing in the vicinity of the polling places, indicates how the Copperheads thought the soldiers felt towards the peace Democracy. The Union-Republican scheme was checked by the passage of Mr. Taylor's resolutions. When the bill came up, toward the end of the session, it was defeated by a party vote. The Senate, however, created a committee to report to the next Legislature upon suggested amendments to the State Constitution.

At an early date President Lincoln was assured of support from the Union-Republican party in New Jersey in his contest for renomination. Even in May, 1863, the *State Gazette* editorially favored his renomination in 1864.¹³ Shortly after the Legislature assembled in 1864, the Union-Republican members in caucus appointed a committee to draft a memorial favorable to Lincoln's renomination and endorsing the policy of the administration. Apparently, this action was for the time to remain secret, but somehow a note concerning it appeared in the correspondence of the *New York Times*. They finally, however, in a letter to Lincoln presented his name as that of the "man for President of the American People in 1864."¹⁴ This was endorsed by the State Union Convention of May 12, 1864, when the Union character of the Union-Republican party was emphasized by the selection of two former Democrats as senatorial delegates, or delegates at large, to the National Convention. The delegation was instructed for Lincoln, who was the choice of the party, when it met in National Convention at Baltimore, June 7. Marcus L. Ward was appointed a member of the Union National Committee.

Not all the opponents of the Democracy in the Nation or in New Jersey were so favorable to the renomination of Lincoln. At Cleveland, Ohio,

¹³ *State Gazette*, May 27, 1863.

¹⁴ *State Gazette*, February 20, 1864.

there was held a convention of those who were opposed to the renomination of Lincoln.¹⁵ They hoped, by having named a candidate, to influence the convention of the Union party to accept their candidate rather than split the party. They named John C. Fremont and General John Cochrane, of New York. On the committee on resolutions was a Dr. Greiner, of New Jersey. But the Jerseyman really prominent in the movement was Orestes A. Brownson, who had been a candidate for Congress from the Third New Jersey District, on the Union platform, in 1862. In a speech delivered at a Fremont ratification meeting at Cooper Union, in New York City,¹⁶ he declared for any one to beat Lincoln, though he had no sympathy, he said, with Seymour, Vallandigham, Fernando Wood, and the peace Democracy. This movement, since it was composed of men who held more radical views than Lincoln entertained, found little support in New Jersey. When the military situation improved, after the Democratic National Convention had met, Fremont withdrew in favor of Lincoln. His letter of withdrawal¹⁷ was published in the evening journals of September 22. The Union-Republican State Convention of New Jersey was then in session at Trenton. The convention endorsed the National Union platform, and Lincoln and Johnson, and named the candidates for State electors. Marcus L. Ward and Alexander G. Cattell headed the ticket as electors at large. A slight disturbance of the harmony of the convention was threatened when the Senator from Camden, James M. Scovel, sought to have a resolution passed that would place the party in opposition to any extension of the privileges of the Camden and Amboy Railroad. The immediate tabling of the resolution prevented discussion.

The Union Leagues were prominent in the campaign; meetings were held everywhere, but even with the change in political sentiment caused by the victories of the armies in September the campaign was not successful. Some progress, unquestionably, was made against the peace Democracy, but the State remained Democratic.

In 1864, a new chairman of the Union-Republican State Committee—Charles P. Smith—was chosen. He had been a member of the committee since 1859. His comment on the campaign is that little coöperation was shown in the conduct of the Union-Republican campaign of 1864. He claims that the leaders did not back him efficiently; though they were willing to receive and disburse funds, the burden of organization was left to him. He believed that, with more coöperation, the election might have been won.

How many soldiers were able to vote in November, 1864, it is impossible to say. Some undoubtedly did vote in New Jersey. The failure of the Legislature of that year to make any provision for the soldiers to vote in the field rendered it necessary for the soldier to obtain leave and to return to his home district to vote. That had been the plan proposed in the resolutions which the Legislature passed. These resolutions provided that the military commanders

¹⁵ See Rhodes, Vol. IV, pp. 463-64.

¹⁶ June 27, 1864.

¹⁷ See Rhodes, Vol. IV, p. 529.

should be requested to grant leave to soldiers to come home to vote, wherever the military situation would permit. This Governor Parker did by forwarding copies of the resolutions. The problem was undoubtedly difficult. Upon that point we have some expert testimony. Mr. Smith says, "I also assumed the Herculean task of bringing soldiers home to vote—a duty requiring perseverance, tact, unflinching work, and no small outlay of money."

The election assured a tie in the Assembly of 1865, though the joint meeting of the two houses would be Democratic. This would mean, normally, the election of a Democrat as United States Senator. Such an election would involve a Union party loss, since the Democratic Senator would succeed Senator Ten Eyck. However, ex-Governor Newell's election to the House of Representatives would, to a certain extent, balance that loss.¹⁸ His personal popularity throughout the State was always available to his party, which sometimes poorly repaid him.¹⁹

This campaign of 1864 was the last conducted by the Union party. At no time since its formation had the Republican party had formal State-wide recognition or standing in New Jersey. It had admitted the "Opposition" party of New Jersey to its councils, but the "Opposition" party retained its independent existence. When, after the campaign of 1860, the "Opposition" party seemed to have disappeared into the Republican party, the outbreak of the war led to the formation of a new party, known as the Union party. This movement was tentative in 1861, but definitely established in 1862, and continued in 1863 and 1864. Popularly the party was known as the Union party, the Union-Republican party, or merely the Republican party. This last designation found favor with the Democratic press. The close of the war changed the situation; the party was known thenceforth as the Republican party of New Jersey.

¹⁸ The Union party elected two Congressmen and made a gain in the Assembly, thereby electing the speaker, Joseph T. Crowell, and the clerk.

¹⁹ Cf. Nelson, p. 251: "For more than twenty years (to 1870) as the most prominent and influential leader in his party, he had controlled and dispensed party patronage throughout his State and Congressional district."



CHAPTER XXXIX.

THE PEACE DEMOCRACY GAINS CONTROL OF THE STATE.

In the congressional elections held in October and November, 1862, Indiana, Illinois, Wisconsin, Ohio, Pennsylvania, New York and New Jersey declared against the administration. In New York and New Jersey the Democrats elected their gubernatorial candidates, Horatio Seymour and Joel Parker. Though bound by their campaign pledges to support the war, both were extremely hostile to many measures of the administration, and particularly to emancipation. They were, however, placed in quite dissimilar circumstances.

Seymour had already served a term as Governor and was a leader of his party. For some years he had been a figure of national prominence. In New York the Republicans were in control of the Upper House of the Legislature; by a coalition with the Union-Democrats they were able to organize the Assembly as well. Governor Seymour was, therefore, confronted by an opposition Legislature, which was pledged to support the administration. Further, the peace element in the Democratic party in New York, of which James Brooks and Fernando Wood were the principal leaders, was comparatively small. So unpropitious, indeed, was the situation in New York that Brooks and Wood turned their attention to New Jersey as a more fertile field.

Governor Parker, on the other hand, though popular, had not been a dominating figure even in New Jersey politics. Interest in his inaugural message and in the policies he might advocate lay, therefore, in the fact that his party had large majorities in both branches of the Legislature. Moreover, radical or Copperhead opinion which had not been a negligible factor in November, was represented by able leaders, thoroughly aroused by Lincoln's Emancipation Proclamation of January 1, 1863.

Mr. James Brooks, discouraged by his experiences in New York, now became a self-appointed adviser to New Jersey, and urged the latter, because of her peculiarly fortunate position, to assume the rôle of mediator between the North and the South, and to demand an armistice and the calling of a National Convention to settle all difficulties between the two sections. His suggestion was well received by the extremists in the ranks of the Democracy in New Jersey. The latter were dissatisfied also because Governor Olden had appointed Richard S. Field, the chairman of the Union-Republican State Committee, as United States Senator,¹ to fill the vacancy caused by the death, in September, of Hon. John R. Thomson, a Democrat. Field took his seat in the Senate on December 13, 1862.

The approaching session of the Legislature promised interesting develop-

¹ The *Hunterdon Democrat* demanded that the Legislature on the second day of the session elect a *true* Union man to fill Thomson's unexpired term. *Weekly True American*, December 5, 1862.

ments. The Legislature assembled on January 13. Anthony Reckless, of Monmouth, was chosen president of the Senate, over Joseph T. Crowell, the president of the preceding Senate. James T. Crowell, of Middlesex, was elected speaker of the Assembly. Reckless was elected by a vote of 12 to 8, Crowell by 41 to 17. These votes indicated the party strength during the session. Governor Olden, on January 4, 1863, in his annual message² to the Legislature, reviewed New Jersey's part in the war, and stated significantly the position of the Unionists in the State:

Thus far in the history of this war her record is without stain—so may it ever be.

It is not, however, enough that our *brethren in arms* so undauntedly perform *their part* in the contest, . . . but *our patriotism* should be manifested by an earnest determination to support the Government, which is the representative of our country. Even if that Government, in the fearful ordeal through which it has been and still is passing, has "done things which it ought not to have done, and left undone things it ought to have done," still a truehearted patriotism will not therefore desert it, but will strive to correct its mistakes without weakening its power. We want peace, but not until those in arms against the Government are overcome.

Rather unexpectedly, the extreme Copperhead view also was set forth at this opening session, in resolutions presented in the Senate by Senator Daniel Holsman, of Bergen County. Since the debate started by these resolutions continued throughout the session, they are quoted here in full. Holsman did, indeed, maintain that he alone was responsible for the subject-matter of the resolutions. Yet, as the *State Gazette*³ suggested in comments upon them, they showed marked similarity to the proposals of Mr. James Brooks, of New York. The resolutions, which were made the special order of business for Tuesday, January 22, ran as follows:

Be it *Resolved* by the Senate and General Assembly of the State of New Jersey,

1. That it is the sense of the Legislature and people of New Jersey, that the Civil War in which the Nation is unhappily involved, ought not to be protracted one moment longer than is necessary to test the power of the Government within the limits which the Constitution has imposed, and that, so soon as the conduct of the War requires or involves the sacrifice of rights which the Constitution secures, it ought to cease.

2. That the people of New Jersey, their representatives here assembled, and the gallant soldiers, who, without compulsion, have rushed to arms to maintain the Constitution, believe that the time for honorable pacification has arrived and that every effort ought to

² See *Legislative Documents*, 1863.

³ *New York Times*, January 6, 1863; quoted and discussed by the *State Gazette*, January 5-8, 1863.

be made to effect it, and avert the consequences which must ensue from a continuance of war at the expense of constitutional freedom.

3. That the recent proclamation of emancipation, the division of a sovereign state without the consent of its people and legislature, the appointment of a military governor, and the attempt on the part of the executive to control the popular branch of Congress by fraudulent military elections of representatives, are gross violations of the Constitution, and merit and receive the condemnation of this legislature.

4. That to the same category belong the system of arbitrary arrests, the infringement of the freedom of the press, the executive suspension of the writ of *habeas corpus*, the confiscation and seizure of property without judicial process, and the establishment of the military authority beyond the lines of the army, and all attest the evil tendency of civil war.

5. That in view of the possibility of greater evils in the dark future before us, it is the duty of the Legislature and the Executive of the State to economize and cultivate its credit and resources, maintain and improve its military organization, and to take all necessary and proper means to assert the integrity, the dignity and sovereignty of the State.

6. That as in heat of passion excited by civil war, it is impossible to approach the discussion of measures of peace with that calmness which is requisite, an armistice of six months should be established between the contending states.

7. That in the third month after the armistice has been agreed to, one delegate should be elected in each congressional district in each State, which delegates should, on the second Monday of the ensuing month, assemble in the city of Lexington, Kentucky, to discuss such measures of amicable settlement as shall be presented.⁴

These resolutions embodied the extreme demands of the Copperheads in the State. They not only criticized vigorously the conduct of the war; they went further, and suggested (in the fifth resolution) that they had in mind the possibility of resistance to the National Government. The intent of the resolutions was developed more clearly by their supporters during the ensuing debate.

On the next day, January 14, the Democrats proceeded to elect a United States Senator. At the caucus held in the morning the names of four candidates were presented—Dr. Charles Skelton of Sussex, Charles Sitgreaves of Warren, General William Cook, the chief engineer of the Camden and Amboy Railroad, and Colonel James W. Wall. On the first ballot, General Cook led, but on the third the votes which had been given on the first two ballots to Skelton and Sitgreaves were cast for Colonel Wall. General Cook had been a Douglas elector in 1860, and was personally very popular, but he was generally considered to be too much of a war Democrat. Wall was a candidate for the long Senate term which was to begin on March 4, and not for this unex-

⁴ *Senate Journal*, 1863, pp. 10-11; *State Gazette*, January 14, 1863.



GOETHALS BRIDGE AT ELIZABETH



OUTERBRIDGE CROSSING AT PERTH AMBOY

pired term. He appeared in Trenton on January 14, presumably to prevent his name being used in connection with the latter, but his appearance provoked a burst of enthusiasm which rendered his election to the unexpired term sure, in spite of his remonstrances.

When the Legislature went into joint meeting in the afternoon, Wall was elected, over Richard S. Field,⁵ the Union-Republican candidate. The vote was: Wall, 53; Field, 22; Cook, 1; W. A. Newell, 2; not voting, 3. Wall presented his credentials in the United States Senate on January 21; Sumner, of Massachusetts, presented his at the same time. On the same day, January 14, Richard S. Field was nominated by President Lincoln and confirmed by the United States Senate as a judge of the United States District Court, for the district of New Jersey. Wall's election was generally approved in Democratic circles, since it could be considered only as a rebuke to the administration for the policy of arbitrary arrests. It also shows that the Democracy of New Jersey was now in the mood to make a decided expression, at least, of its condemnation of the administration. Copperheadism thus clearly showed itself in these first two meetings of the Legislature. Governor Parker's inaugural address, yet to be delivered, was for the time placed in the background in this rush to rebuke the administration.

Governor Parker, in his inaugural address, presented on January 20,⁶ discussed at great length national affairs. After declaring that the framers of the Constitution considered that they were creating a government for all time, and were making a bond of perpetual union, he discussed the right of secession, as follows:

The nature of our National compact negatives the idea that secession is a reserved right of the States. . . . There being then no constitutional right of secession, the next question that arises is, whether there was sufficient cause for revolution. . . . Upon examination of the ordinances and proceedings of the various conventions, it will be found by their own showing that, although there had been great provocation, no grievance existed sufficient to justify revolution. . . . A minority of fanatical and ultra men in each section, controlling the current of events, brought this Government to the verge of destruction.

Discussing the purpose of the war and the status of the Constitution in war time, he said:

The war was declared by Congress to be waged on the part of the United States, not for any purpose of conquest of subjugation, overthrowing or interfering with the rights or established institutions of the States, but to defend and maintain the supremacy of the Constitution, and to preserve the Union, with the

⁵ See *State Gazette*, January 15, 1863.

⁶ For the text of Governor Parker's message, cf. the *State Gazette*, January 21, 1863, and *Legislative Documents*, 1863. It should be noted that the term of the Governor began on the third Tuesday of January following the election.

equality and rights of the several States unimpaired. This was the only legitimate purpose for which the war could be prosecuted, and with this purpose in view the loyal States responded to the call of the Government. In accepting the stern reality of war for the maintenance of the Constitution, they had a right to expect that their own Constitutional privileges would be respected. They did not expect that in order to suppress rebellion, the inalienable liberties of loyal citizens must be sacrificed. They did not expect that the Constitution of the United States was so impotent that its supremacy could only be maintained by a violation of its provisions.

Calling the emancipation proclamation the chief fruit of the "War Power," Governor Parker held that, if constitutional, it must be discussed. He considered emancipation a problem to be solved in the future by the people of the states where the institution of slavery existed, and one which would prolong the war. "Slavery," he said, "is no more the cause of the war than gold is the cause of robbery or murder. . . . In all these cases the evil passions of men, taking the form of illegal action, were the antecedent cause Abolition and Secession are the authors of our calamity, and Abolition is the parent of Secession." Since slavery was recognized by the Constitution, it was, therefore, he maintained, the business only of the separate states where it existed.

These discussions but led up to a consideration of the duties of the people in the crisis, and of peace. With respect to the former, Governor Parker stated that the chief duty was to restore the Union of the states; all should respect judicial decisions, and conform strictly to the requirements of the law; failure in the proper administration of a good government does not discharge the people from their obligations to perpetuate that government. Further, they should cling to the Constitution and take care that both National and State governments confine their action within the sphere of their respective powers. The constitutional demands of the National Government should be responded to, whether in peace or in war.

We should not be afraid of peace—an honorable and permanent peace—whether it come to us by the exercise of power, or by the exercise of conciliation. It should be a peace on the basis of "the Union as it was," not a union of States where parts are held in subjugation as conquered provinces, adding nothing to the material interests and prosperity of the Nation, and only furnishing a theater of action for swarms of military officials; but a union of all the States, with their "equality and rights unimpaired." It should be a peace founded on the submission of all to the rightful authority of the Government, and the guarantee of all their constitutional rights by the Government. It should be a peace bringing with it such unity as will have the Constitution for its foundation, and obedience to law for its corner-stone.

Governor Parker's inaugural address was, naturally, condemned by the Union-Republican press. In Democratic circles it was well received, since

it was possible for the conservative and the extremist each to place his own construction upon the Governor's statements. From the conservative point of view the Governor expressed again the resolutions of the convention which nominated him in September, 1862, and protested against the administration's unconstitutional acts. His analysis of the duties of the people in the crisis appeared to advocate support of the Government in putting down the rebellion. On the other hand, this position was weakened by his remarks upon peace—"whether it come to us by the exercise of power, or by the exercise of conciliation." Therein he was unquestionably thinking of the proposals of those in his party who favored immediate peace, whether or not peace meant recognition of the Confederacy.

Senator Holsman had spoken for others in the Democratic party besides himself. The Copperhead group in the Legislature had just shown that it was strong enough in the party caucus to elect the most prominent Copperhead in the State to the United States Senate, and it was clear that its members were committed to a program which should hamper as far as possible the Government's conduct of the war. It is not surprising, then, that Governor Parker, who, as a conservative Democrat, was an honest opponent of secession, sought to gain—by his expressions concerning peace and response to constitutional demands of the National Government—support from the Copperhead members of the Legislature. In so bidding for their support he no doubt strengthened them in their stand, though he thereby prevented immediate division in Democratic ranks. Charles P. Smith, in his *Reminiscences*, pp. 243-44, commented upon Governor Parker's policy: "The positive requirements of the administration were acceded to, but without enthusiasm. Less than this would have caused him more trouble than he was able to withstand . . . I regarded his natural promptings as patriotic, but the radically disloyal element of his party was dominant and dictatorial, and he lacked the strength of character to resist it."

The Governor, however, had support in the Legislature for his more moderate views. In the Senate his recognized representative was Theodore F. Randolph, of Hudson, who displayed capable leadership in thwarting Copperhead schemes. He was supported by Chandler in the Senate, and, in the Assembly, by Vanatta, of Morris. The leading Copperhead in the Senate was Daniel Holsman. He had been elected to the Assembly in 1857 and had been speaker in 1858. In 1862 he was elected to the Senate on an avowed Copperhead platform. In the Assembly, all of whose members had been elected in the preceding autumn, Copperheadism had a larger representation. Again the leaders were from Bergen County—John Y. Dater and Thomas Dunn English,⁷ the poet and novelist. The latter, educated as a physician, had, however, for several years been engaged in journalism in New York. He first came into prominence in New Jersey politics in the summer of 1861, when he addressed a majority of the peace meetings held in the State. In the ensuing political campaign, and in 1862, when he was a candidate, in

⁷ English is best known as the author of the ballad "Ben Bolt."

Bergen County, for the Assembly, he was most outspoken in denunciation of the Government, advocating peace through conciliation.

Outside of the Legislature the prominent Copperhead leaders were Colonel James W. Wall, now United States Senator, ex-Governor Rodman M. Price, Edward N. Fuller, the editor of the *Newark Journal*, William Wright, the proprietor of that newspaper, and C. Chauncey Burr,⁸ the most vociferous and outspoken of them all. The latter was not a native of New Jersey, but an addition to New Jersey politics from the West, via New York journalism. For a time after the outbreak of the war Burr was editor of the *Bergen County Democrat*, but he retired from connection with that paper in May, 1862. In attack upon the administration and in advocacy of peace he was by far the boldest of the New Jersey Copperheads. For that reason, and for past adventures, he was subjected to the most virulent attack and abuse by the Union-Republican press. This nullified to a great extent any influence his opinion might otherwise have had in the State. However, as the mouthpiece of the most radical Copperheadism he spoke continually; his addresses were featured, and were quoted at length in the columns of the *Newark Journal*. A little later the *State Gazette* taunted the Democracy by describing Burr as "now the acknowledged head and front of the Democratic party in New Jersey."⁹

On January 22, Holsman's resolutions were again the subject of debate. Senator Holsman finally moved that they be referred to a special committee; of such committee, if created, under the rules, be chairman. Senator Chandler, a conservative Democrat, moved indefinite postponement. Senator Randolph, and Senator Crowell, of Union, also vigorously opposed the resolutions as they stood. Holsman finally yielded, and amended the resolutions so that they should be concurrent resolutions rather than joint resolutions; they were then referred to the Joint Committee on Federal Relations. It was expected that the resolutions, having met with such opposition within the Democratic ranks, would sleep in this committee. This Joint Committee on Federal Relations had been newly created, as the result of a motion made in the Senate, on January 15, by Senator Randolph, and agreed to by the Assembly, on January 21. Senator Randolph's motion prevailed in spite of opposition by Senator Holsman.¹⁰ Messrs. Randolph, Vanatta and English, were members of this committee. The Copperheads were here outmaneuvered. Clement L. Vallandigham, of Ohio, in a letter to Mr. Holsman, which was

⁸ *State Gazette*, October 5, 1863. The account of Burr's life here presented has been gathered from the controversial press. At one time he was, apparently, a clergyman in the west. In 1848 he had written for publication an abolitionist pamphlet. In 1856 he deserted a wife and three children in Urbana, Ohio. Coming east, Burr was for a time press agent for the well-known international character, Lola Montes, then touring the United States with a show entitled "Lola Montes in Bavaria." In New York Burr married again, and later, in June, 1863, his first wife brought suit for divorce in Ohio. During the fall and winter of 1863, the *State Gazette* continually referred to him as "ex-abolitionist, ex-preacher, ex-mesmerizer, and ex-agent for a second rate danseuse. . . ."

⁹ The *State Gazette*, January 10, 1863, quoted the *Sussex Register* which said that Burr had become a distinguished leader of the Breckenridge wing of the New Jersey Democracy.

¹⁰ Cf. *State Gazette*, January 22, and *New York Times*, January 23, 1863.

made public, had endorsed these resolutions and thereby given them a distinctly Copperhead character. The *Newark Journal*, according to the *State Gazette*,¹¹ had been almost alone in openly supporting these Holsman peace resolutions in the State. In endorsing the resolutions, the *Newark Journal* had gone so far as to refer to the Democratic party as the "Anti-War Party."

The views of the conservative Democrats on peace were expressed in resolutions offered in the Senate, on February 4, by Senator Randolph.¹² These recited the pledges of the resolution passed by Congress on July 23, 1861; urged the administration to return to the principles involved in those pledges; protested against every exercise of power upon the part of the Federal Government not given clearly and expressly in the Constitution; and asserted that New Jersey had assisted in maintaining the supremacy of the Federal Union, that she had never been other than willing to terminate "peacefully and honorably to all, a war unnecessary in its origin, fraught with horror and suffering in its prosecution, and necessarily dangerous to all in its continuance," but that in view of opinion expressed in the South it was inexpedient to suggest plans to effect a settlement. The Randolph resolutions expressed essentially the views of Governor Parker's inaugural address, with the added statement that it was not a propitious moment for peace efforts.

Senator Holsman's resolutions were the subject of a Democratic caucus, which was held on February 11. Randolph, Vanatta and Chandler opposed them vigorously. The Bergen group—Holsman, English, and Dater—sought to have them approved by the caucus, and so made a part of the party program. When this move was defeated, they left the caucus. A week later, on February 19, the Joint Committee on Federal relations made majority and minority reports.¹³ The resolutions embodied in the majority report did not go to the length desired by the Copperheads, though they were more radical in tone than the Randolph resolutions.

The Copperhead program had not been a subject of debate in the Assembly before the date set for the Democratic caucus. On the day of the caucus, Mr. James Smith, of Newark, presented resolutions embodying the Randolph resolutions of February 4, and naming commissioners from New Jersey, who should proceed to Richmond and ascertain whether the states now in arms against the Federal Government will consent to reaffirm their adhesion to the Union and recognize the authority of the Constitution; and, if not, on what terms or conditions amicable relations under one Federal Government can be restored between them and the other states. Further, the coöperation of the other states was invited, and the President of the United States was requested to furnish to the commissioners the safeguards necessary to enable them to proceed in security upon their journey. These resolutions had already been printed in the *Newark Journal*, on February 6, and endorsed by that paper. While they received no independent discussion,

¹¹ *State Gazette*, January 22, 23, 1863.

¹² For Randolph's resolutions, cf. *Senate Journal*, 1863, 70-72.

¹³ For both reports, cf. *State Gazette*, February 20, 1863.

they helped to express the radical attitude. The naming of commissioners to take over functions of the Federal Government, perhaps to bring about its overthrow, and the request that the Federal Government should protect such commissioners, bothered Mr. Smith and his friends not in the least.

Debate on the reports of the Joint Committee on Federal Relations was renewed in the Senate on February 25 and 26. Messrs. Randolph and Chandler supported the majority report, while Mr. Holsman interpreted its clause to suit his more radical tendencies. The Republican leaders opposed the resolutions, and denounced them vigorously as an attack on the Union as well as on the administration, but they were, of course, unable to defeat the program of the majority caucus. On February 26 the resolutions passed the Senate by a strict party vote of 12 to 6.¹⁴ The vote was as follows; yeas, Messrs. Blain, Chandler, Garwood, Holsman, Randolph, Reckless, Robbins, Scudder, Smith, Stille, Swayze, Veghte; nays, Buckley, Horner, Leaming, Ludlam, Pierson, Quinby, Reeve, Tatem; not voting, Joseph T. Crowell. The Assembly, however, did not take up the resolutions at once.

The reports of the Joint Committee on Federal Relations were the subject of sharp debate in the Assembly throughout morning, afternoon, and evening sessions on March 17.¹⁵ The principal speech against the majority resolutions was made by James M. Scovel, of Camden. After reviewing the positions adopted by the Democratic party in the State, Mr. Scovel charged the Democracy with seeking to aid the South. Mr. Vanatta, of Morris, and Mr. English spoke at length in advocacy of the resolutions. The former declared that he was for the Constitution and the Union, but was opposed to the policy of the administration; he did not see in the fifth resolution, as did Mr. English, any leaning toward recognition of the Confederacy; many, he believed, felt that the commission idea ought to be tried, as it would place the North in a good position before the world. He did not in any sense admit the correctness of Mr. English's views on the war. In stating his position thus Mr. Vanatta was voicing the attitude of the conservative Democrats in the State, those represented by the Governor, Senator Randolph, and ex-Governor Peter D. Vroom.

Mr. English spoke frequently and at length. He did not agree with Mr. Vanatta's interpretation of the resolutions, but was ready to admit that they intended about all that the Republicans charged. English admitted also that he had no confidence whatever in the administration, and that he had never approved the coercion of the seceding states, believing it wrong in principle and useless in policy. Declaring that the South would never be subjugated, he admitted that the resolutions did look like acknowledging a Southern Confederacy; he would see civil war come, but would lift his voice against the abuses of power. Further, he held that the resolutions were a bold and explicit assertion of reserved states' rights. He spoke, further, as follows:

¹⁴ *State Gazette*, February 27, 1863.

¹⁵ For the debate, cf. *State Gazette*, and *True American*, March 18, 19, 1863.

I approve, in the main, of the resolutions before the House, because, stripped of their surplus words, they embody a protest against the unlawful acts of the President and his advisors—a protest which New Jersey will not fail to make good by ballot, or by bullet, as may be best needed—and because they recommend the appointment of commissioners for the purpose of ending this miserable strife. . . .¹⁶

The debate throughout was sharp. The Republicans denounced the majority resolutions and urged the adoption of the minority report. The Democrats, however, had caucused, so that, when Mr. Salter moved the minority resolutions as a substitute, his motion was lost by a vote of 37 to 13. The majority resolutions¹⁷ were then passed by a vote of 37 to 13. The resolutions were thus passed in both Houses by a strict party vote.

The first and second resolutions, as passed, recited the declarations of President Lincoln's inaugural address, quoted the resolution of Congress of July 26, 1861, and urged upon the President the redemption of the pledges under which the troops of the State had entered the contest, and had continued it, and insisted on a return to the policies promised by those pledges, as the only means by which the Union could be restored and the Nation could be saved.

The resolutions then proceeded as follows:¹⁸

3. *And be it Resolved*, That it is the deliberate sense of the people of this State that the war power within the limits of the Constitution is ample for any and all emergencies, and that all assumptions of power, under whatever plea, beyond that conferred by the Constitution, are without warrant or authority and, if permitted to continue without remonstrance, will finally encompass the destruction of the liberties of the people and the death of the Republic; and therefore, to the end that in any event the matured and deliberate sense of the people of New Jersey may be known and declared, we, their representatives, in Senate and General Assembly convened, do, in their name and in their behalf, make unto the Federal Government this our solemn protest:

Against a war waged with the insurgent states for the accomplishment of unconstitutional or partisan purposes;

Against a war which has for its object the subjugation of any of the States, with a view to their reduction to territorial condition;

Against proclamations from any source by which, under the plea of "military necessity," persons in States and Territories, sustaining the Federal Government, and beyond the necessary military lines, are held liable to the rigor and severity of military law;

¹⁶ *True American*, March 21, 1863. Five of the six columns of the front page, usually given over to advertising, were devoted to Mr. English's remarks.

¹⁷ March 17. Cf. *Assembly Journal*, 1863, p. 377.

¹⁸ Cf. *Session Laws*, 1863, pp. 510-13.

Against the domination of the Military over the Civil law in States, Territories, or districts not in a state of insurrection;

Against all arrests without warrant; against the suspension of the writ of *habeas corpus* in states and territories sustaining the federal government, "where the public safety does not require it"; and against the assumption of power by any person to suspend such writ, except under the express authority of Congress;

Against the creation of new States by the division of existing ones, or in any other manner not clearly authorized by the Constitution, and against the right of secession as practically admitted by the action of Congress in admitting as a new State a portion of the State of Virginia;

Against the power assumed in the proclamation of the President made January 1, 1863, by which all the slaves in certain States and parts of States are forever set free; and against the expenditure of the public moneys for the emancipation of the slaves or their support at any time, under any pretense whatever;

Against any and every exercise of power on the part of the Federal Government that is not clearly given and expressed in the Federal Constitution, reasserting that "the powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people."

4. *And be it Resolved*, That the unequalled promptness with which New Jersey has responded to every call made by the President and Congress for men and means has been occasioned by no lurking animosity to the South or the rights of her people; no disposition to wrest from them any of their rights, privileges, or property, but simply to assist in maintaining, as she has ever believed and still believes it to be her duty to do, the supremacy of the Federal Constitution; and while abating naught in her devotion to the Union of the States and the dignity and power of the Federal Government, at no time since the commencement of the present war has this State been other than willing to terminate, peacefully and honorably to all, a war unnecessary in its origin, fraught with horror and suffering in its prosecution, and necessarily dangerous to the liberties of all in its continuance.

5. *And be it Resolved*, That the legislature of the State of New Jersey believes that the appointment of commissioners upon the part of the Federal Government to meet commissioners, similarly appointed by the insurgent states, to convene in some suitable place for the purpose of considering whether any, and if any, what plan may be adopted, consistent with the honor and dignity of the National Government, by which the present civil war may be brought to a close, is not inconsistent with the integrity, honor, and dignity of the Federal Government, but, as indication of the spirit which animates the adhering states, would in any event tend to strengthen us in the opinion of other nations; and hoping, as we sincerely do, that the



SHAD FISHING ON MAURICE RIVER



OYSTER FLEET AT BIVALVE, GOING OUT AT 4 A. M.

Southern States would reciprocate the peaceful indication thus evinced, and believing, as we sincerely do, that under the blessing of God great benefits would arise from such a conference, we most earnestly recommend the subject to the consideration of the Government of the United States and request coöperation therein.

It was further ordered to whom the resolutions should be sent, and pledges were made that New Jersey would coöperate in any action taken.

The Copperheads had carried through their program, had obtained most of the public printing, and had elected two United States Senators, but, before the end of the session, a reaction set in. There was before the Senate a bill authorizing a State loan of \$1,000,000. This was a supplement to an act of May 10, 1861, entitled "An Act Authorizing a Loan for the Purposes of War," etc. The minority, quick to see their opportunity, in the debate connected the loan bill the resolutions just passed, and the statements of radicals such as Mr. English. The attack was strong, and brought results. The administration press supported the charges. Senator Randolph, in the debate on the loan bill, on March 23, met the attack by saying

If there be any idea that any portion of this money is intended to be aught else than assist the State in maintaining the power of the General Government in the future as in the past, *let that idea be dispelled*. The present worthy incumbent of the gubernatorial chair means not only to sustain the General Government, but to put down all appeal to other than legal means for real or imaginary evils.

On March 24, Senator Randolph followed these remarks with resolutions of like purport:

WHEREAS, Efforts are making for partisan purposes to produce the impression that a portion of the people of the State of New Jersey intend to resist, by force, the execution of certain acts of the Congress of the United States, instead of testing their validity by the customary legal and constitutional means; and

WHEREAS, Such efforts are calculated to misrepresent the sentiments of the people of this State, produce discord, and endanger the peace of the community; therefore, be it

1. *Resolved*, By the Senate of the State of New Jersey (the House of Assembly concurring), that there is no evidence to sustain the impression sought to be created that any portion of the people of the State of New Jersey intend to offer forcible resistance to the execution of those laws, and that all efforts, by whatever means attempted, to strengthen a political party by assuming that their opponents intend to inaugurate civil war, are fraught with danger to the peace of the State; and be it

2. *Resolved*, That the people of the State of New Jersey are a law-abiding people, and ardently devoted to a Union of all the States, and, while they may condemn and protest against certain laws as unconstitutional and unjust, yet, until repealed or declared by a com-

petent tribunal to be unconstitutional, they will regard them as laws, and will confidently look to the courts and the ballot box for redress.

These resolutions¹⁹ were passed in the Senate by a vote of 12 to 8, on March 24, and in the Assembly, next day, March 25, by a vote of 38 to 16, just before the Legislature adjourned. The loan bill which had been asked for by the Governor was also passed, and approved on March 24.

Whereas the Copperheads had for the greater part of the session dictated the program to the Democratic caucus, at the very end they were compelled to repudiate their radical platform. The resolutions just quoted certainly differ in tone and implication from those passed on March 17. Mr. English would have had difficulty in reading in their phrases his own program. In the earlier debates he and his associates had spoken rashly. Governor Parker and Senator Randolph had possessed just enough strength in the Legislature to compel the Copperheads to eliminate Senator Holsman's plan of an armistice. The resolutions offered by Senator Randolph on February 4, were a bid for a compromise. That was obtained in the majority resolutions of the Joint Committee on Federal Relations, though the gain was slight. But, as already suggested, in carrying through their program the Copperheads had gone too far, and were at last compelled to let Senator Randolph pull them out of their difficulty. They could not admit that their resolutions, their pleas for economy in the administration of the finances of the State, and the one million dollar loan bill were significant of an intention to resist by force the execution of certain acts of Congress,²⁰ in other words, to inaugurate civil war. In acknowledging the finality of the decisions of the United States Supreme Court, the Democrats were not upholding Mr. English's idea that the resolutions of March 17 were a bold and explicit assertion of reserved states' rights.

The selection of a United States Senator, in succession to Colonel Wall, for the full term commencing March 4, 1863, was a victory for the Copperhead wing of the Democracy. Colonel Wall was a candidate for reelection. Another candidate was William Wright, of Newark, proprietor of the *Newark Journal*, who had served a term in the United States Senate, from 1853 to 1859. Wright received the endorsement of the caucus. In the joint meeting called for the election of a United States Senator, on February 26, he was elected over ex-Governor Newell, by a vote of 54 to 25.

The election of the two United States Senators and the peace resolutions represent the positive acts of the Legislature that were due to Copperhead dictation. Yet the threatened influx of negroes into New Jersey and the proposal made by the Republicans to permit the soldiers in the field to vote were questions of great importance in New Jersey politics. The negro influx worried the Copperheads to such an extent that they proposed to prohibit it. The Republicans felt that men who were fighting for their country should

¹⁹ Cf. *State Gazette*, March 25; *Senate Journal*, 1863, pp. 395-403; *Assembly Journal*, 1863, p. 473.

²⁰ *E. g.* the Conscription Act.

not be deprived of their right to support her with the ballot. In both cases the proposed legislation failed of passage, but its political importance is not, therefore, in any way lessened.

The question of negro immigration into the State of New Jersey had been made the subject of protest to the Legislature of 1862. During the session eleven petitions against the immigration of the colored race into the State were introduced before both Houses. No action, however, was taken upon the question. After President Lincoln's emancipation proclamation of January 1, 1863, the Legislature was overwhelmed with petitions against the influx of the colored race into New Jersey. A bill was introduced into the Assembly, on February 4, to prevent the immigration of negroes into the State and to define their civil status. The Judiciary Committee made majority and minority reports, on March 11; and after considerable debate the bill was passed by a vote of 33 to 20,²¹ on March 18. Mr. English, in the debate, claimed that the bill was needed by the people of West Jersey and South Jersey; yet an analysis of the vote of the twenty-two members of the Assembly from that territory, which included the first and second Congressional districts, shows that, though ten of the twenty-two were Democrats, only two voted for the bill. The bill provided that any negro or mulatto coming into the State and remaining ten days should be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and on conviction should be transported to Liberia or the West Indies, and, further, that any person who should bring into the State, or should harbor and conceal in the State, such negro, was to be punished, by fines for the first and second offences, by imprisonment for the third. In the Senate, on the last day of the session, the Assembly bill reached a second reading, and a third was ordered, but adjournment prevented further action. The whole incident stirred widespread discussion, since it was clearly a move to nullify in part the emancipation proclamation, by excluding from the State freed negroes. The passage of such a law would have brought the State into actual opposition to the national administration, a situation which, after all, only the more intense Copperheads desired. The latter, at the end of the session, were engaged in toning down the peace resolutions, so that the Senate, now under Randolph's guidance, allowed the bill to be side-tracked in the closing rush of the session. It thereby stood as a protest against emancipation, but not as an attempt at nullification. Early in the session of the assembly Mr. English had introduced joint resolutions,²² protesting against the emancipation proclamation, and declaring it null and void. But no action was taken upon them.

In the New Jersey Constitution of 1844, no provision had been made for the exercise of the right of suffrage by any one in the military service of the State or of the United States outside the State itself. It was therefore

²¹ *State Gazette*, March 19, 1863.

²² January 27. See the *State Gazette*, January 28. English also offered resolutions, on February 3, against the proposed purchase and emancipation of slaves in Missouri, which were passed by the Assembly, and agreed to, by the Senate, on March 24, by 12 to 6. Cf. Rhodes, Vol. IV, pp. 216-217.

impossible for the soldiers in the field to vote, and in the elections of 1861 and 1862 they did not vote. In fact there was at that time no serious demand that provision should be made for them, since it was still believed that the war was soon to end. But the State election of 1862 in New Jersey was disastrous for the administration. At this time, as in later years during the war, the Unionists felt that the Copperheads at home had won through the absence in the service of supporters of the administration—a natural feeling, since the Democrats won, year after year, by such small pluralities. A bill to make it possible for the soldiers to vote was therefore introduced by the Unionists in the Senate early in the session of 1863 and was referred to the Judiciary Committee. The majority in the Senate argued that any bill that might be passed would be unconstitutional. The Judiciary Committee reported the bill a second time, with amendments, on March 6. The bill, as it stood then, authorized the soldiers to vote by proxy. It reached a third reading, was amended then so that the soldier did not have to name the man he was voting for, and it was ordered that the bill should be engrossed. When, on March 19, the bill was taken up again, the majority expressed such grave doubts as to its constitutionality that it was amended so that the President of the Senate was requested to submit the bill to the Attorney-General of the State for an opinion as to its constitutionality. Attorney-General Frelinghuysen decided that, with slight amendment, it would be constitutional. Re-committed to the Judiciary Committee, the bill was reported again, on March 24, with a proposition, which was vigorously opposed by the Republicans, for commissioners, to be appointed by the Governor, to visit each regiment, and receive the proxies, and for sub-committees in the election districts to cast the same. The Assembly had not yet discussed the bill, and the Legislature was about to adjourn. In the confusion the Democrats side-tracked it, and the Senate adjourned without further debate upon it. The Unionists claimed that the reason for Democratic opposition was the fact that there were many thousands of Democrats in the army, but no Copperheads. It was not alone the question of the constitutionality of the bill that prevented its passage. It is clear from resolutions passed by several of the regiments in the field that the program of the Legislature did not meet with the approval of the soldiers in the field.

Three points of view were displayed in the session of the Legislature of 1863. The members of the Union-Republican party supported the policies and the acts of the administration. Though the Democrats were united in the view that many of the acts of the administration and much of the legislation of Congress were unconstitutional, they held conflicting opinions as to the means of opposing the administration. Those who were led by Senator Holsman and Mr. English undoubtedly favored some sort of resistance to the enforcement within New Jersey of the Federal legislation which they deemed unconstitutional. They were favorably disposed toward recognition of the Confederacy or toward the formation of another union which should recognize the demands of the slave-holders. Governor Parker and Senator

Randolph expressed the opinion of those more conservative Democrats who, devoted to the Constitution and the Union, had no intention of recognizing secession, or of placing obstacles in the way of the prosecution of the war. But they were not ready to support, without protest, the administration's assumption, in the prosecution of the war, of powers not clearly assigned to it by the Constitution. Yet, however much they might decry the administration, they had no intention of opposing the administration by other than political and constitutional means. This latter group, through the position of the Unionists in the Legislature, had been able to restrain generally the large Copperhead group, though it could not prevent the Copperheads from voicing their desires.

In the legislation and in the resolutions concerning peace the Democracy was creating or restating its political platform for the remainder of the war; the positions thus expressed it must thereafter either live up to or repudiate. The work of the Legislature of 1863 is, therefore, most important in the politics of the Civil War period in New Jersey. The overwhelming victory in 1862 of the elements in the State dissatisfied with the progress of the war placed the political machinery of the State almost wholly in their hands. In no other State in the North did a similar situation exist during the war. In New Jersey, then, if anywhere, the Copperheads of the country had the opportunity to voice their program. The Bergen group had intimate relations with James Brooks and Fernando Wood, of New York, who, in the East, were the acknowledged leaders of the political element represented in the West by Clement L. Vallandigham, of Ohio. It is, then, as the work of the elements dissatisfied with the progress of the war that the legislative session of 1863 gains importance.

According to the *State Gazette*, March 5, radical Copperhead doctrine, similar to that uttered in the Legislature, was the substance of addresses made at mass meeting in Trenton, on March 4, to celebrate the adjournment of an "infamous Congress, one that (by passing the Conscription act) had trampled upon the liberties of the people." C. Chauncey Burr, Dr. Charles Skelton, and Senator Holsman spoke. Judge David Naar voiced the opinion that "we are cutting each other's throats for the sake of a few worthless negroes." A similar meeting was held at Sergeantsville, Hunterdon County, on March 3.

The Federal Conscription Act of March 3, 1863, was most unpopular in New Jersey. It took out of the control of the States the machinery for raising troops, and placed it in the hands of Federal officers. The method which had been in use since 1861, that of State quotas filled by volunteers, was, by the winter of 1862, no longer furnishing the troops needed to replace the heavy losses in battle.²³ The country was now divided into enrollment districts, each in charge of a provost-marshal, and arrangements were made for drafting men, when necessary, for military service. Provision was, however, made whereby a man drafted might furnish a substitute or pay three hundred dollars to the government to secure exemption.

²³ See Rhodes, Vol. IV, p. 236.

The draft was not ordered in New Jersey at the time it was ordered in other states. Before a date was set for the commencement of the draft, Governor Parker entered into correspondence with the War Department, in which he represented that the draft was unpopular in that State and that trouble might be averted by allowing New Jersey to furnish her quota by a given date through volunteering, before a draft should be ordered. The War Department yielded to his request, and as a result Governor Parker issued a proclamation, on June 28, 1863, calling for the enlistment of five regiments of infantry, and one of cavalry (6,000 men in all), for three years, through volunteering, instead of by draft.²⁴ The State authorities bent every effort to the task of securing the men called for; liberal bounties were everywhere paid to stimulate enlistment. These facts are to be taken as an acknowledgement by the War Department and the administration that it would be the wisest course to yield the method in the lone Copperhead State of the Union, provided that, by a different process, the desired results could be obtained there.

Although no draft was set for July, 1863, in New Jersey, the draft riots of that month in New York City were not without echo in New Jersey, for in Newark there were demonstrations on July 13,²⁵ the opening day of the New York riots. The home of Provost-Marshal Miller was assailed, and the office of the *Newark Mercury* was attacked and stoned. A proclamation by Mayor Moses Bigelow and speeches by prominent citizens of the city cooled the excitement. On July 14, demonstrations were made in many places throughout the State against the draft, but they proved to be unimportant. The *Newark Journal*, July 15, and the *State Gazette*, July 16, note the demonstrations. They also give Governor Parker's proclamation of July 15:

Acts of violence do not restore individual rights, or remedy real or fancied wrongs. The law furnishes a remedy for every grievance, and to the law every good citizen will appeal for redress.

Mobs often originate without preconcert, in the accidental gathering of a crowd. In this time of excitement I call upon all citizens of this State to avoid angry discussion, to discourage large assemblages of the people, to counsel moderation and to use every effort to preserve the peace.

Governor Parker called on all the people to preserve the peace. There was little trouble, since adequate preparations were quickly made to meet such a situation. In Hudson County, where, it was believed, anti-draft sentiment was very strong because of the large foreign population, preparations were made to handle the situation when a draft was expected on August 1.²⁶ That the administration was fearful of the situation in New Jersey is evident from the telegraphic order from Provost-Marshal-General James B. Frey,

²⁴ *State Gazette*, June 26, 1863.

²⁵ Official records, War of the Rebellion, Series III, Vol. III, pp. 489, 496. Here will be found a report to Secretary of State Seward of the attack on the home of Provost-Marshal Miller.

²⁶ *New York Herald*, July 21, 1863.

dated July 15, 1863, to Lt. Colonel R. S. Buchanan, Acting Asst. Provost-Marshal-General, Trenton, New Jersey, in which he advised the provost-marshals in New Jersey to be watchful, but to perform their duties in as quiet and inoffensive a manner as possible, and not to do anything to bring on a disturbance. They were even to yield a little, if necessary. "The draft will not be ordered in New Jersey until we are prepared to enforce it." When the New York riots were put down, troops would be available for New Jersey.

During July and August, volunteering, though stimulated by city and county²⁷ as well as by State and Federal bounties, lagged, and for a time it seemed that New Jersey would not escape the draft, at least for the deficit in its quota. The Democratic press, however, was in a position where it had to support enlistment or face an order for a Federal draft in the State. The *True American* proposed that the Legislature be called in special session to raise money to pay the exemption fee of three hundred dollars for all who were not themselves able to pay for exemption.²⁸ This met with favor generally, though no action resulted. In fact, the call to State pride, and the ever-present prospect of a draft led to high bounties for volunteers, and the filling of successive quotas, though the number of desertions was high.²⁹ Thus the draft was not resorted to by the federal authorities in New Jersey.

The arrest of the Hon. Clement L. Vallandigham in Ohio, on May 5, brought from the Copperheads of New Jersey further condemnation of the policies of the administration. Mass meetings, particularly in the northern part of the State, listened to fiery addresses delivered by C. Chauncey Burr, Daniel Holsman, Congressman A. J. Rogers, Judge David Naar, R. S. Tharin (formerly of Byckville, Coosa County, Alabama), A. R. Speer, ex-Governor Price, and others, and passed resolutions denouncing illegal arrests, arbitrary imprisonment, and all abuses of the power intrusted to the administration. From the point of view of the administration's supporters in New Jersey, the arrest of Vallandigham was most unfortunate. They were none too enthusiastic over the Conscription Act, Emancipation, and the arbitrary arrests in 1861 due to Secretaries Seward and Cameron. The arrest of Colonel Wall in 1861 had contributed greatly to the defeats of the Union party in New Jersey in 1861 and 1862. Now, when the government had changed its policy, and when the uncertainty about the policy of the Democratic party following the passage of the peace resolutions offered the Unionists some hope in the election campaign of 1863, along came the Vallandigham affair and the consequent revival of the fatal question of arbitrary arrests.

Vallandigham meetings offered the Copperheads the opportunity to denounce the administration during the whole summer. On May 21 and 30, meetings were held at Newark, on June 9, a meeting at Flemington. At

²⁷ State Gazette, August 19, 1863.

²⁸ July 20, 1863; *State Gazette*, August 15, 1863.

²⁹ See *State Gazette*, August 18, 1863; *New York Evening Express*, September 26, 1863; *New York Tribune*, September 8, 1863.

a meeting at Montrose, on August 22, Holsman said that the people of his district had been opposed to war from its commencement.³⁰ The meetings finally merged with the campaign. At a gathering at Morristown, July 7, at which Burr, Rogers, Holsman, and Tharin spoke, Burr maintained the doctrine that the Federal Government had no constitutional power to make war upon a State for any consideration whatever and proved to his own satisfaction that such had been the cardinal doctrine of the Democratic party from its foundation. His remarks were loudly applauded. Governor Parker and his supporters, however, maintained an aloofness from the talk of the Copperheads. In a letter in which he said that he was unable to be present at the Vallandigham meeting at Newark, on May 30, Governor Parker declared that he was opposed to the principle of arbitrary arrests and military courts martial. He considered this a fit subject for discussion, but he maintained that the question of the content of Vallandigham's utterances was not involved in such a discussion. Further, he was careful not to indicate his opinion of Vallandigham.³¹

In his relations with the Federal administration, Governor Parker took a dignified and sensible attitude. Against the policies of the administration he freely made protest, arguing always for strict construction of the war powers of the government. Yet in all crises he was careful and discreet, and he was most earnest in meeting demands for troops and supplies. This course he followed throughout his term. During the invasion of Pennsylvania his proclamation calling for volunteers for the emergency was patriotic and able, and drew from the *State Gazette* well deserved praise.³² The *State Gazette* said of him

Governor Parker, fortunately, has from the first identified himself with the war for the Union, and, however much we disagree with some of his sentiments, we should be wanting in truth and in self-respect did we fail to say that, in our belief, his proclamation, calling on citizens of the State to march against the rebels, was dictated by a sincere, and patriotic determination to resist the rebellion to the utmost.—Far different was the action of a meeting in Somerset County which *Resolved*, That in case of invasion, we have no confidence in the wisdom or the ability of the Administration to protect the lives and property of the people of New Jersey; and that it is therefore the duty of this State to retain its militia at home for self-defense.

At the same time (June 29), however, he wrote to President Lincoln to urge that McClellan be placed in command of the Army of the Potomac, or of the militia.³³ He believed that, were the appointment made, "the people would rise *en masse*."

³⁰ See *State Gazette*, August 24, 1863.

³¹ *True American*, May 31, 1863.

³² *State Gazette*, June 20, 1863.

³³ *New Jersey Legislative Documents*, 1865, p. 85. Governor Parker's official correspondence is printed in this volume.



KING'S HIGHWAY LOOKING WEST IN HADDONFIELD



PINE BARRENS BETWEEN CHATSWORTH IN BURLINGTON COUNTY AND BARNEGAT IN OCEAN COUNTY

Known as "The Plains." One of the most primitive regions remaining on the Atlantic Coast. Deer congregate in these hundreds of square miles of white sand, stunted pines, scrub oak and holly trees. A desolate region—yet romantic and alluring.

The political campaign of 1863 (aside from the nature of the political issues) was decidedly local in character. There was the annual contest for the Assembly, in which the factions might gauge their strength, and senatorial contests in the counties of Camden, Essex, Gloucester, Monmouth, Salem, Union, and Warren. But there was no general contest, no State-wide campaign. No new issues were introduced. The Democrats continued their attack upon the policies of the administration, arbitrary arrests, and the draft. The Union party pointed with pride to the success of the Union arms, at Gettysburg, and in the opening of the Mississippi, but final victory and peace seemed no nearer, as the armies made no progress during the summer and fall. It was upon the desire for peace by any means that the Democrats made their campaign in the State. About that there can be no question, at least so far as the Copperheads were concerned. The *Newark Journal*,³⁴ after the election, in interpreting the Democratic victory, declared "Our Platform is Peace," and carried a headline running "War Repudiated." Yet the desire of the *Newark Journal* for peace must be contrasted with the attitude of Governor Parker as expressed in a proclamation³⁵ of October 22, 1863: "Our armies should be largely reinforced. A crushing blow at the armed power of the rebellion, if followed by wise, just and conciliatory counsels, will open the door to the peace which we so much desire and which has thus far eluded us." In these words he expressed the position of many Democrats of the State. The fact is that there was a keen factional struggle for control of the party and the State between the regular and the Copperhead wings of the Democratic party.

During the campaign the result was never in doubt; the question was merely whether the Democratic party, especially its Copperhead wing, would be able to hold its majorities in the next Legislature. In the Senate the Democratic party made slight gains, by the election in Essex County of Mr. John G. Truesdell to succeed James M. Quinby, Republican, who had been throughout his term a vigorous supporter of the administration. In Newark, the Democrats elected Theodore Runyon mayor by a majority of less than 1,000.

Further, the Union cause lost through the failure of the Democrats in Union County to renominate Joseph T. Crowell, a war Democrat. In the Assembly the Union party made a gain of four members. The opposition to the administration, however, about held its strength of the previous Legislature. The *State Gazette* claimed that the Democratic nominations for the Legislature in general had shown the ascendancy of the Copperhead wing of the party. But the latter could not alone have carried the Democratic party to victory. For that success the party owed much to the uncompromis-

³⁴ The *Newark Journal* of November 4, 1863, said in part: "Is it not time for New Jersey to enter a solemn and dignified protest against the further prosecution of this fratricidal war? If the Legislature of New Jersey just elected shall fulfill the fully expressed expectations of her people, she may hereafter occupy the proud position of pacificator in our national troubles."

³⁵ *True American*, October 23.

ing position upon secession maintained by Governor Parker. The organization of the Democratic party was strong enough to hold together two groups entirely out of sympathy with each other. Yet the Copperhead wing, the election over, claimed that the result was an endorsement of its position, and immediately proceeded to attempt the destruction of Governor Parker's influence in the party.

The occasion for the launching of the attack on Governor Parker was a celebration, at Paramus, Bergen County, on November 24, by the Copperheads, of what they termed their victory in the State elections. The principle address of the evening was made by the distinguished guest of the gathering, Fernando Wood, of New York. The latter's advocacy of secession doctrine was loudly applauded by the audience, and endorsed by Senator Holsman, ex-Governor Price, C. Chauncey Burr, and others. Governor Parker was denounced for not preventing the enlistment in the State of men for the Union armies.

On November 25 the *Newark Journal* reported that one of the toasts of the evening was "To the first Governor who shall have the virtue and courage to keep the oath of office, and protect, and defend the Constitution, laws, and sovereignty of his State, and the rights of its citizens." Fernando Wood is quoted as saying that "It is the duty of the American people not to give the present administration another man or another dollar." Daniel Holsman declared that "he had never voted a cent for the war, and that he never, by the help of God, would do so." The *Newark Journal*, of November 30, contains the following from C. Chauncey Burr's speech: "The true policy of the Democracy is to stand by its own principles of state sovereignty and state equality The State of New Jersey has ceased to exist Every Jersey man in favor of this war is a foe to his State, and to the very principles of the government on which the Union of the States was founded."

On November 20, the *Newark Journal* had rejoiced over the Copper-

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head pyramid JER : " the isolated distinction of New Jersey is

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certainly an enviable one. We are proud of our Democratic pyramid, small as it is. It is the Ark of the Covenant, the one star of promise shining in the midnight of political darkness, giving hope and comfort to a discouraged country." On November 24, in a editorial on the *Jersey City Standard*, the *Newark Journal* commented thus:

. . . . while we admit that as the executive of the State he is confined to a certain line of duties which are measurably foreshadowed and defined by the action of the Legislature, yet we cannot reconcile his earnest and continued efforts to push on a war repugnant to his own sense of right and Democracy, which is virtually destroying the independent existence of the State government committed to his charge. We cannot reconcile this action with his position as gover-

nor of a clearly defined and indisputably Democratic State. . . . For one we cannot see what Governor Parker or Governor Seymour have accomplished in behalf of the people, or in support of the sentiment of opposition to the administration.

The attacks made upon Governor Parker at the meeting of the Copperheads, on November 24, at Paramus, the doctrines there set forth, and the assumption that Democratic success in the recent State elections was an endorsement of the Copperhead program, and was due only to that program, caused a great disturbance within Democratic circles in the State. The *Newark Journal* endorsed the Copperhead position,³⁶ and printed the speeches. The *Jersey City Standard*, seconded by the Morristown *True Democratic Banner*, the *Sussex True Democrat*, and a few other papers, rushed to the defense of the Governor.

In the ensuing newspaper controversy very sharp criticism—charges, and counter-charges—were exchanged. The *Jersey City Standard*³⁷ raised a flag of the Union Democracy, and discussed the history and purposes of the *Newark Journal*. The latter, it declared, had been “committed, *ab initio*, to the doctrine of peaceable secession and its inevitable consequent disunion”; it maintained, further, that the *Newark Journal* admitted, endorsed, and defended the principles charged to it. The *Newark Journal*, on the other hand, accused the *Jersey City Standard* of deserting the doctrine of states’ rights, and of giving its adhesion to the anti-Democratic heresy of “coercion of independent states.” During this controversy, which continued from the election until the opening of the legislative session, the *True American* remained quiet; indeed, it scarcely noticed the controversy, except to say that it thought no real difference existed between the *Newark Journal* and the *Jersey City Standard*.³⁸

Governor Parker had been nominated against the wishes of the Copperhead wing of the Democratic party. He had been a Douglas elector in 1860. He had been appointed by Governor Olden a Brigadier-General of Militia in 1861, and had served in that capacity within the State. Thenceforth he had been a “regular” Democrat. As such he was nominated and elected. As a “regular” Democrat he was administering the duties of his office. The Copperheads, controlling the machinery of the party in 1863, had immediately sought to commit Governor Parker to their program. In this they had been unsuccessful. The Bergen meeting and the *Newark Journal* denunciation were thus another attempt by the Copperheads to destroy the Governor’s influence and to compel him to come over to their position, and agree to carry out their wishes. The *Sussex True Democrat* suggested that back of the controversy was a scheme to send Colonel Wall to the United States Sen-

³⁶ The *Newark Journal*, November 19, held that the motto of every peace man must be “. . . . no compromise with the advocates of war. No trimming of principles for the sake of expediency, for office, or for the bloody gains of civil strife.”

³⁷ November 27. In this party controversy the *Newark Journal* was backed by the *Bergen Democrat*.

³⁸ It was at this time that C. Chauncey Burr received so much notoriety in the press.

ate to succeed Senator Ten Eyck, and that its promoters, fearing Governor Parker as a formidable rival, were seeking to discredit him in the Democratic party.³⁹

The Morristown *True Democratic Banner* discussed at length, on December 10, 1863, the Bergen meeting and the situation existing in the Democratic Party:

We say it was a meeting of Secessionists because the doctrine of Secession was put forward by the "star" (Fernando Wood), of the performance, applauded by the audience, and fully endorsed by other speakers. The object of that and similar demonstrations is very obvious; it is to compel Governor Parker and the Government of the State of New Jersey to act as allies of the Southern armed rebels by attacking the Federal Government *in the rear* while the Southern rebels are attacking in the front. . . . Probably their object is, in case they cannot "coerce" the Governor into the execution of their wishes, to crush him.

His administrative policy is the only reason which can be assigned why the Democratic party in this State election was not overwhelmed as it was in Pennsylvania, Ohio, and New York.

We have all along thought and frequently said that the demonstrations of sympathy with Secession, and the Southern rebels which have been made in this State in the last nine months, were the efforts of the New York clique, of which Fernando Wood is the head. The late proceedings at Bergen are an additional proof.

On January 1, 1864, the *Newark Journal* published a statement of its principles, as follows:

Heartily opposing the present civil war as sectional and unjust in its character and tendencies, and favoring an immediate and honorable peace as the only means of restoring constitutional liberty and preserving the blessing of free government, all of the facilities and influence within our reach shall be brought to bear in favor of a vigorous prosecution of Peace, leaving the people of both sections to settle their differences in the interest of civilization and good neighborhood, and to warn the foreign despots that the Monroe doctrine shall be respected on the American continent.

Commenting upon the Democratic situation just at this time, the *State Gazette*, on January 6, 1864, held that the self-appointed leaders (the *Newark Journal* and the Bergen group) were generally Copperheads of the most venomous description, but that the rank and file of the Democracy, a large proportion of whom were Union men, did not sympathize with them.

Governor Parker, in his annual message,⁴⁰ in 1864, in discussing national affairs and the political situation, commented upon the position held by his Copperhead opponents:

³⁹ But Senator Ten Eyck's term was not to expire until 1865.

⁴⁰ For the message, see the *Newark Journal*, January 13, 1864.

We should not abandon the government of our country, engaged in war with those who would destroy our national existence, whether temporarily administered to our liking or not. The government is designed to be perpetual, while administrations are transient. We must subdue the rebellion and save the country in spite of all difficulties. That which interferes with the speedy restoration of the Union under the Constitution, whether it proceeds from the enemy, or exists among ourselves, must be overcome. Every obstacle in the way, whether it be the rebel armies, or the fatal policy of those in power, should be swept from existence by the people in the one case by the use of the military force, and in the other by the untrammelled exercise of the elective franchise. . . .

Presently, discussing the policy advocated by some, that the armies should be withdrawn before both sections should become entirely exhausted, with the further plea that reason would then resume its sway, and that at some future time the South would voluntarily return to the Union, he said:

. . . . The policy they recommend, however sincerely entertained, would certainly result in perpetual disunion, and we would emerge from the present war, only to be involved in other conflicts not less bloody, which would inevitably flow from separation. The withdrawal of our armies would be a confession of weakness, and the Confederacy would at once be acknowledged by foreign powers (They) would never surrender their nationality. . . . The right of secession once acknowledged, the remaining States would soon be divided up into petty provinces, and, involved in endless warfare, would finally become the prey of some ambitious conqueror. It is the duty of the State authorities to furnish the men necessary to destroy the armed power of the rebellion, and it is equally the duty of the General Government to accompany the exercise of the power entrusted to it, with proper terms of conciliation.

Governor Parker thus stated his own position, and his opinion of the Copperheads who sought at least to embarrass him in the execution of the duties of his office, and thereby hamper the Federal Government. He made clear his view that, although they might criticise the policy of the administration, it was still the duty of the people to give it all the support—in men and money—that was required; and, further, that the only method of changing the policy of the government was through the exercise of the elective franchise, and that the National Government could consent to no peace that did not include the supremacy of the Union in every State. The Copperheads could not possibly see in the Governor's message any endorsement of their program. The session of the Legislature was to be the scene of a contest between wings of the Democracy in the State.

The Legislature assembled on January 12, 1864. The election of Amos Robbins, of Middlesex, as President of the Senate, by a vote of 13 to 6, and the organization of the Senate were considered a triumph for the peace party; the choice of Joseph N. Taylor, of Passaic, as Speaker of the Assem-

bly, by a vote of 40 to 20, was accounted a victory for Governor Parker. Mr. English, appointed by the Speaker a member of the committee to notify the Governor of the organization of the Assembly, refused to wait upon him and showed a violent dislike for him. The exhibition by the leader of the Copperheads in the Assembly was indicative of their attitude towards the Governor and of the relations within the party. The *State Gazette*, Jan. 13, 1864, said that this incident meant war to the knife, and that the Copperheads and the peace party would go under, and ultimately Governor Parker would control both Houses. The Democratic majority on the joint ballot was twenty-seven. Later, English's request to be excused from serving on the Joint Committee on Federal Relations was granted. Holsman, however, was a member, with Randolph and Buckley, for the Senate.

The session of 1864 produced no action comparable with those of the preceding Legislature. Mr. English did, indeed introduce again in the Assembly a bill which was designed to protect more effectively the freemen of the State in the exercise of the elective franchise. It received little attention. The *True American* on February 4, said that it was to prevent bands of soldiers from displaying themselves in the vicinity of the polls. A similar bill had been before the previous Legislature. It was a Copperhead proposition, but nothing came of it.

The question of the negro came up during the session, though not, as in 1863, over the influx of negroes into the State. The question now was whether negroes might be enlisted as soldiers. A bill⁴¹ was introduced in the Senate which would have imposed a fine of \$500 and imprisonment for five years on any one enlisting negroes in New Jersey. Another bill, proposed in the Assembly, aimed to prevent the admixture of the two races in the State. The former provoked a good deal of discussion, but no action was taken. Governor Parker later (July 22, 1864), however, assented to the enlistment of negroes in the South to fill the New Jersey quotas. He did not personally approve the scheme, though other states were employing it. It is interesting to note that during this session the *State Gazette* presented a petition from the colored men of Trenton asking that the State Constitution be amended so that they could vote.⁴²

The proposition that the right of suffrage should be extended to the soldiers in the field, a bill authorizing which had been sidetracked in the preceding Legislature, came up again. The Unionists started petitions for such a bill in circulation about the State. The *State Gazette* published a form to be copied and signed. On February 17, Mr. Maylin, of Cumberland, introduced in the Assembly a bill to enable the qualified voters of the State who were in the military service of the State or of the United States to exercise the right of suffrage. On February 24, Mr. Scovel introduced in the Senate resolutions extending to the soldiers the thanks of the State. These resolutions were passed, and were concurred in by the Assembly on the same day. However, the plans of the Unionists to secure for the soldiers in the

⁴¹ Senate Bill, No. 166 (March 16, 1864).

⁴² *State Gazette*, March 24, 1863.

field the right of suffrage were soon frustrated, when Mr. Taylor, on March 9, introduced in the Assembly the following resolution:⁴³

WHEREAS, Under the present Constitution of New Jersey, a law cannot be passed authorizing the citizens of the State to vote at places outside of the State, and

WHEREAS, No change of the Constitution⁴⁴ can lawfully be effected under two years, and

WHEREAS, It is right that our brave soldiers should (so far as it is not detrimental to the military service) have the opportunity of exercising freely, and under the protection of law, the right of suffrage, therefore,

Resolved (Senate concurring), That the proper military authorities be requested (as far as the exigencies of the military service shall allow) to permit soldiers who are legal voters in the State, with out respect to their political principles, to visit their homes, as individual citizens, on days of election, so that they may have the opportunity to enjoy the right of suffrage, in the respective townships or wards of their residence, under the protection of the laws of the State of New Jersey, and free from those military restraints which must necessarily exist in large armies in active service.

Resolved, That the Governor be requested to forward a copy of the foregoing resolutions to the commander-in-chief of the Army of the United States.

These resolutions were forced through the Assembly that day by a vote of 35 to 15. In the Senate they came up on March 15. Here there was considerable discussion, particularly over the preamble, to which the Unionists objected, since it denied the constitutionality of their proposed bill to permit the soldiers to vote. It was finally agreed that the preamble and the resolutions should be voted on separately, after Senator Randolph had urged fair play to the Unionist Senators. The preamble was then concurred in by a vote of 13 to 8, and the resolutions were adopted, by 20 to 1. In such manner was the question of the soldiers' vote disposed of. It did not come up again during the war, but among the amendments to the constitution of the State, adopted in 1875, was one which provided

that in time of war no elector in the actual military service of the State, or of the United States, in the army or navy thereof, shall be deprived of his vote by reason of his absence from such election district; and the Legislature shall have power to provide the manner in which, and the time and place at which, such absent voters may vote, and for the return and canvass of their votes in the election districts in which they respectively reside.

Resolutions were, finally, passed by both houses authorizing a joint committee to sit during the year to consider amendments to the constitution of the State.

⁴³ The New York Legislature, by act of March 8, 1864, permitted the soldiers in the field to vote.

⁴⁴ New Jersey Constitution of 1844, Article IX.

CHAPTER XL.

MILITARY HISTORY OF THE CIVIL WAR.

By B. H. Goldsmith, Historian and Author.

New Jersey possesses the proud distinction of having sent the first fully organized brigade to arrive for the defense of the City of Washington. Of this brigade Theodore Runyon was brigadier-general, the 1st Regiment being commanded by Adolphus J. Johnson, the 2d Regiment by Henry M. Baker, the 3d Regiment by William Napton, and the 4th Regiment by Matthew Miller, Jr. Having been held in reserve during the first battle of Bull Run, these "three months' men" were discharged from the United States service at Newark and Trenton, July 31, 1861.

These four regiments were mustered by New Jersey in response to the proclamation of the President of the United States, published on the fifteenth day of April, 1861, and calling for seventy-five thousand of the militia of the several states. In obedience to the proclamation Governor Charles S. Olden instantly issued a proclamation and order to detach one regiment from each of the then existing four military divisions of New Jersey. The first company, known as the Olden Guard of Trenton, reported April 23, 1861, and in seven days the four regiments were completed. These regiments, being organized into a brigade, were mustered into the United States service at Trenton, May 1, 1861.

New Jersey Regiments in the Union Army—New Jersey's contributions to the defense of the Union consisted of thirty-seven regiments of infantry, three regiments of cavalry and one regiment consisting of five batteries of artillery. At the close of the war they returned to the State for discharge, excepting the 34th Infantry, which was retained in service by the Government until April 30, 1866.

In special emergencies, too, New Jersey invariably proved its preparedness and its determination to uphold the Union. Thus, when the army under General Robert E. Lee invaded Pennsylvania, in June, 1863, universal alarm was created throughout the entire northern states, and an appeal for military aid was made by Governor Curtin, of Pennsylvania, to the governors of neighboring states, June 15, 1863. Only two days later, June 17, Governor Parker, of New Jersey, called for volunteers to serve for thirty days, to aid in repelling the invasion. Under this call a full regiment of militia, infantry, and one battery of artillery responded. The 23d and 27th regiments of infantry, nine months' troops, awaiting their discharge, also volunteered for the emergency. A similar call was made by Governor Parker on July 12, 1864, when the cities of Baltimore and Washington were endangered by a threatened invasion of the enemy. The Governor issued a proclamation calling for aid from the militia for service in Pennsylvania, Maryland or the District of Columbia, to serve for thirty days. One company responded, rendered the service required, returned to the State and was discharged.

Statistical Summary of New Jersey Troops in the Union Army—In the "Record of Officers and Men of New Jersey in the Civil War, 1861-65," published by the adjutant-general's office at Trenton in two volumes in 1876, William S. Stryker, then adjutant-general of New Jersey and a brevet major-general, gives the following totals for the various forms of service and enlistment, covering the period between April 17, 1861, and April 20, 1865: Number of men furnished for four years, 155; number of men furnished for three years, 42,573; number of men furnished for two years, 2,243; number of men furnished for one year, 16,812; number of men furnished for nine months, 10,787; number of men furnished for three months, 3,105; number of men furnished for one hundred days, 700; number of men furnished, but not classified, 2,973. The total number of men credited to the State of New Jersey, therefore, was 79,348. To this must be added 8,957 more, who were furnished but not credited, resulting in a grand total of 88,305 sons of New Jersey who served in the Union forces. Comparing this number with the total number of men called for from New Jersey, 78,248, it appears that the State furnished 10,057 more men than it had been required by all calls issued to supply. Three thousand nine hundred and eighty-one commissions were issued by the State to officers in New Jersey organizations during the war.

The high reputation of New Jersey's troops was fully sustained during the entire war, the State being represented on all the principal battlefields. The 1st, 2d, 3d, 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th, 10th, 11th, 12th, 14th, 15th, 17th, 18th, 19th, 20th, 21st, 22d, 23d, 24th, 25th, 26th, 28th, 29th, 30th, 31st, 37th, 38th, 39th and 40th regiments of infantry, as well as the 16th (1st Cavalry), 36th (3d Cavalry) and 1st Regiment of Artillery, all served in Virginia. The 9th Regiment of Infantry served in North Carolina and Virginia; the 13th, 27th, 33d, 34th, 35th regiments of infantry and the 32d (2d Cavalry) Regiment served in the West and Southwest.

New Jersey's Losses—For its prompt and extensive support of the Union, New Jersey had to pay a heavy price. According to the records in the adjutant-general's office in Trenton, 218 officers and 6,082 enlisted men were killed in action or died in the service, thus making the grand total of citizens of the State of New Jersey who laid down their lives in the defense of the Union 6,300.

The casualties suffered by the various New Jersey regiments are officially reported as follows: 1st Regiment, 10 officers and 224 men; 2d Regiment, 9 officers and 151 men; 3d Regiment, 10 officers and 203 men; 4th Regiment, 7 officers and 250 men; 5th Regiment, 13 officers and 201 men; 6th Regiment, 4 officers and 176 men; 7th Regiment, 13 officers and 247 men; 8th Regiment, 10 officers and 274 men; 9th Regiment, 10 officers and 244 men; 10th Regiment, 5 officers and 269 men; 11th Regiment, 11 officers and 222 men; 12th Regiment, 9 officers and 252 men; 13th Regiment, 3 officers and 103 men; 14th Regiment, 8 officers and 240 men; 15th Regiment, 9 officers and 352 men; 16th Regiment, 16 officers and 282 men; 21st Regiment, 2 officers and 49 men; 22d Regiment, 1 officer and 37 men; 23d Regi-

ment, 5 officers and 79 men; 24th Regiment, 3 officers and 89 men; 25th Regiment, 1 officer and 56 men; 26th Regiment, 1 officer and 35 men; 27th Regiment, 1 officer and 85 men; 28th Regiment, 2 officers and 79 men; 29th Regiment, no officers and 40 men; 30th Regiment, 2 officers and 62 men; 31st Regiment, no officers and 39 men; 32d Regiment, 3 officers and 231 men; 33d Regiment, 6 officers and 141 men; 34th Regiment, 3 officers and 152 men; 35th Regiment, 3 officers and 144 men; 36th Regiment, 5 officers and 140 men; 37th Regiment, 1 officer and 18 men; 38th Regiment, no officers and 11 men; 39th Regiment, 3 officers and 36 men; 40th Regiment, no officers and 19 men. Battery A, 1 officer and 15 men; Battery B, 1 officer and 30 men; Battery C, no officers and 12 men; Battery D, no officers and 32 men; Battery E, no officers and 23 men.

These sons of New Jersey are buried in many military cemeteries in various parts of the country, especially throughout the South. Of course, the two national cemeteries in New Jersey, one at Beverly and the other in Newark, contain a large number of graves of New Jersey officers and soldiers, while many other New Jersey Civil War soldiers were buried in their home cemeteries. However, New Jersey graves are numerous, too, in the following cemeteries: At Arlington, Virginia, 1 officer and 197 non-commissioned officers and men; at various cemeteries in Washington, District of Columbia, and in Alexandria, Virginia, 344 non-commissioned officers and men; at the Andersonville Cemetery in Georgia, 206 non-commissioned officers and men, most of whom died in the Confederate prison at Andersonville; at Antietam, Maryland, 68 non-commissioned officers and men; at Gettysburg, Pennsylvania, 1 officer and 44 non-commissioned officers and men; at Marietta, Georgia, 2 officers and 93 non-commissioned officers and men, participants in Sherman's advance; at Fredericksburg, Virginia, 7 officers and 144 non-commissioned officers and men; and at Poplar Grove, Virginia, near Petersburg, 90 non-commissioned officers and men. Two non-commissioned officers and 3 enlisted men were buried at sea.

Men from New Jersey in the United States Navy and Marine Corps

—The other two branches of the armed forces of the United States, the United States Navy and the United States Marine Corps, too, received very large support on the part of New Jersey citizens. In the navy 75 regular officers and 156 volunteer officers served from New Jersey, as well as 13 warrant officers and 6,525 enlisted men. The deaths in these respective groups were: 12, 2, 3, 141. The United States Marine Corps had 4 officers from New Jersey and 667 enlisted men, losing by death 1 of the former and 22 of the latter.

Among the high officers serving in the United States Navy during the Civil War, two were from New Jersey, Rear Admiral James S. Palmer and Rear Admiral John B. Montgomery. The former had entered the service January 1, 1825, was promoted captain on July 16, 1862, reached the rank of commodore on February 7, 1863, and became a rear admiral on July 25, 1866. He commanded the United States steam sloop "Hartford" during

1861, 1862, 1863, and 1864, and the West Indian Squadron in 1865. Rear Admiral Montgomery, at the outbreak of the Civil War, had to his credit almost half a century of service in the United States Navy, which he had entered June 4, 1812. He was made a captain January 6, 1853, a commodore on July 16, 1862, and a rear admiral on July 25, 1866. He commanded the Pacific Squadron in 1861, the Navy Yard at Boston, Massachusetts, during 1862-63, and the Navy Yard at Washington, District of Columbia, during 1864-65.

For valor on the field of action or for meritorious services in other respects during the war many officers, both in the United States Army and in the United States Volunteers and the New Jersey Volunteers, from New Jersey received commissions by brevet. In this manner three officers were promoted to the rank of brevet major-general: Brevet Brigadier-General Alexander E. Shiras, Brevet Brigadier-General Judson Kilpatrick, and Brevet Brigadier-General Harvey Brown. Others thus honored while serving in the United States Army included: Five brevet brigadier-generals, 6 brevet colonels, 16 brevet lieutenant-colonels, 30 brevet majors, 19 brevet captains, and 2 brevet first lieutenants. In the Volunteer Forces, 7 New Jersey officers were promoted to the rank of brevet major-general: Brigadier-General Gershom Mott, Brigadier-General Judson Kilpatrick, Brigadier-General William Birney, Brevet Brigadier-Generals John Ramsey, Robert McAllister, George W. Mindil, and William J. Sewell. Others thus honored included the following: Twenty-three brevet brigadier-generals, 25 brevet colonels, 41 brevet lieutenant-colonels, 58 brevet majors, 26 brevet captains, and 2 brevet first lieutenants. Many other officers and men from New Jersey received citations or were otherwise honored for deeds of valor and for meritorious services. Of course, there have also been recorded a very large number of cases of individual courage on the field of action on the part of Jerseymen, which, however, it is impossible to relate here in detail.

Under an Act of Congress, awarding Medals of Honor for conspicuous bravery, quite a number of New Jersey soldiers were the recipients of this recognition of their services. The State of New Jersey, too, honored its soldiers, ordering by a joint resolution of the Legislature, March 27, 1866, the presentation to all honorably discharged soldiers and sailors of this State and to the widows and orphans of those who were killed or who died in the service of an "Honorable Testimonial."

General Officers of the Volunteer Army, Appointed from New Jersey

—Three major-generals and eight brigadier-generals of the Volunteer Forces, serving in the Union Army, were appointed from New Jersey. Four of these, Major-General Philip Kearny and Brigadier-Generals George W. Taylor, Charles G. Harker, and George D. Bayard, were either killed in action or died as the result of wounds received in action.

The service records of these general officers from New Jersey, as published officially, are given herewith:

Major-General Philip Kearny: Brigadier-general, May 17, 1861; major-general, July 4, 1862; killed at Chantilly, Virginia, September 1, 1862. Com-

mands: 1st Brigade (1st New Jersey Brigade), Franklin's Division; 3d Division, 3d Corps, Army of the Potomac.

Major-General Gershom Mott: Lieutenant-colonel, 5th Regiment, New Jersey Volunteers, August 23, 1861; colonel, 6th Regiment, New Jersey Volunteers, May 7, 1862; brigadier-general, September 7, 1862; brevet major-general, August 1, 1864; major-general, May 26, 1865; resigned February 20, 1866. Commands: 3d Brigade (2d New Jersey Brigade), 2d Division, 3d Corps; 2d Division, 3d Corps, Army of the Potomac.

Major-General Judson Kilpatrick: Second lieutenant, 1st United States Artillery, May 6, 1861; lieutenant-colonel, 7th Regiment, New York State Volunteer Cavalry (Harris Light Cavalry), August 1, 1861; brigadier-general, June 13, 1863; brevet major-general, January 12, 1865; major-general, June 18, 1865; resigned, January 1, 1866. Commands: 3d Cavalry Division, Army of the Potomac; Cavalry Corps, Army of Tennessee.

Brigadier-General William R. Montgomery: Colonel, 1st Regiment, New Jersey Volunteers, May 21, 1861; brigadier-general, as of May 17, 1861; resigned, April 4, 1864.

Brigadier-General George W. Taylor: Colonel, 3d Regiment, New Jersey Volunteers, May 23, 1861; brigadier-general, May 9, 1862; died, August 31, 1862, at Alexandria, Virginia, of wounds received in action at the second battle of Bull Run, Virginia. Command: 1st Brigade (1st New Jersey Brigade), Franklin's Division, Army of the Potomac.

Brigadier-General Joseph W. Revere: Colonel, 7th Regiment, New Jersey Volunteers, August 31, 1861; brigadier-general, November 29, 1862; resigned, May 25, 1865.

Brigadier-General Charles A. Heckman: Colonel, 9th Regiment, New Jersey Volunteers, February 19, 1862; brigadier-general, November 29, 1862; resigned, May 25, 1865.

Brigadier-General William Birney: Colonel, 4th Regiment, New Jersey Volunteers, January 8, 1863; colonel, United States Colored Troops, June 7, 1863; brigadier-general, May 22, 1863; brevet major-general, March 13, 1865; mustered out, August 24, 1865.

Brigadier-General Charles G. Harker: Captain, 15th United States Infantry, October 24, 1861; colonel, 65th Regiment, Ohio Volunteers, November 11, 1861; brigadier-general, September 20, 1863; killed in action at Kennesaw Mountain, Georgia, June 27, 1864.

Brigadier-General George D. Bayard: Captain, 4th United States Cavalry, August 20, 1861; colonel, 44th Regiment, Pennsylvania Volunteers (1st Pennsylvania Cavalry), August, 1861; brigadier-general, April 28, 1862; killed in action at Fredericksburg, Virginia, December 13, 1862.

Brigadier-General James H. Stokes: Captain and assistant adjutant-general, August 22, 1864; brigadier-general, July 20, 1865; mustered out, August 24, 1865.

Military Department of the State—During the period of the Civil War and the years immediately following, the State of New Jersey had three governors and, therefore, three successive commanders-in-chief: Charles S.

Olden, January 15, 1860, to January 20, 1863; Joel Parker, January 20, 1863, to January 16, 1866; Marcus L. Ward, January 16, 1866, to January 19, 1869.

The military staff of these three governors consisted of the following: Brigadier-General Robert F. Stockton, Jr., who was appointed adjutant-general on January 30, 1858, was breveted major-general, March 9, 1859, and resigned April 10, 1867; Brigadier-General William S. Stryker, appointed adjutant-general, April 12, 1867; Brigadier-General Lewis Perrine, appointed quartermaster-general, September 22, 1855, and breveted major-general, April 28, 1865; Brigadier-General Lewis W. Oakley, appointed surgeon-general, December 25, 1865, resigned, September 28, 1869; Colonel S. Meredith Dickinson, appointed assistant adjutant-general, December 27, 1865; Lieutenant-Colonel James W. Woodruff, appointed deputy quartermaster-general, November 11, 1862.

The personal staff of each Governor consisted of several aides-de-camp, each holding the rank of lieutenant-colonel. During Governor Olden's administration the following officers served on his staff: Thomas H. Richards, N. Norris Halsted, Leonard L. F. Appleby, Charles Scranton, Cornelius Van Vorst, and Robert Sewell. Governor Parker's staff including these: Daniel P. Stratton, Isaac A. Nichols, James S. Rue, William Sweeney, John C. Rafferty, and Garret D. W. Vroom. Governor Ward's staff including: Benjamin W. Hoxsey, William E. Potter, William E. Sturges, William S. Stryker, and N. Norris Halsted.

The First and Second New Jersey Brigades—In response to the second Presidential call for troops, issued upon the third of May, 1861, a requisition was made upon New Jersey for three regiments of volunteer infantry to serve for three years, or during the war. Anticipating the call, Governor Olden informed the Secretary of War upon the eighteenth of May that the three regiments were ready for muster. The organizations were designated as the 1st, 2d, and 3d regiments, while in pursuance of an act of Congress, approved July 22, 1861, the 4th Regiment and Battery A were organized and assigned to duty with the three regiments already raised in the field. These five regiments were generally known as the 1st Brigade, New Jersey Volunteers. These regiments continued in service throughout the war, participating in many prominent engagements in Virginia, Maryland, and Pennsylvania. The colonels of the regiments were: 1st, William R. Montgomery, Alfred T. A. Torbert, Mark W. Collett; 2d, George W. McLean, Isaac M. Tucker, Samuel L. Buck, William H. Penrose; 3d, George W. Taylor, Henry W. Brown; 4th, James H. Simpson, William B. Hatch, William Birney, and Edward L. Campbell.

The 17th, 18th, 19th, and 20th regiments were organized from the 1st, 2d, 3d, and 4th regiments upon the completion of the three months for which they had enlisted in 1861.

The 2d Brigade of New Jersey Volunteers was composed of the 5th, 6th, 7th, and 8th regiments of infantry and Battery B. These regiments were raised under the third call for troops, July 24, 1861, and, as in the case of the

regiments of the 1st Brigade, saw active service in Virginia, Maryland, and Pennsylvania. The colonels of these regiments were: 5th, Samuel H. Starr, William J. Sewell; 6th, James T. Hatfield, Gershom Mott, George C. Burling; 7th, Joseph W. Revere, Louis R. Francine, Francis Price, Jr.; 8th, Adolphus J. Johnson, John Ramsey.

The 9th and 10th Regiments, New Jersey Volunteers—The 9th Regiment was organized under an act of Congress approved July 22, 1861, leaving the State December 4, 1861. The regiment was in active fighting in Virginia and North Carolina. The colonels of the regiment were Joseph W. Allen, Charles A. Heckman, Abram Zabriskie, and James Stewart, Jr.

The 10th Regiment, organized independently of State authority and known as the "Olden Legion," had been formed under the act of Congress approved July 22, 1861. On January 29, 1862, the regiment was transferred to the authorities of the State of New Jersey. Its service was entirely in the State of Virginia. Its colonels were William Bryan, William R. Murphy, and Henry O. Ryerson.

Five Three-Year Regiments—Upon July 7, 1862, President Lincoln issued a call for three hundred thousand additional volunteers to serve for three years or until the close of the war. Of this call New Jersey's quota was five regiments. For some time a regiment had been recruiting in the State, and this, the 11th, was sent on August 25 to Washington. The colonel was Robert McAllister, the State of Virginia being the scene of its active service. The other four regiments furnished under the Presidential call and known as the 12th, 13th, 14th, and 15th, were recruited rapidly from the organized, equipped, and drilled militia of the State. The 12th participated in the prominent battles in the State of Virginia, the colonels of the regiment being Robert C. Johnson, J. Howard Willetts, and John Willian.

The 13th served in Maryland, Pennsylvania, Virginia, Georgia, and North Carolina, its colonel being Ezra A. Carman. The 14th and 15th regiments participated in battles upon the soil of Virginia. William S. Truex was colonel of the 14th Regiment, while the colonels of the 15th Regiment were Samuel Fowler, Alexander C. M. Pennington, Jr., and William H. Penrose.

First New Jersey Cavalry—The 16th Regiment, the 1st Regiment of Cavalry, was organized under the provisions of an act of Congress approved July 22, 1861, and was not under the control of the State authorities. Designated as Halsted's Cavalry, the regiment reached Washington about September 1, 1861, and served in Virginia with great distinction until the close of the war. The colonels of the regiment were William Halsted, Percy Wyndham, John W. Kester, Hugh H. Janeway, and Myron H. Beaumont.

No Draft Required in Patriotic New Jersey—The State of New Jersey, by its patriotic enrollment of volunteers, escaped the necessity of a draft of three hundred thousand men, to serve for nine months, ordered by the President upon August 4, 1862. The quota of the State under that draft

was ten thousand four hundred and seventy-eight men, which was filled by the organization of the 21st, 22d, 23d, 24th, 25th, 26th, 27th, 28th, 29th, 30th, and 31st regiments. The service of these regiments was almost wholly in the State of Virginia. The colonel of the 21st Regiment was Gillian Van Houten; of the 22d, Abraham G. Demarest, Cornelius Fornet; of the 23d, John S. Cox, Henry O. Ryerson, Edward Burd Grubb; of the 24th, William B. Robertson; of the 25th, Andrew Derrom; of the 26th, Andrew J. Morrison; of the 27th, George W. Mindil; of the 28th, Moses N. Wisewell; of the 29th, Edwin F. Applegate, William R. Taylor; of the 30th, Alexander E. Donaldson, John J. Cladek; of the 31st, Alexander P. Berthoud.

Two More Cavalry Regiments—The 32d Regiment, known as the 2d Regiment of Cavalry, was organized under authority and instruction from the Federal War Department dated June 30, 1863. The regiment took part in engagements in Virginia, Mississippi, Tennessee, Missouri, Kansas, Arkansas, and Alabama. Its colonel was Joseph Kargé.

The 36th Regiment, 3d Regiment Cavalry Volunteers, also known as the 1st Regiment United States Hussars, was organized under a proclamation of the President of the United States dated October 17, 1863. The service of this cavalry regiment was entirely in the State of Virginia. Its colonels were Andrew J. Morrison and Alexander C. M. Pennington, Jr.

New Jersey's Final Military Efforts—Under authority of the War Department dated June 30, 1863, the 33d, 34th, and 35th regiments were organized. The 33d served in Tennessee, Georgia, and North Carolina, its colonel being George W. Mindil. The 34th was in battles in Kentucky, Tennessee, and Alabama, its colonels being William H. Lawrence and Timothy C. Moore. The 35th took part in engagements in Mississippi, Georgia, and South Carolina. The colonel of the regiment was John J. Cladek.

The 37th Regiment came into existence under a Presidential call for troops to serve one hundred days. The details of the call were fully set forth by the proclamation of the Governor of New Jersey, under date of May 16, 1864. The colonel of the regiment was Edward Burd Grubb. The regiment took an active part in the operations before Petersburg, Virginia, from August 28 to September 26, 1864.

Under an act of Congress approved July 4, 1864, the 38th and 39th regiments were organized. The service of both regiments was confined to Virginia. The colonel of the 38th was William J. Sewell; the colonel of the 39th was Abram C. Wildrick.

The Maryland Emergency Company, mustered into service for thirty days on July 12, 1864, was called out for service in Pennsylvania, Maryland, or the District of Columbia. The company, under the captaincy of Richard H. Lee, was stationed near Baltimore.

The 40th Regiment was organized under the last mentioned act, the regiment taking part in the Virginia campaign of 1865, its colonel being Stephen R. Gilkyson.

The 41st Regiment was commenced, but owing to the termination of hostilities was discontinued and consolidated with the 39th Regiment.

New Jersey's Five Artillery Batteries—Of the batteries of artillery that of the 1st Regiment, known as Battery A, was a part of the militia force of the State, and was attached to the 3d Regiment, Hudson Brigade. Although the tender was made to the Governor of New Jersey he was unable to accept the services of this battery until permitted to do so by the provisions of an act of Congress approved July 22, 1861. The battery served in Pennsylvania and Virginia, its captains being William Hexamer and Augustine N. Parsons.

In September, 1861, Battery B, 1st Regiment, formerly known as Company F, 1st Regiment, Independent Essex Brigade, tendered its services to the State. Its participation in battles was confined to Virginia. The captains of Battery B were John E. Beam and A. Judson Clark.

Batteries C, D, and E, 1st Regiment, were organized under instructions from the Federal War Department dated June 30, 1863, and served in Virginia. The captain of Battery C was Christian Woerner, of Battery D, George T. Woodbury and Charles R. Doane, and of Battery E, Zenas C. Warren.

Trenton's Famous Company A—A notable military organization in New Jersey was Trenton's Company A, of the State Militia. Thoroughly drilled and disciplined, on the sixteenth of April, 1861, a meeting of the company was called for the purpose of responding to President Lincoln's call for seventy-five thousand militia. Before action could be taken Company A was sent to the southern part of the city of Trenton to guard a large amount of military stores collected there in the State arsenal. This was the first company in the North to perform military duty under arms. The company later volunteered as Company A, 1st Battalion, Pennsylvania Emergency. The boast of the company is that it sent more men to the war than any other organization in the North, while serving as a school for officers, remained unchallenged. The captain of the company was William R. Murphy. Following the appeal made by Governor Curtin, of Pennsylvania, upon the fifteenth of June, 1863, that neighboring states come to the relief of Pennsylvania and ward off the invasion contemplated by the Confederate general, Robert E. Lee, on the seventeenth of June, Governor Parker called for volunteers, particularly from among the nine months' regiments. The 23d and 27th volunteered for the service, as did four companies from Trenton, two from Newark, and one each from Lambertville, Morristown, Mount Holly, and Camden, and a light battery from Rahway. These ten companies were organized into two battalions, one of which was commanded by Captain William R. Murphy, of Trenton, the other by Captain J. Fred Laumaster, of Mount Holly. At the end of thirty days' service at and near Harrisburg the companies returned to New Jersey and were discharged.

Jersey Soldiers in Miscellaneous Organizations—From time to time New Jersey men enlisted in the regiments of other states. Thus there were



LINCOLN STATUE, EAST ORANGE

soldiers from this State in the regiments of Connecticut, Delaware, District of Columbia, Illinois (cavalry), Maryland, Michigan, Missouri, New York, Pennsylvania (artillery, infantry, and cavalry), and Wisconsin (heavy artillery). The total enlistments in these various regiments were 2 officers and 617 non-commissioned officers and men, of whom 39 of the latter group died.

Officers appointed to the regular United States Army from New Jersey numbered 55, of whom 8 died. In this branch of the armed forces of the United States there also served 993 non-commissioned officers and enlisted men, attached to many different units, of whom 39 lost their lives.

New Jersey men also found representation in the Veterans' Reserve Corps, instituted April 28, 1863. It contained 24 officers and 152 men from the State, 6 of the latter group losing their lives. Large numbers of New Jersey citizens also found their way into the various units of Hancock's Corps, established November 28, 1864, and containing 17 officers and 1,319 men from New Jersey, and 1 officer and 11 men of these died.

There were no regiments of colored troops from New Jersey, those enlisting in this branch of the service being sent to the general rendezvous in Philadelphia. Thirty-seven officers, credited to New Jersey, were from time to time assigned to these colored regiments, which also contained a total of 2,872 enlisted men and non-commissioned officers. Of these 3 officers and 469 non-commissioned officers and men died.

Military Camps and Rendezvous in New Jersey—In order to facilitate the mustering of troops, rendezvous were established in August, 1862, at Trenton, Beverly, Freehold, Newark, and Flemington. These were commanded, respectively, by Brigadier-Generals N. Norris Halsted, George M. Robeson, Charles Haight, Cornelius Van Vorst, and Alexander E. Donaldson.

Post commandants and disbursing officers were located in various parts of the State, all of these having been established July 22, 1862. They were to be found at Camp Perrine, Trenton; Camp Stockton, Woodbury; Camp Vredenburg, Freehold; Camp Fair Oaks, Flemington, and Camp Frelinghuysen, Newark. In 1863 an agent of the State of New Jersey was sent to Washington to care for the troops going to the front as well as for those in the hospitals in the vicinity of the National Capital.

Relief Work and Organizations—Early in the war it became evident that the civilian population would have to supplement the relief efforts undertaken by the State and Federal authorities. The earliest organized movement for relief work among soldiers was made by the women of Newark, who, as early as April 24, 1861, founded an organization, of which the wife of ex-Governor Pennington became president. It continued to function very effectively during the entire war, and before long similar organizations were formed by the women in practically every city and town in the State.

Similar in scope, but devoted entirely to relief work in behalf of the families of volunteers, was an even earlier organization founded by the citizens of Lambertville on April 17, 1861. This, too, was quickly followed by other organizations in many other localities, which devoted themselves to the same type of relief work.

At Newark, on April 22, 1861, there was also founded an organization of even wider scope, known as the Public Aid Committee of Newark. Marcus L. Ward, then a private citizen of means and great public spirit and later Governor of New Jersey, became its chairman and devoted himself to its work with untiring energy and the greatest unselfishness, rendering eminent services, together with his associates, to the people of the State, to the Nation and the Union cause. It was largely as the result of his efforts that a government hospital was organized at Newark, so that the wounded and sick from New Jersey could be treated in their own State. Later other hospitals were formed at Jersey City, Beverly and Trenton barracks.

Another body, of State-wide scope, was formed in November, 1863, when the United States Sanitary Commission for New Jersey was founded, with Cornelius Walsh as president, Marcus L. Ward as treasurer, and Dr. George Taylor as secretary. It became eventually to a great extent the central clearing house of all relief work in the State.

The Christian Commission, too, received extensive support in its important relief work from citizens and organizations in all parts of New Jersey. Many churches and other religious organizations, especially, preferred to make their contributions to relief work through this body.

At the end of the war, in 1865, two institutions were established with State funds, for the purpose of healing the wounds made by the war, the Soldiers' Children's Home and the Home for Disabled Soldiers.

New Jersey Surgeons, Nurses and Chaplains—The State was as liberal in furnishing support to the medical organizations of the Union forces as it had been in supplying officers and men to the line troops. Sixty-five surgeons and ninety-three assistant surgeons from New Jersey served with the volunteer regiments, chiefly, but not entirely with New Jersey regiments. There were also nine New Jersey physicians serving as assistant surgeons in the regular United States Army and several in the United States Navy. The highest ranking volunteer medical officer was Dr. A. N. Dougherty, who went out as surgeon with the 4th Regiment, New Jersey Volunteers, and who became medical director of the Right Grand Division of the Army of the Potomac, composed of the 2d and 9th Corps. Several other New Jersey physicians had charge of army hospitals in different parts of the country or held other responsible positions in the Medical Corps.

Many New Jersey women served very effectively as nurses in hospitals in and near Washington and elsewhere. One lady from this State was the accredited agent of the Sanitary Commission to the Army of the Potomac and accompanied it on all its campaigns. Space does not permit to relate here in detail the eminent and courageous services rendered by these angels of mercy. But it is generally admitted that one, Miss Cornelia Hancock, of Salem County, rendered especially valuable services. She was the first, in July, 1863, to reach and to minister to the wounded of the 2d Army on the battlefield of Gettysburg. Later she served valiantly at Camp Letterman, at the Contraband Hospital in Washington, at Brandy Station and in Philadelphia. In May, 1864, she had the distinction of being the first Northern

woman to enter and succor Fredericksburg, Virginia. After that she served again in the field and at City Point, Richmond and Alexandria.

The churches of New Jersey, too, freely supported the Union cause. Forty-seven ministers of different denominations served with New Jersey regiments as chaplains. One of these, Rev. Francis E. Butler, chaplain of the 25th Regiment, died of wounds received in action, May 3, 1863.

New Jersey's Provisions for Its Civil War Soldiers and Their Families—By an Act of the Legislature, passed May 11, 1861, the payment of State pay was authorized of two dollars per month for single men and six dollars per month to the families of volunteers in the service. This referred to county, township and city officials. The sum expended during the war to discharged soldiers and families of deceased soldiers amounted to \$555,-840.63, and that disbursed to families and dependent mothers, to \$1,761,-533.95, a total of \$2,317,374.58.

A system was adopted for the transmission of money through the adjutant-general's office from the troops in the field to their families at home, and in this manner a total disbursement was made of \$2,275,989. The State paid no bounties for recruits, but bounties were offered by county, township and ward authorities on certificate of muster into the United States service. It is estimated that in this way local bounties were paid in New Jersey of more than \$23,000,000.

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CHAPTER XLI.

CONTEST OVER UNITED STATES SENATORSHIP, 1865-66.

The result of the election of 1864, which brought about a tie between the Union-Republican and the Democratic parties in the State Assembly, set up a very interesting situation in the Legislature of 1865 when it assembled on January 10, particularly in view of the fact that the term of United States Senator Ten Eyck was expiring and his successor was to be elected. The Senate was organized speedily by the Democrats, who elected as president, Edward W. Scudder, of Mercer, by a party vote of 13 to 8, over George D. Horner, of Ocean. In the Assembly the ballot showed Mr. Joseph N. Taylor, speaker of the preceding session, and Joseph T. Crowell, of Union, president of the Senate in 1862, with thirty votes each. The resultant deadlock, it was clear, could be broken only by agreement. But for the time being neither party was favorable to such agreement.

Samuel Fowler, a Democratic member of the Assembly from Sussex, was at the time very ill, but had, at great personal risk, been present at the session of January 10, and had cast his vote then. In view of his critical condition, a resolution was offered, from the Union side, to the effect that a majority of the whole house should be necessary to elect the officers of the Assembly. When finally convinced that the proposal was offered in good faith, the Democratic members of the Assembly agreed to it, and the resolution was passed. This action would postpone the organization of the Assembly until Mr. Fowler should be able to take his seat. But Mr. Fowler, as a result, possibly, of exposure in attending the initial session of January 10, died on January 16. This broke the tie, of course, until a successor to Mr. Fowler should be elected. Though the Unionists did not have a clear majority of the Assembly, they nevertheless now had a plurality of one over the Democrats; hence they desired to organize the Assembly at once. But the Democrats held that, by the resolution of January 10, a majority of the whole Assembly, or thirty-one votes, would be necessary to elect officers. When Attorney-General Frelinghuysen was appealed to, he rendered an opinion upholding the Unionist contention, that a majority of the actual members of the Assembly was now thirty. This caused a great stir.

However, as the wisest settlement, an agreement was entered into by the leaders of the two parties whereby the Assembly should be organized by the parties jointly. The Assembly was therefore organized on January 26. The Union party obtained the speaker, the clerk, and the doorkeeper, the Democrats the assistant clerk, the engrossing clerk, and the assistant doorkeeper. Fate had contributed to this Union success. Prior to the assembling of the Legislature, the Democrats had offered a division of the offices on a more equitable basis. Interesting light upon the attitude of the parties towards each other is afforded by the method employed to effect the organization of the Assembly on the basis of the agreement. This was by the passage of a reso-

lution reciting "That in order to organize this House without further delay, Hon. Joseph T. Crowell, of the Assembly, be unanimously declared the Speaker of this House" The resolution named in succession also the various selections for the other offices.

The Assembly was now organized, but the problem that the continuance of the tie¹ created in connection with the election of a United States Senator remained. In New Jersey, it was provided by the rules of the Legislature that United States Senators should be elected by a joint meeting of the two branches of the Legislature. Such a joint meeting could be held only at an agreed time, as the result of resolutions passed by both houses. Soon after the result of the elections in November was known, it was urged generally by the Union party press in the State that the Assembly should refuse to go into joint meeting for the election of a United States Senator, and so prevent the election of a Democrat as such Senator. A Senator elected by the Legislature of 1865 would, under normal circumstances, not take his seat until the following December. It was probable, or at least possible, that the Legislature elected in 1865, to sit in 1866, would be Union-Republican. Should, then, the proposal to defer the election of a Senator be adopted, New Jersey would, on the one hand, be without its full representation in the United States Senate, in practice, for but a few weeks, and, on the other hand, the Senator, when elected finally, might well be a Republican.

The Assembly, however, agreed to go into joint meeting on February 13. At the joint meeting on that day Senator Holsman offered a resolution which was agreed to, by a vote of 45 to 34, providing that no candidate for United States Senator receiving less than a majority of the votes of the Joint Meeting should be declared elected. The election was then postponed to March 1. On that day, by a vote of 43 to 37, it was postponed again, to March 15. Up to this time the Union caucus clearly felt that it could either postpone the election indefinitely, or, should vote be forced, could prevent the election of a Democrat. A strict party vote on joint ballot would have totaled 43 to 38, a Democratic majority of five. But there were a few Democrats who were unalterably opposed to the nominee of the Democratic caucus, John Potter Stockton. When the Union members of the Assembly agreed to go into joint meeting for the election of a United States Senator, and when they accepted Senator Holsman's resolution, they undoubtedly knew of this Democratic opposition to Mr. Stockton. That they risked at all a session of the Joint Meeting was due, no doubt, to the pressure of a public opinion favoring the election of a Senator, whatever his party.

The Joint Meeting, at three o'clock, on March 15, was a scene of excitement and confusion. Senator Holsman's resolution, requiring a clear majority for the election of a Senator, was quickly rescinded, by a vote of 41 to 40. A motion to adjourn *sine die*, which was offered immediately, was lost by 40 to 41, and the Joint Meeting proceeded to ballot for a Senator. Stockton received 40 votes, Ten Eyck, the candidate of the Union-Republican caucus, 37. A

¹ William M. Illif had been elected to succeed Mr. Fowler.

motion to adjourn was then, in the confusion, quickly passed. Senator Scovel had refused to vote for Ten Eyck, and had voted for Attorney-General Frelinghuysen. But, of the Democrats, Senator Doughty, of Somerset, voted for Peter D. Vroom, Senator Jenkins, of Union, for Henry S. Little, and Assemblyman Kennedy, of Warren, for Colonel Wall. In a word, three of the disaffected Democrats held out against the choice of the Democratic caucus, with the result that, on the first and only ballot, Stockton received a plurality of the votes of the Joint Meeting, but not a majority, as Senator Holsman's resolution of February 15 had required. In the maneuvering the Democrats had obtained an unexpected success, Stockton took his seat in the United States Senate in December, 1865.

By the adjournment of the Joint Meeting, the Union-Republican members of the Legislature lost the opportunity to protest, in the Legislature itself, against the rescinding of the resolution requiring a majority vote to elect a United States Senator, and against the subsequent election of Stockton by a plurality. The only recourse, then, was to lodge a protest with the United States Senate, as the sole judge of the election of its members. Steps in the direction of such a protest were taken. Charles P. Smith, chairman of the Union-Republican State Executive Committee, assisted by Cortlandt Parker, of Newark, soon drew up a protest, to be presented to the United States Senate when next it should meet, in December, 1865. This protest was signed by the Union-Republican members of the Legislature. It made its appearance in the Senate, in December, under circumstances described at length by Mr. Smith. In the protest it was urged that Mr. Stockton should be unseated, because his election had been irregular. The points made by the protest were that Stockton did not receive as many votes as were cast against him; that no United States Senator from New Jersey had ever been elected under similar circumstances; and that election by a Legislature could be a legal action only if taken by a majority of the whole Legislature. The report of the Judiciary Committee of the United States Senate, however, to which only Mr. Clark objected, held "That in the absence of any law either of Congress or the State on the subject, a joint meeting of the two Houses, duly assembled and vested with authority to elect a United States Senator, has a right to prescribe that a plurality may elect on the principle that the adoption of such a rule by a majority vote in the first instance makes the act subsequently done in pursuance of such majority its own."

The protest was referred to the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, and was finally reported to the Senate on March 26, 1866. Stockton had been admitted to a seat in the Senate in December, 1865, pending the report by the committee on the protest. The report upheld Senator Stockton's election, and was adopted that day by a vote of 22 to 21. Senator Stockton's own vote carried the motion. Senator Sumner, of Massachusetts, objected strenuously to Senator Stockton's voting on the question. On the next day, therefore, Stockton withdrew his vote, and on another ballot was unseated, by a vote of 23 to 21.² On the same day, March 27, President Johnson's message veto-

² Cf. Rhodes, Vol. V, p. 585.

ing the Civil Rights Bill was received by Congress. The importance of the New Jersey senatorial contest now appears. Circumstances had injected it into the contest over the policies of President Johnson and Congress for the reconstruction of the Confederate States, and at a very critical stage of that contest, when the veto of the Civil Rights Bill, unexpected to the last moment, became known.

The Civil Rights Bill had been reported to the Senate, from the Committee on the Judiciary, on January 11, 1866. On February 2, it passed the Senate, by a vote of 33 to 12; it passed the House on March 13. As already stated, President Johnson sent his message³ vetoing the bill to Congress on March 27. On April 4 the Senate considered the veto message. Senator Trumbull answered it. He characterized the bill as the most important measure proposed for the consideration of the Senate since the Thirteenth Amendment had been before that body. On April 6 the Senate voted. Up to the last moment it was uncertain whether the necessary two-thirds vote, which the Republicans had been unable to muster to override the veto of the Freedmen's Bureau Bill,⁴ could be secured for the present need. There was uncertainty about the attitude of certain Union-Republican Senators.⁵ Further, Senator Foot, of Vermont, had died, and George F. Edmunds, who was appointed, at once, to fill the vacancy, did not take his seat until April 5. Senator Wright, of New Jersey, had been ill at his home, in Newark, but he had been brought to Washington by his son. Senator Dixon, of Connecticut, was also seriously ill. The vote, when finally counted, stood 33 to 15, and the President's veto was overruled.

The opponents of the President had no margin to spare. Had Morgan or Stewart or Willey separated himself from his party or had Stockton not been unseated the veto would have been sustained as Dixon would have been carried into the Senate could his veto have secured that result.⁶ . . . The passage of this bill over the President's veto was indeed a momentous event, not only because, in view of Johnson's character, it rendered the breach between him and Congress complete, but also for the reason that it opened a new chapter in constitutional practice. Since Washington there had been many vetoes but never until now had Congress passed over the President's veto a measure of importance, and this measure was one over which feeling in Congress and the country had been wrought up to the highest tension.

³ He objected to the bill because it conferred citizenship upon the negroes at a time when eleven states out of thirty-six were unrepresented in Congress, and attempted to fix by Federal law "a perfect equality of the white and black races in every State of the Union." It was, he held, an invasion by the Federal authority of the rights of the states; it had no warrant, and was contrary to all precedents. It was a "stride toward centralization and the concentration of all legislative power in the national government." See Rhodes, Vol. V, p. 583.

⁴ The vote then (February 20) had been in the Senate, yeas 30, nays 18. A two-thirds vote would have required 33 yeas.

⁵ For the debate in the United States Senate, cf. *Globe*, 39th Cong., 1st Ses., pp. 1564 ff. The *Senate and Assembly Journals*, 1865, and a pamphlet, *Was the Hon. John P. Stockton Duly Elected Senator from New Jersey?*, dated January 2, 1866, have the minutes of the debates in the Joint Meeting. The pamphlet presents an argument denying the legality of the election.

⁶ Cf. Rhodes, Vol. V, pp. 585-86.

Wright voted to sustain the veto, as Stockton would have done. Stockton's vote would, therefore, have been the deciding vote; its exclusion became, perhaps, the decisive factor in effecting the Congressional plans of reconstruction. Important also are the accounts in Blaine, Vol. II, pp. 154-161; De Witt, pp. 66-86, and Welles, Vol. II, pp. 464-65 (under date of March 26, 1866), Vol. II, p. 475 (under date of April 4, 1866). Blaine seems to believe that, had the vote in the Senate not been so close, Stockton would not have been unseated. De Witt treats elaborately the New Jersey senatorial contest; he holds that the unseating of Stockton was done deliberately by the Republican majority in the Senate in order to secure the two-thirds vote necessary to pass the Civil Rights Bill over President Johnson's veto.

Secretary Welles's earlier comment, because it is completely contemporary with the event, is worth quoting:

The Senate today deprived Stockton of New Jersey of his seat. It was a high-handed, partisan proceeding, in which Sumner, Fessenden, Morrill, and others exhibited a spirit and feeling wholly unworthy of their official position. While I have no special regard for Stockton and his party in New Jersey, I am compelled to believe they have in this instance certainly been improperly treated and for a factious purpose. . . . Had Stockton acted with Sumner and Fessenden against the veto, he would never have been ousted from his seat. Of this I have no doubt whatever, and I am ashamed to confess it, or say it. I am passing no judgment on his election, for I know not the exact facts, but the indecent, unfair, arbitrary conduct of the few master spirits is most reprehensible.

Since the Republicans in New Jersey now controlled the Joint Meeting of the State Legislature, which was still in session, it was expected that a Republican would be elected immediately.

The desire for party advantage, then, was the motive which had dictated the unseating of Stockton. Yet the end sought was not alone, nor even principally, to obtain a radical Republican majority in the United States Senate. As was pointed out above, the protest against the election of Stockton had originated with the Union-Republicans of New Jersey. Smith, p. 306, declares that the protest, the election of Scovel as State Senator, and the calling of the extra session of 1866 were all alike due to his suggestions. He continues: "Yet Cattell and Robeson manifested the utmost hostility towards me simply because I maintained a passive position in preference to becoming one of their unscrupulous and pronounced advocates. It had been immeasurably better for the party as well as my own interest and convenience, if I had not interfered even on general principles and thus suffered Mr. Stockton to retain his place in the Senate." In the reference to his own interest and convenience Mr. Smith is thinking of his efforts to secure his reappointment as clerk of the Supreme Court of New Jersey. For a time the petition slept, of necessity, since the Senate was not in session. It was finally introduced into the Senate in the interest of Alexander G. Cattell, who, since the election of Stockton, and the success of the Republicans in New Jersey in November,

1865, had himself acquired senatorial aspirations. In December, 1865, the Republicans of New Jersey, and Mr. Cattell in particular, were keen for the unseating of Stockton, since, as the outcome of the elections of November, 1865, the Republicans had majorities in both houses of the Legislature of 1866, so that the election of a Union-Republican as Senator, should Stockton be unseated, seemed assured. If we accept Smith's account of Union-Republican party politics in New Jersey, we shall believe that a definite working agreement was made early in 1865 among a group of Republicans for the purpose of gaining undisputed control of the Union-Republican party in New Jersey. As members of this group, or "Cabal" or "Ring," Smith mentions Alexander G. Cattell, George M. Robeson, Horace N. Congar, B. Acton, Edward Bettel, Providence Ludlam, Samuel Plummer, F. F. Patterson, John T. Nixon, George A. Halsey, Barker Gummere, and George T. Cobb. Smith definitely asserts the existence of the "Cabal." His account was written as a history of his contest with the Cabal for party leadership, with particular emphasis on his candidacy for reappointment as clerk of the Supreme Court of the State.

The Union-Republican success in New Jersey in the campaign of 1865, already mentioned, was a notable event in the political history of the State. The contest was for the election of a Governor, and of members of the Legislature. It was the first campaign in the State after the conclusion of peace; it was conducted amid political conditions essentially new; it proved to have an important influence upon the politics of the State for the next decade.

The Union-Republican State Convention had met in Trenton, on July 20. The platform adopted by it congratulated the country upon the return of peace, deplored the death of Abraham Lincoln, and endorsed the administration of President Andrew Johnson. Then followed an arraignment of the influential Democratic leaders and journals of the State generally, for issuing a manifesto, "through an ex-Governor of the State," urging that New Jersey should cast her lot with the South. It was further charged that the Democratic party had prolonged the war by "evidences of sympathy with treason," had discouraged volunteering, thus contributing to the burden of large bounties, and had opposed the enlistment of negro troops. The Democrats were charged also with exciting popular opposition to national taxes, with refusing an opportunity to exercise the elective franchise to the citizen soldiery when in the service of the Federal government, and with increasing, since 1860, the ordinary expenses of the State government. The convention pledged the party to secure bounties for honorably discharged soldiers, to reduce State expenditures, to support a policy of rigid economy, and to sustain the Monroe Doctrine. It pledged also the support of the Union men of New Jersey in the effort to secure the adoption of the constitutional amendment abolishing slavery, and deplored the position of New Jersey as the only free State that had refused to ratify that amendment.

The contestants before this convention for the gubernatorial nomination were Marcus L. Ward, the Union candidate in 1862, now chairman of the Union-Republican National Executive Committee; Alexander G. Cattell,

president of the Corn Exchange Bank, of Philadelphia; and Major-General Judson Kilpatrick. On the fourth ballot Marcus L. Ward, "The Soldier's Friend," received the nomination.

Mr. Smith's account of the contest for the gubernatorial nomination is most interesting. According to him, the Cattell-Robeson Cabal in New Jersey politics originated in connection with the opening of Cattell's campaign for the gubernatorial nomination of 1865, at a conference of members of the Union-Republican party of the First and Second Congressional Districts, held in the spring of 1865, at the Continental Hotel, Philadelphia. Smith was present. Of Cattell's candidacy Smith writes thus:

Mr. Alexander G. Cattell, who, practically, had been absent from the State for about twenty years, and even now had scarcely more than lodgings in Camden County, came forward at the above Conference as a candidate for the gubernatorial nomination. He was pressed upon the meeting by a number of followers, among the most conspicuous of whom were George M. Robeson, B. Acton, Edward Bettle, Providence Ludlam, Samuel Plummer, and F. F. Patterson.

At the close of the Conference it was stated by Cattell's friends, in his presence, that, in the event of his nomination, a very large amount of money would be raised to insure his election (\$125,000).

A combination was then and there formed in which, though strongly solicited in Mr. C.'s presence, I refused to participate. Mr. C. had no claims upon the party, possessed no fitness, was scarcely known, and there was no reason beyond the pecuniary consideration why he should even have been thought of for the position. I was soon made to feel that I was under the ban of the Cabal. Nevertheless, Mr. Cattell deemed it important to consult me in a special visit at my residence. He referred to our boyhood in Salem, and affected to rely on me. Mr. Cattell's coadjutors were very boastful and active, but they failed in securing the delegates from Mercer County. In short, they failed in the State convention. . . .

The Democratic State Convention met on August 30. On the fourth ballot Theodore Runyon was nominated. His opponents were Theodore S. Randolph, General Gershom Mott, Moses Bigelow, and S. J. Bayard. The platform was lengthy and verbose. The Democracy still placed the responsibility for the war upon the Abolitionists of the North and the Secessionists of the South. Opposition to negro suffrage was expressed, upon the ground that the people of each State had the right to control the subject as they deemed best; similarly, the right of each State to control its own militia was maintained. A return to the bimetallic standard of currency was endorsed; so also was the Monroe Doctrine. The payment of equalized bounties to State soldiers was advocated, and the claim was made that the Democrats were the first in New Jersey to advocate it and to establish the principle of equal taxation. The federal administration was criticized for its plan of subordinating the civil to the military power in the Southern States.

The campaign was carried on with energy and enthusiasm. General Kilpatrick addressed political gatherings everywhere in the State on behalf of Mr. Ward, and participated in a series of debates, with Congressman Andrew J. Rogers as his Democratic opponent. At Newark, on September 13, 1865, General Kilpatrick said: "I am not willing to see the rebels of the South, whose hands are yet red with the blood of our fallen braves, restored to all their old rights and privileges; and that, too, before they have shed one penitential tear for the great crimes they have committed. I will not stand tamely by and see the triumph of that band of pitiable traitors in my native State, who, while professing loyalty to the Union and the Constitution, have ever gloried in the progress of treason—men who now call themselves Democrats." "General" Runyon's war record came in for considerable attention and criticism. In brief, the Union-Republican campaign was more thoroughly organized than at any time previous.⁷ On July 4, the Union-Republicans had held at Trenton, and elsewhere, grand receptions for the returned soldiers. It was thought that the soldier vote would decide the election. In November, 1864, about 15,000 soldiers who were voters of New Jersey were outside the State, and did not vote. The Unionists claimed that their vote would have upset McClellan's majority of 8,000 in the State.

Governor Parker, in an address,⁸ pointed out the real issues of the day as he saw them—negro suffrage, and the restoration policy of President Johnson. The latter he urged, must be sustained, since the President was acting on Democratic principles. The former he vigorously opposed.

Mr. Ward won by a majority of 2,789 votes. He received 67,525 votes, Mr. Runyon, 64,737. The Legislature was safely Republican in both houses.⁹ Smith's comment on the campaign is most interesting:

[After Marcus L. Ward was nominated], The plan of the defeated faction was now to secure the legislature by sacrificing the gubernatorial candidate, and pressing Cattell for U. S. Senate. They, therefore, proceeded to declare on all occasions that Mr. Ward could not be elected. It was well understood that they intended he should not be. I strove to conciliate them, and finally prevailed upon three [members of the newly-appointed State Executive Committee] to accompany me to Newark, and call upon Mr. Ward. My object was to commit them to him before they had time to sow dissensions. I soon perceived that their purpose was not to aid Mr. W., but to ascertain the amount and control the means which he and his friends were likely to devote to the canvass. They left him disappointed and angry. From that time forward and until a few days of the election, the Cattell faction, some of them occupying prominent positions in the party and State, continually predicted Mr. Ward's defeat, and declined performing any practical work of the canvass. Through-

⁷ See the *New York Times*, October 14; *New York Tribune*, September 26.

⁸ October 16, 1865.

⁹ The *New York Herald*, November 9, said that the election meant the passage of the Thirteenth Amendment and the election of a Republican as United States Senator from New Jersey.

out the central and lower counties, I was left to contend almost single-handed. Every particle of drudgery was thrown upon me. Of the members of the committee Mr. Nixon attended but a single meeting; Mr. Robeson resigned from his position as chairman of the Committee on Speakers and Meetings, and left his important department entirely in the hands of strangers in the State, who were neither acquainted with the people nor their requirements, and who immediately opened their headquarters in *New York*! I visited different sections of the State, urging our friends to increase their efforts, and the reply almost invariably received was, "*We are anxious and willing, but somebody is holding back.*" The members of the Committee from the First Congressional District assumed to take exclusive control, and yet did nothing. Robeson and Cattell were the moving spirits in commanding this halt. *I became thoroughly convinced that it was their intention nothing should be done until Mr. Ward and his East Jersey friends surrendered to their demands, both as regards dispensing his means and official patronage.*

Mr. Smith declares that the executive committee furnished him neither speakers nor funds. So little was reported by the committee on finances that it was regarded as a virtual abandonment of the gubernatorial campaign.

Then and there (less than a week previous to the election) I assumed a position, which, however prejudicial it may have been to my own interests, saved the Party. From that hour my fate was sealed so far as the confederating parties could accomplish it. . . . Mr. Ward was elected, whereupon these "hard working friends," who throughout the canvass had performed little or no service, became exceeding active—passing through the State, and to neighboring cities, receiving congratulations and boasting of what they had accomplished, while I was left for weeks engaged in gathering bills and seeking means to liquidate them. . . . Never had a man worked more indefatigably, or served a cause more faithfully, and never was any one more shamefully treated by those who had ostensibly [been] selected to aid him in redeeming the State. As chairman of the State Executive Committee, who had contended for Mr. Ward through two gubernatorial campaigns, adhering to him in defeat and victory, . . . it might reasonably be presumed that I was entitled to some consideration at his hands. The men, however, into whose hands he had surrendered himself worked harder for Mr. Cattell's nomination than for Mr. Ward's election, and managed to visit their defeat upon me. . . . The loss of my office might or might not prove a personal calamity, but it always dwarfs in comparison with the widespread corruption which on every hand is cankering the life-blood of the State and party.

Great was the rejoicing of the Union-Republicans throughout the North over the results of the election in New Jersey. The *New York Times*, November 9, 1865, said editorially:

The Union triumph in New Jersey marks, perhaps more significantly than any achieved elsewhere, the progress of Republican

principles and the depth to which they have taken root in the political soil of the Nation. That State, which has adhered more tenaciously than any other Northern State to the narrow prejudices of the so-called Democracy, has at last broken loose. . . .

The *New York Evening Post*, of November 8, commented as follows:

The late glorious result in New Jersey is mainly due to the stupid consistency of the Democratic leaders in that State. With more adroitness and less honesty they might have prevailed. Had the managers of the convention . . . boldly turned their backs upon their past political record and varnished over their close ambitions with a semblance of patriotic zeal, they would indeed have forfeited all claim to the possession of fixed principles, but could hardly have failed to carry the State.

Upon the issues on which the Democrats conducted the campaign, every vote for Runyon became almost an approval of the most unqualified and thoroughgoing Peace Democracy of the period of the war. Throughout, the Democrats were in a defensive position. Mr. Ward had great personal popularity. Interest centered in the Thirteenth Amendment, and the result was probably due, largely to the returned soldiers. The *New York Times*, January 17, 1866, under the caption, "Another State Added to the Union," said editorially: "The inauguration of Marcus L. Ward as Governor of New Jersey . . . completes the necessary formalities for the restoration of that State to the Union." The *New York Tribune*, November 8, 1865, hailed "New Jersey Redeemed."

Mr. Stockton was unseated by the United States Senate on March 27, 1866. It was pointed out above, that the Civil Rights Bill, just returned to Congress with the President's veto, was awaiting action, and that it was uncertain whether the radical Republicans would be able to override the veto. Under these circumstances, the immediate election of a radical Republican Senator by New Jersey would have been welcome. But, when the Legislature of New Jersey sought to elect a Senator, difficulties arose. The choice of the Union-Republican caucus was Alexander G. Cattell. But the Senate was Republican by only one vote. The president of the Senate, James M. Scovel, refused to vote for Cattell, declaring him an upstart and adventurer, a stranger to New Jersey for twenty years, unfit mentally and morally for the position, without claims to it other than financial. He further refused to vote to go into joint meeting of the two houses of the Legislature. Yet, on March 30, he offered to vote for any Republican save Cattell, and put forth a list of acceptable Republicans. He promised that, if the Union-Republican caucus should agree on some one other than Cattell, he would go into joint meeting on April 3. Scovel maintained that, if Ten Eyck had been reelected in 1865, there would have been no protest. He held that, if the Legislature was competent to prescribe a majority vote as necessary to election, it was competent also to prescribe a plurality vote as sufficient for election. As a former Democrat, who had joined the Union-Republican party, he was at odds

with the Republicans on President Johnson's reconstruction policy. It was the radicals in the Senate that had ejected Stockton. The caucus, however, remained firm for Cattell, and, since Scovel held the deciding vote, the Legislature was unable to elect a Senator, and adjourned, finally on April 6.¹⁰ The Democratic caucus protested against the selection of a Senator, because there was no vacancy; because the federal Senate acted by less than a majority of its whole number, against the facts in the case; because it was a high-handed violation of the constitutional right of the State of New Jersey to have two representatives in the Senate of the United States, who were to be appointed in the manner prescribed by the Legislature thereof. On the same day, the Civil Rights Bill was passed over the President's veto. Scovel was subjected to severe criticism and abuse for his refusal to vote to authorize the Senate to go into joint meeting. Cattell, in the short time since his reëntrance into New Jersey politics, had obtained a prominent place in the Union-Republican party. Scovel was not favorable to the railroad interests, in spite of which he had been nominated and elected to the Senate in 1863. Personal animosity between Cattell and Scovel caused the deadlock in the senatorial election.

In June, Congress enacted the Fourteenth Amendment, and in July¹¹ the House and the Senate passed over the President's veto a Freedmen's Bureau Bill. The breach between President and Congress was widening. But New Jersey was represented by only one Senator; he, Wright, was a Democrat. Criticism of Scovel increased. During the late summer, Scovel, at the suggestion of Charles P. Smith, wrote to Governor Ward, urging him to convene the Legislature in special session. He promised to vote for any candidate the party might agree upon. Governor Ward responded by calling a special session of the Legislature, to meet on September 10, 1866, to take action on the Fourteenth Amendment, and on the election of a United States Senator.

Meantime, as the result of the prominence given to the election and the ejection of Stockton, Congress, under its power to determine the time and the manner of electing Senators,¹² had prescribed the manner in which in future, United States Senators were to be elected. Congress had enacted that a State Legislature, immediately preceding the expiration of the senatorial term, should proceed, on the second Tuesday after its session began, to elect a Senator. Each house was first to vote separately; if one person should receive a majority of the whole number of votes cast in each house, he was to be declared elected.

Should no person receive a majority in each of the separate ballotings, the two houses must meet in joint assembly, and elect by *viva voce* vote and *majority count*. Should there be no election on the first day of the joint assembly, the assembly must meet every succeeding day, and take one ballot at noon, until a Senator should be elected. This procedure has since been superseded by that prescribed by the Seventeenth Amendment. As a result of this

¹⁰ See *Annual Cyclopaedia*, 1866, p. 539.

¹¹ July 16, 1866. Cf. Rhodes, Vol. V, p. 598.

¹² The Act of July 25, 1866.

act of Congress, Mr. Scovell, even if he had so desired, would have been unable to prevent the Legislature from going into joint meeting. There the Republicans had votes enough to elect Cattell, should they so desire.

In his message, Governor Ward placed before the special session of the Legislature the two questions—the vacant senatorship, and the Fourteenth Amendment. After disposing of the latter, the Legislature took up the former. Cattell had received the endorsement of the Union-Republican caucus. The Legislature balloted on September 11. Cattell was elected in the Senate by a vote of 11 to 10, in the Assembly by 34 to 24. There was thus no need for a joint meeting of the houses. Since Cattell was favorable to the reconstruction program of the radicals in Congress, his election as Senator strengthened the position of the radical Republicans in Congress. As already noted, had Stockton been permitted to retain his seat, the course which Congressional reconstruction finally took would have been temporarily—perhaps permanently—checked. But national politics and policies did not alone make up the forces that operated against Stockton. Questions of politics within New Jersey itself, party rivalries, and the struggle for control within the Union-Republican party, and especially the personal ambitions of Alexander G. Cattell were weighty factors. During the eighteen months it had taken to elect a senator to succeed Senator Ten Eyck, a quarrel had so far developed between the radical Republicans in Congress and the President that no chances could be taken. The ejection of Stockton was followed by an act of Congress fixing the method of electing United States Senators. As a result of this act, the Union-Republicans in New Jersey were able, first, to uphold their protest against the election of Stockton, and, secondly, to elect a United States Senator at a special session of the Legislature, before the November elections of 1866 and the assembling of Congress in December, while the Republicans yet had secure majorities in both branches of the Legislature.

The ratification by the special session of the Legislature of the Fourteenth Amendment, supplementing that of the Thirteenth Amendment in January, and the election of a United States Senator became the chief issues in the campaign of 1866. Because of the special session Governor Ward was sharply criticized, and charged with playing party politics. The amendments were vigorously opposed by the Democrats as infringements of the principle of states' rights. Special stress was laid on the events in the election of a Senator. Yet, in spite of all, the Union-Republicans were able to carry the State elections, and to retain their control of both houses of the Legislature. In the Congressional canvass the Union-Republicans were distinctly successful. There were elected three Republicans and two Democrats. The reasons for the failure of the Union-Republicans to carry the second district are to be found in the contest for the control of the Republican party machinery in the State. In the second district ex-Governor William A. Newell, of Monmouth, the Union-Republican candidate, was up for reelection. He was one of the older group of politicians in the State, and was personally very popular. But the new group, headed by Cattell and Robeson, seeking absolute control of the Republican party in the State, hoped, by defeating Newell, to force

him and his friends to yield the leadership. Nevertheless, though Newell was defeated, the elimination of his supporters did not immediately follow. The contest for control, however, continued, and was to prove the chief factor in bringing about the disastrous defeat of the Union-Republicans in the following year. In the fifth district the Republicans elected George A. Halsey; in the fourth, from which for two decades a Democrat had been returned, the Republicans elected John Hill over Andrew J. Rogers, a member of the Joint Committee on Reconstruction, a candidate for reelection.

The Union-Republican victory in 1866 permitted the party to elect, in the Legislature of 1867, a second United States Senator. In November, William Wright, who, at the time of the vote on the President's veto of the Civil Rights Bill, had been ill, died. For the interim Governor Ward appointed Frederick T. Frelinghuysen, then Attorney-General of the State. When the Legislature assembled, there were two candidates before the Union-Republican caucus, Frelinghuysen and George T. Cobb. Governor Ward favored Frelinghuysen, Senator Cattell was pledged to Cobb. When, however, George M. Robeson became a candidate for the office of Attorney-General, Cattell, to gain support for Robeson, deserted Cobb. Frelinghuysen was elected and Robeson's appointment was confirmed. When Frelinghuysen's term as Senator expired in 1869, Stockton had the satisfaction of succeeding him. Frelinghuysen returned to the Senate in 1871, to succeed Cattell.

The contest for the leadership of the Republican party reached its height during this session of 1867. The election of Frelinghuysen as United States Senator opened a breach in the group seeking to wrest the leadership from Charles P. Smith. Cattell, Congar, and Robeson, together with Cobb, were the principals in this group. They had defeated Newell. Smith, then chairman of the Union-Republican State Executive Committee, had not supported Cattell in 1865, in his contest for the governorship, or in 1866 in his attempt to have himself elected as United States Senator.

Smith, pp. 307-08, declares that, in order to grasp and wield control of the Republican party to advance his personal interests and desires, Cattell obtained in the fall of 1866 Smith's book, his personal property, showing the organization of the State. This book, says Smith, was the most perfect piece of machinery of the kind ever known in New Jersey. "It was exclusively my private property." It was obtained for Cattell by Robeson. Smith found Robeson's law partner copying the book. "From that time there was not a shadow of doubt as to the settled determination of the Cabal to rule the Party in their sole and exclusive interests." During this session an opportunity was offered, it seemed, to overthrow Smith, and to force him either to resign his position as chairman of the State Executive Committee, or to coöperate with Cattell, Robeson and Congar, in the furtherance of their designs. Smith's term as clerk of the Supreme Court of the State was to expire in 1867; he was candidate for reappointment, at the Governor's hands. The interests opposed to his leadership of the party sought, first, to induce Governor Ward to nominate their candidate, and, secondly, if he would not do that, to prevent the confirmation of Smith, should the Governor nominate him. They failed



JOHN WELLS MEMORIAL HOSPITAL, NEW BRUNSWICK



GEORGE STREET, NEW BRUNSWICK

in both projects. Smith forced Governor Ward's hand, and compelled him to send his name to the Senate for reappointment. In spite of false accusations brought against Smith by Cobb, Smith received the unanimous vote of the Union-Republican caucus, and the unanimous vote of the Senate, for confirmation. He thus retained his position, which amounted to recognition of his position of leadership in his party. Smith's account¹³ of these matters follows:

The Confederates entered upon the canvass [of 1866] with the avowed purpose of establishing an *Oligarchy* modeled after the infamous "Albany Regency"; they avowed as their belief that there should be "*imperio in imperio*" in our State politics, and fully manifested the settled purpose of bringing the gubernatorial candidate and his friends to their knees. Of course, I could neither expect nor desire sympathy from such men. They were averse to my remaining in a position where I could not fail observing and protesting against their practices; *they were aware that I had insisted upon accountability in financial matters*, and had not been warped into participation with their plans, beyond the legitimate duties of the Committee. . . .

The intrigue to control Mr. Ward's appointments was consummated at the Capitol in Washington but a short period prior to the election. Among those reported as participating were Congar, Robeson, Cattell, and Ludlam. The disclosure was made by Ludlam. I failed to learn positively whether Plummer, the Bettles, Halsey, Acton, and the other Confederate allies were in attendance. Ludlam boasted in Camden, that it was unqualifiedly promised he should be my successor; Congar was to have been Clerk-in-Chancery, but subsequently selected the position of Secretary of State, that Gummere might remain undisturbed. Frelinghuysen was to be favored in his Senatorial aspirations that Robeson might fill the Attorney-Generalship. This involved the necessity of Cattell's betraying his trusted friend, George T. Cobb, and Ward's breaking faith with Cortlandt Parker. This conference was held in the course of a few days after my arraignment of Robeson, Cattell and Congar before the Committee, and their forced disgorgement of party funds.¹⁴

Smith continued as chairman of the Union-Republican State Executive Committee. The struggle for leadership was not over, but Cattell and Robeson had received a check. The continuance of the struggle now became involved with the question of negro suffrage; in that connection it will be treated further.

Mr. Smith's account of these events is highly interesting. He describes a letter, dated November 6, 1866, which he sent to Governor Ward, announcing his candidacy for reappointment. With the letter went recommendations, from everyone conceivable, including "the unanimous Bar of the State, by

¹³ *Smith, Reminiscences*, pp. 281-82.

¹⁴ This statement apparently implies financial irregularities in the previous campaign.

counties, irrespective of party." In his letter Mr. Smith used the following expressions: "No incumbent has ever yet been displaced by his party friends." "Under the peculiar circumstances of the case, as chairman of the Union State Executive Committee and foremost in the contests of many years past, my supersedure would undoubtedly afford room for grave surmise." Smith says that he received no answer to this letter, and two months later was reliably informed that the position had been tendered to B. Acton, of Salem, a protégé of the Camden and Amboy Railroad Company, and one of Cattell's principal coadjutors. Smith formally called upon the Governor, to ask the truth about the report that the appointment had been tendered to Acton. Governor Ward declared that he had not made such tender, but he showed also that he had no intention of nominating Smith. Mr. Smith continues thus:

I then remarked, "Governor, I have not been laying around your doorstep begging for this reappointment. I come to ask you what the entire Judiciary, Bar, Press and Party demand at your hands. If you are willing that the State shall know how you reward your enemies and punish your friends, you may apply the bow-string as soon as you please. *Since I have been chairman of the Union State Executive Committee, I have heaped up information as high as Olympus, and I shall use it to the end of my days.*" The interview lasted nearly two hours; and having fairly taken ground, I kept nothing back. He became fully aware of the fact that I was thoroughly informed in reference to the intrigues of those who assumed to control him, and, what was more important, I had the nerve to expose them. . . .

I finally asked him when he would make the nomination. "Very soon." "How soon?" "Oh, very soon, sir." "This afternoon?" "Not quite as soon as that." "I shall expect to hear of it very soon," was my final reply.

Early in the afternoon, after my visit with the Governor, H. N. Congar, Secretary of State, sent his clerk to invite me to call at his office. . . . "The Governor and you had a long talk this morning?" "Yes," I replied, "and a very plain one!" "I am glad of it," he rejoined, "it will do him good. He will nominate you." "Of course he will; I have had no other impression." "Yes, and I have been your friend throughout." "Save me from my friends, and I'll take care of my enemies," had never truer application than in this case.

Smith was nominated for the place finally on January 31, and the nomination was approved on February 12, 1867. On January 30, Robeson was nominated for Attorney-General. Then followed efforts to cause the nomination of Smith to be rejected.

Smith says that, at a meeting of the "Junta," in Congar's office, it was planned that the nomination of Robeson should be confirmed at once, but the confirmation of the nomination of Smith should be postponed for a week. This was done.

CHAPTER XLII.

POST BELLUM POLITICS AND CONDITIONS.

By B. H. Goldsmith, Historian and Author.

The period from 1866 to 1875 showed political changes quite in keeping with this newer period of unrest. From 1850 to 1866 the Senate had remained Democratic, with the exception of 1861, when the Republicans had control of the upper house, and in 1862, when there was a tie. The House of Assembly since 1850 had been Democratic, with the exception of but a few years. In 1865 there was a tie vote in the House of Assembly. Thence until 1873 there was almost constant change. In 1866 and 1867 both houses were Republican. In 1868, 1869, and 1870 both houses were Democratic; and in 1871, 1872, and 1873 both houses were again Republican. In 1865 a Republican Governor, Marcus L. Ward, had been elected, but in 1868 the governorship was wrested from the Republican party by Theodore F. Randolph, whose successor, in 1871, was the former Governor Joel Parker, whose great popularity remained unshaken.

The presidential contest of 1868 found the Republicans with General Ulysses S. Grant and Schuyler Colfax as their nominees, and a platform declaring in favor of a reduction of the national debt, the encouragement of immigration, and the use of coin in the payment of bonds. The Democrats nominated Horatio Seymour and Francis P. Blair, and declared for universal amnesty, a uniform paper currency, the payment of the national debt in irredeemable paper currency ("greenbacks"), and the abolition of the system of land grants to railroads. As in 1864, so in 1868, New Jersey declared herself in favor of the Democratic candidate.

It was in 1872, during the presidential contest, that a resident of New Jersey was brought forward as a vice-presidential candidate. Among minor political organizations which had sprung into existence was the National Labor party, declaring for paper money, an eight-hour law, Chinese exclusion, and the abolition of land grants to corporations. This party had nominated Joel Parker for the vice-presidency. While he declined the honor the very use of his name gave the party some local strength. Besides this movement the "Greenback" or "Ohio" idea had swept in from the Middle West; from 1865 to 1870 National Labor congresses had met, the restriction of immigration of the Chinese agitated the Pacific slope, while the moral question of prohibition of the liquor traffic assumed formidable proportions. Added to this the Republican and Democratic parties were divided. The death of Lincoln and the failure to carry out his plan of reconstruction upon broad and permanent lines had produced much bitterness in the South. The schemes adopted by professional politicians had split the Republicans in Missouri, from which arose a new party called the "Liberal Republicans," owing to its

doctrine of more generous consideration of the Southern States. In the national convention of the party in 1872 Horace Greeley, of New York, and B. Gratz Brown, of Missouri, were nominated for President and Vice-President on a platform which for the first time in the politics of the Republic declared for civil service reform. The "regular" Republicans, unaffected by this movement, nominated General Grant and Henry Wilson. The nomination of Greeley and Brown was endorsed by the Democrats, but to many of the "old line" Democrats of New Jersey this endorsement was most distasteful, in that Horace Greeley, as "war editor" of the New York *Tribune*, had but recently accused many of his new political associates in New Jersey of disloyalty and even treason. The breach in the party widened, and General Ulysses S. Grant was elected President, the State of New Jersey giving him that remarkable majority of 15,200, a majority since unequalled in a presidential contest, until 1896, when McKinley and Hobart, Republicans, received a plurality of 87,692.

New Jersey and the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments—On August 30, 1866, Governor Ward called the Legislature into special session to meet in Trenton on September 10 to accept or reject the fourteenth amendment to the Federal Constitution. This amendment dealt with citizens and their rights, the apportionment of representatives, the disability of persons engaged in the Civil War, and the validity of the public debt. In the Senate there were ten Democrats who refused to vote. Eleven Republican Senators cast their votes in the affirmative, and the Upper House accepted the amendment on September 11. In the Assembly, on the same day, the vote was thirty-four ayes to twenty-four noes. Approved by the Governor, the fourteenth amendment from now on was to become a cause of bitter political strife in the State.

The House, on February 20, 1868, passed a joint resolution rescinding New Jersey's previous action, just related, by a vote of forty-four to eleven, the Senate having taken a like action the day before, by a vote of eleven to eight. In adopting this course, the Legislature, in a series of resolutions arousing national interest, declared that the basis of all government is the consent of the governed, and that all constitutions are contracts between the parties bound thereby. These resolutions also tried to justify "the natural and constitutional right of New Jersey to withdraw its assent, as long as three-fourths of the State had not yet given their assent." They were presented to the House of Representatives at Washington on March 30, 1868. By a vote of the National House of eighty to seventeen, ninety-two members not voting, it was ordered that the New Jersey Resolutions should be returned to the State, that only their title should be referred to in official publications, and that the House denied the constitutional right of any State Legislature to withdraw its assent to the amendment. New Jersey, with Ohio, which State had also withdrawn its assent, was included in the joint resolution of Congress in the list of ratifying States, and their acts withdrawing their assent

were treated as null and void. This attitude of Congress has never been successfully questioned in the Supreme Court.

The fifteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States was rejected by New Jersey in 1870, in the House on February 1, by a vote of thirty-three to twenty-seven, and in the Senate on February 27, by a vote of thirteen to eight. This joint resolution of rejection was approved on February 15. This amendment, which declared that the right of the citizens of the United States to vote should not be abridged "on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude," later received the assent of a Republican Legislature, being then approved by the Democratic Governor in office. The joint resolution providing for the approval of the fifteenth amendment was passed by the Assembly on February 8, 1871, by a vote of thirty-four to twenty-four, and by the Senate on February 21, 1871, by a vote of twelve to seven, the Governor approving it on February 21, 1871.

The Election of 1868—John I. Blair was the unanimous choice of the Republican convention of 1868. The State platform endorsed the national platform, which congratulated the country upon the success of the "Reconstruction" policy, and the guarantee, by Congress, of equal suffrage to all loyal Southerners. Repudiation was denounced, and equal taxation in the interest of labor advocated. It was urged that the national debt be extended "over a fair period for redemption," and that Congress reduce the interest thereon "whenever it can honestly be done," thus improving national credit. Reversing the attitude of the platform of 1865, New Jersey Republicans, by endorsing the national platform, violently denounced Andrew Johnson's administration and the "corruptions which have been so shamefully nursed and fostered." Protection to naturalized citizens was granted, bounties and pensions for soldiers were promised, as well as the protection of their widows and orphans, foreign emigration encouraged, while removal of restrictions and disqualifications upon those "reconstructed" was advocated. The State platform, in addition, urged that the Democrats in New Jersey be driven from power, they being charged with "attempting to undo the ratification of the 14th article of the Constitution."

In 1868 the Democratic party selected as its gubernatorial nominee Theodore F. Randolph. The ballots were taken, those presented in nomination besides Mr. Randolph being Isaac V. Dickinson, Amos Robbins, Nehemiah Perry, General Theodore Runyon, Henry S. Little, and Moses Bigelow. The platform was marked by brevity and directness. The "Republican proposition" of striking the word "white" from the State Constitution and establishing political equality between the races in New Jersey led the Democrats to "congratulate the people of the State upon their spontaneous repudiation" of such a course. Accepting the decision of the war and the consent of Southern States to the constitutional amendment as the practical abolishment of the institution of slavery, the Democrats of New Jersey insisted upon the right of all the States to regulate their domestic affairs without congressional inter-

ference. In spite of the fact that New Jersey in 1868 had a Republican Governor, Horatio Seymour, Democratic nominee for President, secured in New Jersey 2,870 votes over Ulysses S. Grant, the Republican nominee and successful contestant for the office. Seymour's vote was 83,001, Grant's vote 80,131. The gubernatorial vote was 83,619 for Randolph and 79,072 for Blair, giving the Democratic party a majority of 4,547, as compared with a Republican majority for Ward over Runyon in 1865 of 2,789.

The Elections of 1871 and 1872—Before the Republican convention of 1871 there were the following nominees: Cornelius Walsh (who was nominated by South Jersey), Major-General Judson Kilpatrick, John Davidson, Marcus L. Ward, Theodore Little, Ellston Marsh, John Hill, Colonel A. D. Hope, and James M. Scovel. The platform endorsed the fifteenth amendment to the Federal Constitution, and commended the national administration in its effort to reduce the public debt and the adjustment of the controversy with Great Britain. Civil service reform was recommended, and the claims of Jersey City to be made a port of entry as the seat of an independent custom house were endorsed. Popular education, the "passage of a general law of incorporation and of the abolition, as far as practicable, of all special and private legislation" were recommended. Upon such a platform Cornelius Walsh was nominated upon the second ballot, but practically by acclamation.

Although Joel Parker had positively declined the honor, nevertheless the Democratic State convention of 1871 forced upon him on one ballot the nomination for Governor. There were many candidates, including Thomas D. Armstrong, Benjamin F. Lee, Nehemiah Perry, Theodore Runyon, Joseph D. Bedle, Leon Abbett, General Charles Haight, David Naar, Austin H. Patterson, and Isaac V. Dickinson. Once more State issues occupied the attention of the platform builders. The party pointed to its record in New Jersey. It had, said the platform, urged the adoption of general laws, under which there would be no further "enterprises born of special legislation and maintained by corruption." An honest judiciary had been maintained, State and constitutional rights had been guaranteed, the sinking fund had been increased, riparian laws had been enforced, and three hundred thousand dollars had been collected from the Federal Government since the recent Governor had proclaimed that the accounts between the State of New Jersey and the United States had been substantially settled. Upon federal questions the Democratic party declared for a prompt and complete amnesty of all persons charged with political offenses, and a tariff based upon the principle of taxing luxuries, and the abolishment of taxes upon the necessities of life. All conspiracies against law and good order, North and South, were denounced, while the government of the United States was declared to be a "government of limited powers," prescribed and enumerated in the Federal Constitution, and not a "supreme, unlimited, imperial, consolidated" government. Legislative commissions for the regulation and government of municipal corporations were declared to be "hostile to the principles of self-government," while

recent legislation prohibiting the use of money at elections was commended to the attention of the Democrats in townships throughout the State.

Judged by the results of the State election of 1871, the hold of the Democratic party was even stronger than three years before, the Democratic majority in the gubernatorial vote being 5,979 as compared with 4,547 in 1868. However, neither party polled as many votes in 1871 as it had done in 1868, the vote for Parker being 82,362 as compared with 83,619 for his predecessor, and that for Walsh being 76,383 as compared with 79,072 for Blair, the Republican candidate of 1868. But even in the total votes cast the Republicans were the heavier losers.

In spite of success in 1871, the Democrats were unable, in 1872, to overcome Ulysses S. Grant's remarkable majority of 15,200 over Horace Greeley, Democratic nominee for President of the United States. The State of New Jersey, for the first time, in 1872, cast its entire electoral vote for a Republican candidate. Grant's vote was 91,656, the vote of Greeley being 76,456.

The Elections of 1874 and 1876—The gubernatorial contest of 1874 was distinctively upon local affairs. The Republican State platform declared its faith in the policy of the national administration. Upon national issues the platform advocated a tariff and a plan of equal internal taxation such as would protect and encourage the domestic manufactures and industrial interests of New Jersey. The establishment of a custom house in Jersey City was also favored. In special instances the Republicans commended, and stated they would pursue, the policy of a general railroad system, the judicious amendment of the constitution, the advancement of the cause of popular education, and the wise management and liberal extension of penal, sanitary, and charitable institutions. George A. Halsey was nominated for Governor by acclamation.

Joseph D. Bedle was the unanimous choice of the Democratic party in its State convention of 1874, although scattered votes upon the first and only ballot were cast for Charles Haight and John T. Bird. The Democratic platform presented no novel or characteristic features in its treatment of national issues. Strict construction of the Federal Constitution, condemnation of "carpet bagging" in the "reconstructed" States, the restoration of gold and silver as the "only true basis of the currency of the country," the advocacy of resumption of specie payment, the adoption of a "tariff for revenue," and opposition to the "Civil Rights" bill were the subjects under review. The platform denounced the Republican policy of attempting to subject the "free press of the country to a new censorship" and condemned the doctrine of a "third term" for any presidential candidate. Once more in State issues the Democratic party opposed government of municipalities by legislative commissions, and advocated a system of general laws, while the "assumption by the Republican convention of credit for the passage of the general railroad law is as impudent as it is false, this measure having been originated and sustained in both branches of the Legislature by distinguished Democrats."

The "store-order system" and the illegal issue of paper promises in forced payment of wages were declared to be an "unjustifiable imposition upon the laboring man." The Republicans were also charged with falsely asserting that they saved the Union and abolished slavery, "when but for the Democracy of the country, and its men and means, every Republican administration would have miserably failed." Against the Republican administration were further charged fraud, "hard times," the burden of a vast public debt, a failure to make the flag of the United States respected abroad, leniency in punishing dishonest officials, the use of military power, "carpet bagging," and wholesale robberies in the administration of affairs in the District of Columbia. The Republicans, said the platform, had been enabled to continue their career "by complacent assumptions of superior patriotism, integrity, and intelligence."

Bedle received 97,283 votes, Halsey 84,050, giving a Democratic majority of 13,233.

Two years subsequently, in the memorable contest of 1876, the State of New Jersey gave 115,962 votes to Samuel J. Tilden, the Democratic candidate for President of the United States. His opponent was Rutherford B. Hayes, Republican, who received 103,517 votes. Tilden's majority was 12,445.

Legislative Changes of a Decade—During the ten years of 1865-75 much important legislation was passed by the Legislature, which, in spite of the frequently intense political contests and the animosities arising from them, in a general way did much to further progress and to advance the well-being of the citizens. In 1866 the State Board of Education was established and the sectarian support of schools was abandoned. The year 1869 brought the passage of a new National Guard Law, providing for not more than sixty companies of infantry. The fate of the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments to the United States Constitution in the New Jersey Legislature has already been described in greater detail in the earlier part of this chapter, but it bears repetition here that, eventually, both were adopted by the Legislature. In 1871 all public schools were made free of tuition. Two years later a law was passed providing for compulsory education. That year, 1873, also saw two other important events in the legislative and constitutional history of the State. A joint resolution empowered the Governor to appoint a bipartisan commission of fourteen to suggest constitutional amendments. As a result Governor Parker named, on April 24, 1873, the following: Benjamin F. Carter, Woodbury; Samuel H. Grey, Camden; Mercer Beasley, Trenton; John C. Ten Eyck, Mount Holly; Robert S. Green, Elizabeth; John F. Babcock, New Brunswick; Martin Ryerson and Jacob L. Swayze, Newton; Augustus W. Cutler, Morristown; Benjamin Buckley, Paterson; Theodore Runyon and John W. Taylor, Newark; and Abraham O. Zabriskie and Robert Gilchrist, Jersey City. From this original roster there were several resignations, declinations and other changes. Mercer Beasley was succeeded by Philemon Dickinson, Trenton; Martin Ryerson by Joseph Thompson, Somers-



"FLEMING CASTLE," FLEMINGTON



HOME OF THE MORSE TELEGRAPH, MORRISTOWN

set; Theodore Runyon by George J. Ferry, Orange; Robert Gilchrist by William Brinkerhoff, Jersey City; and John W. Taylor by Algernon S. Hubbell, Newark. Ex-Chancellor Zabriskie had been unanimously chosen as president of the constitutional convention, but, dying before he could assume office, had been succeeded by Dudley S. Gregory of Jersey City. The secretaries were Joseph L. Naar and Edward J. Anderson, both of Trenton. The commission sat from May 8 to December 23, 1873. Amongst the amendments recommended by the commission were two of outstanding importance. One was an amendment forbidding the Legislature to pass any private, local or special laws regulating the internal affairs of towns or counties. Another prohibited the appointment of local officers or commissions to regulate municipal affairs, concerning which the Legislature was directed to pass general laws. The commission reported to the Legislature in 1874 and was praised by Governor Parker for its work, "animated by patriotism, wisdom and discretion, and particularly free from local prejudice and partisanship." The Legislature rejected a number of the commission's recommendations but accepted several of the most important. Those accepted by the Legislature were submitted to the people at a special election held September 7, 1875, and were adopted by a majority of 40,000 votes. Prior to that the Legislature had passed in 1873, a general railroad law prohibiting any future "exclusive" privileges.

Social Development—The distinctive type of social development during the period preceding the panic of 1873 was different from that during the Jacksonian period of unrest. Then it was the betterment of humanity; later it tended more toward the personal comfort of the individual. But with newly-acquired wealth there was much ostentatious display, and attempts to attain a superlative degree of elegance in dress and house furnishing. New men had come to the front with new ideas as to a standard of living, with new plans to spend their own—and other people's—money.

Upon the wide acres of New Jersey's farms which had been cut up into building lots new homes could be found, often with no apparent thought as to a desirable location. Square masses of brick or wood, with mansard roofs, treeless and forlorn, indicated a too common type of the "modern" house, while smaller residences, fearfully and wonderfully designed by ambitious architects, were to be found on country roads.

In the family homes by peaceful country sides, with all their associations, the old gave place to the new. Mahogany was supplanted by gaudily decorated "cottage sets," while more ambitious housewives painted, in gorgeous blues and greens, antique bird's-eye maple chests. Old silver, with its graceful shapes, was packed away, and "plated" ware, with a wealth of flowers and scrolls and fanciful designs, appeared upon the tables. "Art," struggling for existence, found its expression in hanging baskets made of pine cones, and in bunches of dried grasses and autumn leaves dipped in alum water to produce a "frost effect." Mottoes and chromos were to be found on the walls, and family portraits were hung in the garrets.

In the cities there were like crudities. Men sought great hotels and their ornate "bars," where the common parlors, dazzling in red and yellow silk, walnut furniture, and cheap paintings, attracted attention and called forth praise. In the summer there was an exodus to "fashionable watering places"—to Saratoga, Lake George, and various springs, but notably to Long Branch. Gambling and drinking were common—much more common than at present—and wealth, so quickly gained, was lavishly displayed. It was, indeed, an era of false taste, of striving for an artistic effect with little or no knowledge of how that effect should be obtained.

Even the railroad trains were not exempt. The engines were gay with color and brasswork, the coaches were paneled with mirrors, or decorated between the windows with scenes of tropical life—these, by the way, being often more artistic than more pretentious efforts. Newspaper advertising type felt the effect of this spirit and lacked both dignity and grace.

From the midst of this whirl of color, excitement, and money-spending the country was plunged into a short period of financial disturbance and then into the panic of 1873. This was largely caused by overproduction, as that of 1857 by a lack of capital preceding the failure of the Ohio Land and Trust Company. That of 1873 was due to altered industrial conditions. It was the over-development of the new West that was largely responsible. It has been most truthfully said that, while the spirit of speculation had been rampant in New Jersey, and ten companies had been engaged in exploiting a given industry when one would have sufficed, the condition of affairs in the State, bad as they were, had no parallel to the rioting with money and credit which had taken place in the Mississippi Valley. That over-stimulation had its necessary reaction was well proved. Three transcontinental roads had been wholly or partly constructed, with scores of feeders and dependent lines. In the feverish markets of the United States and in Europe bonds and stocks of these corporations had met with ready sale in spite of the fact that none of them could show permanent earnings within a decade. There were constant defaults in interest, and at last the capitalists, gorged with unremunerative securities, refused to take more. Devastating fires in Boston and Chicago demanded money for municipal rehabilitation, and to add to the discontent a contest between the farmers and common carriers arose.

In New Jersey, land speculations had become topheavy. The mortgages fell due, taxes were unpaid, improvement assessments had been neglected by property owners. Local banks, to aid their depositors, withdrew their money from city institutions, which also demanded their loans. Then came rumors of the end, and finally that "Black Friday" of September, 1873, when the crash came. Men, plunged from affluence to poverty, became wrecks of their former selves. Their industries were paralyzed, their workmen beggars. In 1873 and 1874 there were nearly eleven thousand failures, and the Nation learned anew that old lesson that, in spite of political conditions, he who would dance must pay for his pleasure.

The effect in New Jersey was disastrous. Railroads, manufactures, and

the farmers were alike crippled. There were but few who did not feel the evil that had fallen upon the Nation. Municipalities which had engaged in expensive and often useless improvements were either bankrupt or were closely approaching that condition. Everywhere were but the flotsam of personal fortunes.

From these conditions the State and the Nation emerged to once more enter upon a career of prosperity, and to see the world, in a new light, in the Centennial Exposition held in Philadelphia in 1876.



CHAPTER XLIII.

THE INDUSTRIAL HISTORY OF NEW JERSEY SINCE 1861.

By Jeannette Paddock Nichols, Ph. D., Research Historian.

When her men marched away to fight in the War of the Rebellion, they left behind them a New Jersey that was destined to change her industrial outlook before their return. They well knew that the war between the North and the South was working hardship for every manufacturer of boots, shoes, carriages, locomotives, machinery, or textiles who had been in the habit of selling to southern people; but they could not realize how speedily these manufacturers would find new markets and enlarge opportunities in the West Indies, South America, the Orient and Europe. Forces more powerful than they guessed were bound to engulf the business depression in a tide of commercial optimism which would give New Jersey a full seven years of plenty and would work immensely significant changes in her occupations. From the war she would emerge as an industrial State in the modern sense, but in the meantime the first years would be marked by that temporary depression which is involved in any industrial right-about-face.

Perhaps the industry to suffer most severely when the war destroyed the southern market was the shoe manufacture in the Oranges, which had been crippled during the panic of 1857. Many there found their assets wiped out, in 1861, and hopeless ruin staring them in the face. The United States Army stepped into the breach with contracts for heavy shoes in large quantities at profitable prices. But the close of the war removed this resource and the passage of the years showed the industry as a whole incapable of reviving under normal conditions. Joseph Atkinson wrote of Newark as having twenty boot and shoe manufactories great and small about 1873 and as surpassing Lynn in the finer goods, and it is clear that Newark continued to manufacture a great many shoes. But Stephen Wickes wrote of the Orange shoe manufacturers in 1892 that their "entire product is trifling in comparison with the results of many a single shop, in the ante-bellum days." Further south, Burlington, which had been specializing in high quality shoes for southern ladies, turned to making a general line for ladies and children to be sold in Cuba and Mexico as well as in the United States. That locality had had shoes as a leading industry for forty years, but by 1927 her total employees in it numbered but 35 women and 39 men. So it went in different parts of the State for the next half century until, in 1927, the enumerators found that the entire State was producing less than \$7,000,000 worth of boots and shoes out of a total national production of more than \$450,000,000. If one inquires where the industry now thrives if not in New Jersey, one finds that Massachusetts produces about one-half of the national total.

A large proportion of New Jersey industries receiving war contracts were thereby stimulated to greater expansion in the years following. Among



LOS ANGELES (LARGEST AMERICAN DIRIGIBLE) AND SUSPENSION BRIDGE (LARGEST IN THE WORLD) OVER THE DELAWARE RIVER
Two great governmental achievements. Bridge from Camden to Philadelphia built by New Jersey and Pennsylvania. New Jersey is the home state of the Los Angeles.

these were the makers of saddlery and knapsacks at Newark, who received (with others of the guild at New York, Philadelphia and Wilmington) large contracts to equip horses for Union troops. In the same city, the Hewes and Phillips Iron Works welcomed the opportunity to alter fifty thousand stand of arms from flint-lock to percussion cap; they made thousands of dollars worth of gun factory machinery; they placed motive power outfits in the "Modoc," the "Cohoes" and other light-draft ironclads; they made a twenty-one day record for turning in that length of time the turret rings for the "Monitor" besides making a planing machine for planing the turrets of that historic vessel. This record was one of which J. M. Phillips always spoke with pride. Elsewhere in the State (as well as in Pennsylvania) Joseph Wharton undertook to supply the government with nickel for making fractional currency; he established reducing works which marked the beginning of the commercial production of that metal. At the same time, in Jersey City (and Pittsburgh) the output of crucible steel was increasing rapidly although the product was likely to be hard and brittle because of carelessness or lack of skill in selecting materials. In their struggles to control their raw materials, the makers of Bessemer steel employed as a "recarbonizing metal" franklinite—a residuum of iron, magazine, silicon, lime, zinc and magnesia, which was a by-product of the zinc paint manufacture in New Jersey. While Pittsburgh was the center of the crucible steel industry which was making the real progress of the war period, Jersey City (and New England) shared in that progress.

In other industries also the war was stimulating local inventiveness. Edward Balbach, Jr., son of the founder of the New Jersey Smelting and Refining Works at Newark, patented in 1864 a de-silverizing process which better separated gold and silver from lead and concentrated them. Within a decade father and son had a yearly product worth five million dollars; and they further acquired the reputation of handling annually more gold and silver than the Philadelphia mint itself. Their fellow-townsmen, W. H. Murphy, established a varnish industry based upon improved processes which within two decades had a branch as far west as Cincinnati, besides depots in St. Louis and Chicago. The Rankin Mills were at the same time laying in Newark the foundation of a less elegant, but no less important, industry in knit underwear. The year Balbach made his discovery in Newark, George A. Clark and his brother William came there to carry on the finishing and spooling of thread which they planned to import from Scotland. They were descendants of Peter Clark, who had had the wit to turn to making cotton sewing thread when he found that Napoleon had destroyed the supplies at Hamburg which he had depended upon importing for the purpose of his linen thread business. George and William proved true descendants of Peter, for within a twelvemonth of their arrival they were incorporating as the Clark Thread Company and expanding their business to include the manufacture of thread from the raw material obtained in the United States, a decision which the tariff doubtless induced. Thus was launched the famous trade mark, O. N. T.

Newark was by no means the only Jersey center of war time activity. Trenton chose this period to found firmly her pottery industry, upon the basis of clays brought from Pennsylvania and feldspar taken at first from Connecticut; but as the ceramic industry has separate treatment, further mention in this general industrial history is unnecessary. At New Brunswick the war helped the rubber industry to extend its scope. Rubber blankets for the army made in William Judson's establishment could be seen drying in the sun on a vacant lot along the east side of Dennis Street. Christopher Meyer was very busy indeed at this time in making boots and shoes. He had left his employment under New Brunswick's pioneer manufacturer of rubber carriage cloth, H. H. Day, because the latter would not recognize the value of his improved processes for obviating the odor of rubber and for perfecting its resistance to heat and cold. Until vulcanization was invented, Meyer led in the attempts to make rubber goods which would not melt in summer or freeze in winter or smell to heaven at all seasons. After he set up for himself, taking various partners from time to time, he manufactured rubber articles by rights obtained under Goodyear patents.

During the experimental period there were so many rubber companies in the vicinity of New Brunswick, shifting about in name, management and control, that it is very difficult to separate the threads of the various enterprises; but it appears that Meyer was the leading spirit of three concerns—The Meyer Rubber Company at Milltown, and the New Jersey Rubber Shoe Company and the Novelty Hard Rubber Company at New Brunswick. His works were described as the birthplace of most of the improved machinery for making rubber shoes. One machine was invented for converting sheets of rubber at one process into three thicknesses for sole, shank and heel; another for making sandals; and a third for imitating the ridge effect upon the tops of fore-uppers. The mills of his Novelty Hard Rubber Company (erected in 1853) thrived by the sale of a curious lot of odd articles during the period of peculiar public taste following the Civil War. Under the apt classification of "Yankee Notions," they manufactured buttons, smokers' requisites, crochet hooks, knitting pins, trimmings, rulers, checks, and tags of all sorts. Most ingenious were their canes. A contemporary described them as "elegant canes in immense variety with plain crooks or ornamented with ivory, or rubber trimmings, knotted crooks with carved rubber heads and ivory trimmings." These tasteful articles made to tempt the purses of the dandies of that period were shipped in paper boxes made by the same firm in its upper story. Conditions in the rubber industry became favorable to combination and the United States Rubber Company included three of the New Jersey factories making footwear, in its original organization.

It was Paterson which felt the most decided wartime impetus. There, silk weaving was resumed after a lapse of several years about the time the war began and by 1863 they were weaving raw silk from the Orient into dress linings, plain dress goods, flags, neckties, ribbons, and combinations of silk and mohair. They were also going on with the manufacture of the sewing

twists, braids and fringes which they had been making for nearly three decades. All of this was made relatively easy and inevitable, because foreign silks were taxed heavily as luxuries and the gold premium made them even more costly. Moreover, the silk mills employed chiefly women and children and, therefore, did not suffer from the war drafts. At the same time, the high price of cottons and other competing fabrics had come at a moment when the standard of popular consumption was rising, with the combined result of expanding the silk market. While the Silk Association of America computed the product as worth \$27,000,000 by the end of the war, and the United States census of 1870 testified that it had doubled since 1860, and while Connecticut and some other New England towns had some of the largest silk mills in the United States, the industry tended more and more to centralize at Paterson. This was largely due to her location. She was near New York and Philadelphia, which were the consuming and distributing centers for the trimmings, braids and ribbons which were the main output of the mills at first. She was convenient to an abundant supply of pure water, which the silk manufacture particularly needs. She had in her vicinity the machine shops and locomotive works which involved the nearby residence of the wives and children of these men, persons available for silk work. She was conveniently nearby for merchants who wanted to secure in a hurry, to respond to fashion changes, special shades, colors and patterns. An English inventor having perfected a loom which would multiply a weaver's output more than 500% had introduced the manufacture of silk plush for men's hats; and there had been erected in Paterson the largest dye house in America for the particular object of dyeing silks. Small wonder that at such a juncture a large silk weaving firm should desert Boston for Paterson.

Definite measurement of the temporary depression in New Jersey early in the war seems impossible; but as for the trend upwards after 1863, the special censuses of her most populous industrial center may be taken as a fair index. Newark showed an interesting fluctuation:

1860	71,941	1865	87,413	1871	110,000
1861	73,000	1866	94,800	1872	115,000
1862	70,000	1867	101,100	1873	118,000
1863	68,000	1868	105,000	1874	120,000
1864	70,000	1869	113,040	1875	123,310
		1870	105,059		

The population for 1861-65 thus reached a low point from the depression occasioned by the severance of relations with the South, and turned upward as industry rebounded under the impetus of the matured wartime policies. The war ended, a vigorous spurt forward showed that the forces vitalizing industry were far from temporary. Clearly, things industrial were happening to Newark. A contemporary, J. F. Hageman, left a record of the situation: "the inflation of the currency, the abundance of money, the rise in the price of labor and commodities, in land and in salaries, seemed for the time to mitigate the evils of the war, and tended apparently to enrich rather than to impoverish the people. There was work for everyone to do, and the remunera-

tion stimulated everyone to work." More and more industries were being transferred to the shop and factory. At the same time the entire State was becoming more highly industrialized due to the fact that the National Government had inaugurated in wartime a set of policies particularly helpful to manufacturing.

In the first place, to provide revenue for the war, Congress had raised the tariff to a point where it almost freed the manufacturers from foreign competition; and when the war ended, the main increases were left standing, with the result that manufacturing grew as it scarcely could have grown otherwise.

In the second place, to cement the west to the northern cause, Congress had subsidized the railroads and given away public lands, with the result that the transportation system experienced a mushroom growth and built up the western market.

The rush of railroad building caused some New Jersey concerns such as the Taylor-Wharton Iron and Steel Company at High Bridge, to adopt railroad materials as their chief product. They went into rolling stock, coupling links and pins, axles and wheels, as specialties—the wheels for a time of chilled iron, and later steel-tired. What the completion of a transcontinental line could mean to New Jersey was best demonstrated by the experience of Paterson after the Union Pacific was put through in 1869. That railroad facilitated trade with the Orient, especially in commodities of high value in proportion to their weight. Over its rails to Paterson (and the Connecticut Valley) came raw silk; importations at San Francisco had been insignificant before, but three years after the railroad was completed, they reached nearly \$1,000,000 or more than five times as much as at New York. By the same railroad in the opposite direction moved eastern goods, laid down in California on better terms than ever before. Thus the West adopted its rôle of consumer of eastern goods; and it did not invade the eastern field as a competitor until the day came when it had accumulated enough capital to enter large scale production. Then, some few New Jersey manufacturers, such as the makers of canned goods, were to find the railroads a little less of an unmixed blessing.

In the third place, to help finance the war, Congress had established a National banking system, with the result that currency became more uniform, financial centers became more closely related, and the speed and confidence with which business could be transacted were greatly accelerated. While manufacturing and transportation were being stimulated by this fostering care, the money market was being shrewdly manipulated. As a result it became possible for huge sums to be accumulated by a few people, so that they, in turn, possessed the capital to carry out enterprises on a gigantic scale. For large scale production they required an immense labor supply, which the influx of immigrants provided. Thus the joint functioning of capital and labor greatly augmented production. As the states did not check individual enterprise, as the Federal Government treated industry liberally, and as labor



HOBOKEN FROM THE AIR

Called the "Little Square" City, Lackawanna Railroad Terminal at the left, United States Navy German Lloyd, and the parts of other transatlantic and transoceanic lines make Hoboken a leading shipping centre

saving machinery was being continually invented, the economic opportunity became a most exceptional one. Wealth was created at an abnormal rate, faster even than the population. Manufacturing became concentrated in a relatively small section of the country; and within that section many of the various single industries became localized. Their segregation in turn determined the course of trade, as between the manufacturing states and the rest of the country, and as among the manufacturing states themselves, for they themselves were the largest consumers of manufactured goods. Before 1860 there had been neither much pauperism nor great riches; after 1860, both poverty and wealth developed, not always regardful of public interest.

Post-Bellum View of Industrial Situation—Thus it happened that the disbanded soldiers returned to a New Jersey where a rosy and careless outlook prevailed. They faced a scene of intense industrial activity in a State gone wild over wealth-getting and prosperity in general. Small concerns were consolidated into larger ones, while capital was wielding more influence in industry and politics than ever before. The State Legislature was becoming notorious for its generosity in granting special charters to particular corporations at the urgency of powerful lobbies. This practice of "special legislation" long was to cry to heaven in vain for some correction. In the meantime the Legislature, which had been usually Democratic since 1850, took to swinging back and forth between Democratic and Republican, nip and tuck, through the seven years following the war. The new developments in transportation meant that the railroad influence must figure biggest in politics; and while the strong Camden and Amboy monopoly had been chiefly a Democratic organization, under the new circumstances it showed itself nothing averse to controlling both parties when necessary. When the Camden and Amboy was leased by the Pennsylvania in 1871, the latter in turn became actively interested in New Jersey politics. It took to working through the Republicans and thereafter that group tended more and more to dominate the charter-granting Legislature.

While the Legislature was none too cautious in granting its favors, the investing public was imbued with blind faith in the money making powers of any undertaking boasting a corporate seal. Between 1863 and 1874 no less than eleven companies were formed in the expectation of making mints of money out of the marl beds, and thirty-two other concerns pinned their hopes upon the little red cranberry. The seriousness with which they contemplated the cranberry is indicated by the fact that several years later it was chosen as one of the four industries allotted special space in the first report of the Bureau of Statistics. Another group of imaginative gentlemen thriftily incorporated under one and the same charter for both oystering and stock raising, obviously with a weather eye out for an unkind fate. Such industrial ebullitions could not fail to victimize overtrusting individual investors. But sometimes whole communities burdened themselves far into the future with obligations incurred during the post-war enthusiasms. As long as times were boom-

ing, and more and more commuters from New York and Philadelphia were settling in the precincts of New Jersey, it seemed certain that vast real estate developments and extensive municipal improvements were immediately justifiable. Witness the confidence of Rev. Edwin F. Hatfield, writing of the prospects of Elizabeth in 1868: "A spirit of optimism characterizes every department of city life. The work of improvement steadily goes on. The city bids fair, within a few years, to attain at least the third, if not the first, rank in population and prosperity, among the cities of the State. The time is not far distant when every available building lot within its present bounds will be occupied." Alack and a day, Elizabeth, like Rahway, like New Brunswick, and even Paterson, too, overestimated the bounties in store.

It was but human nature that as long as times were flush taste should run riot. There was a market for all those things which contribute to ostentatious display, whether in city or country. In the cities, elegant iron store fronts simulated elevations non-existent in the rear; and every fire attracted its quota of admirers of the steam engine, shimmering in its brass trimmings. In both country and city, homes suffered a surfeit of adornment. On the outside, "gingerbread" filigrees along every possible gable, with generous distributions of cresting and balconies. Within, rooms panelled with paper in imitation of fresco, with all the requisite caps and corners. The iron dogs behind the ornate fences guarded all the glory, no aspect of which but could be purchased within the confines of the State. Great was the flair for personal adornment, also. Jewelry to the value of about \$3,500,000 was being made in New Jersey annually. Never before had the State produced so many silk ribbons and trimmings as now, employing the largest number of wage earners in any one factory industry in the State. A hint of the delights which the future had in store for the dressmakers, was whispered in the census of 1870 which recorded one sewing machine establishment, employing five persons and producing machines worth only \$4,500 annually. (Thirty-five years later the largest sewing machine factory in the world was found at Elizabeth and New Jersey was leading the world as a producer of sewing machines.) Together with the joys of personal adornment went the satiation of appetite; in a period when heavy drinking was common, New Jersey was supplying more than \$3,000,000 worth of malt liquors. Likewise, sugar was increasing in common use, refining appearing in the census of 1870 with \$11,200,000 worth produced annually. Large sums changed hands quickly because gambling was fashionable and reputable; and the general market for luxuries profited by the emergence of Long Branch and similar locations as fashionable watering places.

Underneath the froth of money spending there was a certain solid element of industrial accomplishment creating definite trends in production, especially in textiles. At Passaic, cotton, woolen and cassimere mills were being started. To New Brunswick came a hosiery mill, said to be the largest in the country turning out the finer grades of products. To Newark came F. Heller and H. Merz to experiment in making ultramarine and various analine

colors used for a multitude of purposes. Andrew Aldright was there, busy with experiments in rubber goods. The finest cotton yarn was being spun in New Jersey, where the count was 36, although the State was declining in the comparative amount of cotton spinning, as were also New York and Pennsylvania. This decline in cotton spinning was due partly to the war, which had shifted labor and manufacturing plants to other branches of production, and partly to competition with the rising silk industry in the State and the rising cotton industry in the South after the war. The maker of silk goods could pay higher wages than the maker of cotton and the cotton manufacturer in the South could get his raw material for one cent to one cent and one-half cheaper than his New Jersey competitor. Consequently, while Paterson in 1868 had fourteen cotton mills, not to mention the numerous manufactories of cotton tape for hoop skirts, in 1882 she had but three mills left, of which one specialized in mosquito netting and another in warp for horse and army blankets.

While Paterson was destined to lose cotton industries, she was headed straight for silk development. About 1868, John Ryle greatly enlarged his mill. The Phoenix mill introduced power looms. Paul Greppo made improvements in dyeing and finishing which stimulated the trade. Hamill and Booth, having been rather forced from spinning into weaving, concluded to go ahead with experiments in that field, and to continually surprise the market with original designs, a daring attitude which eventually took them into velvet manufacture. In 1869 the Dale Manufacturing Company brought in from France skilled operatives for starting the weaving of broad silks, thus adding their weight to the other branches already firmly established. The census of the next year showed that New Jersey had twenty-eight of the country's total of eighty-six silk mills, and led all the other states in the value of her total silk product. This, in spite of the fact that she was outranked by Connecticut (the chief seat of the sewing machine industry) in the manufacture of machine twists and broad silks. It was silk ribbons and trimmings that New Jersey made her peculiar specialty.

Other textile developments during this period occurred in worsteds, where the manufacturers were separating the spinning and weaving into distinct establishments, although they did not do so in woolens. In linens and linen thread the principal establishment on the entire Atlantic Coast was at Passaic. In special articles of clothing such corset firms as that of James Bowers and Company at Newark rode with profit the crest of the wave of the wasp-like waist. By 1880 six strong corset manufacturers were listed as giving employment annually to more than 1,400 Newarkites in more than \$1,000,000 worth of that article. A more distinct innovation in clothes were the domestic "Arctics" which now came into use, thanks to the 30% tariff which kept out English competition.

In the matter of food products, it is surprising to find that a State with such indifferent agricultural resources was still taking considerable interest in grinding grain; in 1866 was erected in Newark what then was considered the

largest flour mill in the country, with its twenty runs of stones and its daily capacity of two thousand barrels of flour. At Camden an undertaking with a bigger future before it, was begun three years later, when Joseph Campbell, with Abram A. Anderson, started to can food. That business was destined to become progressively famous, first for packing strictly fancy peas and "Beef-steak Tomatoes," then for preserving some 200 varieties of products, and finally at the present day for a highly specialized output of soups, pork and beans, and spaghetti. Oddly enough, the last-named product was foretold at the moment the firm was formed, for just then Italians were beginning to flock into New Jersey. The first of them had come about the beginning of the war and a generation later their younger relatives were arriving in great numbers.

From the standpoint of industrial progress, possibly the most valuable advance made in New Jersey soon after the close of the war was in an industry which warfare as well as the industrial revolution peculiarly fosters—the production of iron, of steel, and of machinery. The introduction of the Bessemer process had put a premium upon ore relatively free from phosphorous and sulphur and New Jersey (like Lake Superior and Lake Champlain) was a region blessed with ores of this sort. The popularity of the domestic product withstood experiments at Trenton and Bethlehem with Spanish and Algerian ore; and as a result the home output increased. While the eastern mines, under centralized and improved management, produced but a fraction of the output of the great mines in the Northwest, their absolute production increased notably. "Between 1864 and 1871," says Victor Clark, "the quantity mined in New Jersey approximately doubled, rising from 226,000 tons to about 450,000 tons, of which more than four-fifths came from Morris County." The concentration of the industry in a few counties is shown by Mr. Sypher's statement of the location of the different branches in 1870. New Jersey's 42 forges and bloomeries were nearly all in Sussex and Morris counties. Of the 11 blast furnaces, Sussex had 5, Passaic 3, and Morris, Warren and Cumberland one each. Of the 15 rolling mills, 5 operated in Morris, 3 in Passaic, 2 in Mercer and Hudson, and one each in Warren, Cumberland and Camden. There were 7 steelworks, of which Essex had 3, Morris 2 and Passaic and Mercer 1.

At Trenton, the manufacture of steel had received some impetus in 1868 with the building there of the first open hearth furnace in the United States for making steel by the acid, or Siemens-Martin process. Frederick J. Slade erected it for Cooper, Hewitt and Company, owners of the New Jersey Steel and Iron Company, after Mr. Hewitt came back from Paris with his imagination fired by what he had seen at the Exposition there. While the open hearth steel cost more than that produced by the Bessemer process, it was much softer and therefore admirably adapted for use for locomotive boiler plates. Jerseymen took special pride in their locomotives, having won the gold medal at the Paris Exposition much to the astonished dismay of European rivals. However, nearly eighteen years were to pass before open hearth steel would receive a decided impetus.

These improvements in the quality of the iron and steel produced led naturally to some other advances where that iron and steel constituted the raw material of industries. On the one hand the New York Plow Company, which had come to Newark in 1869 from Peekskill, achieved such skill in manufacturing agricultural implements as to create a foreign demand; and within five years they were offering the trade more than 1,000 different styles of plows, not to mention cider mills, feed cutters, and like implements. On the other hand the finer uses of steel were demonstrated by Rochus Heinsch's Sons who capitalized their father's ingenuity in devising an improved thumb piece for tailor's shears—a thumb piece so remarkable that it made the tailor more comfortable at the same time as it increased his efficiency. It was said that “even English tailors pass by Sheffield and come to Newark for their shears.” Magic, in the minds of some people, seemed to reside in machinery used at Newark. The equipment of one of her watch factories was taken to Illinois, then to San Francisco and finally to Berkeley.

The expansive mood which New Jersey knew during this postwar period had to struggle to find expression at the industrial center of the State; but when it finally did become articulate there, it flowered into a perfect expression of the typical manufacturing center in this epoch, and it is fortunate for our understanding of those times that glowing accounts of what Newark did in the fall of 1872 have been preserved. Newark, according to one metropolitan paper, had the habit of doing everything “on the steady and save plan.” Another commentator, less kind, wrote of the city's “old fogeyism,” a trait which was to prove a saving grace in view of the dark days not far ahead. Newark was, in fact, demonstrating industry and thrift, her factories were running steadily on a ten-hour schedule, her workers were riding back and forth in comfortable horse cars, through streets which were kept clean if not paved to any great extent. The product of her industry amounted to some \$70,000,000 annually, and she had her own young Board of Trade chartered just three years before. To many of the townsfolk, manufacturers and others, it seemed proper to tell the world about Newark. This faction was led by Albert M. Holbrook, who found manufacturing and political support in those two veterans of Jersey life, Governor Marcus L. Ward and General Theodore Runyon; and they determined to stage an industrial exposition devoted exclusively to articles manufactured in Newark. For several years, their project met a cold reception from the more conservative, because “the majority were skeptical of any good results accruing from it.” By January of 1872 the proposal had attained the dignity of serious discussion in the papers and from then on it moved toward fulfillment in spite of the opposition of a few leading manufacturers. August 20 chronicled the formal opening, at the Rink on Washington Street, where much of the 30,000 feet of floor space had been taken over for displays installed by some 1,000 local exhibitors. “No articles were on sale, but orders were taken.” The total effect proved “unexpectedly flattering to the community.” Newark came to see, and was charmed with itself. Some manufacturers who had held back up to this time now

installed exhibits and the resourceful Mr. Holbrook seized upon the golden moment of August 30 to celebrate the fact that the Exposition had a record of ten successful days to date.

On that historic evening, Mr. J. H. G. Harris "operated a calcium light at the Four Corners (this was ten years before the day of electricity), directing the throng of visitors coming in from out of town." About 8,000 people found their way to the Rink where every gratification possible was afforded them. A choir of mixed voices sang to them with patriotic fervor:

New glory to workingmen, whose cunning hands today
Have wrought the wondrous things we see spread out in grand array!
Not as of old as the conqueror with blood-bought trophies decked
Appears this scene, the wealth of skill of many an architect;
For freemen's hands have forged the iron and worked the shining gold,
In wood and leather, glass and brass, each labored to unfold
Some delicate fabric, deftly planned and fair and useful, too,
And each has triumphed—builded better than he knew.

The exhibits here referred to so tunefully, astonished with their elegance. As Mr. D. L. Pierson relates,

The harness exhibit alone was valued at \$10,000, and gold-plated sleighbells were displayed costing from \$75 to \$200 per set. The Gould Manufacturing Company showed a steam fire engine and thirty different styles of leather were from the tanneries. Among the varied exhibits were 100 styles of table oil-cloth, books from Newark printing houses, two sewing machines run by steam, pearl buttons, ribbons, and all kinds of notions, 100 different qualities of varnish, paint, etc., and an art gallery in which local artists were represented. A large fountain played every night, pure Passaic River water cooling the atmosphere as it sprayed into the basin, and a brass band furnished music. No articles were on sale, but orders were taken.

The feelings which stirred the breasts of the visitors to Newark's Industrial Exposition that night are clearly reflected in the words of the Right Reverend William Henry Odenheimer, Episcopal Bishop of New Jersey:

If any one impression beyond all others was left on my mind . . . it is the perfection of Newark work. Wherever I turned this element of perfection met my eye. The brazen padlocks glittered like gold, the huge shears were ornamented as if for simple beauty, the carriages and harness seemed as though they might have been made for a perpetual showcase. The thread and silk were attractive in the variety of their colors and in their artistic arrangement. The cutlery and the iron and steel work of every description were perfect in their departments, even to the arrangement of the objects in lines and forms of beauty. Even the trunk department had its beauty and the perfection of workmanship was seen in a trunk that could be converted, by a very simple process, into a baby's cradle and bathtub.

With such charming and attractive novelties, can one wonder that the Exhibition was a success?

But these were not all. Political attractions were another of Mr. Holbrook's special features, as was natural in the day when politics had the quality of a religious faith—when many a stout partisan freely declared he would rather his son should go to an untimely grave than enter the camp of the opposing party. For the benefit of all who swore by the Liberal Republican and the Democratic principles, Holbrook brought Horace Greeley to the Exposition on September 16. For the Republicans, he brought no less a person than Ulysses S. Grant, three days later. Atkinson relates that Grant was "equally emphatic with his distinguished rival in expressing the pleasure he experienced at the magnificent display." In addition, Grant had the wit to turn the manufacturers a pretty compliment upon the expansion of their market: "This far-famed city of Newark has done well. The excellency of your manufactures is working a large influence on the importation of foreign manufactures," after which, be it added, he went to the Ward mansion to review 4,000 torch-light paraders. His visit stood Grant in good stead, for on election day he carried Essex County, excepting Orange and Caldwell, Newark giving him 3,684 majority while the State at large gave him 14,000 votes over Mr. Greeley. What Benjamin F. Butler, an old politician bell-wether who also attended the Exposition, thought of the outcome is not related.

The Industrial Exposition ran its happy length to fifty-two days, entertaining some 125,000 visitors, considerable more than the town's population. Time was taken to present to the city a bust of Seth Boyden, perhaps the most fitting thing that the Exposition did. Before its close, a delicate compliment was paid to the prime mover of it all. Mr. Holbrook was made the recipient of "the best watch and chain Newark could produce"; and Mrs. Holbrook was given a fine morocco case containing \$125 worth of jewelry. Gifts could not have been selected which would have been more typical of Newark's historic industries.


Recession of Prosperity—In succeeding years, Newark endeavored to make her Industrial Exposition an annual affair, but failed. The times were out of joint. The joyous mood of the post-war period was being destroyed by a sinister influence. Scarcely were the doors of the Rink closed upon the last visitor than the State of New Jersey stirred uncomfortably in the face of the wintry blasts of the approaching panic; and the storm was not entirely over until six years had passed. The general falling off in business which became noticeable in the latter part of 1882 was supposed to be temporary, but it became aggravated and proved to be long continued. Mr. F. Bazley Lee found that "The effect in New Jersey was disastrous. Railroads, manufactures, and the farmers were alike crippled. There were few who did not feel the evil that had fallen upon them. Municipalities which had engaged in expensive and often useless improvements were either bankrupt or were closely approaching that condition. Everywhere were but the flotsam of personal fortunes." To practically all laborers in industries the panic brought

sweeping reductions in wages, although earnings in 1880 were still 25% higher than in 1860.


The individual experience of each manufacturer varied with the condition of the industry in which he happened to be engaged. The individual experience of each city varied with the probity of the officials who happened to be at the moment of temptation in its offices. What befell many industrial centers may be inferred from the statement of a keen observer who congratulated Newark because she was not as badly off as her neighbors. Atkinson reminded his fellow-townsmen that, while they could not boast of munificent public buildings, art galleries, public statues, monuments or fountains, and had but twenty-two miles of streets with a pretense of paving besides 100 miles entirely innocent of it, yet, in spite of all this, and partly because of it, Newark bonds stood high during the depression. Said Atkinson, Newark had only one important public official proved guilty of unlawful handling of the public purse: only one important failure or suspension due to worse than mismanagement. "In its comparative freedom from plundering officials and defaulting bank and other trust association officers, Newark stands singular among the leading cities of the Republic." Such a fortunate circumstance, Atkinson attributed to Newark's conservative character and the traditional innate honesty which had come down through her Puritan heritage—a heritage which he thought was still functioning although 70,000 of his 120,000 townsmen were of foreign extraction!

As long as industry remained unsettled, capital and labor made their discontent known to the political parties and the Legislature. As far back as 1871 the Democratic State Convention had voiced its opposition to the careless habits of the Legislature in the matter of incorporating concerns thoughtlessly, those laws from which had come "enterprises born of special legislation and maintained by corruption." After the panic had been going on for a year, the same party came out against the payment of wages in non-negotiable paper, declaring this "store order system" to be "an unjustifiable imposition upon the laboring man." The Republicans countered with an appeal to both capital and labor—declaring for a plan "to protect and encourage the domestic manufactures and industrial interests of New Jersey." The failure of the fly-by-night banks led to the enactment of a savings bank law in 1876 and the next campaign saw the Republicans and the Democrats adopting very like planks: the one advocating "such a tariff for revenue as would promote the interests of labor"; the other advocating legislation for the proper securing of "statistical information relating to the interests of capital and labor." How useless legislation can be in stemming the tide of a deep industrial unrest was shown in 1879 when the State deposits reached their low ebb of \$15,000,000.

Among the important industries showing an appreciable falling off in receipts were two which had been depressed ever since the Civil War, the carriage and trunk industries. Mr. Shaw declared that Newark carriages were unable to maintain their position because of "the cheap and indifferent work of eastern and western manufacturers seems to have lessened the demand




THIS IS THE PLANE IN WHICH COLONEL CHARLES A. LINDBERGH MADE
HIS FAMOUS FLIGHT FROM NEW YORK TO PARIS IN 1927
It was equipped with a Wright motor made in Paterson



BALLOONS AND BLIMP

Naval Station at Lakehurst—used for observation and instruction



LOS ANGELES, SECOND LARGEST DIRIGIBLE

Entering the Lakehurst hangar of the United States Navy, which is the world's largest building—40,000,000 cubic feet

for the best quality of carriages"; and Mr. Clayton, several years after the panic, found that the largest surviving carriage firm at Rahway, that of Woodruff and Dunham, had only about sixty employees, whereas before the war W. H. Platt had kept about three hundred busy there. The loss in the volume of business does not seem to have destroyed entirely the high standards of the surviving carriage producers; for the little Rahway firm of Hetfield and Jackson, employing some twenty people at the manufacture of high class light vehicles, won an International medal at the Centennial for two of their buggies, a skeleton wagon and a sulky. One of the oldest carriage firms in the United States and the oldest at Newark, that of J. M. Quinby, survived the panic, as did three others who were still operating there in 1884. As for the trunk decline, this again was attributed to unavailing competition with a cheaper article made in the West, but strong firms like Thomas B. Peddie in Newark and J. Lagowits in Harrison continued to hold up their heads. Peddie's standards of utility, finish and beauty were held responsible in the middle 'eighties for his large business, which an Essex County historian considered the largest in the world. Newark had a long history of leather development and in spite of this period of decline she continued to be known for her leather originalities, for the introduction of leathers made from horse-hides elegantly disguised under the name "cordovan," from kangaroo skins, from French calf, etc. Incidentally, it was Newark tanned leather which enclosed Emperor William's state carriage. The period is full of strange contradictions, for it was in this same panic year of 1873 that was founded one of the most notable concerns flourishing in the State at the present time, the Maddock sanitary pottery business. Thomas Maddock in that year formed his partnership with Astbury and Young.

Cotton was another New Jersey industry which long felt the panic, although not as severely as did iron and steel. After the panic shutdown, the mills resumed operations in the fall of 1873, but the revival was not as complete or enduring as at first supposed. Production was curtailed, yet the market remained stagnant, and by 1876 there was confirmed depression in the trade, the market opening very low at prices slightly above the cost of production. The print-cloth factories were peculiarly sensitive to these conditions, and the number of idle spindles in the industry as a whole was enormous.

At the Clark Thread Works in Newark there was perhaps less of the short time schedule than in most of the cotton factories. Mr. George A. Clark had died in February of 1873, and his brother William proceeded to extend the works in the Eighth Ward along the banks of the Passaic, at the same time as he adopted an enlightened policy toward the workers. The concern established its own printing and lithographing branch. The making of thread was developed into a process whereby one pound of cotton was spun into fine yarn, which after "nearly 8,000,000 doublings" emerged as about sixty miles of the famous Clark thread. The workers engaged in these multiple extensions had their own relief society (which paid out nearly \$12,000 to its members in 1896) their own fire company, their boat club, and their band

of eighteen pieces which presumably played for them on the Saturday half-holidays which the advanced ideas of their employer permitted them to have.

A great many cotton workers in the State were performing their labors in their own homes, especially in the vicinity of the Paterson shirt mills. There the Manhattan Shirt Company had started, in 1865, the production of dress shirts of all grades and finenesses of white and printed goods, to sell at from \$6 to \$15 and more per dozen. More people worked upon the shirts away from the factory proper than in it. The M. Price and Company shirt concern (established in 1874) followed a like practice. "The collars, cuffs, bosoms, gussets and the like were put on by farmers' wives and daughters in the country," and by the inmates of various charitable and reformatory institutions in Newark, New York and Brooklyn.

New Jersey was most fortunate in the fact that one of her major industries, silk, suffered less than any other textile manufacture from the panic, showing little or no idleness when other factories were quiet. Silk at this time was still enjoying the benefits which the previous years had brought, the new route from the Orient, the tariff of 60%, rapid technical progress, and superior facilities for accommodating their output to the caprices of fashion. Furthermore, the panic itself benefited the silk manufacture, because the heavy borrowing from Europe and the general depression at home discouraged importation of competing goods. So it happened that in the year of the panic silk mills in ten states manufactured goods to the value of twenty millions. One-fourth of this amount was in machine twist, next came ribbons, trimmings, handkerchiefs and neckties, with broad silk comprising only about one-twentieth of the entire amount at that moment. More than half of this entire output was credited to New York and New Jersey.

In the years immediately following the panic the low prices of raw silk, which became cheaper than for twenty years previously, favored the United States manufacturers and helped them to lower their terms to meet the hard times. Thus, in 1875, the quantities of raw silk consumed and the number of laborers employed reached a new high point, although the margin of profit in relation to the amount of business done was relatively small. At the moment the manufacturers reaped the advantage of mechanical improvements. New machinery for "throwing" silk (twisting the filaments into thread fit for weaving) was introduced at Paterson by which the revolutions of the spindles was increased from 3,500 to 7,000 per minute and the work accomplished by each spindle was practically doubled. The speed soon went to 10,000 revolutions. The cost of "winding" was lowered from one dollar to forty-five cents per pound; the cost of "warping" from ten cents to five cents. Ribbon looms now took care of themselves to such an extent that only one girl operator was needed to watch eight of them. Silks were reported cheaper in the United States than ever before and the New York commission houses sought domestic goods, some of which they sold under French, English and Italian labels.

The advantages accruing to Paterson from this concatenation of circumstances were considerable, because she was becoming the acknowledged center of the industry. In the days since John Ryle had first established himself

there permanently, his success had attracted quite a number of competitors. Manufacturers now saw that he was succeeding because he was located near admirable water power, skilled labor, and important cities. From Boston Dexter, Lambert & Company, from Williamsburg William Strange & Company, from Schoharie and New York City, they flocked to Paterson, making the 'seventies a period of increasing geographical centralization. Mr. Ryle found himself competing successively with such firms as Hamill and Booth, the Phoenix Silk Manufacturing Company, the Dale concern, Dexter Lambert & Company, William Strange & Company, and Frederick Baare. All of these were operating in Paterson by 1871 and the following year they reorganized the Silk Industry Association of Paterson (originally founded in 1858), and issued a call for the forming of The Silk Association of America. They crowded in so fast that they raised the price of labor, thereby attracting, as immigrants, master weavers from abroad; but the conditions fostering the industry were so powerful that Paterson could not lose its attractiveness. Not only was the manufacture of broad silks greatly extended, but the production of ribbons, handkerchiefs, and fancy silks for trimmings and ties was more than doubled. Employment in the silk mills was afforded the women and children of families in which the father had been thrown out of work by the depression in other industries, for two-thirds of the employees engaged in the silk mills were women and one-fourth of the operatives were under sixteen years of age. Also, some of the foundry and machine shop workers, the turners of bobbins, the chemical plant workers, and the makers of paper boxes who would otherwise have been idle were kept busy by orders from silk firms. In other industries the depression of 1873 lengthened into the years following, but in 1875 the silk people were paying out to their 8,000 operatives at Paterson \$2,500,000 in wages.

Small as well as large silk concerns flourished for a time. There was the wife of Giles Van Ness, who was reputed to be the real executive in his business. To her for many years came most Paterson ladies for their silk trimmings, buttons and guimp. The large mills had an opportunity to make a name for themselves at the Centennial in Philadelphia in 1876, although the response from New Jersey manufacturers to the invitation to exhibit was far from unanimous. There the big Phoenix Silk Mills whose power looms had been installed after the union of the handloom weavers tried to control production, maintained a loom in operation in Machinery Hall. Thousands of visitors bought the souvenir silk handkerchiefs woven on the spot, and the more politically minded also purchased badges of their favorite candidates for the presidency and vice-presidency, interesting operations which cleared the firm some \$40,000. Eight other New Jersey manufacturers of silk and silk machinery exhibited at the Centennial. All were from Paterson, and that town had thirty-four of the State's forty-six firms. The different branches of the industry were distributed as follows:

Throwsters of, and dealers in gum silk ¹	20
Manufacturers sewing silk and twist	8

(1) This number included many which carried on other branches of the industry, because the throwsters had been nearly all obliged to begin weaving or retire from the silk manufacture.

Weavers and Dyers	32
Manufacturers of fringes, braids, ladies' dress trimmings, upholstery goods, etc.	7
Total	67

At the Centennial—In fact, 1876 marked a milestone in the history of American silk manufacture. The Centennial exhibits showed that America was first in the acknowledged excellence of her twists and sewing silks, with none of the former imported, and only enough of the latter to meet a lingering prejudice. Of ribbons, two-thirds of those used in this country were made here and in the industry as a whole at least one-half of the goods used was of domestic manufacture.

This was all well enough from the standpoint of progress, but the story has its other side as well. The pendulum had to swing backward. Later in 1876 the price of raw silk suddenly rose, doubling in a short period, and at the same time foreign manufacturers began dumping in the United States. In the acute depression which followed, Paterson had her share. Many firms were caught with large stocks on hand and the resulting depreciation caused the Dale Manufacturing Company to fail with liabilities of several hundred thousands of dollars. However, the price of raw silk declined again the next season so that the mills were soon well employed again and the industry quickly steadied with an increasing production of dress silks. By 1879 the value of the product was exceeding the figure for 1875, and 67 factories were in successful operation.

As has been suggested, the prosperity of Paterson's silk was reflected in some other industries in the vicinity, enabling them to avoid disaster. One of these was the Johnson and Austin manufacture of wool "flocks" which developed into a business for separating cotton fibre from mixed goods for the purpose of permitting the woolen content to be reused. They ran "without cessation all through the panic." The Passaic Rolling Mill Company was another firm to avoid closing down. Its management was one of proven versatility, having demonstrated in 1869 that it could commence rolling Paterson's first shapes and angles when its merchant iron was being swamped by imports. So again in 1873 when the outlook darkened, this firm began rolling beams, I beams and channel iron. The beginning order was for the New York Evening Post Building and it was followed by such complementary undertakings as the capitol at Albany, the 7th Regiment Armory in New York City and the Centennial buildings at Philadelphia. The concern also made structural wrought iron for bridges. The industrial outlook at Paterson seemed sufficiently promising to the great Irish flax firm of William Barbour and Sons to justify them in establishing a branch in New Jersey as well as in Pennsylvania. They are said to have brought their own workers from Ireland, but evidently they engaged an American architect thoroughly in tune with contemporary taste to design the factory erected at Paterson in 1877. It was described as "the finest specimen of mill architecture in New Jersey" with "here and there a modest turret . . . and an occasional pinnacle."



LUMBER WAITING TO BE MADE INTO HAMPERS AND BASKETS, BRIDGETON



STATE NURSERY FOR FOREST SEEDLINGS WHICH ARE DISTRIBUTED TO LAND OWNERS FOR
REFORESTATION

Located in Washington Crossing Park, near Trenton

In the nature of things Paterson could not entirely avoid the fate of other cities and as she had so many industries dealing with iron and steel, they included some serious breakdowns, such as that of the Grant Locomotive Company. The price of engines had fallen below the high levels of the Civil War, thus bidding for foreign orders. Russia had been purchasing at home and from Germany, France and Belgium, but now gave an order for fifty-five "on the European plan" to be built at the Grant works. The foreign model required heavier machinery than did the American so that the Grant Company was unable to deliver the locomotives in contract time, and had to go into the hands of a receiver. Quite a number of the casting, boiler, tube and tank manufacturers also had to discontinue at least for a time. A particularly pathetic attempt to survive the panic was made by the Whitney Sewing Machine Company, which had started at Paterson in 1871, persuaded the financiers of the town to subscribe "quite liberally" and found itself able to produce machines at from \$10 to \$15. The head, J. H. Whitney, had been connected with Wheeler and Wilson and had invented some sewing machine features for himself; but other companies which controlled other more important patents would not permit him to undersell them, and he could not get together enough capital and a sufficiently harmonious organization to make his manufacture pay, as long as he had to sell his products for as high as \$35. So the panic closed the shop for a time, the business revived enough for a spasmodic sort of existence lasting two years more, and finally gasped its last breath about 1876.

The depression at Paterson was doubtless somewhat less severe than elsewhere in the State; but the fact that the clouds, given a reasonable length of time, did not lift, there or elsewhere, caused some of the bolder leaders in the textile and ceramic industries in New Jersey to determine to adopt strenuous measures. In their behalf a committee of the Centennial Commission of New Jersey presented a memorial to the Legislature, February 22, 1877. Therein they declared their conviction that their State was destined to be a "manufacturing and commercial State, and in the main a city of vast dimensions, a workshop for our own and other communities," that is, as soon as skilled labor could be developed on an extensive scale. Anxious not to offend the agricultural members of the Legislature, the memorialists assured them:

The double interests of agriculture and commerce are inseparable. To the one comes a market for the products and an occupation for the population; to the other the advantage accrues of a successful agriculture in close proximity to the workshops. The State has been wisely generous to her agricultural interests, but these depend to a very considerable degree upon the market which the manufacturers supply. . . . We only propose the appointment of a Commission to devise a plan to be reported to your Honorable Body at another session, the report to include the statistics of skilled and unskilled labor, male and female, in the State of New Jersey, and the consideration of a plan for the encouragement of technological teaching in textile fabrics and designing, and extending to other kindred pursuits with the same object in view.

So humble a petition could scarce fail of kind response, so on March 9 was approved an act authorizing the appointment of a commission which should devise a plan for the encouragement of manufactures of ornamental and textile fabrics. Commissioners S. C. Brown of Trenton, Thomas N. Dale of Paterson and R. H. Thurston of Hoboken (a significant selection of localities) were appointed May 29, and met the next week at the Stevens Institute of Technology in Hoboken where they organized and planned their procedure. These gentlemen energetically undertook to discover what was being done elsewhere in the United States and abroad in the prosecution of similar plans, and the following year they made an earnest report to the Legislature. They urged "immediate and effective action" including:

1. The establishment of a Bureau of Statistics for collecting and reporting all facts, figures, and other information relating to industrial matters, for the information and benefit of the people of the State.

2. A complete system of coördinated technical and trade education beginning with the primary schools and continuing through agricultural, polytechnic and trade schools up to a Technical and Industrial University, in order that the State might be placed on a level with foreign countries and other States.

3. Such legislation relating to capital as shall be best adapted to lead to its introduction and employment in the State, such legislation relating to labor as shall secure to the honest and industrious of all classes the right to sell their labor wherever and whenever it can find the best market for it, and such legislation relating to industrial enterprises as shall secure safety to property and non-molestation by ill-disposed men.

With these recommendations the commission rested their case.

Their first proposal was in process of being carried out before they made their final report, for a Bureau of Statistics of Labor and Industries had been established by a law of March, 1878, and James Bishop had been made chief. According to him, the workmen were responsible for the Bureau, having demanded that they be recognized to that extent. Said the Legislature, the duties of the Bureau

shall be to collect, assort, systematize, and present in annual reports to the Legislature statistical details relating to all departments of labor in the State, especially in its relations to the commercial, industrial, social, educational and sanitary condition of the laboring classes, and in all suitable and lawful ways, foster and enlarge our manufacturing and every other class of productive industry, with a view to their permanent establishment upon a prosperous basis, both to the employer and the employed.

This assignment Mr. Bishop interpreted chiefly to mean a duty "to stimulate and assist the wage worker in his endeavor to reach a higher social position" by educating him to the point where he could by lawful expedients receive a

larger share in the profits of his labor. New Jersey, about 1880, had become the scene of considerable industrial unrest, as the legislation suggests, and Mr. Bishop's interpretation of his duties was in line with the spirit of other labor legislation. As the history of labor in New Jersey is dealt with in a separate chapter, the inspector's reports are valuable here chiefly as indicating the existence of certain industries in particular localities. From the annual reports of the Bureau of Statistics, on the other hand, we obtain considerable qualitative information which outlines dimly the trend of events industrial until 1899, when the scope of the reports was expanded and standardized by law, an event which will be discussed as soon as the occurrences of the two intervening decades have been set forth.

When Mr. Bishop submitted his first report, in 1878, there was as yet no visible sign of improvement, either in commerce or manufactures, a fact which may have had something to do with the failure of the majority of the manufacturers to supply the Bureau with adequate data, as the law made that service voluntary. The next year comprehensive figures continued to elude the inspector, but he waxed enthusiastic over signs of revival in the iron mines and furnaces, and the silk factories. "Many factories and workshops in which the busy hum of machinery had been silent for years have been started into life, and the delightful music of industry again salutes the ear." Somewhat less fortunate than the iron and silk workers, were the hat people, whose factories had remained silent at least a third of the year, a state of affairs which the employees attributed to competition with convict labor. The shoe industry complained of the same competition, while the clothing manufacturers attributed low prices—and wages—to over-production. Obviously, over-production was outside the province of legal remedy; but prison labor was another matter, one which the Legislature promptly attacked upon the behalf of the suffering hatters. Henceforth, no convict could devote his energies to the happiness of freer men with a taste for silk hats. This law left the shoe makers and numerous other trades unsatisfied; so the next step prohibited that more than one hundred convicts should work in any special branch of industry, whether shoes for the wandering world outside, or other articles. Still unsatisfied, the industrial interest finally obtained from the Legislature (in 1883) an entire prohibition of contract labor in penal institutions, and the substitution of the "piece-price" plan.

At the same session, the position of inspector of factories was created, placing in the hands of its occupant a limited police supervision over factory sanitation, safeguarding of machinery and employment of minors. It was inevitable that some labor legislation should be enacted, because both parties pledged themselves to it. The Republicans had declared their intention of protecting "honest labor from unfair competition" and they shared with the Democrats a vague horror of what they called "oppressive monopolies." Consequently, within a couple of years labor legislation was taking a more definite shape and more important factory measures were being enacted.

Such panaceas as these could not prove effective in stabilizing industry,

because New Jersey had been caught in the same low tide that had lessened the progressive speed of production throughout the United States—a tide that could not prevent industry as a whole from showing an absolute increase, but a tide that made the percentages of increase considerably lower between 1870 and 1880 than they had been between 1860 and 1870.

Percentage of Increase in	New Jersey 1860-70	New Jersey 1870-80	United States 1870-80
Capital invested	96.0	37.0	36.0
Value of products	121.7	51.2	27.8
Hands employed	35.0	67.3	34.0
Wages paid	100.5	45.0	23.0

Even so, as the table shows, the New Jersey percentages of increase between 1870 and 1880 were higher than the national average. The State already had attained sixth rank in manufacturing, but there was a much wider gap between her and the five leading states (New York, Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, Illinois, and Ohio) than there was to be later on. The next fifteen years were to be marked by a fluctuating state of affairs in which manufacturing developed by fits and starts, making it a peculiarly trying time for both employer and employed. They repeatedly found themselves in anomalous situations and their efforts at extrication necessitated conflict between them.

Fluctuations in the "Eighties"—Any major industry can be cited as an illustration of the ups and downs in the 'eighties. Cotton furnishes an excellent example. After a boom in 1879 it slumped into a depression which was acute by 1883, in most of its branches, and there was wide discussion as to the cause and probable duration of bad business. Victor S. Clark reports that:

Some attributed the unsatisfactory conditions in the north to the increasing competition of the South, others to the growing demand for finer goods than the older American staples, and still others to the unorganized and indeed anarchic conditions of production. Some factories were running night and day, while others were shut down. Gingham weavers in Maine were paid \$8 and \$10 a week for work for which Philadelphia weavers received \$11 and \$15. Even in Philadelphia mills the average pay of operators in different establishments ranged all the way from \$4.35 a week to \$7.35 a week. It was observed at this time that cotton mill wages—especially for weaving—were lower in New Jersey than in Philadelphia and lower in New England than in New Jersey. . . . Simultaneously with this declining market for colored and printed cotton goods the worsted industry was booming.

In rebuttal and in connection with the tariff agitation, the managers of the Clark thread concern in Newark, which had become the chief thread center in the United States, countered that they were paying their Newark employees from \$5.50 to \$20.00 per week, while their employees in Scotland received but \$2.50 to \$7.00. Comparative wages pertain more properly to a history of New Jersey labor than to a general industrial account, but reference



AMERICAN BROWN-BOVERI ELECTRIC CORPORATION AND NEW YORK SHIPBUILDING COMPANY
PLANTS AT CAMDEN



QUARRY OF VULCANITE PORTLAND CEMENT COMPANY AT PHILLIPSBURG
Quarry 160 feet deep—Deposit 300 feet deep

must be made to them as barometers of trade. Statistics of course vary with the point of view ; but the fact remained that wages were relatively low within the State. . . . Bishop, the chief of the Bureau of Industrial Statistics, had been earnestly devoting himself to an attempt to find out the real condition of the wage-earner, what he was earning and how he was spending his income. He reported in 1882 that compensation in the textile industries and iron mines of New Jersey scarcely exceeded common laborers and that "In comparatively few trades does the annual income of the best paid mechanics exceed \$700 ; while that of a very large proportion is considerably lower."

The cotton industry continued in a "spotted" condition, with many weaker firms losing out while the better managed ones operated under all conditions. The fall of 1884 temporarily witnessed "the largest closing movement ever inaugurated" and the summer of 1885 was "about the darkest period the cotton trade ever experienced," according to contemporary observers. But a year later the mills were again well employed with wages rising from five per cent. to twenty per cent. because trade was increasingly active. Several fat years intervened before the crisis of 1893 was felt in the latter part of that year. Cotton manufacturing did not share markedly in the movement toward large consolidations common to many industries during the late 'eighties and early 'nineties, but the industry was steadily expanding into bigger establishments, larger capitalization, greater use of machinery and diminishing importance of operatives. The cotton spinning mills of New Jersey were more firmly established than elsewhere in the North outside of New England ; and they produced in relatively large quantities, knitting yarns and others for manufacturing special fabrics.

Another New Jersey industry sensitive to the business vagaries of the 'eighties was the manufacture of silk. Changes in the location of plants, improvements in machinery, amalgamation of firms, and the vagaries of fashion, worked havoc time and again, now to employees and then to employers. The entire State felt these oscillations, because there were so many cities and towns in which various branches of the industry had been established. Firms would evolve from spinning to weaving, from tram and organzine to ribbons and broad silks. Improvements in throwing machinery made it possible to substitute unskilled women and children for men, and this led to the removal of the throwing process to places of cheap labor. Broad-silk and ribbon establishments opened throwing annexes in the mining towns of Pennsylvania, where boys and girls worked at throwing for one-third the wages paid at Paterson. From Paterson the Phoenix Silk Mills sent their throwing annexes to Allentown and the Dexter, Lambert Company sent theirs to Hawley and Honesdale, Pennsylvania, while Pelgram and Meyer moved theirs to Boonton, New Jersey. Erie was not too far distant for one Paterson annex. A new mill was "dedicated" by a grand social display, with special trains carrying the notables, and with feasting at long improvised tables set up in the new factory. Quite an elegant affair was given by the Phoenix con-

cern at their Allentown opening, which perhaps was to be expected from a firm of their repute. This was one of the concerns that undertook to capture the American market by the originality of its designs; it produced marvelous badges for the committee of management at the Paterson Light Guard Annual Ball in 1882; and it was known for its "several styles of bookmarks of exquisite patterns, among them one with the words and music of the Star Spangled Banner," and another decorated with portraits of Lincoln and Washington. One of their active competitors, Hammill and Booth, was resolved not to be outdone in artistry. This firm welcomed the opportunity presented them to show what they could do, when a ladies' association sent them a quantity of silk grown and reeled in the United States for the purposes of a dress for the widow of President Garfield. Hammill and Booth wove the silk into a special, original design—"an alternate stripe of satin and lace, a graceful spray of delicate flowers being strewn over both stripes. The effect is as exquisite as it is novel. . . . It is black, of course."

The improvements in silk machinery during this period were notable for lowering costs and raising quality. A practical machine was invented for testing the strength and regularity of silk thread, a device which played directly into the use of the automatic machinery so largely employed in the United States. Power looms continued to displace hand looms and to increase in number, being adapted to the manufacture of silk chenille and feather trimmings. Silk came to be used in place of worsted for upholstery fabrics and dress trimmings. Against strong opposition there were brought to Paterson foreign machines for the establishment of the manufacture of silk velvets, and about the same time Paterson experimenters were working upon seal plush, or imitation seal skin which already were being made at South Manchester and at Philadelphia. However, fickle fashion made the seal plush manufacture unprofitable in the early 'nineties.

Amalgamation in the silk industry began to come to the attention of the Bureau of Industrial Statistics in 1883, when the general depression in this major industry caused Bishop to devote fifty-six pages of his report to silk alone. He noted that four New Jersey firms were operating three mills each and thirteen were operating two mills each. The general depression in business had caused a decline in price and production which stopped many broad goods looms for the first time in twenty years. Piece silks went down about 30% in price and the decrease in value of total product between July 1, 1882, and July 1, 1883, amounted to 12½%, yet even at that the value remained greater than before 1882. Tariff changes and undervaluation of imports were blamed for the depression, which created its most spectacular effect at the model village of the Wortendyke Manufacturing Company when its two thousand employees were thrown out of work by the concern going into the hands of a receiver. Of the 15,000 employees suffering from the slump in the State at large, there were 3,200 weavers who lost much time, the hand loom workers lost thirty per cent., the power loom twenty per cent., and nearly all workers ten per cent. of their time.

In 1886 silk again received special attention in the annual report, and amalgamation had progressed a little further. There were:

3 firms operating 4 mills each.	10 firms operating 2 mills each.
4 firms operating 3 mills each.	9 firms with branches in Pennsylvania.

Though the price of goods had been lowered, the improvements in machinery were making it possible for the manufacturers to increase their output at less cost, wages having climbed back to where they were before the reduction of 1883. The strikes were alleged to have caused more than \$1,000,000 worth of contracts to go from Paterson to Europe, because the Paterson makers would not accept important contracts without a proviso that the "time for the delivery of goods be extended in case of strikes." Nevertheless the year's silk output was above that of 1883 and preceding years. In respect to this increase in production over the ten year period, under conditions of lowered prices and improved machinery, the tendency was shared by almost all the important State industries, even so sensitive a one as hats.

In 1890 and 1891 yet another period of depression settled upon the silk industry. Silk handkerchiefs had gone out of style, so the value of that branch of production was cut in half; but the ribbon makers suffered the most apparently because high speed automatic ribbon looms had increased output at the moment when the style changed. However, recovery came with the fall of 1891. The period closed with New Jersey still in the first place as a manufacturer of silk, followed by Pennsylvania, New York and Connecticut in the order named. The total value of New Jersey's product had risen in spite of all obstacles from \$17,122,230 in 1880 to \$30,760,370 in 1890.

Perhaps the greatest extremes of prosperity and failure during this period were experienced by concerns engaged in the manufacture of iron and iron products. At the old iron mines, the price of the ore loaded on cars advanced during 1880 from \$3.25 to \$5.50 per ton, but competition with distant ores brought decline in the next few years. Among the furnaces, the exclusively charcoal type already had been abandoned because of the growing scarcity of fuel and the inferiority of the ore. The anthracite type of furnace rallied in 1879 after a long depression and even ventured upon some new construction soon thereafter, because pig iron production in New Jersey (and New York) did not feel Western competition as soon as the New England furnaces felt it. The difficulty which the furnaces had experienced in getting hard coal during the strikes of the middle 'seventies had led them to adopt a mixture of coke and coal which proved advantageous and was the most significant development of this period in the anthracite furnaces of the region. The actual amount of iron made in New Jersey declined between 1882 and 1885 much more than half, a tendency which the formation of the Eastern Pig Iron Association was unable to check. In 1885, there was no industry in the State more seriously affected by the depression than the iron and steel, with low prices, light demand, and many employees laid off. The quantity of products made during the year fell fully 40% below the capacity of the factories. For the decade as a whole, the furnaces declined in number from twenty to

eighteen and in capacity from 157,000 to 145,000 tons, and the period marked the turning point of the furnace industry in the State, growth ceasing and decay setting in. A romantic symbol of the change was the demolition of the old Oxford furnace which, with the Cornwall furnace in Pennsylvania, had held the honor of being the oldest establishment still standing in the United States.

The industries using iron in various forms did not all share the same fate. The crucible steel manufacturers found that open hearth steel was taking the market for locomotive boilers, fireboxes, car springs and agricultural machinery. Therefore, "the Adirondack Works at Jersey City, whose record of continuous operation since 1849 made them the oldest firm in the industry on this side of the Atlantic, were forced by dull business to shut down permanently." On the other hand, the making of alloy steel was demanded by the navy and the firms getting contracts for this harder metal prospered. A process for tempering low grade Bessemer steel so as to give it many of the qualities of crucible or cast steel was hit upon by Henry A. Harvey, and these works, first at Jersey City and later at Newark, developed the Harvey armor-plate process. Another improvement was electric welding, for which the first commercial machine was put in operation at the Roebling Iron Works at Trenton in 1888. The connection between this process and electric traction became intimate, when the process was applied to joining rails. The machine industries continued to profit from the impetus of patent improvements, such for example as those taken out by the Singer and Domestic Sewing Machine makers, and various textile manufacturers.

The locomotive output was extremely mercurial. The Rogers, Grant and Danforth companies all showed a fair production in 1882-83; but two years later they were building fewer engines than they had made in the panic period a decade before. Not more than one-third of their men were employed and their entire output amounted to but 137 out of a capacity of 600. With the next New Year came a brighter outlook. During the period we are considering at present, the Rogers works continued to rank as the second in size in the country, until displaced by the Schenectady firm, and the three Paterson firms together turned out each year about as many locomotives as were produced in Philadelphia. Ultimately locomotive construction was destined to leave New Jersey.

Any period of depression is certain to react unfavorably upon the jewelry industry, and as Newark was first among all cities in this trade, an immense number of her population suffered. The Bureau of Statistics painted a gloomy picture of the 1883 situation: the trade was in an inchoate condition, it lacked stability. Wages and working conditions were varying between extremes and "some men have been idle from seven to eleven months." Then, with the next business upturn, jewelry took an accompanying spurt. It became so self-assured that such important firms as that started by Carter, Pierson and Hale, that of Durand and Company, and of Alexander Miller were unable to abandon the practice of selling their goods under foreign labels.

Throughout the restless period of the 'eighties, New Jersey had her quota of curious citizens bent on discovering new processes, making products which constituted, later on, immense industries. At this point a mere mention is made of their foundations. Hannibal Goodwin invented the photographic film in his Newark rectory. John W. Hyatt of the same town perfected celluloid as a substitute for ivory and made a water filter—a perfect symbol of what the advance in manufacturing was doing to New Jersey's streams. In another small new plant, a mysterious electrolytic process was working a revolution in copper refining. Nearby, at Menlo Park, Thomas A. Edison was ceaselessly laboring over the possible uses of a strange force called electricity. At Jersey City, Colgate was catering to the fastidious in soaps, while Lorillard applied the factory system to tobacco manufacture in a paternalistic and modern fashion. At Bayonne bold ventures in oil fairly challenged the world to invent a vehicle for the use of gasoline. At the Elizabethport docks, they were transferring clay and coal from cars to boats with unaccustomed speed, by means of Sauton's new invention. At New Brunswick Johnson and Johnson set to work to make antiseptic a race about to become conscious of germs. At Atlantic City the de luxe vacation idea was being carefully nurtured on capital and ingenuity.

All of these inventions could not work the miracle of a lower cost of living, which rose inexorably. However, there were, as stated elsewhere, certain improvements in wages and these were accompanied by some shortening of the working day and agitation for abolition of the "truck" and "order" systems. All of these signalized the growing tendency of the wage-earners to unite and assert themselves. New Jersey workers had not been exceptionally quick to enter the Grange, the Knights of Labor and the Unions. But they now found themselves increasingly incapable of coping with the influx of immigrant labor, which by 1880 had given the State a greater density of population than any other State except Massachusetts; or with the united front of the manufacturers, who, on their part, had been forming their own associations. So it came about that such employers' concerns as the United States Brewers' Association for example now found that wage changes required consultation with the united forces of the Brewers' Workingmen's Union and the Beer Drivers' Union. All of this in an age when the taste for beer was increasing faster than the population.

Improvement in the market conditions in 1886 gave the workers an opportunity for making their strikes effective and so they tried in considerable numbers this weapon which had been in little use since 1881. An incomplete tabulation by the Bureau of Statistics covers for 1886, 299 strikes and 16 lockouts:

Year.	Number of Establishments.	Number of Industries.	Number of Localities.
1881	179	10	5
1882	27	10	9
1883	15	7	6
1884	16	6	4

1885	32	11	9
1886	446	34	4
1887	175	24	22
	890		

Figures for the years 1883-85 are probably underestimated.

It will be noticed that one-half the disturbances occurred in 1886 and 70% of them in that year and the following one. Taking the strikes and lock-outs as a whole, the employees were victorious in over 54% of the establishments, they compromised in 6% and were defeated in about 40%. Nearly one-half the strikes turned upon the question of wages only, giving the employees entire or partial victory in 78% of the cases; where the strikes turned solely upon reduction in the hours of labor, the employees were 80% successful; and where these two objects of wages and reduced hours overshadowed other questions at issue, the employees were successful in 70% of the cases. Their failures came where their grievances were mostly of other sorts than these two. The industries most largely affected included the silk goods, other textiles, transportation, metals, glass, building trades, and leather workers. In connection with these two strike years, if so they may be called, a peculiar fact is noted regarding Essex County, which practically meant Newark. This county was the most populous and had its share of large and small strikes, boycotts and lock-outs. Yet the Bureau reported in 1886:

The scenes of disorder and infraction of the law which have occurred in other sections were not, however, duplicated in Essex County, a condition of affairs due to the law-abiding spirit of the people themselves and the conservatism of the chosen leaders in the various bodies of organized labor. During the twelve months not one arrest made was due to labor troubles, although at times there were several thousand men on strike, and neither were the police authorities once appealed to for protection against damage that might be done by strikers.

The above statement is a curious reminder of Newark's experience during the panic of 1873; and it makes a vivid contrast to the rioting at Homestead and other affected centers during 1886.

With the passing of the year 1887 went the period of the greatest power of the Knights of Labor in New Jersey. Its membership had been largest at about the close of the previous year, after which the "dropping out had been considerable." In July of 1887 it was estimated that New Jersey had approximately 50,000 organized workmen, of which 30,000 were Knights of Labor. Evidently this form of organization was less fitted to the industrial mood of the State than some milder forms during the years immediately following. The popularity of the simpler coöperative organizations, such as the building and loan associations, did not wane. 1886 had 160 of these associations; 1888, 215, and 1890, 254. In the same period, the aggressive labor organizations were meeting failure. Although the sanitary condition of their working quarters was being improved, their financial status was uncertain. The fac-

tory inspector of the sixth district, P. Callan, of Newark, concluded that the introduction of machinery and the influx of workmen were powerful factors in increasing the uncertainties in the lives of the workers, while destructive competition was doing the same thing to the employers. Therefore, he said, "In the midst of intellectual, social and industrial activity, such as has never been known in the history of this country, . . . trade unions appear to be no longer able to secure advances in wages, or to prevent frequent reductions by employers, who are united, and determined to increase their profits or decrease their losses by such a course. As a rule, strikes are failures." When to this combination of factors was added the sweating system, particularly in the clothing trades, the ground work for the panic to come in 1893 would be pretty thoroughly laid.

Throughout this turgid, restless, decade and a half, there was a double phenomenon of industrial significance which continued uninterruptedly. It consisted of the abandonment of rural districts while the metropolitan areas were growing marvelously. Mr. Bishop's attention had been attracted by the number of real estate foreclosures in the rural regions, and he undertook to publish statistics covering lowered farm values and the depopulation of the agricultural areas. Although Governor Abbott took measures which prevented the printing of some of Bishop's conclusions, enough statistics were circulated to show startling contrasts. Between 1880 and 1890 the chief areas had shown the following considerable increases:

	Percentage.		Percentage.
Atlantic County	54.2	Jersey City	35.02
Atlantic City	138.36	Mercer County	37.8
Camden County	39.3	Trenton	92.1
Camden City	39.98	Passaic County	52.6
Essex County	34.9	Passaic City	99.45
Newark	33.2	Paterson	53.53
Orange	42.68	Union County	30.4
Hudson County	46.4	Elizabeth	33.78
Bayonne	103.08	Bergen County	28.4
Hoboken	40.8		

The *low increases* were found in the following counties:

Monmouth	24.5	(with 7 decreasing townships and the principal increases at Ocean Grove and Long Branch.)
Cumberland	20.6	
Middlesex	18.1	(with 5 decreasing townships and Perth Amboy showing an increase of 97.84%.)
Cape May	15.4	
Gloucester	10.7	
Ocean	10.5	
Morris	6.4	(with 7 decreasing townships and Morristown the chief increase.)
Burlington	5.7	(with 18 decreasing townships.)
Somerset	4.2	(with 8 decreasing townships.)
Salem	2.3	(with 8 decreasing townships.)

Actual decreases in total population occurred in the following counties:

Hunterdon	8.4	(the only place that grew was the town of Clinton.)
Sussex	5.5	(the only considerable increase being in the town of Newton.)
Warren	.1	(with 14 decreasing townships.)

For the State at large, the increase in population had been 27.7%, the total residents having reached 1,444,933; but of this number nearly one-fourth were foreign born persons, who had settled in the urban centers as industrial wage earners.


The number of men, women and children employed in manufacturing showed the following increases, between 1870 and 1890:

	Men.		Women.		Children	
1870	58,115		11,198		6,239	
1880	86,787	50%	27,099	112%	12,152	128%
1890	114,864	67%	39,370	46%	5,313	57%*

* Decrease—child labor laws responsible.

The social as well as the economic significance of the figures given in the two tables immediately preceding is considerable because the foreign born workers settling in the northern counties lowered the standard of living for those with whom they were competing as wage earners; and they proved more amenable to sweatshop work and to the illegal employment of children than were the native born people. In five centers these forces could be seen most actively affecting conditions: at Camden, Jersey City, Newark, Paterson and Trenton, the five towns which together embraced one-third of the State's entire population and more than one-half of her workers in industry. All of the five, except Trenton, were also centers of a growing commuting settlement, the hegira from Philadelphia and New York City having begun about 1870 and continuing without diminution. Transportation facilities had made this hegira possible and added their quota of available occupations. Newark, for example, at the beginning of the period under discussion, was joined to New York by 198 trains moving daily over four different railroad lines, a promise of the network of iron rails destined ere long to take possession of the meadows. The important fact to keep in mind is that New Jersey was becoming, for all important purposes, an urban community. That was the condition in which the panic of 1893 and all subsequent panics were to find her.

Panic of 1893—It might seem that New Jersey had experienced a sufficient amount of industrial unsettlement to last for quite a while. Unluckily, however, business throughout the United States as well as in Europe had been carried on in flush times in a manner warranted to increase the severity of the next depression. Each period of activity had tempted promoters into questionable ventures, every period of abnormal demand for goods had encouraged owners to enlarge their factories beyond the limits useful in normal times. European financiers had been dabbling in stocks of American companies. Mechanical improvements and cut-throat competition had been narrowing the margin between cost of production and sale price. Then when dull times lowered prices, the margin of profit was erased altogether in the less efficient plants and cut perilously in the best managed. This put the enlarged establishments in a sorry predicament, because their constant overhead charges made it very costly to close them temporarily. They could not simply shut down and wait for a rising market before resuming operations



AERIAL VIEW OF SINGER SEWING MACHINE AND DIEHL MANUFACTURING COMPANY PLANTS AT ELIZABETH

because that would bring failure. If it could possibly be managed, it was better to continue in operation, selling below cost when necessary and multiplying stock when inescapable.

Such a procedure put a severe drain upon capital, credit and resources, which weak competitors could not survive. Trusts and association agreements had offered a way out, because they decreased the number of competitors and temporarily set standard prices for those who remained. Hence the constant tendency toward "big business" in New Jersey as well as elsewhere. But big business meant an enlarged and congested working population. Twenty years before, the ranks of the wage earners in industry had been less great, and when hard times destroyed their factory living, many of them had drifted toward the western farming region. By 1893, very little free land was left to receive them; and there were more mill workmen than ever before holding jobs which a panic would take away from them. Added to all these disturbing elements, were others, chief of which was the political dispute over whether gold or silver should be the standard of value. Indeed, the time was ripe for a panic. Late in 1892 it appeared in the offing and early the next year it materialized. As industry was now on a gigantic scale compared with twenty years earlier, business suffered a correspondingly terrific crisis—one of the worst in the history of the country.

In New Jersey the depression began to be felt slightly in the latter part of 1892, the end of the following June found the State completely in its grip, and it continued, although with diminishing intensity, until 1897. Manufacturing activity for each of these years averaged fully 33% below normal, according to the Bureau of Statistics. The Inspector of Factories for the most populous district, Essex County, scarcely knew what to report in the midst of the distress of 1893. He wrote in complete confusion:

Owing to the depressed condition of manufacturing interests in this district, it is almost impossible to give a fair estimate of the number of hands employed, as some factories are entirely closed, some are running on half-time, and some with a very limited number of employees. I therefore base the estimated number employed on the report of 1892, which would be a fair average were all the factories in full operation.

The report for the next year brightens somewhat. The inspector for the third district (Monmouth, Middlesex, Somerset and Union counties) reflects the hopefulness of the manufacturers: "Most of the manufacturers feel that the crisis of hard times has been reached, and that an era of returning prosperity is at hand." In Essex County the year closed better than it had opened: "During the early part of the year, several factories were shut down or running with a small number of employees, but nearly all of them are now quite busy."

The Bureau of Statistics tried manfully to record the experience of the State. The manufacturers were asked to send in statistics covering the period of least activity, and to submit their opinions as to the cause of the disaster

and means for preventing its recurrence. Comparatively few manufacturers responded in full to these inquiries, and the lack of uniformity in their standards of measurement vitiated their figures to a large extent. Comparing June, 1893 (at which time panic conditions held everywhere) with the eleven months following, the percentage of further decrease in number of employees and in amount of wages was computed as given below :

Taking June, 1893, as 100%, the following months showed a decrease of	Number of Employees.	Amount of Wages.
July, 1893	9%	19%
August	18	31
September	21	37
October	21	37
November	23	37
December	24	39
January, 1894	27	47
February	27	40
March	25	36
April	22	36
May	22	32
June	10	16

Those fortunate enough to retain employment worked on shorter time or at reduced rates.

Business reached its lowest ebb in January of 1894, six months later had almost climbed back to where it had been in July of 1893; but of course it still was considerably below what it had been in 1892. The number of establishments making the reductions in force of workers and amount of wages paid was greatest in the silk, machinery and forge industries.

As for the causes of this panic and the prevention of a recurrence, New Jersey manufacturers blamed a variety of influences, most of which were included in two emphatic though incoherent statements by makers of iron and brass goods :

We are compelled to meet the Alabama cheap production. After reducing wages 15% and then losing our profits, we are able to meet the southern cheap product, but cannot make any profit, only keep in the market.

Tariff disturbances since 1888, silver legislation, over-production, want of a settled policy in finance and in currency, business failures, real estate speculation south and west, enormous iron and steel plants erected, excessive crops the world over, discovery of new iron ore fields south and in Lake Superior region, immense capital destroyed by excessive and dishonest railroad building, the uncertain and unsettled state of the tariff question, together with over-production and the no-realization of so may swindle concerns and companies, based on word and promises; in a word, "swelled head-iness."

Not all the manufacturers could reduce wages. Some making stoves reported that they had to run all hands half time, instead of discharging a part and reducing the wages of the remainder, "because the stove moulders have a very strong union." In other cases, such as the silk and pottery indus-

tries, the situation was held to justify calling strikes, of which there were six during the depression's high period.

An unsteady improvement in business the following twelve months was indicated by the rise in employment and wage totals:

	Number of Employees.	Amount of Wages.
Taking June, 1894, as 100%,		
July, 1894, showed	no change	decrease of 5%
August showed an <i>increase</i> of	1%	2%
September	4	3
October	7	11
November	9	7
December	7	11
January, 1895	8	4
February	9	5
March	10	18
April	15	19
May	16	26

The industry which showed the most momentum in starting back toward full time operation was the industry which had first rank in the State in respect to value of product, wages paid, and number of employees—the silk manufacture. One of its leaders could foresee a future downward swing of the pendulum, but most of them showed no signs of worrying over the next recession. As the factory inspector for the Passaic district reported in 1895:

All the factories in my district are busy, and many of them have been forced to enlarge . . . and besides a number of new industries have already commenced business in this district and not a few new factories have been erected since last year, noteworthy among them being the handsome new factory of Doherty and Wadsworth, silk manufacturers of Paterson.

This factory was hailed as a model of the latest design. It must have seemed a far cry from this well-provisioned establishment to the soup-kitchens and bread lines of the previous two years. At Trenton and Burlington, also, the inspector found the "majority of them very busy."

New Building construction, based upon the confident promise of an increase in production after depression, required more capital than any ordinary old-time partnership could have been able to muster, and proved that capital must have become concentrated, both as to location and holding parties. Investigation shows that by 1895 over one-third of New Jersey's population and taxable property were located in the four cities of Newark, Jersey City, Paterson and Camden; and in these localities:


15% of the population of Newark owned 63.8% of the wealth.
 11% of the population of Jersey City owned 58% of the wealth.
 10% of the population of Paterson owned 51.6% of the wealth.
 12% of the population of Camden owned 55.1% of the wealth.

In the State at large, a mere .08% of the population owned 22% of the wealth. Furthermore, one-third of the important establishments had now adopted the corporate form of control, and the entire industries of bar steel and iron, and electric lamps were managed in that manner. None other could

carry the long-time load of investment and expenditure involved in the largest industries. The above figures show that New Jersey, thirty years ago, had become a capital illustration of the fact that modern industry is based upon the concentration of huge funds in few hands. Already, not less than twelve of the State's industries were known to be producing annually more than one million dollars worth of goods, and the next year they numbered twenty. The list is interesting for purposes of comparison later on. It was composed of bar steel and iron, brick and terra cotta, cotton goods, chemical products, electric lamps and dynamos, foundry (iron), glass, hats (men's), jewelry, knit goods, leather and leather goods, machinery, metal goods, paint and varnish, rubber goods, shirts, shoes, structural steel and iron, silk goods, woolen and worsted goods. It was estimated that these twenty industries had 87% of the total capital invested in the State and produced 90% of the value of goods manufactured therein.

Industries of the size attained by these had too much at stake to profit by political disturbances, such as the exchange of compliments between the followers of Bryan and McKinley in 1896. Therefore the campaign year impressed the factory inspectors as one of "great business depression," of "a scarcity of orders," of "factories closed down indefinitely" or "running with only one-half or three-fourths of their usual complement of hands." Detailed comparison of the figures for 1895 and 1896 is impractical because they do not relate to precisely the same industries and establishments, but the Bureau of Statistics demonstrated fairly conclusively that the proportion of business done was lessened by nearly 7%, having fallen from approximately 71% of capacity in 1895 to 64% the next year. Thirty-six establishments were reported closed, with no intention of resuming work. The industries which came the nearest to working full time were paint and varnish, chemical products, metal goods, electric lamps, machinery and silk goods. The greatest loss of time was experienced by that barometer of business, the iron and steel trade. The period of low prices developed the fact that the piece-price system was cheaper than the wage system and could be applied where mechanical improvements had simplified manufacture and made it possible to employ women and children in place of men and adults. This was especially true in the making of pottery and silk goods. Furthermore, depression had seemed to accelerate the change from partnerships to corporations during the year; with 40% of the establishments now become the property of corporations, and these corporations controlling over 60% of the total capital invested. What would happen when business had thoroughly recovered from the depression was the next question—one to which the turn of the century gave a most satisfactory answer.

End of the Century—Beginning with 1897, the wheels of industry in New Jersey moved at a continually increasing speed. A marked improvement in employment and wages, over what they had been the previous four years, took place early in 1897. The high level of 1892 was reattained in 1898, when war expenditures infused new life into business. The next two years became



PORT NEWARK

The City of Newark has expended \$1,000,000 in its development. Covers 1,100 acres, has a 31-foot channel, and extraordinary warehouse and docking facilities. Newark Airport, also Municipally owned, is seen in the background

known as the most prosperous the State, and the country, had known. Production reached a volume crowding capacity. Particular activity in the iron and steel trade proved that industry had completely recovered from the depression of 1893 and the years following. Other great trades enjoyed corresponding activity. As prices and wages rose, the number of strikes increased, with especially frequent outbreaks among silk and machinery workers in 1900. The industries in which improved business in 1899 caused the employers to grant wage increases voluntarily were:

INDUSTRY.	Average Per Cent. of Increase in Number Employed.	Average Per Cent. of Increase in Rates of Wages.
Mining Iron Ore.....	39.3	16.
Foundry (Iron)	10.1	10.4
Foundry (Brass)	26.8	9.2
Machinery	20.8	10.8
Electrical Machinery and Appliances.....	8.	8.2
Boilers, Furnaces, Ranges.....	2.3	7.2
Metal Goods and Novelties.....	15.	14.4
Structural Steel and Iron.....	34.5	23.8
Bar Steel and Iron.....	19.1	12.9
Forgings (Steel and Iron).....	18.7	6.7
Wire and Wire Rope.....	27.	6.7
Gas Fixtures	29.	11.8
Artisan's Tools	31.	10.
Buttons (Metal)	28.5	4.7
Refiners (Copper and Nickel).....	5.1	9.5
Jewelry	27.	8.8
Textiles and Textile Products.....	31.7	8.
<i>Leather and Leather Goods</i>	33.6	9.7
Wooden Goods	36.7	6.7
<i>Clay and Clay Products</i>	8.6	9.9
<i>Glass (Window and Bottle)</i>	19.	11.1
<i>Hats (Men's)</i>	25.3	8.7
Rubber Goods	29.1	14.2
Paints, Oils and Varnish.....		2.8
Chemical Products	17.	15.4
Paper	7.4	9.
Food Products	64.9	6.4
Quarrying and Cutting Stone.....	65.2	7.5
Unclassified	22.6	13.

The above list includes the major industries of the State at the turn of the century if one adds to it *brewing*, *shoes*, smelting and refining precious metals, and the specified textiles usually treated separately, *silks* (broad and ribbon, and dyeing and finishing) and *woolen and worsted goods*. Those in Italic were considered so important for a great many years that they received separate and special presentation in the table compiled by the Bureau of Statistics.

The increased prosperity of this decade permeated to the very small communities. Factory inspector William B. Tucker of the third district (Middlesex, Monmouth, Morris, Somerset and Union counties) reported in 1899 that he had visited manufactories in thirty-six towns and villages not previously found in the reports, and that "throughout the entire district there is abundant evidence of prosperity and contentment which is greatly in contrast with the conditions prevailing and noted in these reports within a few years past." Indeed it seemed that the cup of happiness would overflow, for two whole

years later he reported that "Conditions do not vary in this district from my previous reports except in the larger activity of industries and the greater employment and increased advantage of employees in the matter of wages." Other inspectors were finding the sweat-shop a difficult problem of the lush times, the enforcement of the laws in New York having sent the abuse into New Jersey. Some spoke of the difficulty of enforcing the labor laws in times when there was so much work to do, for the manufacturers were tempted to employ women and children illegally. This was reiterated in 1902, in mentioning the "unusual and perhaps unprecedented material prosperity. . . . More factories and workshops are now in operation and there is greater industrial activity than ever before." Throughout the decade, the average number employed and the proportion of business done showed increases nearly every year. If there was any time of significant industrial pause it centered around the election period of 1904, as is indicated by the fluctuation in the average number employed per establishment:

1899	102	1900	105	1901	115
1902	120	1903	126	1904	119

Doubtless no small part of the slump was due to the falling off in silk goods and explosives, the former losing fourteen mills and the latter four.

During the early part of this booming decade, New Jersey became industrially self-conscious (as other states were becoming), and she signalized the fact by taking action regarding the Bureau of Statistics. The original act of 1878 established what was technically termed a "Bureau of Statistics of Labor and Industry of New Jersey" which in turn was commonly interpreted as a pro-labor fact-finding unit. Under an "elastic clause" of the act, the first two chiefs had endeavored to venture into statistics but met the prejudice of manufacturers against revealing many figures. In 1897 the Inspector of Factories laid out a plan whereby he proposed to attempt a regular sequence of statistics as "an unprejudiced and reliable history of the manufacturing interest"; and at the same time the Chief of the Bureau of Statistics resumed his urging that the law empower him specifically to send blanks to the manufacturers to be filled out and to write up the results. In 1898 and 1899 the Legislature responded by enacting supplements to the original law. They put it beyond doubt that the bureau could send out the questionnaires, although the return of them was not made obligatory. They also carefully specified the limits of the published statistics which were to include eleven points with no personal identification of individual plants therein: showing the character of management, the capital invested, the cost value of materials, the selling value of goods made, the number of persons employed by months classified as to sex, the total amount paid in wages, the classification of wage-earners according to wages, the number of working hours per day and week, the overtime if any, the proportion of full productive capacity in use, and the character and quantity of horse-power used. Within two or three years thereafter, most of the manufacturers had concluded that coöperation held little or no threat to their interests and the figures became much more nearly representative. In 1905 a

basis of coöperation with the Federal Census Bureau was established to the advantage of each. Inasmuch as the State Bureau limited its tabulations to businesses producing five thousand dollars worth of goods annually and employing ten persons or more, the State tabulations presented a more vivid picture of modern industries in New Jersey than did the Federal figures. Until 1917 the Bureau of Statistics continued to compile an interesting and valuable array of facts which particularly must interest anyone concerned with the detailed development of specific industries.

During the decade of general prosperity, 1897-1907, certain forces identified with modern industrialization were continuously active. The percentage of establishments and of capital, controlled by corporations, increased as the percentage of partnerships diminished. At the same time corporations in identical or allied industries united forces as trusts. The late 'nineties comprised New Jersey's "trust-building epoch." Some of these trusts concerned the State's own industries; on the other hand a large part of them had no connection whatever with the State except that its incorporation regulations made the use of the State for that purpose profitable. To the first class belongs the American Thread Company, which Victor S. Clark describes so interestingly. It was incorporated in New Jersey in 1898 with a capital of \$18,000,000, and absorbed fourteen companies and factories and put them on a profitable basis. It had been formed because the J. P. Coats Company, the largest thread manufacturers in Great Britain, had absorbed four competing firms there with their American branches. Such a combination the other mills in America could not face individually on equal terms. Hence the American Thread Company consolidation, which seems to have secured control of about one-third of the American production.

To the first class also belongs the Bement-Pond Company, a tool and cutlery consolidation embracing one establishment at Plainfield, New Jersey, one at Hamilton, Ohio, and two at Philadelphia. The stock of this company was taken up by members of the constituent firms, which were left for a time with their former management. A year earlier (1898) the National Shear consolidation had been formed to combine five important works in New Jersey, New England and Ohio; but it proved unsuccessful and after two years passed into the hands chiefly of a new combination known as the International Cutlery Company.

A combination destined to have peculiar interest for Patersonites had its inception in 1899 when the American Car and Foundry Company utilized the New Jersey laws to combine thirteen of the most important plants in the United States manufacturing freight cars, parts, etc. A like interest attached to the American Locomotive Company six years later, when it united nine plants including the Cook and Rogers works in a trust which made a few more locomotives than the Baldwin works. At Elizabeth Andrew L. Riker proposed to accomplish big things in the building of electric vehicles under a capitalization of \$7,000,000.


To the second class belong a host of consolidations, of which but a few

here are mentioned, to illustrate some particular point. The National Enameling and Stamping Company, for example, combined establishments of enamel and tin-plate goods as far distant as St. Louis, New York, Milwaukee and Baltimore, in order that the four principal concerns in the business might jointly share the protection of a \$30,000,000 charter. It seemed the irony of fate that the Alabama and Georgia Iron Company should incorporate at Trenton, for it united as a strong unit with \$1,300,000 capital mines and furnaces which effectively competed with those in New Jersey. So did the Sloss-Sheffield Steel and Iron Company with its Alabama and Tennessee properties in a \$20,000,000 corporation. For long distance connections, the Pennsylvania Steel Company of New Jersey was notable, with its \$50,000,000 worth of capital uniting extensive properties in Cuba with manufacturing operations at Sparrows Point. This problem of distributing steel plants so as to make them immediately accessible to all important markets was grasped by the formation in 1899 of a New Jersey corporation, out of the former American Steel and Wire Company of Illinois; the new mammoth embraced in one firm bond of union coal and coking properties, a zinc plant, mining and smelting concerns, and manufactories of steel rods and wire. The list of corporations blessed with New Jersey's easy charters cannot be closed without mention of the speculative boom in automobiles. In 1899 the International Power Company announced its capitalization of \$8,000,000 devoted to relieving 110,000 trucking horses in New York City alone, not to mention suffering quadrupeds elsewhere, by substituting for their labors the efficient force of auto-trucks propelled by compressed air. "An even more ambitious enterprise with \$75,000,000 prospective capital planned to consolidate the automobile industry of the world." It is understood that these companies did not leave a very permanent record on the sands of industry.


A curious transitory boom occurred during this decade, largely due to the impetus which the Spanish War gave to the "big navy" idea. This boom of course concerned the iron industry. The number of tons mined had shown a steady decrease due to the substitution of steel for iron, up to 1896, when the figure was lowest in thirty years. The mine and furnace output did not mount noticeably until 1899, after which it renewed its youth in great style—a feat made clear by convenient statistics:

YEAR.	Iron ore Mining. Tons of Ore Produced.	Iron Ore Smelting. Tons of Pig Iron Produced.
1895.....	170,375	33,673
1896.....	133,604	55,593
1897.....	147,514	72,679
1898.....	176,885	75,743
1899.....	192,575	88,083
1900.....	241,422	116,244
1901.....	306,280	127,283
1902.....	381,092	155,378
1903.....	415,816	170,082

The "piping years of peace" closed with a zealous three-year period of bustling industry, during which many factories, mills and shops were running



JERSEY CITY CHAMBER OF COMMERCE



NEWARK CHAMBER OF COMMERCE

overtime without being able to satisfy the demand for their goods. Then stalked upon the scene the spectre of financial distrust, walking hand in hand with falling values and want of credit. The State's statisticians declared the depression was as great in 1907 as it had been in 1873 or 1893, and in some respects more distressing "because it originated entirely in the domain of finance." Orders fell off about 35%. Industries with the smallest number of wage earners succumbed first or were most severely affected. Among the larger firms, few could avoid reducing the working time anywhere from 25% to 50%; 42% of the establishments retained their force but worked them on part-time; 50% reduced both the force and the working time; 12% discharged all their employees. The number of plants closing permanently was greater in 1893, amounting to 89 establishments distributed among 36 general industries.

Recovery from the cataclysm proved steady, though slow, and with the autumn of 1909, New Jersey industry was approaching the level of 1906. The quickest and most effective way to gain an understanding of the intervening period is to take an arithmetical bird's-eye view of the major changes. Of course it should be borne in mind that the percentages do not claim to be more than approximate.

In the first place, the percentage of establishments having the corporate form of management steadily increased:

1906.....	62.6%	1908.....	66.1%
1907.....	64.3%	1909.....	67.2%

Partnerships disappeared entirely from certain industries: thread, smelting and refining precious metals, high explosives, lime and cement, roofing material and bedding.

The annual percentage of increase in the amount of invested capital fluctuated:

1906.....	11.2%	1908.....	3.1%
1907.....	8.6%	1909.....	10.3%

and would have moved on to the minus side if the Standard Oil had not expanded its New Jersey holdings. Before the panic, it had been oils, machinery, furnaces, goods of metal, rubber, clay, leather, and wool which had expanded. During the depression, invested capital was the only major industrial factor which did not decrease.

In cost of materials, the changes were extreme because the much-heralded "prosperity" brought a general advance in prices and the depression reversed them drastically:

1906.....	13.8% Inc.	1908.....	11.04% Dec.
1907.....	8.1% Inc.	1909.....	22.2% Inc.

The only important industries which did not experience decreases were brewing, cigars and tobacco, woolen goods and oil.

In total value, manufactured products swung between even greater extremes:

1906.....	19.9% Inc.	1908.....	13.4% Dec.
1907.....	9.6% Inc.	1909.....	23.% Inc.

The only important industries which did not suffer losses in their value of output were lamps, rubber and oil. The fact that cost of material decreased 11% while manufactured values went down 13.4% indicated that finished products were affected more seriously than raw material.

In total number of persons employed, a like change occurred:

1906.....	8.7% Inc.	1908.....	12.3% Dec.
1907.....	7.6% Inc.	1909.....	13.7% Inc.

The significant exceptions to the decrease were, as may be guessed from the two preceding lists, lamps, rubber, brewing, woolen goods, paper and oil. The worst decreases occurred in railway equipments, where 77.7% of the workers were laid off; in carriages, wagons and trucks, 59.1%, and in general and special machinery, iron and brass, lumber and mill work, all of which laid off between 40% and 50% of their workers. Upon the whole, the metal trades suffered most from unemployment, textiles least, and men more than women.

The number of establishments which had to be closed temporarily, varied in importance according to the length of time they were dark:

1906.....	27 (2 weeks to 3 Months)	1908.....	53 (1 Month to 10 Months)
1907.....	35 (2 Weeks to 1 Month)	1909.....	38 (2 Days to 12 Weeks)

The doors remained closed the greatest length of time in the mills where they worked with metal, building materials being almost as badly affected.

The inveterate weakness of optimistic competitors for expanding their plants to capacities unwarranted by their share of the market customarily keeps the figure for "percentage of capacity in operation" below 80; and just at the beginning of a boom period the percentage reaches a higher figure than it can maintain after prosperity has had time to encourage building. In 1905, New Jersey's industries had operated at 79.06% of their capacity, but thereafter:

1906.....	78.22%	1908.....	66.8%
1907.....	77.96%	1909.....	74.38%

Possibly there is no surprise in the added fact that when all other industries were going down, in percentage of capacity, oil was moving up. The worst sufferers as to unused plants were in steel and iron forgings, furnaces, machinery, pottery, brick and terra cotta, with a long, long list of others dragging out its gloomy length. As if to cap the climax, it was computed in 1909 that the cost of food had advanced 37.13% during the past ten years while the average earnings of manufacturing employees had advanced only 19.0%. The building trades workmen were the only wage workers who had been able to keep their earnings at a pace with living costs. Against the dark background of the 1907-08 depression, the upward turn of 1909 stood out boldly, a relieving contrast. When the State took stock the following year, the conditions disclosed proved most gratifying. It was found that the increase in wealth, and population, had been greater during the previous ten years than in any other decade.

The Last Quarter-Century—Fate had in store for the industries of New Jersey another series of unsettlements, some of them merely reminiscent of former adjustments, others phenomena new to her experience. Practically all of her recent industrial expansion, with the exception of that in the vicinity of Trenton and Camden, had taken place in the middle counties. The towns of the extreme south and north were relatively quiescent and the agricultural districts dormant except in the districts tributary to the canneries.

In the industrial centers the manufacturers had begun to take thought upon that 25% of unused capacity which continually reminded them that they might be more prosperous than they were. They had concluded that part of the answer lay in the foreign market and a movement was set on foot to invade distant marts across the sea. The Bureau of Statistics had compiled an *Industrial Directory of New Jersey* in 1901, 1906 and 1909, and set out to enlighten the world with the latest issue of the volume. From the Department of Commerce and Labor in Washington were secured the names and addresses of all United States consuls abroad, and each was sent a copy of the *Directory* with a request that he call attention to it. The Bureau modestly reported: "the name and address of every manufacturer in New Jersey is thus brought to the notice of persons interested in industry, trade and commerce in every center of population in which an official representative of our country is permanently stationed." The book and the letter were followed up with another letter asking consuls to send lists of importers and merchants handling American goods or willing to handle them in the future, with addresses and products handled. The letter closed:

There is a great awakening of interest in everything relating to foreign trade among the manufacturers of New Jersey, and already we are in receipt of many requests for the names of persons to whom correspondence should be addressed. It is our desire with your kind assistance to bring together as far as possible through the medium of correspondence, catalogs, descriptive literature and price lists, the dealers whose names you may favor us by sending, and the manufacturers in our State who produce the several lines of goods which these merchants express a desire to handle.

From the replies the Bureau collated exhaustive information regarding trade conditions and requirements, character and quality of goods, packing of merchandise, methods of canvassing, and credit arrangements, for the use of New Jersey manufacturers.

At the same time the Bureau had kept a watchful eye upon trade tendencies nearer home. The consular and trade reports issued daily by the Federal Bureau of Manufactures were regularly examined, their information classified and sent out as bulletins or circulars to firms manufacturing the products concerned. The home bureau illustrated its services. If it should learn that Vancouver, B. C., was having a building boom and that therefore hardware used in building construction was especially in demand, it immediately would circularize every manufacturer in the State engaged in the pro-

duction of such goods, "setting forth all the facts in the case, with the names of dealers in the district to whom correspondence should be addressed." Or if a German firm manufacturing army goods and wanting certain kinds of leather sent the Bureau a letter in German, the Bureau would send an English translation to every leather manufacturer in the State, etc., etc. During the twelve months ending September 30, 1910, approximately 2,000 copies of circular letters or bulletins on trade subjects were sent out by the Bureau. Patently, the modern era in advertising had arrived.

The *Industrial Directory* was circulated selectively in the United States, with the thought of encouraging manufacturers to establish plants in New Jersey. In the one year of 1906, 37 plants came to New Jersey, chiefly from New York, Brooklyn, Buffalo, and Philadelphia, it was thought because of the invitational volume. Furthermore, every manufacturer in the State received a *Directory* which doubtless thoroughly informed him upon local enterprises and competition.

So far as is known, exact figures showing the effectiveness of the efforts described above have never been compiled. Events proved that the most earnest efforts could not forestall entirely the occasional depressions common to all industry. In 1912 the increase in capitalization was not as great as it had been since 1908, and other increases then and in 1913 were relatively lower than their recent record. Nevertheless, the average capitalization attained by this time was so huge as to attract attention. Before the outbreak of the war New Jersey already had seven industries in which the average capitalization, per establishment, was more than \$1,000,000. This was true of:

Brewery Products, With.....	35	Establishments.
Woolen and Worsted Goods.....	28	
Refining Oils	23	(the Largest Capitalization per Establishment)
Ship Building	18	Establishments.
Steel and Iron Forgings.....	13	
Drawn Wire and Wire Cloth.....	13	
Lamps, Electric and Other.....	12	

And this was true in a year when business was running 28.76% below capacity.

With enormity of individual establishments, labor unrest also assumed towering proportions. Strikes expanded their scope, involved more persons, imposed mounting losses. At Passaic, which had become an important wool and worsted manufacturing center, a serious strike occurred in 1912. The German manufacturers who had established large factories there, and had raised New Jersey from thirteenth to fifth place in the worsted industry of the United States, insisted that they had to import their machinery and some of their labor if they would compete with the highest grade fabrics made by European manufacturers; and of course the wage scale proved difficult. At Paterson, the silk workers were on strike six months of 1913. The weavers were largely of foreign birth and had lost their privileged position as skilled textile workers when automatic machinery had brought them in competition with cheaper female labor in the Pennsylvania coal and iron towns. They

violently resisted wage reductions. Their employers found it difficult to combine against them effectively, because fashion changes made it foolhardy to work up a stock of goods in anticipation of strikes or lockouts. Other strikes in Passaic and Hudson counties emphatically expressed the current dissatisfaction of the employers. In 1914 practically all industries felt depressed in the early part of the year, while one-fourth of the wool and worsted machinery in the entire United States was idle during the twelve months prior to the World War. In the silk goods manufacture was staged a remarkable comeback, indicating recovery from its strikes. Business as a whole fell to 32.94% below full capacity for the year.

Some new industries were more confident of coming prosperity than old ones. For example, the greatest increase in capitalization in 1914 took place in "electrical supplies" and a great many business men erecting new factories chose to enter into the manufacture of such modern things as auto tires, aluminum cooking utensils, briquettes, chemicals, electric lamps, synthetic dyes, sanitary ware and vacuum bottles. The State had been the home of some of the most significant experiments contributing to modern life, and factories for manufacturing the new inventions often were established near the place of invention, whether at Menlo Park, at Newark, or at Orange. Thus, the work of her inventors made the product of New Jersey's industries more varied and her processes more speedy. Foremost stood Edison, whose encyclopædic labors, extending back as far as the 'seventies, included inventions in diverse fields. His list embraces, in part, the stock ticker, typewriters, dynamos, incandescent electric lamps, street railway motors, electric meters, telephone receivers, phonographs, ore concentrators, Portland cement, batteries for electric vehicles, for submarines and for radio, synthetic phenol and other chemicals, moving pictures and "talkies." None of these efforts but what affected modern industry.

Electricity tempted the genius of other men in New Jersey, also; notably Edward Weston, who concentrated upon machines for nickel plating, electroplating, electro-typing, electric lighting and electric transmission of various sorts. The decade of 1890-1900 had seen such a promising development of electric communication that New Jersey's small generating plants were taken up by heavy capital and combined into less than a dozen companies. The hold of electricity upon the daily life processes of her industrial population continually strengthened. Each new invention made the connection closer. Finally the production and distribution of this strange force which the modern worker knows only as a universal necessity, became part of a vast "superpower" system with her own industries figuring as the largest consumers of the New Jersey part of the product.

In view of the relatively slow pace of business during much of 1914, it may be said that the war came as something of a relief, industrially, to New Jersey. The machinists at Trenton, on strike since June 1, returned to wage earning the first of September, with their industrial importance presumably enhanced. The United States supply of aniline dyes from Germany having

been cut off, New Jersey set to fill the gap with the construction of six factories of that variety. Twenty-three new chemical plants were built, the largest evidently those of the Ammo-Phos \$1,400,000 corporation at Linden in Union County, and the Harrison Brothers \$1,000,000 works at Paulsboro, in Gloucester County. At Hoboken the Remington Arms people established a \$1,500,000 concern, not to mention specifically the munitions, the nitrating cotton, and the loading fuse concerns which sprang up. Leather and leather goods, machinery and metal goods, all expanded into new construction, as did a great many others besides. Every county in the State except Atlantic, Ocean and Salem shared speedily in this new activity. The tendency of manufacturing plants to search for cheap rentals and inexpensive labor in rural districts along the line of the main railroads became manifest.

As 1916 was drawing to its close, the officials of the Bureau of Statistics took a backward look over the course of events since the beginning of the new century. They reported with pride:

Our percentage of growth of population during the fifteen years is greater than that of any other State east of the Rocky Mountains, with the single exception of Florida. . . . Our increase in both volume and variety of manufacturing industry during the same period is unequalled by that of any other State. . . . The expansion of manufacturing industry in New Jersey during the twelve months ending September 30, 1916, is approximately 400% greater than that of any preceding year.

The last statement certainly lacked nothing of enthusiasm. It seems to have been based on the fact that the average annual increase in the value of products between 1850 and 1914 had been slightly over 6%, while the increase as between 1914 and 1915 was 25.6%. This initial war boom was felt most at Perth Amboy, Newark, New Brunswick, and Jersey City, all of which increased the value of their products by 20% or more.

The World War has come to be used as the explanation for any change, industrial or otherwise, occurring after 1917. It must be admitted that the artificial stimuli of that period worked swift and unexpected alterations. But many of the new trends were but temporary or had their foundations laid long before the war and apart from it; and one needs the perspective of later years to evaluate the period. Now that we are a decade beyond the war experience, we can better determine whether industry since 1917 has made any right-about-face in New Jersey. The annual reports of the Bureau of Statistics ceased in that year; and the biennial *Census of Manufactures* which the Federal Government instituted in 1919 can not provide quite the personal and direct view which the State Bureau furnished. But from it one can approximate a fair estimate of what has been happening and the *Industrial Directory* published by the Bureau of Statistics in 1927 helps in the task, because it identifies some of the important output which the Federal census must keep anonymous under the classification of "other states" and "all other products." The author has obtained as many as possible of the advance figures which will

be included in the forthcoming volume of the census for 1927 (not yet published) and where these have not been obtainable the census for 1925 has been utilized.

At a glance one can see the fluctuation in the volume of New Jersey's industries between 1919 and 1927:

	Number of Estab- lishments.	Wage- Earners.	Cost of Materials.	Value of Products.
1927.....	8,312	408,093	\$1,956,597,097	\$3,417,450,248
1925.....	8,204	425,377	2,086,855,079	3,539,181,253
1923.....	8,767	448,069	2,039,477,467	3,396,627,729
1921.....	8,784	381,773	1,484,334,069	2,556,142,540
1919.....	11,057	508,686	2,270,473,279	3,672,064,987

As to relative industrial rank among other states, we find that New Jersey has maintained her position. Though so small in area, she supports a population third in density in the United States, counting 420 people to the square mile, or 3,821,000 persons in all according to an estimate of the Federal Census Bureau in July, 1928. This population in 1925 was 78.4% urban and produced per capita a value of manufactures far greater than the United States average—\$983 as compared with \$543. In the number of her wage earners she ranks seventh among all the states, being surpassed by only New York, Pennsylvania, Illinois, Ohio, Massachusetts and Michigan. In her number of separate establishments (which is less in 1927 than in 1919 in all the states) she ranks sixth, being surpassed by the first five states listed above. In value of products, she also keeps sixth place, being preceded by the first four states listed above and Michigan.

The products manufactured in New Jersey having the greatest value in 1927 are listed below with the cost of their materials. Both sets of figures need to be considered because they indicate which products have their sale price determined chiefly by the cost of the raw material, and which have considerable value added by manufacturing processes. The latter group is, of course, the more important from the standpoint of number of employees and amount of wages.

	Cost of Materials.	Value of Product.
Petroleum Refining	\$231,829,625	\$273,341,828
Smelting and Refining Copper.....	198,702,372	210,201,789
Electrical Machinery, Apparatus and Supplies.....	68,444,637	173,932,303
Silk Manufactures	88,678,434	163,967,060
Chemicals	65,762,049	115,370,137
Foundry and Machine Shop Products.....	42,602,926	112,966,808
Dyeing and Finishing Textiles.....	38,234,552	91,732,052
Slaughtering and Meat Packing, Wholesale.....	68,204,112	77,537,055
Paints and Varnishes.....	44,310,738	74,555,420
Motor Vehicles, Not Including Motorcycles.....	54,095,018	66,276,110
Canning and Preserving.....	36,453,882	61,405,429
Cigars and Cigarettes.....	24,092,533	59,581,620
Bread and Other Bakery Products.....	28,933,845	58,959,553

It will be noticed that the above list is confined to products with a value over \$50,000,000. Among the products below that figure are many others of peculiar interest, either because it has been possible to trace the history of

their manufacture in New Jersey, or because they show what a wide variety of goods is being made in the State to meet the demands of modern life. One cannot realize the immense diversity of these manufactures, unless one sees a list of some of them, with figures to show the extent to which they are made.

To the millions of Americans who subscribe to the doctrine that "clothes reveal the man," New Jersey offers products of no small value designed to meet the demand for personal adornment:

Boots and Shoes.....	\$6,735,998	Knit Goods	\$35,851,312
Buttons	4,887,657	Linen Goods	3,600,025
Men's Clothing	25,784,940	Needles and Pins.....	1,959,198
Women's Clothing	18,649,387	Shirts	21,251,380
Work Clothing	4,192,986	Textile Machinery	6,009,187
Corsets	8,411,220	Trimnings	1,919,665
Cotton Goods	19,692,931	Woolen Goods	5,587,632
Cotton Small Wares	2,027,563	Worsted Goods	47,781,728
Embroideries	11,960,806	Blacking	7,686,559
Felt Goods	3,476,442	Gold and Silver Refining.....	31,662,362
Fur Goods	2,101,222	Jewelry	19,860,120
Furnishing Goods	4,594,380	Cosmetics, Etc.	10,985,654
Dressed Furs	6,806,918	Pocketbooks	3,656,966
Handkerchiefs	13,772,578	Soap	43,517,671
Hats and Caps.....	2,477,234	Hat and Cap Materials.....	4,192,722
Fur-Felt Hats	9,179,657	Straw Hats	1,622,703

Or of those primarily interested in their homes, New Jersey provides:

Asbestos Products	\$13,261,190	Wall Plaster and Board.....	\$3,327,924
Awnings, Etc.	1,432,642	Silverware	4,575,961
Brushes	4,697,921	Stoves, Ranges and Furnaces..	9,997,649
Rag Carpets and Rugs.....	271,454	Stamped and Enameled Ware..	7,295,879
Wool Carpets and Rugs.....	11,608,738	Window Shades and Fixtures..	3,874,533
Clay Products	22,072,505	Gas and Electric Fixtures....	4,358,129
Cleaning Preparations	1,799,613	Gas Machines	3,026,695
Cutlery	6,091,645	Illuminating and Heating Gas..	38,705,313
Furniture	13,371,389	Glass	15,666,810
Plumbers' Supplies	6,575,808	Ornamented Glass	2,225,433
Roofing Materials	19,649,492	Hardware	6,251,015
Ice	5,728,899	House Furnishings	3,835,951
Pottery	22,852,003	Mattresses and Bed Springs...	7,020,271
Rubber Goods	49,756,024	Pipe Covering and Gaskets....	3,231,595
Wall Paper	4,875,633		

For the satisfaction of the inner man, New Jersey manufactures other things besides bakery products, cigarettes, meat and canned goods, of which the following suggest a few:

Beverages	\$8,624,219	Ice Cream	\$14,167,842
Coffee and Spice Roasting, Etc.	13,093,007	Druggists' Preparations	5,212,143
Confectionery	6,875,631	Flavoring Extracts	3,458,177
Food Preparations	7,934,286	Flour and Grain Mill Products	2,879,073
Patent Medicines	22,925,373	Sausage and Meat Puddings...	5,740,837

As the twentieth century seems to have little of the puritanical about it, New Jersey caters to the demands of modern man for diversion. For him who has literary tastes:

Book Binding	\$1,598,178	Printing Ink	\$4,911,174
Printing and Publishing.....	29,744,819	Lithographing	1,141,223
Book and Job Printing.....	21,444,780	Paper	35,769,883

For him who would see the world:

Steam Car Construction.....	\$24,802,489	Motor Vehicle Bodies	\$26,050,567
Electric Car Construction.....	3,253,923	Boat Building	34,249,127
Rubber Tires	29,240,084	Trunks and Suit Cases.....	4,839,401

Not to mention motion pictures, musical instruments, sporting goods, toys, and "other articles too numerous to mention."

In an industrial history confined, as this must be, within a relatively small space, it is impossible to do justice to a State as important as New Jersey. Of the many points of interest but a selected few can be presented. This history cannot be closed, however, without special reference to New Jersey's nine leading communities as they stand today, here listed in the order of their products: Newark, Jersey City, Perth Amboy, Bayonne, Paterson, Camden, Trenton, Elizabeth and Passaic. Each of them is producing more than \$100,000,000 in goods annually. Each of them, except Passaic and Perth Amboy, provides some reason for living in that locality to more than 100,000 population. Each of them is known throughout the land for manufactures in its special field, adapted to life in this age of invention. Inasmuch as the census compilations keep jealously secret the identity of the firms whose figures they present, and even classify as "other industries" gigantic outputs in fields so special that they might be identified with particular corporations, it is appropriate to list in this chapter the largest of the State's notable concerns, with their places of location.

"Made in Newark" is a slogan known abroad as well as at home. The city's industries are extremely varied, including about 250 distinct lines, sixty of which have annual production of more than \$1,000,000; and there are sixteen firms which number their employees above 500. The General Electric, Western Electric, Westinghouse and Weston companies provide the electrical instruments now considered necessities, while Crocker-Wheeler specialize in electric motors. The American Can Company, DuPont de Nemours, Lewis Cigar, United States Tool and Tiffany companies are known in practically every hamlet. Who does not think of pens when he hears the name of Waterman; or if he is troubled with deafness, does not know the name of the Brandes Products Corporation, making accoustical apparatus as well as radio sets. The remaining titles among the big sixteen are Oxweld Acetylene, Union Carbide and the Evening News Publishing Company. In addition, there are the quantities of smaller firms, many of them extremely important in spite of the fact that they employ lesser groups of people. They, with the big sixteen, produced in 1927 a grand total of \$482,739,348 in manufactured goods.

The product in Jersey City during the same period was \$270,842,268. Its population of approximately 325,000 is about 125,000 less than that of Newark and the relative numbers of their wage earners are 24,732 as compared with 62,727. Obviously the industries are not as numerous; but a more interesting fact is that Jersey City's industries are far more concentrated than those of Newark. An immense amount of wealth is produced in a few limited fields. This fact is demonstrated by a comparison of the city's industries as listed in New Jersey's *Industrial Directory* for 1927, with those specifically listed in

the latest United States Census of Manufactures bulletin upon "Statistics for Cities" as of 1927 (the latter being advance figures for the regular biennial volume not yet issued at the time this chapter was written). When the Federal enumerators came to tabulate the figures for Jersey City's industries as such, they had to classify \$166,150,710 out of her \$270,842,268 under the vague description of "all other industries," for fear of disclosing data of individual establishments. Thus was demonstrated the dominance of certain types of industry in the locality. To illustrate—Jersey City has fourteen concerns employing more than 500 people and eight of these firms made products which could not be listed by the Federal census takers:

Typefounding	American Type Founders Co.
Soap	Colgate and Co.
Lead Pencils	Joseph Dixon Crucible Co.
Cigars and Cigarettes.....	P. Lorillard and R. J. Reynolds Companies
Electrical Machinery, Apparatus and Supplies..	Manhattan Electric Supply and Western Electric Companies
Petroleum	Standard Oil Company

Other employments monopolizing 500 or more workers are provided by the Brunswick Laundry, Continental Can, Crucible Steel, DeForest Radio, Jersey City Printing, and Swift companies.


At Perth Amboy, the concentration of work lies in modern uses of chemicals, cigars, asphalt and metals. Each of seven concerns employs more than 500: the Roessler & Hasslacher Chemical Company, the General and the Perth Amboy Cigar companies, the Barber Asphalt Company, and in metals the immense American Smelting and Refining Company, which works in copper and lead, the Raritan Copper Works which refines electrolytically, and the Standard Underground Cable Company which hides under the ground the multiplicity of conduits which big cities cannot allow to crowd the air above. These great establishments, together with a few lesser ones, account for an annual product over \$230,000,000.

Bayonne, even better than Jersey City, illustrates the tendency of great industries to concentrate in a favorable locality. Out of her total \$218,989,680 of products in 1927, \$216,391,934 were classified as "all other industries." None of her major concerns were identified under "Bayonne" in the Federal bulletin. The American Radiator Company, the Babcock and Wilcox steam boiler firm, the Safety Cable Company and the broad silk establishment of Schwarzenbach Huber carry on their manufacturing in an atmosphere almost completely monopolized by the great modern fuel—oil. The Standard, Tide-water, Gulf and Vacuum Oil companies all find it convenient to operate in Bayonne's location.

At the other extreme from Bayonne and Jersey City lies Paterson—the city almost entirely given over to silk, dyeing and finishing, and shirts, but in such an immense number of establishments that the Federal enumerators ran not the least risk in openly listing silk manufactures with a value of \$105,871,838, dyeing and finishing textiles with a value of \$39,244,714 and shirts with a value of \$11,862,318—these out of a total annual industrial product in 1927 of \$207,469,696. The *Industrial Directory* shows that Paterson has only five

COMPARISON OF RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF INDUSTRIES IN NEW JERSEY AND IN THE UNITED STATES RANKED AS PER CENT OF TOTAL VALUE ADDED BY MANUFACTURE 1923


Per cent of total value added by manufacture



1. Textiles and their products. 2. Chemicals and allied products. 3. Machinery, not including transportation equipment. 4. Iron and steel and their products, excluding machines. 5. Food and kindred products. 6. Transportation equipment: air, land, and water. 7. Paper and printing. 8. Stone, clay, and glass products. 9. Metals and metal products, other than iron and steel. 10. Musical instruments and phonographs. 11. Rubber products. 12. Tobacco manufactures. 13. Leather and its manufactures. 14. Railroad repair shops. 15. Lumber and allied products. 16. Miscellaneous industries.

NUMBER OF WAGE EARNERS EMPLOYED IN NEW JERSEY BY INDUSTRIAL GROUPS 1925


Average number of wage earners in thousands



1. Textiles and their products. 2. Machinery. 3. Chemicals and allied products. 4. Iron and steel and their products. 5. Stone, clay, and glass products. 6. Food and kindred products. 7. Transportation equipment. 8. Paper and printing. 9. Metals and metal products. 10. Rubber products. 11. Railroad repair shops. 12. Lumber and allied products. 13. Tobacco manufactures. 14. Leather and allied products. 15. Musical instruments and phonographs. 16. Miscellaneous industries.

LEADING NEW JERSEY INDUSTRIES RANKED BY VALUE ADDED BY MANUFACTURE FOR 1925


(Millions of dollars)



1. Electrical machinery, apparatus, and supplies. 2. Silk manufactures. 3. Foundry and machine shop products. 4. Dyeing and finishing textiles. 5. Chemicals, not elsewhere classified. 6. Petroleum refining. 7. Tobacco manufactures, cigars and cigarettes. 8. Printing and publishing. 9. Motor vehicles. 10. Canning and preserving, fruits and vegetables. 11. Worsteds goods. 12. Iron and steel, steel works and rolling mills. 13. Bread and other bakery products. 14. Rubber goods excluding tires, inner tubes and belting. 15. Gas, manufactured, illuminating and heating.

NEW JERSEY INDUSTRIES EMPLOYING OVER 6,000 WAGE EARNERS 1925

Average number of wage earners



1. Silk manufactures. 2. Electrical machinery, apparatus, and supplies. 3. Dyeing and finishing textiles. 4. Foundry and machine shop products. 5. Worsteds goods. 6. Chemicals, not elsewhere classified. 7. Car and general shop construction, steam railroad shops. 8. Petroleum refining. 9. Cotton goods. 10. Rubber goods, not elsewhere classified. 11. Tobacco, cigars and cigarettes. 12. Iron and steel, steel works and rolling mills. 13. Ship and boat building, steel and wooden. 14. Pottery, not including porcelain ware. 15. Clothing, men's. 16. Printing and publishing. 17. Bread and other bakery products.

firms so large as to engage 500 employees or more: the three dyeing and finishing concerns known as the Lyons, National and United, the Manhattan Shirt Company and the Wright Aeronautical Corporation. The last-named is so isolated at Paterson as to debar separate Federal notice.

New Jersey's sixth city in point of value of products brings us again to an area of concentrated character. Of Camden's \$196,859,864 product, the sum of \$169,691,715 hides under "all other industries." Leather, in which the Evans and the Keystone concerns employ the largest groups, is sufficiently scattered to permit of separate specification; and the same is true of furniture, in which Van Sciver perhaps is the best known name. But on the other hand, one could never guess from the United States census bulletin that Camden rather specializes in such things as large-scale production of cork, licorice, ships, soap, soup, and talking machines. These are made in the order named by large groups working under the aegis of the Armstrong Cork Company, McAndrews and Forbes, Brown Boveri, Hollingshead, Campbell, and the Victor Company. Mention is merited also by the Welsbach concern nearby in Gloucester, where more than 1,000 workers are engaged upon the manufacture of gas appurtenances and allied products.

Examination of Trenton's industries employing more than 500 brings out the fact that just as oil firms incline to settle near Bayonne, rubber concerns take a liking to the vicinity of Trenton. Witness the Acme, Ajax, Certain-Teed, Murray, Sloane and Stokes factories, each concerned with phases of rubber manufacture, each keeping busy more than 500 workers. In these days when the number of bathrooms in a dwelling multiplies as the number of the occupants decreases, a market has been built up for sanitary earthenware and plumbing supplies, which Maddock, Mott and the Trenton Potteries devote large forces to satisfying. Scarcely an important span across one of the mighty rivers of the United States but requires the wire or wire rope made by more than 5,000 workers in the Roebling plant. Trenton contributes her quota also to satisfy the smoking demands of that part of the population which has not abandoned cigars for cigarettes, the American Cigar Company maintaining its Seidenberg plant with more than 850 employees at Trenton. Inasmuch as New Jersey has well nigh become a network of railroads, it is but natural that 700 of Trenton's industrial workers should be spending their time upon the repair of Pennsylvania Railroad locomotives. There was a sign over the old bridge across the Delaware which read, "Trenton Makes, the World Takes." The removal of the sign with the construction of a new bridge in nowise indicated any lessening in the applicability of the slogan.

There remain but two of New Jersey's major cities to consider—Elizabeth and Passaic. The former at the present time is best known for her Singer sewing machines, which engage the labors of 6,336 employees, but she is also particularly concerned with the needs of the traveling public, as her employment allotments demonstrate.

	Men.	Women.
Hayes-Hunt Corporation Automobile Bodies	2,523	125
Central R. R. of New Jersey Car Repairs	2,375	23
Durant Motor Company Automobiles	900	100
Diehl Manufacturing Co. Electric Motors, Fans, Etc.	508	238

Outside of these fields, the greatest number of workers are making copper and brass wire for the American Copper Products Corporation or printing equipment for the American Type Founders Company. As none of Elizabeth's greatest industries are separately specified in the census bulletin, it seems probable that they are responsible for most of the \$98,436,706 of "all other industries" out of the city's total of \$120,642,986.

Passaic's specialty, as indicated at an earlier stage, has become worsteds and woolens:

	Men.	Women.	Children.
Forstmann & Huffmann Co.... Woolens and Worsteds.....	2,400	1,300	..
Botany Worsted Mills..... Worsted and Woolen Yarns....	1,279	925	69
Passaic Worsted Spinning Co... Worsted Tops and Yarns.....	200	430	70
Gera Mills Weaving, Dyeing and Finishing	600	450	..

But rubber holds a great deal of interest in that vicinity, also:

	Men.	Women.
Manhattan Rubber Manufacturing Company Mechanical Rubber Goods.....	1,500	71
New York Belting and Packing Company Mechanical Rubber Goods	1,449	101

Other large units employing around 700-800 are the Acheson Harden handkerchief concern and the McLean Andrew Company making buckram.

It would require far more space than has been allowed to the industrial history of New Jersey to treat adequately the developments outside of the nine largest producing cities. One must pass by such important groups as the International Motor Company maintains at New Brunswick and Plainfield, each more than 1,200 strong in the "Mack" truck line; such organizations as those of Johnson & Johnson at New Brunswick and Merck at Rahway, devoted to surgery and medical matters; or the Worthington pumping machinery, the General Electric lamps and the Hyatt roller bearings perfected at Harrison; not to mention the ship building interests at Hoboken. Enough has been suggested, at any rate, to demonstrate the forces working for industrial progress throughout the urban centers of the State, a State which, by reason of its location and mechanical aptitudes, is destined for a continuing career of usefulness. There is no sign of diminution in that multiplicity of wants which only the age of invention, of electricity, of inexhaustible curiosity, can create. The industries of New Jersey have long been dedicated to the satisfaction of those wants. From the time when the State passed out of her colonial stage, and on through the middle period of experiment and growth, to the attainment of true industrialization, New Jersey has been well and widely known for her manufactures. An earnest of the perpetuation of her ideals comes at the moment when this account is brought to a close, December 5, 1929. Newark announces that she has appropriated \$1,000,000 in order that her School of Fine and Industrial Art the better may continue its work of instruction in such branches as ceramics, textile making, modelling and jewelry design. With her leading cities showing vision of this sort, it is small wonder that the State has made great strides in manufacturing in the past, and it is certain she must continue to do so in the future. This is New Jersey's great contribution to the upbuilding of the United States as it stands today.

THE LAST HALF CENTURY IN NEW JERSEY POLITICS.

By Edwin P. Conklin.

Mr. Conklin prepared this section largely from material assembled by James Kerney, of the "Trenton Times," author of "The Political Education of Woodrow Wilson," who turned over to him the results of his research in this field of New Jersey political history. It was Mr. Kerney's intention to write the chapter, but his appointment by President Herbert Hoover to the Commission to Study and Report on Conditions in Haiti called him to the larger and more pressing problem. An expression of earnest appreciation is due at this point for his willing and effective coöperation.—Ed.

CHAPTER XLIV.

FROM BEDLE TO ABBETT.

A sketch of the last half century in New Jersey politics should start with the year 1879, or 1878, which were rather uneventful years in New Jersey. It would be wiser to take 1873, or 1875, as the starting point, thus giving us years which mark the end of certain political tendencies and events, and the beginning of some new interests which were to hold the attention of New Jersey legislators and people for many years. There are few eras and epochs in politics which can be circumscribed within certain dates; the eras and epochs are always overlapping and becoming inextricably tangled. The beginnings of most movements are too vague to be recognized, and the supposed completion of any fundamental change too often proves to have been only imaginary. One may write of New Jersey that it was Democratic from the casting of its vote for Tilden, in 1876, to the McKinley landslide of 1896; and that it has been Republican since that time, the vote for Woodrow Wilson in 1912, notwithstanding, but this is an inference drawn from the national vote of the State during that period. In State politics there was a succession of Democratic governors from Randolph, of 1868, to Griggs, of 1895, and more Republican governors than Democratic have been elected since that year, but one cannot use this as an excuse for writing of the Democratic "epoch" and the Republican "era," for the Legislature legislates and, although the selection of a Governor indicates rather well which party is in control, there is always the fact to be considered that the usual Senate of New Jersey has been Republican and that the Assembly constantly has changed complexion. During the early years of our half century, the Legislature might have both Houses Democratic one year and both Republican the next, as witness 1878 and 1879. In the early period the party label a legislator bore might have little to do with the way he voted, since bosses and "rings" cracked the whip and members of both parties might be forced to team together in putting through legislation pleasing to neither.

General Survey—In 1875 New Jersey took an accounting of its affairs and was pleased to find that the population of the State exceeded one million by 19,413, and that this constituted a gain of about three hundred per cent. in a half century; it was to increase at a slightly greater rate during the next fifty years. Seventy-five per cent. of its residents were native born; slightly fewer than one-half of the population were rural, living outside the towns of 1,500 inhabitants, a condition which may be compared with the present period when eighty per cent. of the population reside in cities and towns of more than 2,500 inhabitants and only 38.3 per cent. of the people of the State can claim American-born parentage of at least two generations (Census of 1920). Newark and Jersey City were the only cities of more than 100,000 population, and Camden, Paterson, Elizabeth and Trenton were the only other four

places having 25,000 inhabitants or more. Five counties, Hudson, Union, Essex, Passaic, and Camden, contained half the taxables of New Jersey, and almost that proportion of the population. In 1928, seventy-five per cent. of the inhabitants resided in seven of the twenty-one counties of the State—the above indicated five, with Bergen and a part of Middlesex. The total taxables of the State amounted, in 1876, to \$596,943.707.70, and the receipts for the year were \$3,195,493, including \$1,258,115 for schools. The transportation systems now supply six times the amount of the total revenue of 1876; it costs about \$94,000,000 a year to keep the schools open, and nearly \$47,000,000 was raised by various means to construct and maintain roads. Such comparisons might be multiplied, but the outstanding one would be, that while the population of the State has trebled in the last half century, the sum total of the taxables has multiplied ten times, and the receipts and disbursements are nearly twenty-seven times as great.

It is hardly necessary to elaborate a picture of the uncomplicated semi-rural conditions of New Jersey of 1875. These were similar to other sections of the United States and are comparable to those holding in some of the smaller semi-pioneer states of today. New Jersey had a system of highways, the legislative side of which had been started in 1695, but which had been turned over to sectional jurisdiction under Republican government with the result that they never got far beyond the dirt road stage until the present century. By 1875 the turnpike fever which, while it raged, had given rise to many surfaced highways, had abated. The stage coach was still very much in use, travellers were few; the railroad, after more than a third of a century, gave but limited service. School conditions were bad with less than two hundred thousand pupils in the whole State. There was a great deal of criticism because counties having much wealth and few children were taxed to support schools in sections where children were numerous and dollars few. School boards and school control, and even the appointment of local teachers were political perquisites.

New Jersey was just as far advanced in the care of its needy and defective as any other section, but its institutions were few and bore no fine sounding names. The mentally deranged were "crazy" and incarcerated in a "lunatic asylum"; the mentally defective were "idiots"; prisons were for punishment. New Jersey completed, in 1876, a second "Lunatic Asylum," which was to become a remarkable institution. There was a State Prison, over the entry of which were the words: "Labor, Silence, Penitence. . . . Erected that those who are Feared for their Crimes, May Learn to Fear the Laws and be Useful." There were small reform schools for boys and girls, a normal school and a soldiers' home, which just about completes the list of the New Jersey institutions of that date. Departments and commissions were not considered a necessary part of government. There was, of course, a military department, a holdover from the Civil War; a State Board of Instruction, as yet more ornamental than efficient; a fish commission, which dated from 1870; and an insurance department, which had been established



DELTA UPSILON CHAPTER HOUSE, RUTGERS UNIVERSITY



FALLS OF RARITAN RIVER, NEW BRUNSWICK

by a law approved on April 9, 1875, for the registration of companies doing business in New Jersey.

However uncomplicated as seen in retrospect, the governmental and political affairs of New Jersey fifty years ago were just as simple as the manner of living. The management of the business of the State required fewer executive abilities than the direction of the affairs of a modern large corporation; there was less to do and less expert knowledge was required. Most legislative problems could be decided by debate; the ability to make a good speech was a perquisite to holding most political offices. The old Jacksonian doctrine was "Anybody is good enough for any job" and, foolish as it may sound now, was not far from the mark in the day when uttered. All that was needed to direct the destinies of the State was a group of wise politicians who could keep themselves more or less permanently established in inconspicuous offices, where they could become familiar with the needs of the State and see to it that the proper sort of legislators should be selected at the caucus and polls, men "with clean hearts and a love for the people." Instead of committee hearings, public discussion fathered programs; instead of calling in experts for advice, the "boss" or the "ring" decided what was expedient. There had to be a great deal of trading of influence and votes, and much of the "you scratch my back and I'll scratch yours" attitude to get things done. All of which seems to have been a thoroughly reprehensible way of doing things governmental in a State which now must have more than fifty permanent departments, boards or commissions to carry on its business. And yet the "politicians" of a half century ago and years later somehow managed to accomplish many fine results. They found a way to break the grip of the corporations which dominated the State and bring them within reach of the tax collector. Schools were made free, and public libraries as well. A riparian policy was defined and established which saved one of the great natural sources of wealth. Vitally important amendments were added to the Constitution which made possible many of the modern improvements in legislation. The foundations of some of the larger Jersey institutions were laid by our so-called "boss-ridden" Legislatures of thirty, forty and fifty years back. The principal issues in State politics of today are connected with taxation, the control of corporations, and the management of the many institutions, funds, departments, which go to make up the business of the State. These are handled elaborately and well and expensively, but in a simpler day, with less machinery, the business of the State was attended to; issues like unto those which confront the legislators of today were faced and handled in the 'seventies and 'eighties quite as well.

Railroad Influences—In 1875, New Jersey was just getting back on its feet after the disastrous financial panic of 1873, and making ready to go on with improvements which had been begun but had stopped. It even prepared to vote more funds for representation in the Centennial Exposition, at Philadelphia, than any other of the United States, except Pennsylvania.

Politically it was congratulating itself upon winning a round in the perpetual battle against railroad domination of legislation. It is not necessary to go at length into the history of the numerous charters of earlier years which had eventuated in handing the control of the rail transportation systems of the State over to a single corporation. As is well known it required every inducement to get the first railroad built, and the most liberal charters were given and subsidies provided. Rail transportation proved more successful and profitable than had been expected, thereby not only making the privileges granted exceedingly worth the fighting for, but the profits had provided the means to battle for their retention. No existing company wanted any other concern to construct a parallel or competitive line, and there was just as strong a trend towards consolidation as characterizes business of all sorts at the present time. The stronger companies absorbed the weaker ones, and then in turn consolidated or had working agreements. By purchase, lease, by control of stock, by interlocking boards of directors, the Camden and Amboy and New Jersey railroads became the strongest organizations and formed the connecting link between the two most important cities in the United States, Philadelphia and New York. The climax of monopoly came on June 30, 1871, when these and other companies executed a lease for nine hundred and ninety-nine years to the Pennsylvania Railroad Company, the lease being validated on March 27, 1873.

It is probable that the advent of the Pennsylvania Railroad into New Jersey, and thereby into the center of Jersey politics, had little to do with the passing of railroad enactments at that period. The sentiment of the State had been swinging towards the legal curbing of corporation powers, and the abolition of special charters. There is something very familiar about the legislative call of 1872, for an investigation of the Pennsylvania road and its lease, a demand to which little attention was paid.

Rather more typical of the politics of the period was the sly attempt of the Philadelphia and New York Railroad to rush through a charter for a competing line, but without success. A great battle was staged in 1873 when these two corporations fought body against body to a draw. One almost might say that the referee won, for the Legislature passed what was called the General Railroad Law, which gave all competitors the right to build their lines across the State. Henceforth no charter could be granted which deprived railroads of similar privileges. Not only did the free railroad idea open the door to renewed development of the resources of New Jersey, but it brought about a realignment of political forces which ended the political prominence of the Camden and Amboy régime, an outstanding factor in politics up to that time.

Political housecleaning, like any other sort, is likely to uncover many things which need sweeping out; getting rid of one evil is apt to disclose others to be ousted. If the special privileges of railroads are abolished, then special privileges of all kinds should be abolished. Governor Joel Parker summed up the situation in his annual message of 1873: "The State Constitution should require general laws and forbid the enactment of all special

or private laws embracing subjects where general laws can be made applicable." The Republican platform of that same year had urged the adoption of general laws under which there would be no further "enterprises born of special legislation and maintained by corruption." With both parties for reform the brooms must of necessity go to sweeping. The Republican Legislature backed the Democratic Governor in the appointment of a bi-partisan advisory constitutional commission, whose privilege it was to propose all the amendments it thought wise to the existing Constitution.

The commission sat from May 8 to December 23, 1873, and there were very few possible changes in the "States Bill of Rights" which were not discussed. The question of more limited Senatorial representation was dropped like an overly hot potato; there was no possible chance of anything adversely affecting its own status being acceptable to the Senate. The suggestion of biennial sessions of the Legislature, together with a proposal requiring a two-thirds vote to override a Governor's veto, were both killed. The commission spent much talk over the existing method of distributing the State school tax moneys on the basis of pupils rather than by apportioning them to the county from which the money came; no recommendation was made. Rural conservatism stood in the way of any change in Senatorial representation. No Legislature could be expected to limit the number of times it should meet; neither would that body reduce its power by increasing those of the Chief Executive. Education was coming to be thought of as a State affair and, therefore, to be managed without reference to county divisions. There were a few other reforms which failed to come up for consideration, and in connection with the public schools funds, it was recommended that no public moneys should be awarded to religious or sectarian organizations, a suggestion which led to a later opposition to the acceptance by some voters of all the changes to the Constitution recommended. This opposition, however, proved an aid in bringing out a great vote in favor of all amendments.

There were other suggestions discussed by the commission and rejected, and the Legislature in 1874, which met to consider the report, also rejected a number of the suggested amendments. Highly important was the acceptance by the Legislature of the amendments prohibiting special legislation for municipal corporations, prohibiting State grants to municipalities, societies, associations or industrial organizations, and directing that taxable property should be assessed under general laws and by uniform rules. An outstanding amendment was the one forbidding the Legislature to pass local laws regulating the affairs of towns and counties, and the allied measure which prohibited the appointment of local officers, or commissions, to manage municipal affairs.

The Legislature to which the report of the commission was offered was overwhelmingly Republican, the Senate having twice as many Republicans as Democrats, the Assembly running thirty-three of the former to twenty-seven of the latter. Garret A. Hobart, of Passaic, was chosen Speaker of the Assembly. Well oiled machinery carried the report of the Constitutional Commission through the Legislature. Governor Parker commended both the Commission and the Legislature, saying of the latter: "Seldom has a delib-

erative body convened in which so little local prejudice or partisan feeling existed, or in which greater patriotism, wisdom and discretion were displayed." The report adopted was referred to the Legislature of 1875.

Election of Governor Bedle—Before the job of amending the Constitution could be completed, the State had to pass through the excitement of a gubernatorial contest. It was one of the first, since the Civil War, in which local affairs were more to the fore than national. Two splendid men were nominated by the opposing factions, both of whom were undoubted leaders, and both nominated without opposition. There were no practical differences between the platforms of the two parties as regards State matters, each claiming the glory for what had been accomplished, each blaming the other for what had been done amiss, and both advocating a system of "general laws" and opposing government of municipalities by legislative commissions. George A. Halsey, a wealthy resident of Newark, whose straightforward treatment of his employees had won him favor with the labor voter, was nominated by the Republicans. He was a man known to be opposed to the ring which was jobbing Jersey City, and in favor of laws which would check such robbery there and elsewhere. Opposed to him was Judge Joseph D. Bedle, who, if less experienced and less known politically, had made a name for himself in the prosecution and punishment of some of the chief participants in the looting of Jersey City.

It so happened that the act by which home rule had been taken away from cities and placed in the hands of department commissions chosen by joint meetings of the Legislature, was formulated by Jonathan Dixon, a Republican. Jersey City was the chief victim of the act which had turned over the municipal government, its property, taxes and public improvements to a bunch of looters, not one of whom could have been elected in the city if required to gain office by way of the local ballot-box. Conditions had become so thoroughly disgraceful that all sections of the State recognized that they must be corrected before a like fate came upon them. Both parties selected men for the Governorship who were pledged to come to the succor of "poor afflicted Jersey City" and all other municipalities endangered.

It was expected that Halsey would have little difficulty in leading his party to a safe majority in the elections. The Republicans had led for quite a period in the Legislature. Two years earlier New Jersey had given, in the national elections, a remarkable majority for General Grant. The man who does things, however, catches the public eye sooner than the one who makes victory possible. The centering of political attention upon the plight of Jersey City and on Bedle's sentencing of some of its jobbers to the penitentiary had a great deal to do with the swing throughout the State to the Democrats, who not only elected Joseph D. Bedle as the Chief Executive, but also secured a majority in the Assembly. Halsey's quiet opposition to looting which had made the punishment of the leaders possible was overlooked by the voters. Quite possibly this action of the electorate was but a precursor of the tremendous vote which was cast for Samuel J. Tilden, Democratic nominee for

President of the United States, two years later. It is worth recording that the majority of 13,233 given to Bedle was the third largest given any Governor of New Jersey, and, that in the years which followed, elections to that chair were to be indicated in pluralities, since other parties, notably the Prohibitionist, were to win attention from the electorate.

The amendments, approved by the Legislature of 1874, had now to be voted upon by the people before becoming a part of the Constitution. Before the special election could be held, efforts were made to push through certain special laws whose passage would be impossible after—and if—the changes were accepted by the voters. More than a quarter of the population of New Jersey in 1875 were Catholic in their religious adherence, and it was the desire of some of their authorities to establish penal and corrective institutions which should be under the direction of the church. This and other acts of similar character failed to receive sufficient support and were tossed aside, but the fact of their introduction created great excitement throughout the State which led to all manner of animosities and pseudo-reprisals. The storm had all but quieted before the September day arrived for voting, when it was whipped again to hurricane force by the publication in a Catholic organ of an appeal to vote against all amendments, or at least against those which forbade special legislation and the donation of public funds to private organizations. Just how much the unusually large vote which followed this pronouncement was divided along religious lines would be hard to decide. The amendments were accepted by a wide majority, and they immediately became a part of the Constitution of New Jersey.

By a devious route we have arrived at the year 1876 and noted as we came that the free railroad idea had displaced the monopoly of years' standing; that a fine patch had been put on the Constitution intended to keep those who, through special legislation, were reaping all sorts of unfair advantages. A better and more nearly free school system had been made possible and, although not enlarged upon, methods had been devised to save the natural resources of the State from misuse and loss. Politically New Jersey had become definitely Democratic and was to remain so until close to the end of the century. The State had gone for Tilden and thereby, so it was considered, had carried the Nation for him. In the controversy which followed and which ended in the selection of Rutherford B. Hayes as President by a commission, Jersey's Democrats felt they had been robbed, and not a few from the other parties agreed in this contention. Incidentally it was the Centennial Year, and New Jersey did more to make the exposition held in Philadelphia notable than any other State except Pennsylvania.

The Jersey Legislature of this year had the very difficult job of putting through some of the reforms which the change in the Constitution predicated. Said Governor Bedle, in his inaugural address: "Now is the opportunity, though late, to strike a blow for the protection of our property in municipalities by sweeping away the devices under the forms of law under which these abuses have been perpetrated, and substituting plain, just, and general laws, alike applicable to all cities." When the legislators started to do some of the

wonderful things promised under the brand new amendments, they found that they had jumped from the frying pan into the fire. The abolishment of special legislation seemingly had made all legislation impossible. The makers of our laws had been greatly pleased when the prohibiting of special legislation relieved them of that most onerous duty of bringing home the bacon for their constituents by means of bills passed for local interests, but they did not want to have that burden so completely taken from their shoulders that they could get no legislation which stood any chance of being declared constitutional. For some time it was the chief labor of the legislators to devise methods whereby special privileges could be secured under the guise of a general act. Legislation became so difficult that in 1881 commissioners were appointed, of whom Leon Abbett was one, to suggest further amendaments of the amendments to the Constitution so recently adopted. The recommendations of this committee were never accepted.

It may be that Leon Abbett was chosen to head the aforesaid commission because he had been one of the few legislators who had been able to frame a bill which was both special and local in its character, but which had received the approval of the courts. Jersey City was the one city which was expected to profit most by the constitutional changes. Governor Bedle had remarked, "It is plain that in New York and New Jersey the system of legislative commissions had failed. The best municipal government is that where the people govern themselves, and I hope to see the day when every city in the State shall be governed by a general law, guaranteeing to it local self-rule." Jersey City was the only city whose government was managed wholly by a legislative commission. When the attempt was made to free her from her bonds under the new constitutional system, it proved impossible, for any enactment intended to cover the situation was local and special and, therefore, unconstitutional. Senator Abbett cut the Gordian knot by securing the enactment of one of the prohibited special laws and then arguing before the court that this law seemingly of local application was really general in character since it merely gave Jersey City a place on a parity with all other municipalities in the State, since it was the sole exception to the order of home rule. The court was either complaisant or just sensible; it declared the law constitutional. Jersey City was thus relieved of the chains which had bound it and set free to choose home-made shackles and local jailors. Lobbyists of all sorts were hard hit by the new Constitution, and these were just as important a part of legislation a half century ago as they are now, however much methods have changed. Legislators and lobbyists later combined forces at various times to get rid of the obstructive amendments, notably in 1881 and 1890, but during this latter mentioned year, the voters of the State decided emphatically that the additions to the Constitution must stay where they had been put. For forty years our lawmakers, and their back-door assistants, have been seeking, and finding, ways and means of getting special legislation, despite the constitutional prohibition of such legislation.

The reform spirit which was rampant throughout Governor Bedle's administration forced the passage of a law which corrected one of the serious

faults in legal procedure. This was the District Court Act, by which this type of court superseded the Justices' Court—"Courts for the Trial of Small Causes"—and took from the elected local justices of peace their very profitable business of acting as collection agencies. Up to that time suits involving small sums were handled by minor justices, which was a very good procedure in theory. In practice it had evolved a type of official who was plaintiff, jury and judge, who nearly always decided for the client he represented. Honest men would not stand for the office; some of the incumbents were little more than licensed extortionists. About the only way to remove some of the most vicious of the justices was by way of an indictment by the grand jury. The act by which the civil functions and privileges of the local justices were handed over to District Courts met with general approval in the cities, but not in the rural sections for the expense of sustaining districts was thought to be too great. Governor Bedle's appointments of new functionaries were not so pleasing, particularly his nomination of John A. Blair, a Republican, and of his father-in-law, B. F. Randolph, both to serve in Jersey City. Senator Leon Abbett led the group in the Senate which prevented the confirmation of the nominees, but the Governor made the appointments *ad interim* and waited until the next year when a more complaisant Senate did as he wished.

One incident occurring during the Bedle régime served to introduce a contest which was waged until the so-called "State House Ring" were denuded of their powers in Jersey politics. For half a century after 1844 there had been but three Republican governors and these had been elected during the Civil War period. Soon after the war the Republicans were usually in control of the Senate and often had a majority in the Assembly. If there was one man responsible more than any other for keeping of New Jersey in the Democratic column, and particularly for the procession of governors from that party, it was Henry C. Kelsey, who, for nearly two decades was able to hold the position of Secretary of State, half of the time with the approval of a Republican Senate. He, with Benjamin F. Lee and Henry Stafford Little, made up a triumvirate which dominated Democratic councils for many, many years. If they used methods at times which might be considered questionable, these were somewhat better than the methods used in politics elsewhere. All three in the early days held offices which paid no fixed salaries, compensation coming from fat fees.

Governor Randolph—Governor and Senator Randolph was responsible for the appointments of Kelsey as Secretary of State, Little as Clerk of the Court of Chancery; Lee was appointed Clerk of the Supreme Court in 1872, by Governor Parker. Theodore F. Randolph was elected, in 1869, as the first Democratic Governor of New Jersey after the Civil War. and was made United States Senator a half dozen years later at the behest of the State House Ring in the face of determined opposition, because of his former connection with the "Know Nothing Party." He deserved the honors granted to him, for he had served the State long and well. A resident of Hudson County,

one of the foremost coal operators in New York, he had been active in public affairs since making his home in Morristown. He was so rich that he was called "Mr. Moneybags of Morristown"; he had ample leisure to play the political game to the limit, and did.

While campaigning for the Governorship, he met Henry Kelsey, editor of the *Herald* of Newton, and was so impressed with his ability that he made him his Secretary of State. Mr. Kelsey, a native of Sussex County, besides being a country newspaper editor, had been at various times, the postmaster of his town, and a judge of the Court of Common Pleas for four years. It seems likely that his predecessor in the State position was encouraged to resign to make way for Mr. Kelsey; at any rate, his appointment to the office was made July 1, 1870. When the term ended the following year he was reappointed and confirmed by a Republican Senate; again, five years later, another Republican majority in the Senate confirmed his reappointment by Governor Bedle. By virtue of his office he was a member of all kinds of commissions, and clerk of half a dozen State organizations. His duties were multifarious and his opportunities to advance the political fortunes of those he favored equally numerous. He was a pleasant faced man of slight stature and outwardly gave no suggestion of the versatile canny mentality, or of the cold calculating courage which was manifest in his career. He was the brains of the State House coterie, the first to be recognized by his party for skill in politics, and the one who clung longest to the power and position which his abilities had won. It was not until 1897 that his reign as Secretary of State came to an end, but his influence had waned during the later years.

Henry Stafford Little, tall, active and energetic, made a splendid running mate for Kelsey, his efficiency and forcefulness made effective the plans of the others. Mr. Little was born at Middletown Point (Matawan), son of an Irishman, who had settled in Monmouth County in 1810 and had made himself wealthy in the development of the resources of the section. Henry Stafford Little was admitted to the bar in 1848, but divided his time between the law and the further development of his home section. He promoted roads and turnpikes. He was the first president of the New York and Long Branch Railroad Company, and mainly instrumental in the construction of its line. He was sent to the State Senate to represent his county during the years from 1864 to 1871, being its President during 1868 and 1869. He was nominated by Governor Randolph as Clerk of the Court of Chancery, January 25, 1871, and reappointed by Governor Bedle in 1876, and at the end of his term refused to serve longer in order to succeed Judge Lathrop as receiver of the New Jersey Central Railroad Company.

The Chancery clerkship was not only "one of the most lucrative places in the Capitol Building, but it was also one that gave largest opportunities for acquaintance with the class of men who make and mould public sentiment. The fifteen hundred lawyers in the State, with their army of clients, and litigants, were brought in almost daily contact with his office. Mr. Little had enough of the Irish instinct of push, aggressiveness and ambition to make the most of the opportunity that lay at his hand." When he threw up the

office he by no means resigned from his position as one of the political bosses of New Jersey.

Benjamin F. Lee became a member of the State House Democratic cabinet slightly later than the others, and was its diplomat and chief wire-puller. Suave, courtly, a *raconteur* of the first flight, the son of the Hon. Thomas Lee, and the descendant of a prominent and ancient family, he was valued for his personal qualities as much as for his political acumen. After some years of business with father and brother, he retired to become identified with South Jersey interests and politics. A lifelong Democrat he was nominated in the strong Republican First District for Congress twice and made great inroads upon the usual Republican majority of the district. He had 118 votes, the entire strength of his section, behind him on the informal ballot which later selected Joel Parker as the nominee for Governor, and swung the whole 118 to Parker. When the latter was elected he recognized the favor by appointing Lee Clerk of the Supreme Court, in 1872, and was subsequently reappointed by Governor Bedle in 1877, Ludlow in 1882, Green in 1887, and Abbett in 1892, giving him a most remarkably long tenure of office which was, until 1881, one of the most lucrative in fees of any in the Capitol, and was even more valuable for the political contacts and control it gave.

These were the men who made up the nucleus of the State House autocracy which dominated Democratic councils, to a very large extent, from the 'seventies on into the 'nineties, and whose names must recur in any account of Jersey politics of that period. The coterie's ascendancy was challenged from time to time, but never so ably or so successfully as by Leon Abbett and those who became associated with him. Abbett ranged himself on the side of the People—spelled always with a capital—holding the State House group up to obloquy as aristocrats, plutocrats, wholly out of sympathy with the masses, managing the affairs of the Democratic party to its utter damnation or eventual dissolution. He was accused, during his long career in Jersey legislation, of all the crimes on the political calendar, but none suggested that he lacked aggressiveness or courage. He had been sent to the Legislature from Hudson County in 1865 and from that time developed in power and influence, being active in every political agitation so long as his party held sway in the Senate.

The phrase which started this excursion into past politics and the formal introduction of certain prominent politicians of that period, began "One incident occurring during the Bedle régime served to introduce a contest which was waged until the 'State House Ring' was denuded of its powers." This incident was the election of a United States Senator in 1877 to succeed the Hon. F. T. Frelinghuysen. It will be recalled that there was a parity of the two parties in the Assembly, at that time, with a Democratic majority of just one in the Senate, making it a most inopportune time for any factional rivalry to arise among the Democrats. It was in this critical situation that Abbett and John R. McPherson joined forces and challenged the supremacy

of the State House managers. Both were from Hudson County, both had won recognition as representatives of the "Masses" and had a large popular following. Both might have been enemies striving for the ascendancy in their districts, but had been wise enough to work with, rather than against, each other, and to form an alliance against the moneyed aristocracy which ruled their party. They had opposed the "Ring" in opposing the election in 1875 of ex-Governor Randolph for United States Senator, but had been beaten. The fight over McPherson's candidacy, two years later, was spectacular and bitter, but, and for the first time, the combination of Kelsey, Little and Lee received a decided setback; McPherson went to the National Senate, taking the place which Abbett probably desired for himself, but had enabled his colleague to secure. It seems likely that the Senatorship for Abbett was expected to be the gift of another day, and that his service to McPherson was to be rewarded by the latter's support for the Governorship, from which one so often graduated to the United States Senate, or to even higher office.

If the Abbett-McPherson alliance thought that they had conquered the State House autocracy, or even that they could put Abbett in the gubernatorial chair, they were mistaken. A successor to Governor Bedle had to be nominated in 1877; Abbett was one of the foremost of many candidates, which included the name of Orestes Cleveland, a leader in Hudson affairs and a sworn enemy of Abbett even as the latter was of the "autocrats." Orestes Cleveland realized it was the better part of political valor to cast his lot with the State House coterie to defeat Abbett; he did so and withdrew his name. He was an exceedingly pleased man when in a most dramatic convention, the name of General George B. McClellan was introduced and, by a well planned and beautifully staged coupe, made the nominee. The Republican convention, held the following week, nominated Dr. William A. Newell, of Cumberland, who managed to make one of the most maladroit canvasses possible, one notable for the enemies it made for him in his own party. There were few real differences between the platforms of the two organizations as touching State affairs, and the campaign was burdened with personalities rather than creeds. The Republicans threw down the gauntlet with the accusation that the opposite party had nominated a man unidentified with the interests of New Jersey, one who had been twice in the past two years a candidate for office in another State. General McClellan answered that "if I am not a resident of New Jersey I have no residence anywhere in the country. I have lived here since 1863 and voted at many elections." The general was a popular hero, the Civil War being still bright in the memories of the people. His journeys through the State were triumphal processions. He received a vote of 97,837 as compared with 85,094 for Newell.

George Brinton McClellan was a splendid figure to have as the head of the New Jersey government. A native of Philadelphia, a graduate of West Point, second in general rank and first of his class in engineering, he served as a lieutenant in the Mexican War, emerging with the brevet rank of captain. He was sent abroad, in 1856, as military observer for the govern-

ment in the Crimean War, remaining for a time to examine the military systems of Europe. Some of his plans for the improvement of the American Army being rejected, Captain McClellan resigned to become the chief engineer of the Illinois Central Railroad, of which he was a vice-president in 1860, when he resigned to accept the presidency of the Ohio and Mississippi Railroad. His Civil War record is too well known to require retelling. Suffice it to point out that his experience and skill in arms were put to use immediately after the firing upon Fort Sumter, at first in Ohio organizing the volunteers, and after the disaster at Bull Run in command of the troops at Washington. His experience at home and abroad taught him the need of thorough preparation as a preliminary to battle, but his methods proved too slow for an impatient people. He was deposed in favor of General Pope, who led the Union troops to defeat in a second Bull Run. After Lee's invasion of Maryland, McClellan was again called to organize the disrupted army, but in 1862 he was superseded by General Burnside, which so angered him that he took no further part in the war. In August, 1864, he was nominated for the Presidency and received a vote of 1,800,000 to 2,000,000 cast for Lincoln. General McClellan went abroad for the remainder of the war, returning in 1868 to take charge of the Department of Docks of New York, with a home in New Jersey. Nationally and internationally known, his was a name to conjure with in the politics of a State whose total population was far less than the number of votes he had received for the Presidency of the United States.

McClellan's inauguration was so largely attended by notables from all over the country that it had to be held outside the State House. He had back of him—the first Governor to be so blessed since 1870—a Legislature which was Democratic in both branches. Great things were expected from a great man and a complete party control of both Houses. The results were disappointing. So much time was given to partisan politics that little was accomplished of permanent legislation. The Governor and the Senate never could agree and McClellan's appointments nearly always met with opposition. The Assembly, not satisfied with the gerrymander which had put the Democrats in office, devised one so bad that it displaced them the following year. An act was passed disfranchising college students, for then as in later years, the young men of the country were inclined to become Republicans in their political faith. Much time was wasted in the Legislature in the arraignment of the Keeper of the State Prison on charges of inhuman treatment of prisoners, the death after torture of one of the inmates being made the occasion. Nothing was done about it, however. The first year of McClellan's administration was saved from utter failure by the belated passing of laws which reduced the taxes nearly a half; fixed the legal rate of interest at six instead of seven per cent.; the making of bribery in elections illegal; and, what is interesting, if not important, the predecessor of modern primary laws was placed on the records. The bribery and primary laws lacked teeth and became dead letters. Not until the early years of the present century did Jersey begin serious experimenting with election laws.

The Legislature of 1879 was the reverse of that of the previous year as regards its political complexion. It may have been darker and more than skin deep in the eyes of the ousted party, with two men admittedly connected with the Pennsylvania Railroad Company as heads of both Houses; Schuyler B. Jackson being chosen Speaker of the Assembly and General William J. Sewell President of the Senate. The Legislature did things, however: McClellan's hands were even more securely tied by the Senate, which continued to reject his nominations. The Republican majority, none too hopeful of retaining that majority at future sessions, started a raid upon what they believed was one of the chief material resources of their opponents, the large sums of money paid in the State to the State House triumvirate, Kelsey, Little and Lee. The fee system was then in force in many of the State offices. Only recently had the Governorship been taken out of the fee class, and the previous Governor had refused to tell the Legislature how much he received. "The Secretary of the State, Kelsey's office, was reputed to be worth \$25,000 a year. Ex-Senator Henry S. Little, who had become Clerk of the Court of Chancery, was said to be in receipt of \$30,000 a year. Supreme Court Clerk Benjamin F. Lee was understood to have a more than comfortable income from his office." (Sackett.) The situation was amply ventilated in Legislature and press, but the attempt to place the offices on a salary basis failed. The amount of fees charged were reduced about a third by a series of acts.

Laws were passed establishing industrial schools in New Jersey. A normal school was opened at Newark. Two commissions were appointed by the Governor, one to suggest methods of codifying the tax laws, the other to frame a general law for the government of cities; and there was an attempt made to improve the militia system. The State Agricultural School and Rutgers' Scientific School were made one, in 1880, and granted State support. An amendment looking to biennial sessions of the Legislature was voted down. That the reports of the two commissions led to nothing was unfortunate, but the fact of their selection indicated which way the wind was blowing in politics. The direct occasion of the City Government Commission was the bankruptcy of Elizabeth and Rahway, the result of systematic looting by dishonest officials. Jersey City was on the brim of a like ruin. Garret A. Hobart, then a Senator from Paterson, introduced an act which became a law, which should have been a splendid weapon in the hands of the people to fight and prevent such situations, but for some reason was seldom used. The law authorized the examination by experts of the books of city and county officials at any such time as twenty-five freeholders should demand in the Circuit Court an investigation.

When the time came, in 1880, that a candidate for Governor must be nominated, it seemed that the stage had at last been set for a capture of the gubernatorial chair by a Republican. This party "could point with pride" to the fact that Republican Legislatures had so reduced the State expenditures that by 1880 no State tax need be laid; that it had made unchecked looting of cities impossible; the introduction of an act providing for the arbitration

of labor disputes; and a number of other betterments in government. What was of greater import was the disruption of the Democratic leadership growing out of the rise of the Abbett faction and the waning powers of the State House bosses. Most important of all was the apparent alignment of the railroads with the Republicans. Frederic A. Potts, Senator from Hunterdon, one of the ablest men in his party, was named by acclamation to head their ticket. To Senator Garret A. Hobart, whose political career began some ten years earlier had been one of continual progress, was committed the conduct of the canvass of the State. Hobart at this time was almost a professional "Receiver" of Jersey railroads; Potts was a large and influential stockholder of the Jersey Central Railroad—this company usually backed Democratic candidates; while the Pennsylvania, with General Sewell, were old Republican standbys; other corporations were favorable since Leon Abbett was the logical candidate of the other side, and Abbett had showed himself definitely in favor of taxing railroads and corporations and people on an equal basis, a situation which the larger corporations had fought against for years.

Political Strategy of Leon Abbett—If clouds appeared in the Democratic sky all was not black. The very conditions which forced a combination of the railroads and other corporations were to the advantage of their opponents, for the ordinary taxpayers and voters had become exceedingly restive under the burdens borne in the maintenance of their home towns, from which load the shoulders of the corporations were comparatively free. The anti-monopoly sentiment, which so soon was to rise to so great an outburst, was ready to swing to the aid of anyone who could break the shell which restrained it. Abbett was the man who could do this, but the lion was no longer roaring, unready to move to the attack. Since the death of his wife, a charming if ambitious lady, he had become somewhat indifferent to politics. Yet it seemed likely that despite his apathy he might be compelled to run for office because of the popular demand. This did not suit the State House coterie, who had fought Abbett to defeat in the previous convention; neither did it please the magnates to have Orestes Cleveland thrust upon them, even if he had been their aid in depriving Abbett of the gubernatorial chair. With Abbett out of the way, Cleveland stood the best chance of being the Democratic nominee for Governor. When his name was placed before the convention, held in 1880, he had enough pledged delegates to secure the nomination. Senator George C. Ludlow was the choice of the State House set.

Abbett stirred himself when he perceived that his arch enemy was surely going to succeed where he had failed and did the unexpected. He allied himself with Kelsey and his group and, under the solemn promise that under no circumstances would he accept the nomination, was chosen by the coterie to preside at the convention. He probably did not realize the pressure which would be brought to bear on him to accept the nomination when he was compelled to face the enthusiasm of the delegates, but he held to his pledge.

and as chairman ruled with a rod of iron, also with much guile. He would let none but delegates have seats, which shut out the professional makers of enthusiasm and noise. Amid a bedlam of protests, Chairman Abbett ruled that the preference of each delegate must be recorded, thus splitting up the units pledged to Cleveland. There seems little doubt that Orestes Cleveland received a majority of the votes on the first ballot, but Abbett announced that "the secretaries had found an error in the tally," and insisted that another ballot be taken. A thousand voices roared in protest, but in vain. A fourth vote nominated George Craig Ludlow, Senator from Middlesex County, corporation counsel, attorney for the Pennsylvania Railroad.

The convention in which Abbett, almost single-handed, sidetracked Orestes Cleveland, was somewhat typical of the system through which the "people" expressed their choice of men for high office. The manner in which one railroad man was nominated to oppose another so that the power of each corporation upon election day might be nullified, was also characteristic of that day. It is noteworthy that the railroads were so dominant a force in politics that two men in its employ were nominated for the gubernatorial office and a third, General William J. Sewell was, during the next year, elected to the United States Senate. In the election which followed the recrudescence of Abbett and the naming of Ludlow, the Republican Potts seemed certain of being swept into office. When the ballots had all been cast, the first count showed a plurality for Ludlow of 251 from a total cast of nearly one-quarter of a million. A later count brought the plurality up to 651, probably the narrowest margin by which a Jersey Governor was squeezed into the chair. There were claims of fraud, but both parties feared the irregularities a recount might disclose. Potts believed that the Pennsylvania, after persuading him to stand for office, had failed him. Perhaps he knew of a visit made by Henry Kelsey, on the day before election, to the office of Alexander J. Cassatt, from which visit he came with a broad smile on his face like that of a cat which had swallowed a canary.

If the railroad was false to its nominee, Potts, it was to suffer for it in legislation which was begun while Ludlow was Governor, which the latter refused to veto, and in his thoroughly unexpected vetoes of some of the corporations' pet measures. One bill in particular slipped through the Legislature which, under the pretense of giving aid to a railroad in the settlement of certain litigation, carried a provision which made it forever impossible for the city of Jersey City to complete streets over all land made by filling in beyond the old water line. As a henchman of Abbett's Allan L. McDermott remarked "the bill was intended to build a Chinese wall about Jersey City." Passed by both Houses this bill was put up to Governor Ludlow to put his signature upon the document to make it effective. He made it clear that he would not approve the steal. Neither cajolery nor temptation, persuasion or threat, could make him change his attitude. He sent back the act to the two Houses, vetoed. Only the disclosure of attempted bribery and the investigation of the disclosure, so delayed the passage of the bill over this veto, that

the fixed time for adjournment arrived and the session ended without action by the Assembly. Only five in the Senate had stood by the Governor.

Ludlow, as we have seen, backed by the Ring and Leon Abbett, had been nominated and elected the Chief Executive of the State. One of his first acts was to nominate Kelsey as his Secretary of State, only to have this reappointment refused by the Senate. The Governor simply appointed Kelsey *ad interim* and waited until the Senate of 1882 gave its approval; the nomination of Lee was confirmed at the same time. The "Ring" was showing signs of disintegration. Lee had become an opportunist, shifting his allegiance readily and often. His control of so large a following in the southern part of the State still made that allegiance valuable. When United States Senator McPherson stood for reelection, in 1883, Lee refused to join Kelsey and Little in their fight against the Senator, and Kelsey left the losing battle mainly up to Little. Later when Leon Abbett's name was suggested for the Democratic nomination for Governor, Little was the only member of the triumvirate who continued the fight against him, nor did he desist throughout the State campaign which followed the nomination.

With Lee lying low, and relation strained between Kelsey and Little, the Ring was in no position to dominate Democratic counsels in 1886, when a successor to Abbett must be elected. Kelsey and Little made what was to be their last political alliance with the intent of making Rufus Blodgett, superintendent of the New York and Long Branch Railroad, Governor. Kelsey's term as Secretary of State was about to end and he must see to it that he be reappointed. Little had long since resigned his office and only after much persuasion joined Kelsey. Meanwhile the Abbett-McPherson alliance had fixed upon one Robert S. Green as the future Governor, and by a coup, similar to that by which Abbett had brought about the nomination of Ludlow in a convention which had a majority for Orestes Cleveland, Green was nominated. It was not this defeat which shattered the State House autocracy, but the manner in which it had been brought about. Kelsey, convinced by Lee that he would be appointed to his secretaryship, proceeded to knife his associates of so many years by secretly swinging delegates under his control to Green. It was the end. Little withdrew from politics except for an occasional raid when he would create dismay by his high-handed methods. Kelsey became identified but with a greatly weakened influence, with his former enemies. Lee had already joined the Abbett-McPherson ranks. With the dissolution of the State House Ring, the other wing of the party dominated Jersey Democracy until it was overwhelmed in 1895 by the Republicans. The State House autocracy was the first of the machines which became a feature of Jersey politics. It was an uncomplicated and loosely organized affair as compared with the machine created by Abbett or the military type of organization commanded by James Smith, Jr., but was long-lived and effective.

Ludlow Administration—Returning to Governor Ludlow and his administration, and we are confronted with the oft-repeated situation of a capable Governor struggling through three years with hands tied. He was

uncompromisingly honest, wise in his judgments, stern in courage, but aside from the stand he took in opposition to the flood of railroad bills which almost submerged the Legislature during his régime, his leadership accomplished very little. The Riparian Commission had its hands strengthened in its endeavors to protect one of Jersey's possessions. During the second session (1882) women were made eligible to serve as school trustees, probably the entering wedge of the sex into political office. Laws were passed making it possible for each town to have a free public library. Cities were divided into four classes, which made the administration of their affairs simpler, and their relations to the State government more clearly defined. In his last year in the chair, Governor Ludlow appointed a Council of State Charities and Correction. He left office undeservedly discredited within his own party, hated by the politicians, soon to be disciplined by the corporations he had antagonized. George Ludlow was ostracized in his law practice, and cast aside politically until 1895, when he was appointed Justice of the Supreme Court.

If the political history of New Jersey revolved for two decades after the Civil War about the State House Ring, that until the Democrats lost control of the State in 1896 centers upon Leon Abbett. Just what manner of man he was is still a question often debated. A native of Philadelphia, born October 8, 1836, he became a lawyer in 1858, settled in Hoboken the following year, and was soon drafted for political duty as a stump speaker for General McClellan during his candidacy for the Presidential office. In 1865 Abbett was elected to the Assembly to represent Hoboken and Jersey City, making his home in the latter city from 1866 until his death, December 4, 1894. He was a member of the State Legislature during 1865-66 and 1868-70; Speaker of the House, 1869-70; State Senator, 1874-77; Governor of New Jersey, 1884-87 and 1890-93; was twice refused nomination for United States Senator, and finally was appointed a Judge of the Supreme Court. His name has appeared on these pages because of his frequent clashes with the powers that were in his party, his hold upon the voters as a "Representative of the People," and his stand upon the question of equal taxation, particularly as it affected the railroads. He had been in line for the Governorship and United States Senator for several years, but had stepped aside willingly and otherwise, that others might be so honored.

In 1883 the Republican convention named Judge Jonathan Dixon as their nominee for Governor. There were nine candidates before the Democratic convention of that year, the number being due to a frantic desire of the party to find some way out of the inevitable—the selection of Leon Abbett, opponent of the Ring, of the railroads, and of all non-tax paying corporations. The Republican platform had endorsed with vigor equal taxation and the control of "oppressive monopolies"; Democracy had been hardly less emphatic in its advocacy of equalizing taxation "on all properties within the State whether that of individuals or corporations." Both parties knew that the campaign was to be waged on the question of corporation taxation, and those in power realized that Abbett stood out as the champions of such taxa-



SEA VIEW GOLF CLUB—ABSECON



MAPLEWOOD COUNTRY CLUB—MAPLEWOOD



BALTUSROL GOLF CLUB—SHORT HILLS



RUMSON COUNTRY CLUB—RUMSON

tion. The campaign which followed was of a whirlwind character, Abbett speaking with little rest, in all the four quarters of the State, preaching his doctrine and replying strongly to the many attempts to discredit him. He was elected with a plurality of 6,809 over Dixon, rather more than ten times that by which Ludlow had been eased into office.

Abbott's First Administration—The Governor went to the task at hand immediately, his inaugural address explaining his attitude towards the question of corporation taxation and suggesting ways and means by which this might be accomplished. His chief method seems to have been that of getting back, or the establishment of, the charters granted in former years by New Jersey, or if this proved impossible, to tax the charters, which in themselves were a valuable piece of property. To state this more in detail, as he did in his inaugural: After expressing himself as "opposed to any levy of a direct State tax," he suggested that this might be avoided, "first, by increasing the percentage of tax paid by the railroads on their roads, equipments and appendages; second, by subjecting the irrepealable franchises of the companies to taxation; third, by taxing other than railroad corporations, such as telegraph and telephone companies, gas, insurance and trust companies; fourth, by exacting license fees from foreign companies doing business in the State; fifth, by imposing a collateral inheritance tax."

There was nothing particularly new about the efforts made by and under Abbett to modify the laws and charters which gave certain special privileges to the railroads by which they avoided the payment of their just share of taxation. The question had come up every few years since 1872; Governor Ludlow made it a prominent feature of all three of his annual messages. The whole matter is a part of the "equal taxation" movement whose beginnings may be traced back to 1664, if one cares to, for in that long ago the "Grants and Concessions" made by Berkeley and Cartaret, power was given the General Assembly "to lay equal taxes and assessments, equally to raise money or goods upon all lands . . . or persons within the several precincts." The ideal and idea of equal taxation has been inherently a part of the New Jersey Constitution since its organization as a State, and the subject of legislation to the present day. One may sit in judgment upon Leon Abbett and condemn him as a thoroughly selfish, obstinate politician who did all sorts of venial things, but full appreciation must be accorded his tremendous service to New Jersey in exposing the true nature of the tax exemption privileges enjoyed by the railways, and their tremendous drain upon the finances of the State.

At the time of Abbett's inaugural, the total assessed valuation of all property in New Jersey was little more than half a billion dollars; the worth of the railroad property in the State was conservatively estimated at one-quarter of a billion dollars. The railroads' estimates were very much lower than this, but even at their own rating one-fourth of the value of all the property in New Jersey was exempt from local and county taxation, and this

exempted property belonged to the transportation systems. A third of the property of Jersey City could not be taxed, the value of that property thus exempted equalled the total valuations assessed in each of more than half the counties; it was four times the value of all the real estate, institutions, and personal property owned by the State. The railroads were receiving an involuntary subsidy equal to the interest on the whole of the public debt of the State, and New Jersey ranked fifth among the United States in the magnitude of its debt. But the public debt increased; New Jersey had exceeded all other states except one in the increase of its indebtedness during the passing decade. There were no great public works being carried on, the State lacked a hundred of the improvements which are now commonplaces; rigid economy was being practiced in governmental expenditures. The burden of taxation had become too heavy to be endured, and something had to be done to make the corporations bear their share of the burden. Ludlow, mildly, and Abbett, emphatically, led the foray upon the railroads.

Governor Ludlow during the closing weeks of his régime had induced the Legislature to appoint a joint committee to consider the matter of a railroad tax. Abbett fathered a definitely and comprehensive equal tax bill, which was passed by the Assembly, but which had no chance of getting by the Senate. Governor Abbett realizing this, gave his support to a committee bill, and signed it when passed, the important item of which assessed: "All real and personal property, including franchises at $\frac{1}{2}$ of 1% for the use of the State; all real estate outside of the main stem (which is legislated to be the road not exceeding one hundred feet in width and buildings thereon), is subject to an additional assessment for the use of the municipalities in which the property is found, at local rates not to exceed 1%. Personal property and franchise of these corporations are exempt from municipal tax." The act provided for the appointment by the Governor, with the consent of the Senate, of a State Board of Assessors to ascertain values and collect railroad moneys.

Before there was time for mutual felicitations upon the successful cornering of the railroads and to estimate the benefits to be derived by the State from the enforcement of taxation, the Central Railroad Company rushed into court claiming that the act was "special," in its application only to rail corporations, and therefore unconstitutional. The Erie and the Pennsylvania systems paid the taxes assessed against them for the first year on the agreement that the sums paid were to be returned if the Central was successful in its litigation. The case was tried before Chief Justice Beasley of the Supreme Court, during the November term of 1885, and the law declared unconstitutional and, therefore, inoperative. New Jersey's financial situation was thus rendered more difficult than ever, because it not only was prevented from collecting from the railroads, but must return the amounts paid by the Pennsylvania and Erie. These two systems made no demand for a refund, however, even going so far as to pay another year's taxes while awaiting the result of the appeal to the Court of Errors and Appeals. The decision of Justice Beasley was overruled and the act maintained.

As with many great battles there were skirmishes which attracted attention in this affray, the outstanding one being that carried on between the State and the Delaware, Lackawanna and Western Railroad, which refused to pay its assessment on the contention that the Supreme Court of the United States had ruled that the charter granted the company exempting it from local and State taxation was a contract which no Legislature had the right or the power to break. It was after the exposure of certain delinquencies on the part of the railroad whereby it had defrauded the State, and the threat of confiscation of its property, that the Delaware, Lackawanna and Western Railroad compromised by doing about everything which had been demanded. Great credit must be given to Assemblyman William H. Corbin, of Union, 1885-87, in bringing to a successful conclusion this skirmish with a recalcitrant railroad. The battle for "equal taxation" had been won, insofar as the transportation corporations were concerned; congratulations were in order. However many the attempts to tamper with the laws established during Abbett's administrations, agitation upon the equal tax question dwindled until its revival in the early years of the present century.

The various tax and railroad legislation somewhat overshadows the other achievements of government during Abbett's first term as Governor. Other progressive measures were passed by the Legislature of 1884, 1885, and 1886 for which credit was claimed by the Republican party since the Legislatures in question were wholly Republican, except the House of 1884. Laws were passed, in 1884, protecting labor from prison contract competition; acts forbidding cities to owe more than \$13,000,000, or to expend more than ninety per cent. of their tax levy; Civil War veterans were exempted from taxation. A State Board of Agriculture was organized, an agricultural fund of \$116,000 established; and one of the first endeavors to preserve the health of women employed in factories was embodied in a law. The outstanding actions of the Legislature of 1885 were, those forbidding railroad companies to lease lines without legislative consent; the extension of the geological survey for another five years; the opening of a State School for Mutes at Chambersburg. The session of 1886 expended a deal of time in the impeachment of a State Prison official, a friend of Abbett. Laws were passed covering the accession of drained land, and for the protection of the oyster and fishing industries. Just as the House was about to adjourn, fire destroyed the front of the State House, which was made the excuse for an attempt to remove the Capital to Newark. A bill introduced to this end was defeated by a vote of twenty-seven to twenty-five, and Trentonians breathed their first full breath for days and began, shortly after, to expend \$225,000 which had been voted for rebuilding the burned State House. The outstanding Democratic features of the legislation during Abbett's administration were, as indicated, the acts taxing the railroad and canal corporations, bills which were passed in the first year when the Democrats had a majority in the Assembly. Bills introduced providing for equal taxation in the Republican Legislatures of 1885 and 1886 were defeated.

In the gubernatorial campaign which followed the end of Abbett's first reign, much was made of this failure of the Republican controlled Legislatures to favor equal tax laws. Benjamin F. Howey was the Republican candidate for Governor in 1886; Robert Stockton Green was the Democratic nominee chosen by a political chicane similar to that which had been used by Abbett in outwitting his enemy, Orestes Cleveland. Rufus Blodgett, railroad man and level-headed politician, was in line for the nomination, but divided interests among the State House Ring led to the desertion by Kelsey at the last moment with the rejection of Blodgett as the candidate and the nomination of Green. As pointed out, this affair brought to an end the régime of the Ring.

The platforms of the two parties, in 1886, were rather more interesting than the nominees for the gubernatorial chair, in view of what was to occur within the near future. The Republicans claimed that it had "placed upon the statute books of the State most of the existing laws" favoring labor. They advocated arbitration, inspection of factories, regulation of the working hours of women and children, compulsory education and equal taxation. The platform advocated certain pure food laws, further protection of the fishing interests, a "non-partisan judiciary." It endorsed the submission to popular vote of the question of "the regulation, control, or prohibition of the liquor trade." All of which went to make up quite a liberal program for its day.

The Democratic platform was built around an approval of the administration of Governor Abbett, more particularly of the legislation which characterized it affecting taxation. The Governor was credited with saving the State the necessity of general taxation by shifting part of the burden to the hitherto exempt corporations. His efforts to protect labor from convict competition were applauded. Education for every child at public expense was demanded. The liquor question was discreetly left unmentioned, although it came up in the campaign which followed. When the votes were all counted Green had received 109,939, while Howey had secured 101,919, a Democratic plurality of 8,020. Meanwhile General Fiske, Prohibitionist, had accumulated 19,808 votes, the greatest number ever cast in the State, chiefly in those counties where the Republicans had made their greatest losses. It was easily recognized that the Prohibitionists held the balance of power in New Jersey, and that the rate of its rise was about equal to the Republican loss.

Governor Green was duly inaugurated, but in the political events of the next three years had little to say or do. Robert Stockton Green was a good old-fashioned regular Democrat, a lawyer, native of Princeton, who settled in Elizabeth just after his admission to the bar. He presided as judge in the Union County courts, was elected to Congress in 1884; became vice-chancellor immediately after his years as Governor, and in 1894 was appointed Judge of the Court of Errors and Appeals. He was born March 25, 1831, and died May 7, 1895.

Aside from certain local option measures, the outstanding laws of his

term as Governor were those establishing State Boards of Agriculture, Health, and Bureau of Vital Statistics; making Labor Day a legal holiday (1887); giving women the right to vote at district school meetings; the setting up of a State military camp at Sea Girt—all of these being acts of 1887. Very minor accomplishments marked the following year, unless exception is made of \$50,000 appropriated for the Old Soldiers' Home, and the opening of a home for the education of feeble-minded children. In 1889, a Legislature completely Democratic was so engaged in the building of political fences that few bills of a general character were considered, and only one worthy of note was passed, that which authorized all corporations, except railroads and canal companies, to increase their capital stock.

Governor Green's administration was not so unexciting or so little prolific of important results as the above list of enactments would suggest. There were political fights galore, wild and woolly legislatures which did and undid things with little rhyme and less reason. The temperance question dominated legislation and was to wreck more than one political future; fuses were lighted which almost exploded a party out of power. Governor Abbett's first effort to enter the United States Senate created the initial excitement. His term as Governor ended in January, 1887, as General Sewell's term as Senator wound up in March. Abbett expected to replace the general as a reward for his accomplishments as Governor. Although the Republicans controlled the Senate, twelve to nine, the Democrats had thirty-two regulars and two Labor Democrats to oppose twenty-six Republicans, so that it was fairly certain that Sewell would not go back to Washington. It so turned out that neither was Abbett to go to the Nation's Capitol; he had made so many enemies within and without his party, had so many monied interests against him that even his efficient political machine was not strong enough to force through his nomination. Only after two months of negotiation and fifteen ballots was a Senator named, and then only when the Republican group was made to realize that they must vote for a Democrat or have the neutral enemy Abbett chosen Senator. The switch was made, and the votes added to those of the Democratic malcontents sent Rufus Blodgett to the United States Senate. An angered but resourceful Abbett was left to lick his wounds and prepare for a new attack.

Two years later, 1889, it became necessary to elect another United States Senator, McPherson's second term having come to an end. Although ex-Governor Abbett had been the partner in the alliance which had sent McPherson to Washington, he now announced his candidacy for the office. Abbett had the backing of the powerful Baltimore and Ohio Railroad lobby, whose desire to bridge the Kills to Staten Island he favored. Quiet investigation disclosed a safe majority for Abbett if the caucus was allowed to meet and vote. It required skilled, if frantic, manoeuvring to delay matters and eventually to squeeze out enough votes to elect McPherson, who became the first Jerseyman ever to be honored with three terms in the United States Senate. It is doubtful whether Abbett hoped to be elected at this time over his erstwhile associate and political partner. His move was apparently a

dramatic gesture, a serving notice that his hat was still in the ring. Rather was he looking forward to 1893, when a successor to Blodgett must be chosen; the tilt with McPherson was but a warming-up bout in preparation for the greater battle.

Temperance Agitation—The notable legislation of Green's administration had to do with the temperance question, and the laws passed were illustrations of Republican ineptitude in the handling of public measures. That party, for the first quarter of a century of its activity in New Jersey, seemed always to take hold of the hot end of the poker when it tried to stir up trouble. Since a few years after the Civil War the temperance movement had been gaining momentum, and in 1877 had attained a strength which found outlet in a third party which polled less than 1,500 votes. In the gubernatorial campaign of 1880, the Prohibition vote dwindled to 195, and, as the modern phrase has it, "that was that." The women of the State became increasingly interested in temperance, however, not as a political issue so much as an humanitarian movement. Blue Ribbon societies, "Bands of Hope," various sorts of cold water clubs were organized, which activities were reflected in a vote of 4,153 in 1883, and nearly 20,000 in 1886, or almost ten per cent. of the total poll, and quite enough, if cast with the Republicans, to elect their candidate for almost any office.

Finding themselves in control of the Legislature of 1888, the Republicans made a play for this vote by introducing a bill which required the holding of a special county election, when a proportion of the voters so demanded, at which it could be decided whether saloons should be licensed. There were other provisions in the bill covering the question of the amount of the license (\$100 to \$250, according to the size of the section) and classing drinking places as disorderly houses, and punishable as such, if liquor were sold on Sunday. The act was rushed through both houses, the negative votes being wholly those of Democratic members. It was promptly vetoed by the Governor, only to be passed again and become a law.

The fat was in the fire and the temporarily dominant party was claiming all credit for putting it there. All the temperance organizations in the State rallied for the fight which was now inevitable and invaded the counties with proposals for special elections under the law. Strangely enough the politicians and voters of the larger cities ranged themselves alongside of the temperance workers, for the new high license rates promised to bring amazingly large and highly appreciated amounts into the treasuries; Jersey City and Newark were due to receive a quarter of a million dollars each, where never had more than ten thousand been collected from this source before. The liquor interests considered the law, however unpleasant and even insulting its features, only a passing affair which a new Legislature would wipe from the books. They were right in their conjecture, but they shivered in their shoes while waiting for the next Legislature to be elected and to act. And well they might! Before the summer was over Cumberland County had voted no saloon; Warren and Salem followed; then came Gloucester and even Cape

May with its summer hotels and joy places. Before the 1889 Legislature met, Hunterdon had gone over into the dry columns and the temperance folks had great hopes of swinging Hudson and Essex, with their populous centers, into line.

The State elections of 1888 were conducted strictly on for and against the "High License Local Option" lines, with the "State Liquor Dealers' Association," representing capital of millions of dollars, doing the separating of the sheep from the goats. The anti-temperance adherents were more active in the Democratic campaign than were other members of the party; the Republicans could not withdraw from the stand they had taken. There followed a mighty battle of the ballots, but when the dust lifted it was seen that the Democrats were in the majority in both Houses. Practically all action in the Legislature of 1889 was stopped while a bill was passed by both Houses, and signed by Governor Green, which repealed the High License Local Option Law, or at least the local option feature of it, and modified the clauses relating to the sale of liquor on Sunday. County elections could be held under similar conditions as had been authorized by the repealed law, but could determine only the minimum license fee to be assessed. The liquor interests did not gain all they desired, but the prohibition threat was thrust back and was kept at bay for many long years. The Republican politicians in the State had ditched their machine again, but somehow failed to learn that the liquor question was not one for the regular parties to handle. The outstanding result of this temperance uprising was the bringing of the liquor interests into State politics, where as an organized element it has remained an effective minority influence in legislation down to the last decade.

The 1889 Democratic legislation, however capable its personnel, was rabidly partizan, and undid most of the work, good and bad, of the two previous Legislatures. An Assembly gerrymander was created even less representative than that which in 1870 was passed by the Republicans, one which turned New Jersey over to the lowest grade of spoilsmen; even its own party organs declared that it "put the State into the grip of the Devil." George L. Record, who by the way accompanied Abbett on several of his trips as a speaker, during the second campaign for the Governorship, writes of this period as the "era of corruption." One of the last acts of the 1889 Legislature was the raising of the Governor's salary to \$10,000, or among the very highest in the United States.

The Republican platform in the gubernatorial campaign of that year was almost entirely given over to searing criticism of the Legislature which, according to it, had "flagrantly violated" the policy of local self-government in township, city and county. The Democrats were arraigned and charged with being "partizan, arrogant, and profligate," enacting laws redistricting the State, creating new charters for municipalities and establishing new offices "only after deals and promises of appointment made between legislative and executive branches of the State Government." The platform declared for "reformed election laws" to prevent fraud and false registration, and for "the purpose of establishing the Australian or other like system of voting."

Besides the usual claims and the reiteration of certain statements of legislation desired, the one contribution to the temperance movement which had so disrupted its counsels was the feeble remark that the Republican party stood "for purity, for temperance, and for the preservation of the home," and that it resented "the intrusion of the liquor power, as an organized force, into the politics of the State." General Sewell was master of the convention, but he had little to do with the nomination of General E. Burd Grubb, of Burlington, for Governor. It seems likely that Sewell counted the election as already lost, or, as the gossip of the time had it, he had made a deal with Abbett whereby the latter should not be effectually opposed for office if he dropped his agitation for increased railroad taxation. At any rate, the wealthy and brainy General Grubb polled a very heavy vote as far up as Hudson County, and might even have been elected had there been a recount of the votes cast for Governor in Hudson as there was of those cast for State Senator and Assemblyman.

Abbett's Second Term—The Democratic convention was all Abbett, he being nominated by acclamation. The platform adopted was a reaffirmation of that of 1886, which itself was a brief endorsement of Abbett's first administration. Local option was not mentioned, but ballot reform was advocated strongly. Abbett won by a plurality of 14,253, which was just a bit more than the unprecedented majority given him in Hudson County, which was, incredibly enough, just about the majority given to McDonald, the machine candidate for Senator, over William Stuhr, Independent Democrat and fusion candidate, whose election had been considered certain. When in January, 1890, Governor Abbett was reading his inaugural address, facing him on the balcony of the old Taylor Opera House, was a great banner on which was the boast, "Hudson, 13,515," recalling that wonderful majority. "The best sentiment of the country," read the Governor, "demands ballot reform and honest elections." Just then, so it is related, a vagrant breeze twisted the banner until only the number "13" was left exposed. "See," cried Senator and the next Governor Werts, "see how Abbett's majority shrinks as he advocates ballot reform?"

Whatever may have been the irregularities in connection with his elections, or the disgraceful character of much of his administration, Governor Abbett gave immediate attention to the passage of an act looking to the improvement of the methods of balloting, and Senator Werts, aided by Foster M. Voorhees, of Union, drew up what was called the Werts Ballot Reform Law, but which was later and better known as the Australian Ballot Law. "It incorporated the idea of an official ballot, issued to the election officers by the county or city officers, and of the closets at the booths in which voters are required to seclude themselves in the preparation of their ballots. It permitted only the parties which had polled a certain percentage of the total vote to file nominations made in convention; forced the less numerous parties to the expedient of putting their candidates forward by petition; and provided for the selection of poll attendants by the two predominant parties.

By surrounding the procurement of official ballots with obstructions, and depriving them of poll workers to handle the tickets after they had been secured, it discouraged the canvass of the smaller parties, and made independent party movement almost impossible. The Republicans hoped through it to crowd the Prohibitionists out of the polls; and the Democrats employed it with considerable effect to prevent threatened organized revolts against the ascendancy of the masters of the party." (Sackett, "Modern Battles of Trenton.") The Prohibitionists did test the law in the courts, but it was declared constitutional.

The uncanny coincidence of the figures of the Hudson "ring" nominee with those of Abbett's majority in the same county, were too unusual to be passed over in silence. The defeated Stuhr dropped a brick into Abbett's smooth working machine by protesting the seating of McDonald in the Senate, and creating such a disturbance that a committee was appointed to investigate the balloting in Hudson County. The facts disclosed by this investigation were appalling in evidencing a county-wide conspiracy against suffrage. As one after another as the ballot boxes were opened, proof of stupendous fraud piled up. There were fraudulent votes by the thousands, cast unseparated in bunches; in some boxes they were placed in alphabetical lots as though the voters had gone to the polls out of a directory. Registry books and poll books failed to agree; tally sheets bore little relation to the contents of the boxes. All the male cadavers in the graveyards had voted, and there were hundreds of names which lived only in the imagination. There had been intimidation around the polls; rascalities of every sort had been practiced. The Senatorial committee reported these facts and many others and computed that at least 10,000 more votes had been cast than there were voters. A well-known New Jersey legislator of today, who was getting his primary schooling in politics at the time of the stuffing of ballot boxes in Hudson, estimates that there were 13,000 "obviously fraudulent ballots" taken from boxes by the committee. "They were all for the Democratic candidate for Senator and also, presumably, were votes for Governor Abbett, although the investigating committee counted only the Senatorial votes. These fraudulent ballots were just about the majority by which Governor Abbett was declared elected." . . . "Nothing was ever done to impeach the vote by which the Governor was elected. After he took his seat he did nothing, as I now recollect, towards carrying out his pledge to further tax the railroads."

The recount showed Stuhr to have been elected Senator from Hudson and, therefore, he was seated in Senate the last day of the 1890 session. The first act of the 1891 Senate, which was Democratic two to one, was to oust the one-day Senator, and Mr. Stuhr's name comes down through history remembered for having served the shortest term ever granted a Senator of New Jersey. He had disturbed a deal of political mud, however, which was long in settling, and indirectly served his State well in bringing about an exposure of the corruption in politics then prevailing, which had a profound

influence upon the public sentiment of New Jersey, "and it marked the turning point of that era of corruption."

The indictments of the men responsible for the ballot frauds were secured only under the greatest difficulties, for these men were strongly intrenched behind backers with money to expend where it would accomplish the greatest results. Even when, under the pressure of public opinion, some sixty-seven men were indicted, every sort of foul tactics were employed to secure their acquittal, but only one escaped conviction. After interminable delays, numerous appeals, the most of the actual ballot box stuffers were sentenced to prison for terms running from a few months to a year and a half, only to secure pardons. The big men behind the frauds, the instigators, were for the most part left untouched, but had been frightened enough to make them play the game of politics with fewer crudities of methods, and less criminal fraud. The adoption of the Australian ballot system by the 1889 Legislature was one of the valuable by-products of the ballot scandals of that year. That law, by doing away with the old practice of permitting each party, or group of candidates, to print their own ballots, made the stuffing of ballot boxes very difficult. It marked the first real reform of ballot laws; "and to this can be traced the very remarkable law which was put upon our statute books in the first year of Governor Wilson's term" (Record).

Abbett's administration was notable among many other things for the quantity of its legislative acts. Executive power in New Jersey Government is lodged in the Governor; he is the principal State official chosen directly by the people and the one held responsible by the electorate for the proper management of State affairs. He can influence legislation by messages and otherwise, calls extra sessions, vetoes, pardons, suspends effects of legal decisions, can borrow money on the State's credit, is a member of many boards and the *ex-officio* president of numerous others. Yet there were very few of the governors of the nineteenth century who were genuine leaders of legislation, or even of their parties. Abbett was an exception. He *did* things, whether in his first term or his second. He was the party boss; he used his gubernatorial powers to their limits; he forced, when needs be, the passage of acts of which he approved; often he saw to it that bills passed by the Legislature should not be turned over to him until close to the end of the session so that there was seldom an opportunity given to override his veto. Abbett was fortunate in having legislatures which, with the exception of the first (1890) when the Republicans had a majority of one in the Senate, were overwhelmingly Democratic.

The ballot reform law was but one of the measures which he piloted through the legislative shoals to a safe harbor. The platform upon which his successor floated into office presented a long list of desirable statutes passed during the Abbett régime and receiving his approval. These embraced acts securing all sorts of benefits to labor, including a Saturday half holiday; acts creating sixty-five free scholarships in the State Agricultural College, acts establishing free public libraries and reading rooms. There were statutes

creating a State Board of Arbitration, a commissioner of mines, insuring secrecy of the ballot, incorporating trades unions, a legacy tax, and a law providing for permanent road improvements at State and county expense. Many kinds of boards were created such as those of public works governing the cities of first and second classes, State Board of Taxation, Superintendent of School Census, State Police, State and County Excise, Department of Banks and Insurance, Commission of Electric Subways, and numerous others. Contrarywise he vetoed such acts as the Coal Combine Bill—which combine was later forced to dissolve by order of the courts—and the Race Track License Bill. Moneys were granted, \$40,000 for new normal school buildings, \$25,000 for the Industrial School for Girls, \$25,000 for a cross State ship canal survey, \$25,000 for purchase and improvement of the military camp at Sea Girt.

Some of this was forward-looking legislation, something beyond the usual conservative measures. Much of it was not popular; there was much money to be expended, too many new officials appointed, or the ideas and powers conveyed were too novel. But Abbett later could point to the fact that the ideas worked, that the salaries of the new officials appointed by him totalled less than \$15,000, and that the expenses of the most of the departments established had been paid by the corporations whose activities they affected. No general State tax was levied during his administration, and in three years a floating debt of \$400,000 had been entirely paid, this in addition to the quarter of a million dollars spent at the State military camp. Attention was drawn to the fact that total State receipts for 1892 were less than two million dollars, and that through legislative action initiated and supported by the Governor, railroad property which practically had escaped taxation for years, was now (1892) assessed at \$216,000,000 and paid taxes upon that amount.

Abbett's opponents, particularly those of the party which was now very completely the under dog, could see no good thing in anything that the Governor stood for, or in what he accomplished. All that he did was acclaimed as being done for his own personal benefit; and that all legislation passed, even if useful and necessary, was passed for no good purpose. To paraphrase from William Sackett, who gave the most permanent publicity to the picture of Leon Abbett as a venal, utterly selfish politician who rode Jersey Democracy a long way on its road to a most disastrous fall, the portrait of a rule or ruin autocrat who in his second term as Governor did not one deed meriting approval: Abbett forced the 1891 Legislature to put all State functions into the Governor's hands, and the Legislature of the following year to give him control of localities as well. In 1891 he created the office of Banking and Insurance Commissioner to secure far-reaching powers over corporations. (Abbett is accused of producing the office of Banking Commissioner (1883) as a sinecure for Colonel George Harvey.) A State Tax Board was given power to scrutinize the business affairs of any taxpayer. A State Board of Assessors, whose duty it was to make up the tax bill for the railroads, was made subservient to the Governor. The State Riparian Board was compelled

to consult him about leases. The State Lunatic Asylum's managers were discharged and a new board appointed by Abbett. The managements of the State Prison, the Boys' Reform School and the Girls' Industrial School were changed to the Governor's liking. He was even authorized to draw money from the State Treasury for any public purpose he judged fit. In order to have control over the police in labor difficulties he created a State Chief of Police with power to draw posses from the municipal police anywhere in the State. To get the liquor men to stand with him he persuaded the Legislature to establish county excise boards wherever desired, which were intended to have the power to grant licenses in localities where such licenses had been refused by the local boards. One act turned the District Court judges out of office so that the Governor could appoint a new set. Another act shoved three police commissioners on both Jersey City and Newark.

To continue further from Sackett: The 1892 Legislature put local government into Governor Abbett's hands. The managements of Essex and Hudson counties, being pleasing to him, the terms of the freeholders were extended. Other counties were reached by vacating seats in the Board of Freeholders and electing their successors in the gerrymandered districts. When these new officials did not please the Governor another act was passed throwing the new men out of their jobs. Then the cities were attacked. Jersey City was in line, but Newark was not and could not at first be brought into line because of its elective common council which reigned supreme. The difficulty was got around by the creation of a new department, the Street and Water Board, appointed by the mayor, which took over practically all the important functions of civic government. Second-class cities could easily have been controlled by placing their management in the hands of the mayor, but as some of these mayors were Republicans, such as that of Camden, one of the last acts of the 1892 session was the passing of a bill which gave a police board, named by the Governor, the dominancy in city affairs.

Then there was the notorious and rather absurd gerrymander by which, in 1892, forty-two seats in the Assembly were elected by 113,084 voters and only eighteen went to 98,534 Republicans. There was also the "Coal Combine Bill," by which several large railroads sought legislative authority to combine with the intent of controlling the delivery of coal to New York City, and supposedly with a coincident increase in price. Abbett and his lieutenants certainly brought pressure to bear upon the Legislature to get the measure passed—and then he vetoed it, much to the disgust and wrath of some of the honest men who had fought for the bill. There was also a race track bill intended to help the famous Long Branch track to function, and Abbett switched his favor to veto this measure.

The declarations in the Republican platform in 1893 repeat in more dignified but partizan terms the accusations against Abbett and his administration. It charged Democracy with legislation making the Legislature and the courts subservient to the executive department; with abolishing home rule in the municipalities; with multiplying public offices and increasing salaries; with the appointment of public officers for a stated consideration to be paid

to the party campaign fund; with indiscriminate use by the Governor of pardoning powers; with wastefulness in State expenditures; with creating "unnecessary boards for partizan purposes," investing them with arbitrary powers, and placing them beyond the control of the people by making their term of office subject to the will of the Governor; with countenancing "race track gambling with all its attendant evils"; and with destroying "the right of suffrage by false registry, ballot box stuffing, and fraudulent count of votes."

Such is the rather sketchy picture of both sides of the Abbett shield, a summary of the activities of three very busy years in Jersey politics. Like most such affairs all of the truth is not to be found on one side, neither all of the good. However cautious one should be in imputing motives to others, there can be no mistake in stating that Leon Abbett intended to be the successor of Rufus Blodgett in the United States Senate. He was the political strong man of Jersey Democracy and had effaced himself, willingly and otherwise, in the selection of other and less able men to high office. He had been the balance of power which had kept the Democratic party in control in the partial betterment of the State and its finances. He now insisted upon having his reward. He had built up a political machine upon the model of that then, and later, used so successfully by James Smith, Jr., in Essex County. He had surrounded himself with capable lieutenants, of whom Smith was one; Benjamin Lee, his former opponent, was another; and had others in all the strategic centers of the State. Allan L. McDermott had been his right hand man from the beginning. The enormous power and patronage which was his as the Chief Executive was to furnish the activating force of the machine. It was a fine scheme, one embodying every element for success.

There was something of the Dr. Jekyll-Mr. Hyde about Leon Abbett's frank going after what he wanted, in his being at one time the beneficent reformer and at another the greedy boss. One must either consider him somewhat of a reformer or lacking in political acumen in his advocacy of certain important and politically unpopular measures, in his siding with one group of corporations at one stage of the game and with their opponents at other times, in the making of enemies or friends, in the permission of legislation which became dangerous boomerangs. He created a strong element in opposition to his ambitions when he vetoed the race track bill. His veto of the "Coal Combine" measure, a courageous and righteous deed, was really an act of political treachery which made him bitter enemies in the very circles upon which he must depend for his political future. Several of his most progressive pieces of legislation were politically unsafe, or worse, for one supposed to have no other thought than the getting to Washington by hook or crook. Consider how Abbett held the Jersey delegation for Joel Parker in a national convention which favored Tilden for the Presidency; and did likewise in opposition to Cleveland's nomination, in 1884, against the overwhelming sentiment of Democracy in his own State and the country at large. Abbett was no fool; why not credit him with some good moments when he

did a few things that were worth the while? Why not concede that he may have been something of a statesman as well as a politician? It surely is worthy of more than a passing thought that so many of the innovations brought by Leon Abbett in Jersey's governmental affairs were retained so long after he and his party were completely out of power.

Abbett went out of office before the time had arrived to choose a United States Senator, and none more than the Governor procured the election of his successor, Judge Werts, as the Executive of New Jersey. As the days approached when the Legislature should go into caucus for the choice of a National Senator, everywhere the name of the ex-Governor was mentioned as the man who would replace Blodgett. A few weeks after Werts' election, at a banquet held in celebration, he arose and hailed Leon Abbett as the next United States Senator from New Jersey. This was evidence that the slowly constructed machine was ready to do its work and, if it proved to be in order, no one had a chance to win from the ex-Governor. At last he was to receive the reward for his long and truly great service of his party.

The one other name mentioned was that of James Smith, Jr., the close political associate and friend of Abbett. Mr. Smith's machine had failed to function very well in the recent election, Essex, for example, having given a majority for Cleveland in the national election, while Werts was receiving a minority as the Democratic nominee for Governor. Whatever the reason Mr. Smith needed a rest and went South to get it. The political enemies of Abbett gathered in Smith's absence and determined to declare for the absentee. When the latter was sent word and asked whether he would be a candidate, he was still too weary to give a definite reply. Upon his return, however, finding that the political situation had so changed that the ex-Governor stood small chance of winning the honor he coveted, the gentleman from Newark agreed to have his name brought before the caucus. All the rest was mere formality, and James Smith, Jr., went to the United States Senate. Abbett was bitterly disappointed. This disappointment was not assuaged by the necessity of standing aside while the popular Job H. Lippincott, he who in the ballot box stuffing prosecutions "showed an inflexible honesty and withstood such a tremendous pressure by the Democratic politicians, and counteracted their actions with a standard so far above the usual standard of the day," was given, what might well have been a consolation prize, an appointment to the bench of the Supreme Court. A few weeks later, the ex-Governor also was appointed an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court and proved as capable in the discharge of his new duties as he had been in his political activities. A few months after a short illness, which was but the climax of an incurable disease which had been gnawing at his vitality for years, Leon Abbett died.

CHAPTER XLV.

CLOSING YEARS OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY.

The legacy left to New Jersey Democracy by the Abbett régime was that of a machine which had been falling to pieces before it had accomplished the purpose for which it had been built, inter-party enmities which must prove ruinous if not immediately checked, and the discontent of an electorate and of an out-of-power officialdom which is the usual result of a complete control of legislation by any one group of politicians. This came, too, at a time when there was a Nation-wide restlessness and desire for change which, within a few years, was to bring about an upheaval which would disrupt all parties and bring to the top those which had been submerged. Signs of such an upheaval in New Jersey were not lacking when the candidates for Governor were named in 1892, although John Kean, Jr., was nominated by the Republicans after but two ballots, and it took but one to name George T. Werts as the standard bearer of the Democrats. The latter had been appointed to the Supreme Court, in 1892, possibly because Abbett thought it wise to have a less independent man as the State Executive during that period which must elapse between the end of his own term and his projected nomination for United States Senator. But even more feared men were being proposed for the Governorship, such as Edward F. C. Young, later an arch-enemy, and the redoubtable Judge Lippincott. Governor Abbett preferred Werts to either of these and persuaded the judge to resign his assured and dignified position to make a try for the gubernatorial nomination. In the caucus the vote was close, but Werts was nominated. He had a worthy opponent in the wealthy, influential Kean, who had proven his ability as a campaigner by repeated winnings of a seat in the Congress from a district which was normally Democratic.

In the campaign which followed, Kean and his cohorts tried to keep it local, or Jersey, in its scope: the "crimes" of Democracy during its two-year reign being the object of attack. Instead of bothering greatly to reply to these attacks, Jersey Democracy tied its campaign to that of the national party. Grover Cleveland had been renominated for President and was certain to receive a majority in New Jersey. He was even induced to make a speech in the State, whereby he seemingly gave approval to the ambition of the Werts cohorts. When the count was completed Cleveland had received 171,066 votes to his opponent's 156,101, and Werts had been given 167,257 as compared to 159,362 for Kean. Werts had fallen sufficiently behind the Presidential vote in the State, and Kean had so managed to run ahead of that given Benjamin Harrison, that the plurality by which Werts was made Governor was only half the one piled up by the national ticket.

Governor Werts has already been introduced in previous paragraphs as the author of the ballot law based on the Australian system, of an act

which revised the high license and local option laws, and as a judge in the Supreme Court. He had been prominent in politics for a number of years, elected to both Assembly and Senate, serving (1889) as President of the latter body. He was a friend of McPherson, aiding in his election to the United States Senate in 1889; was a sometime opponent, but chiefly follower of Leon Abbett; the father of the act which doubled the salary of the Governor a week or so before Abbett was inaugurated. Regular as a Democrat, he introduced the resolution whereby the single day career of William Stuhr (Independent) was brought to an untimely end. One who knew him writes of Governor Werts as "genial, courteous, approachable, entertaining, a man of infinite humor, full of quip and jest and anecdote . . . he had those shining social qualities that attract men."

There rode into the Legislature on the coat tails of Grover Cleveland and Governor Werts a most impressive Democratic majority, if only numbers are considered. The Abbett machine, or rather its parts, had again been successful, but with the better element hanging back, too many whose thirst for loot had been but wetted by the graft of two full-flowing years, filled the seats in the State House. Robert Adrian, notorious in his Presidency of the Senate, was reëlected for the second time. Thomas Flynn, a starter on a race track, and a stormy petrel (or perhaps "vulture" is the word), in State Democracy, was chosen Speaker of the Assembly. Thus was served warning to the State that the mismanagement, the grafting, the debauchery of the last few years, with no Abbett to help hold the Legislature in check, was to be raised to the Nth degree. Neither Governor Werts nor any other man could have prevented the débâcle of 1893; only the electorate could prevent further legislative excesses, and even this only at the cost of tremendous watchfulness and activity.

Race Track Gambling—Of the waste and graft and uselessness of the 1893 Legislature little need be written at this late date. About the only enactment of permanent value was one which made the selling of milk and newspapers on Sunday legal. The outstanding legislation was the passing of three bills by the "horsey" Legislature favoring race track gambling, all of which were vetoed by the Governor, only to have the vetoes overridden. The story of Jersey's race tracks, and the part they played in legislation, is rather too lengthy to be condensed within a few paragraphs. Horse racing had been fashionable since pre-Revolutionary times, and the Monmouth track, near Long Branch, was, in the 1880's one of the three most famous in the United States. While gambling, particularly betting, was illegal in New Jersey, the laws were but lightly enforced. The Monmouth course, with its summer racing, had become so successful that it had competitors and prior to 1891 race tracks had been established at Guttenberg and Gloucester which were kept open the year 'round contrary to the sentiment which kept the eyes of the law closed to its infractions during the summer season. These two tracks, although the races upon them were travesties of honest running, were extremely profitable both to their owners and the political rings paid to pro-



VICTORY BRIDGE, LOOKING TOWARD PERTH AMBOY



HOLLAND TUNNEL

The New Jersey-New York line is under the middle of the river

tect them. The attempts, by the application of almost forgotten laws, to shut down on these resorts of the crooked, only reacted to the closing of the Monmouth track to the utter discontent of the seaside crowds and the neighborhood which profited both from the crowds and less directly from the track.

In 1891 Parker, of Monmouth, tried to secure legislation which would permit the course in his county, which had been closed, to open without the danger of having its betting booths classed as "disorderly houses," as the law read, and, therefore, subject to being raided and the inmates jailed and fined. The fines were infinitesimal, but the publicity was too vulgar for a fashionable resort. But the bill introduced also gave a like immunity to all other tracks in the State where the disgrace of an arrest would attract little attention. The act slipped through both Houses without stirring more than a ripple or two. Governor Abbott delayed consideration of the bill, and is rumored to have sent word to certain individuals who were opposed to gambling, informing them of just what this measure meant both as to the legalizing of gambling and the probable increase in the number of race tracks operating within the State. At once an Anti-Race Track League was formed, with Reverend Doctor Kempshall, a minister of Elizabeth, at its head, which with others interested "persuaded" the Governor to append his veto to the bill.

The "Jockey Legislature" of 1893 was determined to secure some permanent legislation permitting gambling on horse racing by hook or crook, by gentle measures or force. First came a bribe in the form of an offer to contribute half of the gate money taken in at the race tracks—that were four by now—to the State, if betting be allowed. It was dropped as a propaganda and an enactment when it proved to be unpopular. Then three bills were introduced, one permitting the authorities of a county or town to license a race track located within its limits, a second which declared that a race track where bets were made did not come under the category of a disorderly house, and third, imposing the lightest of fines upon those who violated the anti-gambling laws then on the statute books. They were rushed through the Legislature and sent to Governor Werts, who vetoed them. Before the anti-gambling forces could be collected in sufficient numbers to make an impressive demonstration, the House and Senate reënacted the measures over the veto, by practically the same vote as originally cast. In view of what occurred later, it seems unlikely that any early emphatic expression of public sentiment could have prevented the placing of these three laws upon the books.

The reform element in the State flamed into action. Anti-gambling leagues or similar organizations were founded all over New Jersey and sent their delegates by the scores on to Trenton to plead for or demand repealing measures be introduced before the three bills could be made use of by those who had secured their passage. They swarmed into the Assembly Chamber and held a session despite the boast of Speaker Flynn that never would they be admitted. The net result was the appointment of a notable commission

which urged before a committee of the House that the "repealers" to the iniquitous laws, then in the hands of the said committee, be reported upon to the Assembly. The bills never emerged, for the committee had been appointed to prevent just such an untoward happening.

The race tracks had won. The owners of the tracks made application to the places wherein their courses were located for licenses. Passaic was persuaded to grant the desired permission to Clifton; the almost unknown town of Guttenberg did likewise for the track bearing that name. Gloucester City gave Thompson, of the Gloucester course, the right to go ahead, and Linden was almost ready to do so when other political scandals forced the township officials to hunt cover. The rambling hamlet of Eatontown licensed the biggest of the tracks, Monmouth. Obscure spots in New Jersey became famous for a brief period all over the United States. The tale of how a hurricane of votes swept clean from the political map the race track legislation and the men who promoted it, is the story of but a few months later. The conclusion of the race track matter was marked by an amendment to the State Constitution adopted September 28, 1897, by a vote of 70,443 to 69,642, a majority of but 801. That amendment reads:

No lottery shall be authorized by the Legislature or otherwise in this State, and no ticket in any lottery shall be bought or sold within this State, nor shall pool-selling, book-making or gambling of any kind be authorized or allowed within this State, nor shall any gambling device, practice, or game of chance now prohibited by law be legalized, or the remedy penalty, or punishment now provided therefor be in any way diminished.

Democracy, or the "Abbott Régime" as unfairly it has been called, had sown the wind and was now ready to reap the whirlwind. The political machine proved futile against a storm of ballots; even the gerrymander of 1892 was an ineffectual barrier. The vote of late 1893 for State officials revealed an unprecedented Republican majority of nearly 30,000; never had Jersey so overwhelmingly repudiated its legislators. The gerrymander which, in the previous year, had been effectual in securing an Assembly consisting of thirty-nine Democrats and twenty-one Republicans, failed to prevent a complete reversal by which the Republicans controlled the House by exactly similar figures. In the Senate, as finally organized, the complexion was changed from one overwhelmingly Democratic (sixteen to five), to one in which the opposite party had a majority of one. In 1895 the Republicans controlled the Senate by exactly the numbers of 1893 reversed. Only once in the thirty-seven years since this upheaval has Jersey Democracy been so overwhelmingly in control of both Houses, 1913, when it held the Senate twelve to nine, and the Assembly fifty-one to eight. It again had majorities in both Houses, 1911 and 1914, but aside from these and 1907, when for one term there was a Democratic majority in the House of two, New Jersey Legislatures have always been Republican.

The uprising of the electorate, while a fitting rebuke of ballot box

stuffing, bossism, the looting of municipalities and State, attempted steals and race track domination, reflected other and more general resentments. The working man was restless and much was heard of the conflict between labor and capital. The word "trust" was on men's tongues, and corporations and corruptions were somehow used as synonymous. And by the way, the first declaration in New Jersey party platforms against "trusts" was in that of 1889 upon which Abbett was elected. The panic of 1893 reacted, as a business depression usually does, against the party in power. True, President Cleveland was given a fine majority in that year, but when next there was a Presidential election, McKinley received a plurality in New Jersey more than half as large as the total vote cast for Cleveland. Incidentally, United States Senator Smith, by aiding some of his colleagues in the mutilation of a Democratic Tariff Bill, had contributed to the splitting up of his party in the State. To be brief, the reaction which had upset the political situation in New Jersey was both national and local in its origin.

The organizing of a Legislature is usually hardly more than a formality, but this was not so in 1894. The mere being voted out of office by a huge majority was not to be considered as final by the group entrenched behind walls constructed during years of power and patronage when every public office had been filled by the faithful. Or, to change the metaphor, the rats had been too long in full possession of the feed bins to be driven from their privileges without fighting as only cornered rats can fight. There were all sorts of rumors as to what those who were in would do to prevent the seating of those chosen by the electorate to displace them, and they had a great deal more to go on than simply the possession of the offices. Just after the election the Supreme Court declared that the gerrymander was unlawful; therefore, so the threat was made, the Assemblymen just elected would be refused recognition since they had not been elected in a legal manner. Other threats were in the air, but when it came time for the Legislature to meet, the fight simmered down to one endeavoring to prevent a Republican majority in the Senate. The method used was a very simple one by which the holdover Senators, nine Democrats and four Republicans, with the right to pass on the eligibility of the new members, were to find excuses for refusing the admission of such newly-elected men as were Republican. The whole plan was based on the conception of the Senate as a continuous body.

The story of what followed is both disgraceful and picturesque, but need not be gone into at length. Eight of the Democratic holdovers met a bit earlier than the usual time and organized. They sent word of their organization to Governor Werts and persuaded him, if persuasion was necessary, to turn over to this Senate his annual message. At the usual hour the Republican members, new and old, and the recently elected Democrats appeared at the Senate Chamber to find, to their disgust, that there was an organization there which was about to vote on a resolution calling for a committee on credentials which would prevent the seating of any of the newcomers until such a time as the committee cared to report to the Senate. None but the eight already in their seats and the four holdover Republican Senators could,

under parliamentary law, discuss the resolution or vote upon it. The Republican Senators did the only thing possible under the circumstances; they withdrew and organized another Senate. To the amusement of the world-at-large Jersey was compelled to sit and twiddle her thumbs while two Senates, one of which had the recognition of the Governor, and the other of the Assembly, argued as to which was the lawful body. These scrambled conditions held until March 27, when the Supreme Court decided that eleven was more than ten, in other words, that the Republican Senate was legal, and the real business of legislation was allowed to get under way.

Measured in terms of the number of bills passed this Legislature, once it settled down to work, was one of the most prolific in enactments the State had seen in two decades. There have been but two Legislatures in the last fifty years and more, and one of these was the record breaking organization of the following year, which have rushed through so much legislation. Very few legislatures ever made so few worthwhile laws. Bills by the dozen were passed whose only object was the ousting of Democrats from the jobs to which they had been appointed, dozens of acts went on the books which were aimed at undoing everything that the previous three legislatures had done; the gambling features of the race track measures were, of course, included. Aside from the above-mentioned classes of legislation, out of the 354 laws enacted and seven joint resolutions, the few which stand out were those permitting flags for schools to be purchased out of the regular school funds; a provision for the providing of free school books; and a law prohibiting all religious services in schools except the reading of the Bible and the repeating of the Lord's Prayer.

The Legislature of 1895 outdid the records of the previous session by passing more bills than any such body enacted since 1874, and took an amazingly few weeks to do it. Even more remarkable than their numbers was the paucity of outstanding measures; the legislators still were so busy tearing down that they forgot to do anything constructive. Since there were but five Democrats in the Senate and six of the same party in the Assembly, the Republicans were not in the least hindered in their wrecking. Jersey Democracy had bogged itself in the muck made by its venal leaders, and the party in both State and Nation was being split to shreds by criticisms of President Cleveland, squabbles over the tariff, labor disputes and the menace of Free Silver and Populism. Republicans everywhere were laying low, watching the work of disintegration go merrily on, and particularly in Jersey, giving an impetus to the work, while it planned methods of climbing to power over the debris created.

To the credit, of a sort, of the 1895 session of the Legislature, it passed one thoroughly valuable law to prevent the waste of State moneys, and it ostentatiously washed a large tubfull of dirty linen. The important enactment forbade the expenditure of State funds over and above those directly authorized by the annual State appropriation act. This was aimed directly at the provisions which had made Governor Abbett the real head of the Treasury Department, and had placed an exceedingly dangerous power and

weapon in the hands of the Chief Executive. The enactment worked out well, serving as an admirable check upon the wastage of Jersey's moneys. This law was only one of several growing out of the efforts of a constitutional commission appointed in the early summer of 1894 to propose changes in the organic law whereby some of the vestiges of the colonial custom of centralizing power in the hands of the Governor which had been left in the Constitution of 1844, might be eliminated, and where the bench might be democratized by making some of its officers elective. This commission, approved by a joint resolution of the Legislature, May 17, 1894, was made up of so representative a group of Jersey's foremost legislators and politicians as to merit, at least, the placing the names on record here. The commission, as appointed, consisted of:

At Large: John P. Stockton, Trenton; Allan L. McDermott, Jersey City; Samuel H. Grey, Camden, and William Walter Phelps, Englewood. From the eight Congressional Districts: George Hires, Salem; Howard Carrow, Camden; William M. Lanning, Trenton; Edward D. Stokes, Mount Holly; Henry Mitchell, Asbury Park; George C. Ludlow, New Brunswick; John Franklin Fort, East Orange; Carman F. Randolph, Morristown; Garret A. Hobart, Paterson; John D. Probst, Englewood; Edward Balbach, Jr., and Frederick Frelinghuysen, Newark; Edwin A. Stevens, Hoboken; Joseph D. Bedle, Jersey City; John Kean, Jr., Elizabeth; John Morrow, Newark. Hobart and Balbach could not serve and their places were filled by the appointment of Eugene Emley, of Paterson, and E. Cortlandt Drake, Newark.

The amendments suggested by this commission were not accepted by the Legislature as reported to that body, but the ideas formulated by this group of men were made the basis of the three amendments submitted to popular vote in a special election on September 28, 1897, when two were adopted and one rejected. The first which has already been quoted in full—outlawed gambling, lotteries, bookmaking and the like, and was accepted by a surprisingly small majority. The second, passed by a vote of 73,722 to 66,296, read:

No person who shall have been nominated to the Senate by the Governor for any office of trust or profit under the government of this State, and shall not have been confirmed before the recess of the Legislature, shall be eligible for appointment to such office during the continuance of such recess.

The third amendment authorized women to vote at any school meeting held in any school district in which they might reside, for members of the boards of education and all other school offices. It was rejected by a vote of 75,170 to 65,021, which manifests very clearly what Jerseyites thought about women's suffrage just prior to the end of the last century.

Of the ostentatious scrubbing of filthy linen, done by the Legislature of 1895, it can be said that, save for political reasons, it might better have been performed two years earlier. The scandal unearthed, or rather ventilated, in Trenton wrote a last chapter to the history of the Abbett régime, provided the

readers of the newspapers with many columns of spicy reading, and gave the electorate a vigorous push towards the voting booths to pile up another fat majority for the Republican nominees. At this late date a tale of raw jobbery, the wastage of State funds and the glaring over-riding of justice, might prove dull, and cause noses to be upturned, not so much by the odor of the thing as in the contempt of the crudities displayed. Such things have been done so much better since. Voorhees, of Union, was chairman of the committee to do the investigating, and William H. Corbin, one of the ablest lawyers of New Jersey, was secured as chief counsel and principal investigator. A very thorough job was done. "Barney's State House Bar" was disclosed in all its splendor and corruption, and with it one of the reasons why State House expenses had more than trebled in five years. "Barney" Ford was the go-between of the looters and their collector of revenue. John Mullins, Mike Hurley, State Comptroller "Bill" Heppenheimer, Colonel John T. Van Cleef, Secretary of the State Board of Assessors, Joseph Hulme, Republican, of the Treasury Department, were shoved in the limelight with graft still clinging to their hands. Ex-legislators were proven guilty of accepting bribes, and boards of making endless charges for things never done. Even more unsavory were the details of the pardons passed out to the sixty ballot box stuffers sentenced to State Prison by Judge Lippincott and of the remittance of penalties imposed on election officers, race track criminals and numerous others. The prices for pardons seem to have ranged from \$1,000 down to "what-have-you?" The investigation uncovered a filthy mess, but was very useful in paving the way for the election of a Republican Governor and to complete the domination by the Grand Old Party of the politics and government of New Jersey.

In the gubernatorial campaign which followed close upon the heels of the disgraceful disclosures, all that the Republican platform needed to be was a résumé of its wrecking operations and the statement: "The redemption of the State, committed to our hands, is not yet complete. It will not be complete so long as there remains a reform to be effected, a wrong to be righted, an enemy of good government to be defeated and overthrown." The Democratic platform piped up with the assurances that the party was not so black as painted, that the State was not in a bad fix, since under a succession of Democratic governors during twenty-five years the "State's credit had given New Jersey a deserved fame." The few progressive measures touched upon in both platforms were quite forgotten in the lively campaign which followed the nomination of Senator John W. Griggs by the Republicans, for Governor, and Chancellor Alexander T. McGill for the same office by the opposition. The former had plenty to speak about and speak he did all over the State. The chancellor realizing that he could not save his party, and having not the slightest chance of being elected, neither resigned his seat on the bench nor neglected his work there to canvass the State.

John W. Griggs—By the then largest plurality ever given to any Governor, John W. Griggs was elected, his vote being 162,900 and his

plurality 26,900. His inauguration in 1896 as the first Republican Governor in thirty years was celebrated with an enthusiasm unparalleled in the annals of New Jersey. To the country at large, his selection was an augury of a sweeping victory for the National Republican ticket at the polls later in the year, although some felt that he had been swept into office on the tide which was to reach its high flood in November when the State gave McKinley the unprecedented plurality of 87,692, and Jersey's native son, Garret A. Hobart, a difference of 102,657 as compared with 1892 when Grover Cleveland had been given his largest plurality during three contests of 14,965; a remarkable reversal in a State which, in 1896, cast less than four hundred thousand votes.

With George T. Werts, and 1896, the unbroken line of Democratic governors which began with Theodore E. Randolph, in 1869, came to an end, and a splendid group of men they had been. Joel Parker, "the old war horse of Monmouth," a name to conjure with in the Jersey of post Civil War times; Joseph D. Bedle, rotund judge and mild reformer; General George B. McClellan, a national figure; George C. Ludlow, square-jawed and courageous, one of the first governors to oppose railroad control of legislation; Leon Abbett, a truly great man, whatever may be said of his ideas and political methods; the somewhat colorless but rigidly honest Robert S. Green; and George T. Werts, stripped of power, but then and later a force in politics—any State might well be proud of such chief executives. But one or two of these governors had a chance to prove their mettle, except as fighters and leaders of forlorn hopes, for it was seldom that they had an effective working majority in the Legislature. The Senate was usually Republican, and of eighteen Assemblies beginning with 1879, only half were Democratic. There was little chance of showing capacities for leadership, and, except in the case of Abbett, the genuine leaders of the State Democratic party did not care to achieve the prominence of the Governor's chair. It is difficult to work well in the glare of the spot-light. A cynical editor of the early 1900's wrote, "The Governorship of New Jersey bears over its portals in letters most perceptible to every honest independent mind this inscription, 'Who enters here leaves all hope behind.' None have been able to leave with the respect of the people." Whatever the truth in the statement, it is certain that it is hard to conceive of a more difficult task than to be a Democratic Governor of New Jersey during that long period when party majorities in the legislatures were lacking, when the hands were tied by counter demands from political boss and citizenry. Abbett, the exception, did manage to get all the reins in his hands but, unfortunately, he was then more interested in becoming a United States Senator than in the direction of the destinies of his State.

The emphatic choice of John W. Griggs for Governor was the placing of a period after the thoroughly apparent affirmative that the Democratic party was through as a dominant factor in State politics. That only three years later the wide party majority was nearly eliminated with only the defection of the adherents of Bryan preventing that margin from disappearing; that

after another three years only a national event prevented, perhaps, a coup of the Democrats whereby their candidate for Governor might well have slipped into office, does not disprove the above statement. There was the Woodrow Wilson and James F. Fielder period, and from 1920 to 1929 Democratic governors held sway, but only once in all these years was there a Senate which was decidedly Democratic, and but two Assemblies of the present century had worthwhile Democratic majorities. Since the Republicans, with the exceptions noted, are to hold the front of the stage after the early 'nineties, it may be well to sum up, and reëmphasize, some of the political history made in the era when an opposing party always elected the Chief executive of the State.

It is rather difficult to keep in mind that Jersey is, and was, one of the littlest of states, and thirty years or so ago was considered by her somewhat bloated neighbors as a "backward" State. She did not have as much money to spend as these larger neighbors, nor so many people to govern, and hence less business for her Legislature to transact. New York was inclined to bulldoze her, and Pennsylvania, or at least its chief city, had no particular use for her except as a source of early vegetables and a means of rapid transportation across her terrain. But all this did not prevent Jersey from taking herself seriously or from going about her business in as intelligent a way as did other states. Almost a half million residents had joined the million already there in less than a quarter century, which was a rate of gain above the average for the coastal sections. The State's income had increased at even a greater rate; legislatures now appropriated close to two million dollars annually. Not many more institutions had been established, but the departments of government, commissions, committees and similar organizations, were very much more numerous. It had come to be realized in these 'nineties that government was becoming complicated and Jersey's affairs required elaborate methods of handling.

The State was no longer rural; there were fewer farms, but these were producing very much larger incomes. Seventy-five per cent. of the people either lived in municipalities or were daily visitants of the two largest cities of the Nation. Although forty-second in area, Jersey was seventh in the total of its manufactures and second in the increase made with the last decade of the century. There were eight railroad systems cobwebbing the State with a total trackage of twenty-two hundred miles, with employees (1899) numbering 32,405, receiving wages amounting to \$18,023,604. There were 173.34 miles of canals; in 1900 there were 771.45 miles of surface traction tracks, the cars on which now were nearly all operated by electricity, a recent innovation. Paterson, West Hoboken and Jersey City had one hundred and fifty silk mills. There were seventy brick and terra cotta works in various parts of Jersey; twenty-five glass works; forty-eight plants made shoes and fifty-five made leather goods. Trenton, with its thirty plants, had but one rival as a pottery center; Passaic was the center of woolen and worsted manufactures. Newark led all cities in its manufacturing of jewelry, and was among the leaders in a half dozen other forms of industries. Newark and

Orange had fifty establishments devoted to the making of men's hats. There were steel plants, iron works, chemical plants, oil refineries, breweries, soap factories, tobacco industries on a large scale. There was the Lorillard Company at Jersey City; Singer Sewing Machine Company at Elizabethport; Standard Oil Refineries at Bayonne; John W. Roebling's Sons at Trenton. Just north of the latter-mentioned city iron ore was mined, reduced to pig, and refined into steel, one of several such industries in New Jersey.

One might go on interminably reciting the glories of the New Jersey industries of 1895. Here was no puny State; her great enterprises, her systems of transportation, the inspiration and influence of proximity to two great cities, the shore resorts, the garden-farms, the fisheries, the possibilities of the future and wealth of the present, gave her power and importance among her sister states, and influence in the Nation.

All this is very true, but one had better not lose the sense of proportion in considering these wonders. Jersey was only at the threshold of industrial greatness. There are ten companies in the State now capitalized for more than the hundred richest of that decade. When pointing out the immense amount of wages paid out by the railroads in 1899 mention should be made of the fact that the average wage per day was just \$1.82, and the average yearly earnings of railroad men totalled \$566.11, and these were among the best paid workers of that day. Men labored ten hours the day and Saturday afternoon holidays were practically unknown. Then, 771.45 miles of interurban car lines, even though they had just been electricized, hardly seems enough for nearly 2,000,000 people, especially when it is recalled that the automobile was still a curiosity rather than an aid to transportation. For that matter hard surface roads were all but absent; there were not five miles of concrete highway in the whole United States; sidewalks of flags, wood or ashes ended in open fields with rutted dirt roads beyond. The split-log drag was still the most used piece of roadmaking machinery, and the "safety-bicycle" a most modern means of locomotion. Commonplace conveniences of today were not even words then.

Of course, there were compensations. One could buy butter for a quarter a pound, eggs at fifteen cents the dozen, and good cuts of meat equally low. A man's suit could be had for ten dollars or even less; a corset need not cost more than sixty-nine cents despite its multitudinous steels and mighty texture. Silk stockings were rarities, the puff sleeved shirtwaist was the one piece of clothing "so splendidly convenient that it never would cease from being a part of every woman's apparel." Tenements were only just coming into vogue, rents were low and families usually had a yard. One could get a room at the better hotels for from one to two dollars, and for half that amount if the stay was to be long. A fellow was under no compulsion to pay \$15.20 to take his girl to a metropolitan revue and double that amount for a night club supper. He need not even part with a half dollar to see a "movie." There were no revues, no night clubs, no movies. The chap who had a bicycle built for two rode high on the top of the world. But all this phase of things has been pictured brilliantly and at length by Beers,

Mark Sullivan, and many others. The 'nineties held so much of interest from every angle that they have been called by all sorts of colors and titles and written about in the attempt to picture the decade for present generations.

W. L. Whittlesey, of Princeton University, spoke of them as the "Moulting 'Nineties" a characterization that would be seriously inept if it referred only to the appearance, but having aptness as an intellectual characterization, since it implies the emergence from old ways, the dropping of old standards, old ideas, old political allegiances, old concepts of human relations, old disciplines of religion and family life. "Moulting" suggests a lusty, youthful hospitality to the new which was crowding in every field; new ways of life, new standards in art, a new spirit in literature, new inventions in machinery, new styles in clothing, new conventions in human relations. We were dropping the hand-made, taking up the machine-made; leaving the farm to enter the factory; dropping the issues associated with the Civil War and its aftermath and thinking about questions arising from out of new economic conditions; edging away from classic Greek and Latin ideals of education to take up science. . . . In short, we were sprouting new coats physical and mental, whose mature nature was not to be seen clearly until well after 1900. (Mark Sullivan: "Our Times.")

Not the "moulting 'nineties," but the years which led up to them here demand attention. It is the delight of the historian to note "origins," possibly because ideas are often more important than facts, or possibly because the growth of a mustard seed is more interesting than the harvesting of the matured plant, and possibly because human nature delights to snub anybody or any movement claiming priority of originality. There are "origins" in plenty to be discovered in the 1875-95 period, and there were a number of movements often considered as of more recent birth which had made quite some progress before the end of the nineteenth century. For example, the "New Idea" group of the late 'nineties, with its slogan of "Equal Taxation," really revived an idea which had been part of the fundamental law of New Jersey for two hundred years. This latter fact does not lessen the value of the work done by the Record-Fagan and other coteries, for the equal taxation conception and many other improvements in government have needed repeated resuscitation and the administering of tonics. The followers of the cult did not triumph until 1906, when an enormously increased tax was forced upon the railroads, but Abbett had laid the foundations upon which the Colby-Fagan-Record-Marelli element builded, and the inception of the idea at the base of the movement may be traced back to immediately after the Civil War.

Outstanding among the legislative accomplishments of the period between 1875 and 1895 were those which had to do with the bringing of the railroads and other corporations under some sort of control and forcing them to help support the Commonwealth more largely; making the schools public schools; trying to equalize taxation, and enactments looking to the expenditure of

State funds for the benefit of the State and its people. These are what might be expected of any State government and which still remain chief responsibilities of legislatures. In 1875 the railroads, and they were then the only corporations of size, had been controlled in New Jersey only long enough to force the one great company of the State to permit the building of a competing line, and that had been the result of a comparatively recent bit of legislation. During the first term of Leon Abbett as Governor, laws were enacted which compelled corporations to bear a larger share of the burden of taxation. The Legislature of 1875 completed a revision of laws then extant relating to corporations. Similar revisions were continued until that of 1896, which made possible such great corporations as the Standard Oil, United States Steel and others of like character, and was the "foundation of laws which in 1903 were to prove so satisfactory to capital."

New Jersey may have been accused in the 'nineties of being "backward"; the political history of the State from the Civil War to the beginning of the present century may appear to be unimportant, her corporation laws may have been open to extensive and bitter criticism; but it cannot be overlooked that New Jersey managed somehow to place a series of laws upon her book regulating big business which were extensively copied by other states, or exactly embodied in their statutes, because of their admirable features. Incidentally, the corporate policy of Jersey was established and expanded under Henry C. Kelsey, during his twenty-seven years as Secretary of State. Because it is one of the outstanding achievements of the legislation with which this chapter has so far been concerned, the following quotation from an authoritative treatise published thirty years ago, "Wilgus on Corporation," is pertinent. Said he:

The State (New Jersey) has the most liberal and consistently worked out corporate policy extending over a greater number of years than any other State in the Union. . . .

This is the only State that seems yet to have consistently and adequately worked out a corporate policy which compares at all with the care that has been given to the subject in England; the New Jersey policy is, however, much more liberal than the English; and whatever one may think of the policy, one must commend the manner in which it has been formulated, amended, and applied through the hands of experts, continually following a definite plan and policy, instead of being a mere hotch-potch of inconsistent and unconnected provisions often without plan and frequently with as little sense.

From the strictly selfish and sensible standpoint, the importance of the corporation policy of New Jersey, in the years of which we have written, lays in its bringing to the State great industries and in furnishing funds during half of the period which helped pay some of the expenses of Jersey government, permitted expenditures for public improvements and institutions, and made it possible to get along without a State tax for general purposes, or

heavy personal taxes. Later developments, modern notions, and different laws do not minimize the achievements of earlier years.

The enactments having to do with corporations were, for the most part, directly connected with the efforts to equalize taxation, and what was done between 1875 and 1895 along these lines, except the increasing the proportion paid by the railroads and other corporations, the franchise tax of 1884, and the very novel (then) Collateral Inheritance Tax Act of 1892, are of too minor a character to require further mention. New Jersey has been striving for equal taxation, variously defined in party platforms, since a hundred years before there were parties or a State. The history of the subject never has been written, and politicians and authorities and statesmen are still busily engaged in trying to invent a scheme of taxation fair to all.

The progress made in education during the two decades was not particularly remarkable. Enough here to note that the local district, or community, school idea held sway until 1874, when the district schools of a city were permitted to combine in a city school district. In 1894 the school districts outside the cities were made co-extensive with the municipalities in which they were located, and reduced the number of school districts from 1,500 to 400. The supply of trained teachers had increased rapidly, and the number of pupils in the schools had more than doubled in two decades, even with lengthened terms and an increase in the population of little more than half. From comparatively isolated individual schools and districts, practically disassociated from State control or funds, taught by those who owed their positions to direct political appointment, the advance had been made to State oversight and expenditure, inter-relation of interests, more suitable buildings and teachers appointed because of their educational qualifications. Free school books were provided and, if one includes 1896, a teachers' retirement fund was established, although this had to be maintained by the teachers. Women were not allowed to hold any school office until 1882, when they were made eligible as school trustees. In passing, the free public library dates from that same year. To the horror of some, women had been given the privilege of voting at district school meetings, in 1887, and nine years later this right was expanded to voting at school elections in all districts outside the cities.

Technical schools and those for the unfortunate had been provided, and the only ones extant in 1875, the State Normal and Model Schools, were given fairly ample support. The State institutions at that time were only an asylum, two reform schools and a soldiers' home; nine were added during the next two decades. The normal school was enlarged from time to time and another established. Rutgers College at New Brunswick, chartered in 1766, became the State University in 1917 and, while recognized by the United States Government as the State Agricultural School in 1864, was not this in fact until 1880, when State support was given and an experiment station set up; in 1887 the College Agricultural Experiment Station was established. The Newark Technical School was founded in 1883, when the city and State combined forces to support such an institution. It was one of the

first two in the United States of its type to be founded. Manual training schools date from a legislative act of 1891.

As noted, the government of New Jersey in the earlier times was very like the direction of the affairs of a small industry, there was one head and a number of superintendents. As the State's business enlarged and became complicated, groups of individuals had to be made responsible for certain parts. Starting with the Department of Insurance of 1875, and of Savings Banks, 1877, and a State Board of Health appointed the same year, Bureau of Statistics of Labor and Industries and a Bureau of Vital Statistics, there came such a succession of departments, committees, commissions, by the later 'nineties as to interfere with the efficient management of affairs. Departments overlapped, authority was divided and responsibility shunned, so that some of the scandals of the later years grew out of this multiplication of offices, and a demand was made for fewer divisions of the government, fewer sinecures. The Republican régime beginning in 1896 made matters worse and better by merrily adding a few more bureaus and jobs. Even so, there are twice as many sections to the State Government than there were in 1900, with small likelihood of any reduction in their number.

Legislating morality into human nature began in this country with the Puritans and their attempts to compel a uniformity of religious beliefs. For a century and a half the propriety of gambling and the absorbing of alcohol were not questioned, Jersey legislated against lotteries in the 'seventies, and as we have seen, did likewise against gambling of all sorts in the 'nineties, although the constitutional amendments covering the question were not accepted by the people until 1897. The temperance movement is more than a century old and, while the warfare was not brought into politics at first, there were in some states prohibitory laws passed before the 1850's, although but two states were "dry" at the close of the Civil War. Blue, White and Red Ribboners were numerous in New Jersey before the 'seventies, and were demanding statutory abolition of the liquor traffic. The claim that New Jersey was not interested in the legislative handling of the liquor question prior to the advent of the Anti-Saloon League in the early 'nineties, will hardly bear scrutiny. In 1877, Bingham, as a Prohibition candidate for Governor, polled a vote of 1,438 out of less than 200,000 cast; General Fiske, in 1886, received nearly 20,000 temperance votes, an evidence of the strength of the movement in the State, which a year or two later forced the passage of the Local Option High License Law.

Conservation of natural resources, a riparian policy, the improvement of the judiciary and the attempts to simplify and codify the too many laws, the outlining of a State-aided good roads system, the encouragement and control of corporations, improvements in public education, new parties, health, medical and labor policies, these and others of minor import, are more or less "origins" of the double decade preceding the 'nineties. So, too, with the famous Geran Act of 1911 and the direct State-wide primary. George L. Record had been working on the scheme for years, and had induced Governor Werts in his first message to the Legislature, January 1, 1893, to recom-

mend an act identical to that passed during the Woodrow Wilson régime. The recommendation was smothered under partisan legislation, and did not become a law until 1903, and then only in a mutilated and ineffective form. The need of a better method of making nominations than the caucus scheme had been realized long before Record thought out his, certainly when the ballot box scandals of a few years earlier were giving Jersey such undesirable publicity. It may be that the germ of the direct primary is to be found in the primary and bribery in election laws passed in 1878. It is hardly necessary to point out that not only the Australian ballot was a product of the period we are discussing, but that tampering with methods of voting are as old as politics. Some of these new ideas were in the mustard seed stage of development by 1893; none had matured. All needed the intensive cultivation that was given them during the present century to bring them to full fruitage. The twenty years which preceded the election of Governor Griggs were truly great years, whatever the débâcle of the last two or three. Jersey's government had grown up. The many blunders of her legislators had been those of youth finding itself; henceforth many more mistakes were to be made, but they were the mistakes of sober, alert, obstinate maturity.

The opening years of the "Moulting 'Nineties" and the first of the new Republican régime were strange and unsettled ones, "crucial" they might be called, were not that overworked term lacking in meaning. It was a difficult period in which to come into power and retain control; the Republicans had to skate on very thin ice for many moons, but managed, although with many hair-raising escapes, to keep from breaking through for fifteen years. There was discontent, restlessness, the determination to do better things which brought on that era of muck, or "muckraking," which was one of the remarkable features of the early years of the present century, and which worried into premature graves many a politician. New Jersey folk were in the forefront with those of other sections in being dissatisfied with what they were getting out of life, inquiring into what seemed an unfair division of wealth and labor, in a lack of readiness to continue as regulars in their parties and follow the lead of bosses, too eager to kick over the political applecart at the slightest provocation. The railroads fought each other and the unions; racial animosities blossomed into ill flavored fruit. Even religions could not be kept out of the *melée*. Emotion rather than common sense were manifest in the reactions of the electorate, which made it very difficult of direction. There was a constant multiplication of parties, four to six had nominees at every State election. Men realized that the Democratic party was not democratic and the Grand Old Party lacked grandeur. The women were getting beyond the stage where the fluttering of "white ribbons" compensated for an impolite and decisive refusal of suffrage. Gentlemen reformers further upset politics without forming permanent organizations. And all this was before a war with Spain was to complicate national affairs with a doctrine of imperialism, before Populism, Bland, and Free Silver had introduced a new Democratic prophet in William Jennings Bryan, who had but to cry: "You shall not press down upon the brow of labor this crown of thorns, you shall

not crucify mankind on a cross of gold," to have so many Americans bow down before him that a mere shift of 50,000 votes would have made him President of these United States. Since 1874 Jersey politics had been practically local affairs; after 1894 they were seldom entirely divorced from national politics.

Jersey's Ship of State began its new voyage under Republican auspices, in 1896, with a mighty man at the helm and a crew predominantly loyal. Governor John M. Griggs was well under fifty years of age, having been born in Newton, Sussex County, July 10, 1849. The son of a farmer, always a lover of outdoor sports, he had the endurance of a finely trained athlete. In brilliance of mentality he ranked with the great men of his day, and he labored among great contemporaries both in the State and later in the Presidential cabinet. Upon his graduation from Lafayette College, in 1868, he became a ticket agent at Phillipsburg while he studied law, a fact which led to the slogan of later years, "From ticket agent to Governor." There were few divisions of Jersey's government in which he did not serve or was asked to serve. The youngest representative in the House of 1876, he became conspicuous in the revision of the laws then being carried on, a line of endeavor which ever after engaged his interest; his inaugural preached the doctrine of few and simpler laws and made suggestions which might at the present day be followed with profit to the State. Elected to the Senate in 1882, he not only became its President, but came to grips with the question about which there was much talk and little action, the equitable taxation of railroads and corporations. After meeting defeat in the first skirmish, he won out in a later year. In conjunction with others of a committee he helped frame the measures which harnessed the railroads and corporations to the New Jersey treasury cart. Entirely of his own construction was another act for the taxation of corporations, the first of its kind to be passed by any State, and widely copied by others, which entirely relieved New Jersey from the burden of a State tax, and gave it a financial strength and credit for long the envy of other sections of the Union.

Governor Werts wanted to appoint him a Justice of the Supreme Court of New Jersey. When he was forty-two years old he was given serious consideration by President Harrison to fill a vacancy on the bench of the United States Supreme Court. As is well known, Governor Griggs resigned his State office to become Attorney-General in the cabinet of President McKinley, and served not only during the trying period of the Spanish-American War and its interminable legal as well as other complications, but continued on through that even more trying period when a Nation which never had attempted to do more than keep peace in its own family had orphaned islands on opposite sides of the globe deposited by war upon its doorstep. Attorney-General Griggs had to provide "judicial machinery for those insular possessions and of settling unforeseen questions forced upon the country by its emergence from a century of isolation. Belligerent right, obligations of neutrals, the Nation's duty as trustee, the orders to the governors in Cuba and Porto Rico that no franchise be granted without the approval from Washing-

ton. All these intricate governmental problems and others were settled by the attorney because of necessity before even the adjudication of the courts thereon. Only a gigantic administrative mind could have accomplished without the guidance of a precedent this tremendous task so aptly performed by the distinguished Jerseyman." To quote former Governor Stokes further, "The United States was fortunate in having at this hour as Attorney-General a man of Griggs' analytic and legal mind, power of research and forensic ability." And again, in reference to a many paged brief in which the Attorney-General exhaustively discussed the relation of the United States under the Constitution to acquired territory, and laid down the basis upon which many of the measures now used in our judicial relations to foreign possessions are builded: "For range of precedent and historic review this plea ranks, in my judgment, with the Cooper-Union speech of Abraham Lincoln. . . . The peroration of this plea ranks in sublimity of its conception of our Nation as a civilizing agent with the patriotism of Webster's reply to Hayne. . . . Webster declared for a Union one and inseparable, now and forever. Griggs showed the power of this Union to take new peoples and new territories and lift them up to a place of equality with the Stars and Stripes." And once again: "No one ever came in contact with Governor Griggs without being impressed with his fine courtesy, his aristocratic yet democratic bearing and the feeling that while he was always gentle and considerate he was a character which brooked no undue familiarity. Association with him was an inspiration and a delight. As a convincing orator I know of no superiors. His style was simple and yet, as it flowed along with the gentleness of a brook, it carried one to the torrents of emotion where the climax of the rapids swept all before it and left one thrilled, uplifted and convinced. Fond of literature and a great student, he typified the scholar in politics, and had he been in the United States Senate he would have found no rivals in debate."

So much emphasis has been placed upon the character of the man John M. Griggs, and his activities in a national rather than in a State office, because his two-year administration as Governor of New Jersey was one of plain efficiency with few showy features, of work without fireworks. The Governorship added nothing to his stature; it had nothing special to give that was not already his, except a title. His inaugural address was an incisive criticism of the multiplication of unnecessary, or conflicting, or harmful, or petty laws, and he asked the Legislature for fewer statutes and better ones, and the codification of those already on the books; fewer officials, the doing away with the fee system for the payment of State officers, less partisanship and better government. After a year he could address the Legislature with congratulations for what had been accomplished along these lines, but again insisted on further revision of the statutes and a continuance of work along the lines already laid down. He certainly secured one thing sought: during the two years of his administration fewer enactments were passed than in the single preceding year, and only once in the last seventy-five years were fewer laws made in any two consecutive years. There were,

indeed, fewer statutes and, it is likely, better statutes, and the result was brought about not by the excessive use of the veto, but by wise direction and persuasion, a thing possible with a Legislature so preponderantly one-sided.

There was a noticeable increase in the number of commissions, bureaus and departments, and appointments under Governor Griggs, an increase which was savagely criticized, of course, in the next Democratic platform. To the victor belonged the spoils and one could not be a statesman without also being a politician. The old crowd had to be ousted from official places, and positions provided for the many worthy. It cost the State money, but so many of the new and expensive commissions were retained throughout future administrations that it would seem that necessity may have had more to do with their creation than the partisan newspapers of the time implied. The Governor knew men or was fortunate in gathering capable men about him. George Wurts, editor and half owner of the *Paterson Daily Press*, was selected to replace Henry C. Kelsey, so long the Secretary of State. Mr. Wurts had refused many times to become a candidate for elective office, but in 1896 he accepted the commissionership of the Department of Banking and Insurance. Alexander H. Rickey, of Trenton, remained as the assistant secretary.

The list of executive appointments was not so overly long, and an unusual proportion of those named not only served well while in office, but had later careers proving themselves men of ability. By a strange coincidence, when John M. Griggs set out on his campaign through New Jersey, in 1895, he took with him as his aides, Foster M. Voorhees, Edward C. Stokes and John F. Fort, who were in turn governors of the State. The one other Governor who made up the full line of those elected by the Republicans before Woodrow Wilson, was Franklin Murphy, who was chairman of the State Committee who called to order the convention which nominated Griggs and whose devotion to the campaign was one of the reasons for the size of the majority piled up.

After two years Governor Griggs' term of office was brought to an abrupt close that he might go to join the cabinet of President McKinley as Attorney-General. New Jersey, in 1896, loomed very large in national politics. William Jennings Bryan, with one of the great orations of American history, had won for himself a nomination for the Presidency and thrown the East into spasms of fright by his advocacy of "Free Silver." The Republicans, determined to sound a different note, hit upon the tariff, and hoped to nominate William McKinley, a fairly well-known Congressman because of the tariff law which bore his name. Into this atmosphere of uncertainty came New Jersey to the Chicago convention, with a full delegation favoring McKinley, and also instructed to urge the nomination of Garret A. Hobart, native son and popular politician, for the Vice-Presidency. Jersey's choice proved to be that of the convention; the twain were paired.

Hobart has been credited with realizing that the ticket could not win on

a campaign based upon the tariff question and is quoted as saying: "The silver heresy is the only issue upon which we have a chance of winning. We can stir the country with the menace of a change in money standard that will reduce the purchasing power of the dollar to half a dollar, and I intend to go at once to Canton and talk Major McKinley out of his high tariff campaign predilections." It is claimed that he won over McKinley and others, and whether the idea came from him or from Mark Hanna, to whom it is usually credited, McKinley and Hobart carried the country on a "money scare" campaign. New Jersey gave them the unprecedented plurality of 87,692, Bryan's total vote being only 133,675. Governor Griggs was made McKinley's Attorney-General, and Jersey was further honored when W. M. Johnson, Senator from Bergen County, received appointment as the First Assistant Postmaster-General under Smith, who was expected soon to resign to be succeeded by Johnson. With General Sewell recently returned to the National Senate and all her Congressmen Republicans, New Jersey was a thoroughly influential factor in national affairs for the first time in history, and this during one of those critical changeeful periods which make or mar a country's future. Vice-President Hobart was to die just before his term was to end; Attorney-General Griggs had ample opportunity to complete work ably begun before resigning when Roosevelt became President; Johnson remained until 1902, when he left Washington with Roosevelt's commendation, "Your administration of that office has been in the highest degree satisfactory, and I wish it might have been possible for you to continue in the post whose duties you have so well performed."

Garret Augustus Hobart was one of those truly remarkable men whose character, career, services to his fellows are so soon forgotten, whose influence upon the destinies of the people is seldom accurately measured and weighed. For more than a quarter of a century he was a directing power in Jersey's political affairs, although for the greater part of this period, his party was in the minority. A native of Monmouth County, born June 3, 1844, after being graduated from Rutgers College he studied law under Socrates Tuttle, whose daughter Jennie he married. Admitted to the bar in 1869, and always a lawyer noted for his skill in the application of corporation laws to business enterprises, he devoted his abilities and energies mainly to business and politics. His political career began in Paterson, where he had gone to live, as city counsel (1871), becoming counsel to the Board of Freeholders of Passaic County during the following year. He was sent, in 1872, to the Assembly from the Third District, with the greatest majority ever given a representative; was Speaker of the House in 1874; declined reelection for a third term. Hobart received a larger vote than that given Hayes for President, when the former was elected to the State Senate in 1876; served two terms and was twice President of the Senate. During his active career in the Legislature he introduced a number of bills of permanent value.

It is doubtful whether the legislator Hobart enjoyed himself as much as the business man and politician Hobart, for his remarkable endowments of

mind and spirit, his bent for organization, manipulation and leadership of men and things found fuller outlet in commercial activities and in being the director in political organizations, conventions and campaigns. Few Jersey-men of his time were more sought in the formation and management of corporations and private concerns than he; he became almost a professional "Receiver" of railroads and banks. Always in demand in State and National Republican committees, he was chairman of the State organization more or less continually from 1880; was a member of the National Republican Committee from 1884, vice-chairman of this for years, and refused tenders of the chairmanship. Beginning with the gubernatorial campaign of Potts against Ludlow for the Governorship, he conducted several brilliantly and well, sharing honors in the one which made Griggs the Chief Executive of New Jersey. His presentation of a solid delegation to the convention which nominated McKinley and himself was a personal triumph, but not an unusual victory for this genius with men. All through the years of his political activities Mr. Hobart was compelled to antagonize other leaders, yet somehow retained their friendship; he prevented men from securing office without arousing hatred. His election to the Vice-Presidency surprised no one more than himself. Always singularly unpretentious and unselfish, the "mixer," a *bon homme*, honors and high places were thrust upon him without seeming to be either of his desire or selection. He would rise to the occasion, do more than he thought possible, be a big man among big men. He never lacked the courage of conviction. He urged a declaration of war against Spain so effectively (see chapter on Spanish-American War) that the next day, April 11, 1898, President McKinley asked Congress authorization to use the armed forces of the United States to compel the evacuation of Cuba by Spain.

The Spanish-American War is no part of the political history of New Jersey. It introduced few new features of legislation other than provisions for securing the State's quota of men and funds. The platforms of the two parties in the next gubernatorial campaign recognized no new policies which were the actual outgrowth of the war. The Adjutant-General's office, one of the oldest departments of the State Government, had been created for just such crises as a national war created, and its head, General William S. Stryker, started up the military machinery a month after the Legislature had adjourned, and peace had been signed in Paris before it met again. On April 25, 1898, New Jersey was asked to supply three regiments of volunteers to serve for two years—a thousand additional men were called for later. Two days later three regiments of the National Guard were called out and within a week had been mobilized. Jersey City was the State rendezvous, but the Sea Girt military camp was the place of actual meeting for most companies. None of the regiments reached any battle front, but lives were lost in the almost as deadly camps of Jacksonville, Florida, and elsewhere. Naval reserves recruited in New Jersey served on the "Resolute," which was under fire several times; the "Badger," which helped blockade Havana, and the monitor "Montauk," which remained on duty in northern waters. That

summer of 1898 was colorful, exciting, an inspiration to youth, but one which left older spirits somewhat unmoved. Prior to the World War Jersey folk were always somewhat critical of the Nation's wars and declined to be divided in opinions of their necessity. It was so in 1898, for there were many in the State who were not swept off their feet by the destruction of the "Maine" and believed that less haste in forcing the Spaniard hand might save much waste.

Foster M. Voorhees—When Governor Griggs resigned to join McKinley's cabinet he was succeeded by Foster M. Voorhees, then President of the Senate, as Acting Governor, who later was regularly elected the Chief Executive. All this was not brought about as simply as it can be written. New Jersey, unlike many states, has no Lieutenant-Governor, its Constitution declaring that "in case of death, resignation, or removal from the office of the Governor the powers, duties and emoluments of the office shall devolve upon the President of the Senate." Also that a Governor must be elected at the next general election. To add another phase of the gubernatorial problem which was to come up later, no Governor could succeed himself in office. There had been a lack of definition of the provisions in the Constitution, which lack opened a gateway to a flood of discussion and speculations. Could Voorhees be Senator and Governor, which, or both? Was it permissible to be both legislator and executive? If he quit the Senate was he eligible to the Governorship, under the provisions of the Constitution? What must be his proper title, anyway? And after serving as Governor could he become a legal candidate for election to that office? These and several other questions required solution before legislative action could get under way. Without going into details, let it be recorded that the knots were cut and barriers were jumped by the passing an act just prior to the Voorhees accession giving his office the official title of Acting Governor, and which left him nominally a Senator, while actually the Chief Executive. A more important hurdle was cleared in the closing days of his term as Acting Governor by a resignation of his seat in the Senate; the Supreme Court ruling that by so doing he had removed himself from the Governorship and was, therefore, eligible for election to that office. David O. Watkins, Speaker of the Assembly, became the Acting Governor from October 18, 1898, to January 16, 1899; Voorhees having served from February 1, 1898, to October 18 of the same year. Thus New Jersey had three governors in three years, or had no governor for one year, however one interprets the term.

Foster Voorhees was made the gubernatorial nominee of the Republican party in 1898, not as a "logical successor" to the office, but because he merited the honor. A friend said of him: "A brilliant intellect, a gifted lawyer, an eloquent lawyer, an able statesman, a skillful diplomat—both in private and public affairs—a philanthropist and patriot." If he had a weakness as the party leader it lay in the stand he had taken on the taxation of corporations, particularly of railroads, for these big business interests often held the balance of power in elections. His nomination was by acclamation.

The Democratic convention of 1898 had before it the names of Richard A. Donnelly, Christian Braun, Howard Carrow, William D. Daley, Clarence T. Atkinson, James M. Seymour, Isaac Carmichael and Elvin W. Crane. United States Senator James Smith, with his Senatorship depending upon the outcome of the elections, backed Crane with all the potency of his leadership of the New Jersey Democracy. It took but one ballot to select his nominee.

Voorhees as Governor—There was practically nothing in State politics on which to make a vigorous campaign; the platforms differed too little and were too narrow to give standing room for any outstanding issues. Both candidates for Governor were worthy men. The Jersey Democratic party was split over the money question in national politics and had too many cliques within its ranks. Griggs had been elected by such a large majority, and McKinley and Hobart had been given so tremendous a vote two years before, that with all Smith's skill and manipulation in promoting his candidate, it was not thought that there was much to the election beyond the guessing the size of the majority which would be given Voorhees. Even the fact that the latter individual was too busy looking after the affairs of his office in a time of war to be able to give attention to his political interests, did not weaken the expectation. It is said by those who know that a few of his devoted friends dictated many answers to those proffering support, signing his name thereto, which the Governor never saw, and of which he never heard. When the election was over it was found that Voorhees had a plurality of only 5,499 as compared with the 26,900 given Griggs, and the unprecedented 87,692 of two years earlier, which was received by Hobart. Since there is little doubt that the personal popularity of Voorhees with the electorate was greater than that of Crane, it would seem that the "corporation interests" evidently had been very much interested in the election of Crane as Governor and the return of Smith to the United States Senate, since the latter's election was dependent upon a return to the Democratic fold of Jersey's voters. It was a narrow escape for Voorhees and his party, one which so thoroughly scared the Republican political powers that they kept very wide awake for several years. The closeness of the result did not help Smith any; on March 4, 1899, John Kean, of Elizabeth, replaced him at Washington. Twelve years later James Smith, Jr., was to be a decisive element in the return of the Democrats to power in New Jersey, with every probability of succeeding Kean, who had been Senator since his displacement of Smith. How Smith was left in the lurch and James E. Martine, the "first product in the East of the Preferential Primary System," came to be chosen is a tale of a later year. It so happened that a second United States Senator had to be chosen while Voorhees was in the executive chair. In 1901 General Sewell's term at Washington was brought to an end by his death on Christmas Day. There were many and notable aspirants for his place of honor; as the Republicans held very large majorities in both Houses there was no question of as to what would be the political faith of the one chosen. David Baird, of Camden, Sewell's right hand man in South Jersey, was

suggested as a nominee; so was John J. Gardiner, from the same district; and there was also Edward C. Stokes, ex-Senator and then Clerk of the Court of Chancery. If there was to be a fair geographical distribution of national offices, from these three should a choice be made. Barker Gummere, Republican leader of Mercer County, was added to the list as representing the mid-section of the State. Former Attorney-General Griggs, with his Nation-wide reputation, stood head and shoulders above all other candidates, and in North Jersey had but one opponent, John F. Dryden, a business man of practically no political experience, but a shining light in finance and commerce. Mr. Dryden was exceedingly wealthy, listed with the forty multimillionaires of his day who were supposed to control half of the banking wealth of the United States. A tall Maine Yankee, he had come to Newark in 1873 to found what eventually was to be known as the Prudential Insurance Company of America, which at the time of his candidacy had outstanding insurance of one billion dollars. This great institution was a monument to the remarkable mental and business capacity of its founder. But it was a "corporation," with its president closely affiliated with the railroads of the State and country, and with large industrial concerns. Now the very word "corporation," or "trusts," as all such were supposed to be, was anathema, gall and bitterness to the average citizen in that muckraking age, which seemingly ruled out Dryden as a "malefactor of great wealth."

The names of Dryden, Griggs, Stokes, Gummere, Gardiner, and Baird were all put in nomination. After seventeen ballots there was still a deadlock. The eighteenth showed Stokes tied with Dryden with twenty-four each, with fifteen cast for Griggs. With the nineteenth the Griggs votes were thrown mainly to Dryden, resulting in his nomination, which was tantamount to election. "He bought the Senatorship," claimed the Democrats and some Republicans. "What of it?" was the reply of many.

John F. Dryden was United States Senator from February 4, 1902, to March 3, 1907. He quietly but quickly established a reputation at Washington, rendering many valuable services to the Nation and to his State. When it came time for his reelection, however, what good he had done was forgotten in the rabid trust busting crusades of that day, and in the scandals unearthed by insurance investigations in New York. That Dryden had been praised by Hughes for his testimony in these investigations, and that the Prudential was not involved in these scandals, and its president still less, was overlooked. When it was found that his renomination could be brought about only at the expense of a disruption of the party, Mr. Dryden, then seriously ill, had his name withdrawn. State Treasurer Frank O. Briggs, a firm supporter of Dryden and at the same time something of a "Progressive," was sent to the United States Senate. Woodrow Wilson, of Princeton, made his initial bow on the stage of Jersey politics at this time, as one of the candidates for Senatorial honors, his friend, James Smith, Jr., instructing a dozen of his followers to vote for the president of the university.

Having at least given the names of Jersey's Senatorial representatives at Washington for most of the period before the Democrats again came to the

top in the Legislature, we can return to Voorhees and his four years as Governor. There is something Coolidge-like about this descendant of Long Island Dutch pioneers of 1662 and his administration. There was manifest a like rugged honesty, quiet kindness, and painstaking attention to details, something of a similar economy in State expenditures and a lack of radical measures and events during his reign. There was no economy of speech practiced by Voorhees, however, and his fondness for detail and readiness to help others sometimes stood in the way of efficiency and effective execution and leadership. The events and demands upon his time and sympathies of the Spanish War kept him out of politics overly much, and his failure to keep up the political fences of his party were said to be responsible for the almost loss in 1898 of the State to the opposition. Not that he was an unexperienced hand at playing politics, for he, by the time he was forty, had served three terms in the Assembly and had been elected for the second time to the State Senate. He had been the party whip in the House, and in the "Rump" Legislature of 1893 it was Voorhees who, after being shoved into the Senate Chamber, had dramatically told the presiding officer: "You are not my President of the Senate"; and went out straightway to help organize a separate body which was to prove to be the legal organization. He was chairman of the committee which carried on the investigation of the State House and other jobberies, whose finding strongly influenced the overwhelming election of Griggs as Governor. Several times was Voorhees offered judiciary honors; once, when Stokes was Governor, his appointment had been confirmed by the Senate before being mentioned to him, but even then the appointment was modestly declined. After his retirement from the Governorship, the only political office he was persuaded to accept was a place on the Board of Managers of the Rahway Reformatory, where he labored most earnestly for years to uplift work for and with the unfortunate. Although hardly bearing upon his political abilities, it helps give a picture of the clean-hearted man and philanthropist, to note that after his death it was found that, after taking care of his family and dependants for life, his estate was to be divided into three parts, one to go to Rutgers College, from which he had been graduated with second honors at the age of nineteen; one to the Women's College of New Jersey, and the third to the Elizabeth General Hospital.

At no time during the Voorhees régime did the Republicans in either section of the Legislature number less than twice that of their opponents. During 1898, the "year without a Governor," the acting executive was concerned with the carrying on of policies and the furthering of measures to which he had fallen heir from Griggs. Most of the laws enacted were necessary constructive political measures, the further consolidation of Republican ideas and party. There were the inevitable investigations which characterized the housecleaning tactics of every sharp change in the political complexion of the Legislature. Senator Johnson, of Bergen County, introduced a program of grade crossing eliminations in the State, which simmered down to a law requiring track elevation in Jersey City and Newark. Senator Ketcham, of

Essex, tried to have considered a State-wide scheme of doing away with the fee system of paying officials, but was glad enough to get a compromise which would make such a law applicable to his county and Hudson. Both acts bordered on special legislation and, therefore, were unconstitutional, but both aroused sentiments which made the elimination of the fee system and of grade crossings, features of political platforms and activity for many years.

The Governor seemed to feel that with the opening of his elected term of office some of the measures near to his heart might well receive attention, and several humanitarian reforms, a tightening up of the taxation of corporations, a reclamation project or two, and a change in the time of holding elections eventuated. The newspapers had started a vivid exposure of conditions in some of Jersey's institutions, notably the Hudson County and other Almshouses, some of the prisons and reformatories. A horrible state of affairs was shown to exist. Voorhees encouraged the publishing of the exposures which featured the front pages of the newspapers; civilian societies of many kinds agitated for betterment and planned ways and means to help the governmental boards. The State Board of Children's Guardians was but one of the bodies appointed by the Governor which did a pretty fair job of dry-cleaning charitable and punitive and reformatory institutions in New Jersey, and gave a great impetus towards the improvement of methods of caring for the unfortunates who became wards of the State.

It was during the Voorhees régime that New Jersey began the seemingly hopeless task of reclaiming some of its marsh and bog lands about Newark, Jersey City and along the Passaic River, and the ditching of large areas with the intent of banishing the mosquito. Only \$10,000 was voted as a starter in the mosquito campaign, but large sums have since been expended in this work, which has not only made this section more pleasantly inhabitable, but added many thousand acres to the territory of the close packed cities. Governor Voorhees, while proud of the reclamation activities, both of humans and land, started during his term of office, rather prided himself on the stand taken by him and the Legislature in "the franchise on public utilities levied on the principle of income, as he thought just to public and to these great interests that today are of such vital necessity to the well being of our people. A State income of \$6,625,000 is evidence of his sagacity and far-seeing vision." (Stokes.)

Change of Election Time—One sensational political move was the passing of legislation which abolished local elections in the spring and consolidated these with the general State election of November. The laws, as enacted, applied to Jersey City and Newark, the only two first-class cities in New Jersey. Looking back upon it, there seems no special reason why such legislation should create any such disturbance as marked its passage. The first enactment was passed while Griggs was Governor, in the face of all manner of opposition both within the Legislature and from outside good government organizations. The principal objections to it seemed to have been: That local affairs and men would be submerged under the greater

interest in the general and State; that it was partisan, aimed like the gerrymander at the giving an unfair advantage to the party then in power; and that it was an assault on municipal home rule. The bill was passed by large majorities, Griggs appended his signature immediately and had it filed as a law. Almost as quickly the Supreme Court adjudged the act unconstitutional.

This law popped up again in 1901, but so worded as to avoid the objections raised by the court. Many of its old friends were ready to turn a cold shoulder upon this disturber of the political peace; Voorhees was quoted as saying that such a bill could never become a law. The Democratic section of the Legislature cried that it was all that was malignant and partisan; the Republicans feared its effect upon the elections which were so soon to follow. The chief arguments in its favor were that more voters came to the polls in the autumn and, therefore, local issues would be voted upon by a larger percentage of the electorate, and that holding one election instead of two would save both State and municipalities money. Whatever the pros and cons, the legislation was enacted, the bill became a law, signed by the Governor, and the courts approved its new form.

Whether it meant anything or no, the first result under the change in the time of election was the winning of Jersey City by the Republicans; Mark M. Fagan was elected mayor. In 1905 the Legislature got up courage enough to advocate the enlargement of the measure to include all divisions of the State, towns, villages and boroughs, but only another of these overwhelmingly Republican bodies could push the law through. Thereafter Jersey began to do the bulk of its voting in the month of November. There was so much dissatisfaction in the State over the change that in 1908, 1911 and 1912 there were serious efforts to have both acts repealed. Just then the Democrats won the State, changed the political complexion of its officials from the highest to the minor ones in the hamlets, and let the laws stay as passed. Even Woodrow Wilson went on to his post at Washington without bothering to see to the passage of the repealers which had been promised during his campaign. What was good enough for one party proved just as valuable to the other, once it was in power.

One of the last enactments under Voorhees was that outlining a new group of Congressional Districts (March 19, 1901). As these were based on the census figures of the first year of a new century, they are of interest, if only for a comparison with the twelve districts of today, and with figures which will soon be issued from the census takers of 1930:

CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICTS.

First—The counties of Camden, Gloucester and Salem.

Second—The counties of Cape May, Cumberland, Atlantic and Burlington.

Third—The counties of Middlesex, Monmouth and Ocean.

Fourth—The counties of Hunterdon, Somerset and Mercer.

Fifth—The counties of Union, Morris and Warren.

Sixth—The counties of Bergen, Passaic and Sussex.

Seventh—The First, Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Eleventh and Fifteenth wards of the city of Newark, and the city of Orange, and the town of Bloomfield, Montclair, and West Orange, and the boroughs of Glen Ridge, Caldwell and North Caldwell, and the townships of Franklin, Belleville, Livingston, Verona and Caldwell, all in the county of Essex.

Eighth—The Second, Third, Fifth, Ninth, Tenth, Twelfth, Thirteenth and Fourteenth wards of the city of Newark, and the city of East Orange, and the town of Irvington, and the borough of Vailsburgh, and the village and township of South Orange, and the townships of Clinton and Milburn, all in the county of Essex.

Ninth—The city of Bayonne, the Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, Eleventh and Twelfth wards of the city of Jersey City, and all the Sixth Ward of said city of Jersey City excepting the first and second precincts, or that portion which lies north of the Morris Canal and east of Summit Avenue, and the towns of Kearney and Harrison, and the borough of East Newark, all in the county of Hudson.

Tenth—The First, Second, Third, Fourth and Fifth wards of the city of Jersey City, and all that portion of the Sixth ward of said city (the first and second precincts) which lies north of the Morris Canal and east of Summit Avenue, and the city of Hoboken, and the towns of West Hoboken, Union, West New York and Guttenberg, and the townships of North Bergen and Weehawken, and the borough of Secaucus, all in the county of Hudson.

SUMMARY.

Districts.	Population.	Total Vote.	Rep. Plur.	Dem. Plur.
First	165,078	35,466	5,663	
Second	169,037	35,251	6,902	
Third	181,566	36,126	2,038	
Fourth	162,820	34,713	1,106	
Fifth	202,290	38,702	1,536	
Sixth	257,777	45,848	1,991	
Seventh	177,106	35,182	3,699	
Eighth	181,947	33,074	3,196	
Ninth	176,319	32,002	207	
Tenth	209,729	34,903		9,205
Total	1,883,669	361,267	26,338	9,205
Net Republican plurality, 17,133.				



CHAPTER XLVI.

SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR.

By Edwin P. Conklin.

A new period in American history was begun with the Spanish-American War. The United States, after more than a century of isolation, emerged to become a world power. Expansion, imperialism, colonial possessions, dominion over subject territory, the right of self-government, these and related words and phrases were added to the Nation's vocabulary, and were much used until a greater conflict pushed them into the background. The war had been years in the making. Cuba, but a few miles off our southern coast, had become something more than a Spanish possession. It was a neighbor with whom each year brought closer relations. There were things produced there that the United States could use, and our country manufactured articles which the Islanders needed. Commerce was not the only tie, however, nor were dollars the only interests involved. Cuba was being exploited to the destruction of its resources and peoples under a contemptuous and vile Spanish rule; her groans under the oppressive burden of that rule reached sympathetic ears in this country; her efforts towards some measure of liberation had many well-wishers in the states and were sometimes given unneutral and illegal aid. When the Spanish Governor-General Weyler issued his reconcentrado proclamation which ordered the gathering of all the country people of the island in the towns where they were herded behind fences like cattle without the care given them such as would be given the poorest of stock animals, the outrage created a flaming demand in America for intervention.

Business and conservative elements felt that intervention too drastic a measure to be taken. President McKinley desired above all things to avert war. He investigated the possibilities of buying Cuba, only to find that "Spain would never sell the brightest jewel in her crown." The average citizen favored intervention without realizing what it would mean. The sensational papers were all for war. The blowing up of the battleship "Maine" on February 15, 1898, with the loss of 266 men ended American neutrality. The demand for war grew increasingly louder as the country waited forty days for a court of inquiry to place the responsibility for the disaster. This court never reported as to the agency, but said that the means was an external force, probably a mine. Congress definitely laid the blame for the destruction of the "Maine" at Spain's door, declared "that the people of Cuba are and of right ought to be free and independent," and that the United States forces should give aid if necessary in the acquirement of such freedom. On April 23, 1898, a state of war was declared to exist between Spain and this country.

"On May 1, Admiral Dewey sank the Spanish fleet in Manila Bay. On July 3, Sampson and Schley destroyed the other Spanish fleet outside Santiago, and shortly after the Spanish land forces in Cuba surrendered. On

August 12, the war ended with a protocol in which Spain ceded Porto Rico and the island of Guam to the United States. In October, peace commissioners met in Paris, where, on December 10, 1898, the peace treaty was signed. On February 9, 1899, the treaty was ratified by the United States Senate with but one vote to spare. By this treaty Spain formally ceded to the United States the Philippine Islands for a consideration of \$20,000,000, together with the other Spanish possessions mentioned in the protocol." ("Our Times.")

While the war was being waged, New Jersey, by a turn of the political wheel, was more prominent in National Government than at any time previously. Garret A. Hobart was Vice-President, John W. Griggs was a member of the Cabinet serving as the Attorney-General, and William M. Johnson was the First Assistant Postmaster General and the expected successor to a place in the Cabinet, as the Postmaster General's retirement was supposed to be imminent. It is told of Mr. Hobart that he was responsible for hastening our entrance into the Spanish-American War. His relations with McKinley were not those usually existing between Presidents and Vice-Presidents; the two were more like brothers. They met often, had faith in each other's ideas, and the President "found himself depending very largely upon Mr. Hobart's judgment, skill, and adroitness in dealing with men and the problems of state." When the relations between America and Spain had become strained to the breaking point, and the people and Congress were urging the reluctant McKinley to declare war, the Vice-President went to his superior and told him: "Mr. President, if you don't act the people will run over you. They are set on war. They will listen to no compromise. They want to fight. The martial spirit is abroad in the land. They will not end their clamors until you unsheath the sword. You should send to Congress at once the declaration it awaits with such feverish impatience."

"Am I to allow Congress to stand over me with a stop watch?" the President asked.

"Congress is doing it," was the Vice-President's reply, "and it will call 'time' on you if you hesitate another hour."

The next day the message for war reached the House of Representatives, and the conflict was on. (From W. E. Sackett's "Modern Battles of Trenton.")

Upon Attorney-General Griggs devolved not only the regular duties of his office, but the enormous additional amount of work growing out of a war unprecedented in the complicated legal difficulties it created. The increased burdens of unsnarling the knots tied in domestic affairs by the attempt to carry on war by a republic which, as ever, had declared war and then started in to make preparations for it, these were enough to smother any one of less ability than Griggs. The international problems, the necessity of creating legal machinery for insular possessions, the Nation's duties as trustee, the obligations of neutrals, the rights of belligerents, arrangements with Cuba and Porto Rico, the whole legal side of imperialism, these and dozens of other compli-

cations tested the skill of this truly great man and lawyer. In the "Insular Cases," famous in international jurisprudence, Griggs laid down some of the fundamental principles which have since guided the administrative branches of the Federal Government in their dealings with all our extra-territorial dependencies.

To Johnson fell the work of keeping the Post Office Department functioning at better than normal speed under the abnormal conditions of war, and he did a job which won the approval of the President under whom he resigned because of failing health. Incidentally, it was William M. Johnson who, during this busy period, put into permanent form and action, the rural free delivery system.

Back home, New Jersey had a Governor in Foster M. Voorhees who ably furthered the military efforts of the period and by his able administration of affairs, placed New Jersey to the forefront among her sister states in promptitude of the enlistment and equipment of her quota of soldiers, in the whole-hearted support given by the people and government to all subsidiary activities, and whose personal interest in, and attention to, the welfare of the troops mobilized and encamped at Sea Girt helped make this the healthiest camp in the country, a high distinction indeed in a war whose principal human losses were those in the cantonments. General William S. Stryker, a veteran and officer of the Civil War, and the Adjutant-General of the State since 1867, held that office during the war, fulfilling his onerous duties to the satisfaction and honor of all concerned. A skilled writer, particularly on historical subjects, his report of the military activities of New Jersey during the war merits something better than being entombed in the archives of the State. What follows is taken almost verbatim from that report, issued in 1899.

President McKinley, on the 23d of April, 1898, issued a proclamation calling for one hundred and twenty-five thousand volunteers, while upon the 25th of April Congress declared, by act, that war existed "between the United States of America and the Kingdom of Spain," which war had then existed for a space of four days. Upon April 25, Secretary of War R. A. Alger instructed Governor Foster M. Voorhees that New Jersey's quota of the call for one hundred and twenty-five thousand volunteers would be three regiments of infantry to serve for a period of two years. The rendezvous for the State was Jersey City.

The following day a conference of the military authorities of the State was held in the executive chambers at Trenton, the Governor being present, and the next morning an order was issued for the calling out of three regiments of the National Guard as the quota of New Jersey under the first call for troops. From the office of Adjutant-General William S. Stryker upon April 27, general orders were issued, each regiment to be organized into three battalions of four companies each. The regiments detailed for duty were the 1st, 2d, and 3d regiments, and Companies A, C, and G, 6th Regiment, and Company E, 7th Regiment (the companies so named to constitute a battalion of the 3d Regiment) National Guard. The State camp at Sea Girt was desig-

nated as the place for rendezvous, which camp on April 28, was constituted a military post under the command of Major-General Joseph W. Plume, Governor Voorhees having assumed the responsibility of changing the place of rendezvous from Jersey City to Sea Girt, which move was made in absence of "instructions to the contrary" from the Department of War.

Sea Girt was designated as the camp of mobilization for the troops of this State, both before and after their acceptance into the service of the United States, and as a point of rendezvous for the 1st and 2d regiments after their return from Camp Alger, Virginia, and Camp Cuba Libre, Jacksonville, Florida. Its occupancy by the troops covered a period of more than five months, and its sanitary conditions during this time were superior to any of the large camps in the country. This was fully evidenced by the splendid condition of health sustained by the troops during the unusually wet and inclement weather of May and June, followed by intense heat of the later summer months.

When the lamentable conditions attendant at other camp grounds, both north and south, are considered, with their long lists of sick and dead, the direct results, as it has been charged of imperfect sanitary arrangements and alleged mismanagement and negligence in feeding and caring for the troops, it is obvious that the people of this State have much reason for congratulation upon the selection of the beautiful camp grounds at Sea Girt for our troops.

On May 4 the Governor officially offered to the United States Government the camp grounds at Sea Girt and the adjoining property as a military post, stating that it was sufficient for the encampment of twenty thousand troops. The offer was not accepted.

So rapidly did the National Guard of New Jersey mobilize that on Monday afternoon, May 2, at one o'clock, Companies A, C, and G, 6th Regiment, and Company E, 7th Regiment, National Guard, all of which organizations were to be attached to the 3d Regiment, marched into camp. At three o'clock the 1st Regiment, headquarters Newark, and the 3d Regiment, headquarters Elizabeth, arrived at Sea Girt. At four o'clock the same afternoon the 2d Regiment, headquarters Paterson, reported in camp, and twenty-five minutes thereafter Major-General Plume had the camp colors hoisted and Camp Voorhees was formally established.

Captain William C. Buttler, 3d Infantry, United States Army, mustering officer of the New Jersey troops, reported to the Governor, and Captain William C. Gorgas, assistant surgeon, United States Army, reported as the medical officer for the examination of recruits. Company B, 1st Regiment, was the first company mustered into the service of the United States for the war, by Captain Buttler, May 6, and the mustering in of the entire three regiments was concluded Sunday, May 15. Notwithstanding the large amount of clothing, equipments, etc., in possession of the regimental organizations of the three regiments referred to, and in the arsenal of the State, there were some supplies in which the regiments were deficient, notably in the matter of clothing.

On May 16 the 1st Regiment received orders to move to camp Alger, near Washington, and on the evening of May 19 they broke camp at Sea Girt and started for Washington. The regiment was fully armed, uniformed, and equipped, had all the necessary tentage, one hundred thousand rounds of ammunition, ten days' fixed rations, and two days' travel rations. On May 24, Colonel Edward A. Campbell was designated by general orders to form and organize the 1st Brigade, 1st Division, 2d Army Corps, at Camp Alger, Virginia. On July 17 Colonel Campbell was relieved by Brigadier-General Joseph W. Plume. It was in this corps that the 1st New Jersey Regiment remained until the close of its service.

Under orders of May 20 from headquarters, Department of the East, the 3d Regiment of New Jersey was ordered for duty. The colonel with headquarters, unassigned field officers, and one battalion of the regiment were assigned to Pompton Lakes, New Jersey, to relieve Lieutenant-Colonel Henry T. Dechert, and five companies of the 2d Regiment of Pennsylvania Volunteer Infantry stationed there, guarding the Laflin & Rand Powder Works. The lieutenant-colonel and major and the remaining two battalions of the regiment were directed to report to the commanding officer of Fort Hancock for duty at that place. On May 25 the 3d Regiment broke camp at Sea Girt and the 1st Battalion proceeded to Pompton Lakes, Passaic County, New Jersey, and the 2d and 3d battalions to Fort Hancock, Sandy Hook.

On May 30 the 2d New Jersey Regiment was ordered to proceed at once to the national camp at Chickamauga Park, and on June 1 the regiment left Sea Girt for Camp George H. Thomas. While upon their journey the regiment was ordered to advance to Camp Cuba Libre, Jacksonville, Florida.

Although New Jersey had filled three regiments, a call came from the War Department on May 27 that a thousand more men should be enlisted. Several conferences by New Jersey military officers were held on this subject on May 28, 29, 30, and 31, and in response the Governor of New Jersey showed that the State's quota had been 2,862 men, which had been sent into the field. The muster-in rolls showed 3,162 enlisted officers and men in the service of the United States. It was shown the Federal authorities that to increase the existing regiments would be difficult. The three regiments contained men from eighteen towns and cities in the central part of the State. New Jersey requested that a new regiment, recruited from the northern and southern parts of the State, be established.

On June 13 the recruits for the three regiments in the field began to arrive in camp at Sea Girt, and the next day the medical examination and mustering in of recruits began and continued until July 8. The contingent for the 1st Regiment left for Camp Alger on July 1, and on the same day the recruits for the 1st Battalion of the 3d Regiment started for Pompton Lakes. The recruits for the 2d Regiment at Jacksonville, Florida, left Sea Girt July 7, and those for the 2d and 3d Battalions of the 3d Regiment at Fort Hancock, Sandy Hook, New Jersey, July 8.

On August 2 the 1st Regiment, then attached to the 2d Army Corps, by

order of the Secretary of War, was attached to the 4th Brigade of the 3d Army Corps, Major-General Wade, United States Volunteers, commanding, and assigned to duty in Porto Rico. This order, however, was not carried into effect.

In the meantime the 2d New Jersey Regiment, at Jacksonville, had been assigned to the 7th Army Corps, Major-General Fitzhugh Lee commanding.

On September 3 the 1st Regiment, arrived at Sea Girt from camp at Dunn Loring, Virginia, having been ordered to return to New Jersey for muster out, and on September 24 the 2d Regiment arrived at Sea Girt under similar orders.

On Monday, the 26th, the 1st Regiment, on its arrival at Newark, was reviewed by the mayor and received a great ovation from the citizens. The 2d Regiment, also, at the same hour, was reviewed by the Governor at Paterson, and a banquet was given later in the day to the officers and men of the regiment. On Saturday, October 8, the 4th Regiment, which had been encamped nearly three months at Sea Girt, was ordered to Camp George G. Meade, Middletown, Pennsylvania, and it reported there on Sunday morning, October 9, and was assigned to the 1st Brigade, 2d Division, 2d Army Corps.

As early as March 26 the Navy Department began to look toward the Naval Reserves of the several states for aid in furnishing the seamen to take charge of the vessels of the navy in threatened war, and Commander Horace Elmer, United States Navy, with headquarters at the navy yard, New York City, was directed by the Navy Department to prepare a scheme for utilizing the available resources of our Atlantic Coast in the formation of a mosquito fleet. In accordance with the intention of the Navy Department to assign the monitor "Montauk" for duty at Portland, Maine, that vessel was refitted at League Island, Philadelphia, in the early spring of 1898. On March 31 the Navy Department requested that Governor Voorhees immediately proceed to put the Naval Militia of New Jersey in thorough condition to meet any sudden call for their services by the President of the United States. The divisions were to be recruited to their full strength and thoroughly drilled. A careful inspection was ordered of all vessels in the ports of New Jersey that could be utilized for a mosquito fleet.

On April 12 and 13 some detachments of officers and men from the Battalion of the East left Hoboken and reported for duty in the "Montauk," but it was not until April 27 that the monitor was ready for the full complement of officers and crew. In the meantime an exchange was made in the matter of service; the Battalion of the East was relieved and the duty was taken up by the Battalion of the West. Under charge of a detachment of this battalion the "Montauk" sailed from Philadelphia Navy Yard at six o'clock Saturday morning, May 7, and anchored under stress of weather that evening inside the Delaware breakwater. On May 11 the "Montauk" reached Portland, Maine, where she remained during the war. Several officers and men of this detachment remained on the "Montauk" at Portland harbor until the cessation of hostilities; the rest of the officers and men were discharged, and on their way to New Jersey enrolled themselves for service on the U. S. S. "Resolute."

On May 21 a large detachment of the Battalion of the East was mustered into the United States service, and on the 29th of the same month they were transferred from the battalion headquarters on the U. S. S. "Portsmouth" at Hoboken, New Jersey, to the "Badger" at the Morgan Iron Works, New York City. On June 6 the "Badger" sailed for Provincetown, Massachusetts, to report for duty with the North Atlantic squadron; giving assistance to the U. S. S. "San Francisco," which was ashore at Cape Cod. The "Badger" then proceeded to the place of its assignment on the coast of Maine. From June 13 until June 20 the vessel was on this duty, with headquarters in Bar Harbor. On June 26 the "Badger" left Portland, Maine, for Key West, Florida, reaching there July 1 and on July 14 arrived in front of Havana, Cuba, and took part in the blockade of that port for one week. On July 11 the vessel was ordered to Neuvas and the blockading fleet at that port, where she remained until July 26 in active service, preventing many vessels from reaching the harbor. On July 26 they captured three vessels flying Spanish flags and the red cross, and were told that the Spaniards had yellow fever on board, finding nearly four hundred soldiers, but few very sick. A prize crew took these to Havana. The "Badger" subsequently became, for several days, the flagship of Commodore Watson. On August 18 she left Guantanamo for Montauk Point, Long Island, with soldiers of the 34th Michigan Volunteer Infantry, arrived there August 23, and sailed immediately for Boston. On September 26 the "Badger" left Boston for League Island Navy Yard, and on October 7 the detachment of men of the Battalion of the East serving on this steamer was mustered out at Hoboken on the U. S. S. "Portsmouth."

While the monitor "Montauk" was being prepared for service a communication was received from the Navy Department, April 15, calling for a detail of men for service on the U. S. S. "Venezuela." The assignment of this vessel was afterward changed to the U. S. S. "Resolute," the recently purchased auxiliary "Yorktown."

The "Resolute," with several divisions of the Battalion of the West, loaded dynamite mines and gunpowder at Newport, Rhode Island, and then joined the fleet off Santiago de Cuba. Early in June the "Resolute" was employed in the delivery of mines and ammunition between Guantanamo and Santiago. As is well known, the Spanish fleet under General Cervera, came out of the harbor that morning at 9:40, and engaging the American fleet, steamed to the westward. The "Resolute" was in position at that time about one and one-half miles out from Morro Castle and a little to the eastward. The first shot fired by the Spanish fleet struck about twenty-five yards on the starboard quarter of the "Resolute," and according to instructions, the "Resolute" immediately started to notify Admiral Sampson, then some miles away on the U. S. S. "New York." Another shot followed immediately under the stern of the vessel. On reporting to Admiral Sampson he ordered the "Resolute" to proceed immediately to Guantanamo Bay and to notify the U. S. Ships "Massachusetts," "Marblehead," and "Newark" to proceed immediately

to the scene of conflict. They notified the U. S. S. "Harvard" and the transports under her convoy, which immediately put to sea, then notified the U. S. Ships "Indiana" and "Iowa." The "Resolute" was then fired upon by the Socapa Battery at the western entrance of Santiago Harbor, one shot passing between the foremast and the smokestack, and the other just over the two forward guns. After this encounter, the vessel steamed westward and the men saw the complete destruction of the enemy, arriving at the scene of surrender of the "Cristobal Colon" before she struck her flag. The "Resolute" received the prisoners from the "Colon," nineteen officers and four hundred and ninety-five men, and under instructions proceeded to Guantanamo Bay, transferring a portion of the prisoners to the U. S. S. "St. Paul," and the balance to the U. S. S. "Harvard." Having transferred all the ammunition and mines on board the vessel to the U. S. S. "Vulcan," they proceeded north, and Sunday, July 15, arrived off Tompkinsville, Staten Island. At this point they took on stores for sick and wounded at Santiago and nurses for yellow fever sufferers, and on July 19 left for Santiago. On August 12 the "Resolute" was sent to bombard Manzanillo. The bombardment was opened by the U. S. S. "Newark," but on the morning of the 13th they were informed that the protocol of peace had been signed. Another trip was made north from Guantanamo Bay with the U. S. S. Marine Battalion, the vessel was refitted at the Navy Yard for the United States Evacuation Committee, and with them proceeded to Havana, from there to Neuvas.

On October 8, 1898, Commander J. G. Eaton, of the "Resolute," while at Key West, Florida, thus addressed Governor Voorhees:

Today, after a service lasting for five months, the members of the West Battalion, New Jersey Naval Reserves, are detached from this ship and ordered north for honorable discharge.

I cannot allow them to leave the "Resolute" without expressing to you, and, through you, to the State which they have honored, my sense of the patriotism, fidelity, and bravery these reserves have shown during the late war. Not only in the battles off Santiago on July 3d, and off Manzanillo on August 12th, when under fire from the enemy they exhibited coolness, courage, and enthusiasm, but also in the much harder, but less glorious, work at Guantanamo and Santiago they have shown the qualities which command respect and enforce confidence.



CHAPTER XLVII.

THE TURN OF THE CENTURY.

It was now the turn of the century, a period made much of by many writers of the day. There was a great taking account of stock and the making of prophecies. Actually there were no more marked differences in Jersey's affairs from 1899 to 1901 than there is between the day before New Year's and the day after. The Republicans were at the helm, after getting things in such shape as suited them under Griggs and Voorhees, and they were to remain in charge for another decade. It was to be a decade full of changes, excitement, and progress political as well as other, one characterized by successful advances along the line of equalizing the taxation of the railroads, reform of election laws and the establishment of the direct primary, and the regulation of corporations and public utilities. These three were outstanding achievements of the succeeding ten years. Each victory was won only after fierce conflict, increase in the numbers of warring factions in both parties, and the rise to power of new groups. One might word this statement differently; some might place above these three the advances made in education, in the building of roads, in the protection of the potable waters of the State, the reintroduction of the liquor question, or even the partial solution of the numerous governmental problems caused by the remarkable growth made by New Jersey during these years. Fairness requires the concession that complete victories in equal taxation, primary laws, and the curbing of public utilities were not won until after the decade had passed and Woodrow Wilson had become the Chief Executive. Whether he "won the war" in these achievements or was fortunate enough to be in at the finish may be just as debatable as to what was the part played by the United States in the World War. It all depends upon one's point of view, and both questions must be left for distant future observers who, from the peak of years, may be able to see more clearly, judge with less bias and heat, and place the laurels where they will not be jarred off by every new twist of public opinion.

In 1900 another Presidential campaign was underway, with a probable renomination of the same candidates for the office as had run three years before, but with different issues up for discussion. The Democratic platform made anti-imperialism the premier issue, anti-monopoly secondary, and free silver a very minor third. Bryan in accepting the nomination made one of those shifts in preachments which he performed so readily, and devoted his advances to anti-imperialism, although he more than any other person was responsible for the acceptance of a treaty which gave the United States foreign possessions and was practically a declaration of war upon the people of the Philippines (Senator G. F. Hoar). The Republican party took up the gage thrown it, but before the campaign had gone far it was making anti-trust promulgations which, while pleasing the greater part of the country, did not suit certain sections in the East, of which New Jersey was one. With

Roosevelt replacing Hobart on the ticket, with Sewall dead and the minor bosses in the State of his party squabbling as to whom should take the lead, with the corporations still strongly entrenched in local parties, McKinley's plurality of 1896 shrank nearly thirty thousand, or more than a third.

Trust Legislation—One very galling feature of the Presidential campaign was the unwelcome publicity given New Jersey as the "Mother of Trusts." She was accused of giving birth to these Frankenstein monsters and turning them loose to devour other states. The accusation was made that: "It was from her that they were deriving their powers of stock-watering, capital-inflating, merging, absorbing, interlocking, and all the other forms of juggling that had given them their ascendancy. . . . The charters she offered lured them. They rushed to Trenton in droves to possess themselves of the limitless powers the charters conferred." They scored her for "mothering the cormorants" even while they (other states) transplanted her trust-nurturing statutes in their own code of laws. The people of New Jersey strongly resented such vicious attacks, although not enough so, until about 1908, to do any real trust busting, the awakened spirit manifested itself in the making of Wilson the Governor. Professor Wilson campaigned with attacks upon the Jersey laws favoring trusts, and hit a popular keynote, but he did nothing about them until after he had been elected President.

The case against New Jersey on the trust question was decidedly strong, even with all due allowances being given to the jealousy of other states who craved the profits derived from the thousands of customers for Jersey charters, immunities and protection. The State had gone into the business first and through experience knew best how to handle it. While New York and Ohio courts were placing a quietus on monopolistic combinations, when all over the country in 1893 there was sweeping a flood of anti-trust enactments, New Jersey, under Abbett, had already upon its books laws authorizing the creation of "holding corporation," an effective substitute for the outlawed trusts. (Railroads and public utility companies were excepted.) This law facilitated combinations by the purchase of stock in other companies "Manufacturing and producing materials necessary to its business." This statute was broadened so as to permit directors to "purchase, . . . the shares or bonds . . . of any other corporation or corporations of this or any other State." Then when New York began investigating the affairs of New Jersey trusts, the Legislature passed an act reading: "No action or proceeding shall be maintained in any court in this State against any stockholder, officer, or director of any New Jersey corporation for the purpose of enforcing any personal liability . . . whether penal or contractual, if created by the statutes or laws of any other State."

Frankly, Jersey once on the business of protecting corporations, or "trusts," if you will, made a thorough job of it. She was no mother of trusts, this honor may be credited to the tariff, to war, to "freight rebates" by the railroads or to various phases of financial growth and industry. But New Jersey was a capable dry nurse, and thousands of combinations came under

her care. "This relaxation of corporation laws resulted in an immense increase in combination. In the three years preceding 1901—the year of the high tide for holding companies—183 were organized, making in all a total capitalization of over four billions of dollars—one-twentieth of the total wealth of the United States, nearly twice the amount of money in circulation, and more than four times the capitalization of all the manufacturing consolidations organized between 1860 and 1893." (Gilbert H. Montague, in "Trusts of Today," published in 1904.)

Whether it was because New Jersey politics had since early railroad days been peculiarly the football of moneyed interests, or because of its proximity to Wall Street and its influence, or because the State supplied the termini of so many railroads, or simply because the fees of foreign corporations lightened the tax burden, or just because such a man as James B. Dill, the supposed author of the practice, and others of his ilk knowing a good thing when they saw it pushed it along to the limit, whether for these or other reasons, New Jersey played nursemaid to harried corporations and was paid well for doing so, and many of her best citizens were unashamed of her skill and profit. Even Wilson's belated "Seven Sisters" anti-trust laws—of which more later—did not change matters except for a short period. Within seven years after his departure to the Presidency, the old laws had been substantially reenacted, and Jersey is today practically back to her position of the early nineteen hundreds. She now has more competitors, for the interim in 1912-16 weakened the policy and gave other states the opportunity of doing just what had been so derogated of New Jersey in former years. William H. Speer has made the undisputed statement that the holding company device "is now an accepted fact in the policy and jurisprudence of every advanced State in the United States."

These general paragraphs about New Jersey's position before the Nation and her own people on the whole chartering and protection of combinations, or trusts, are necessary because that attitude has been always in the background of her political history since the beginning of the present century. The reactions of the electorate to corporations as these affected industry, labor and politics, are a continuous part of that history and had been since Civil War times. They are all a part of the conflict between capital and labor which began in New Jersey with the 'seventies and rose to increasing heights up to and beyond the decade between 1900 and 1910, and, therefore, can be dealt with chronologically. This may also be said of that never-ending striving for equal taxation which is older than the State. The fight for the control of public utilities is somewhat a part of the Wilsonian era and will be summarized in later paragraphs. Since some of the steps taken in the changes made in methods of election and the selection of candidates have already been indicated, it is manifestly impossible to map the course of progress here without covering ground already gone over. All of these, however, came very much to the fore after 1900, and must be kept in mind as one wades through the muddy waters of the next dozen years of govern-

mental rule and misrule, bosses and factions, marches and counter marches, manipulations and compromises, candidates and elections, graft and investigations, law-making and repeals which go to make up political history.

In 1901 it was again the year for nominating a candidate for the executive chair and Franklin Murphy, of Newark, was named on the Republican ticket, while James M. Seymour, mayor of Newark, by the grace of James Smith, Jr., was named after much geeing and hawing by the Democratic convention. Seymour was really something of an anti-Smith man and had, therefore, been checked in his gubernatorial aspirations three years back, but the smiling boss, no longer expectant of being sent again to the National Senate, favored him, in 1901, over less strong candidates, or he may have been uninterested generally. Seymour was the perfect counter to Murphy in this year of anti-trust agitations. A poor man was he, a mechanical engineer, heavy-faced and heavy-minded, with that dull sobriety which so often is taken for serious thoughtfulness and impregnable honesty, just the figure to head an anti-trust campaign on an anticapitalization platform.

Franklin Murphy was a successful varnish manufacturer, a millionaire, a captain of industry, a believer in "trusts," one who had been a beneficiary of "high tariff"; in short, exactly the sort of man, as viewed by the average partisan, whom the Democrats might be able to defeat. "Mr. Murphy had never disguised his sympathy with the larger business combinations which had been fruitful of wonderful business achievements that are beyond the reach of individual efforts. He was openly for the new industrial method of the age. And after he became Governor, and at the time when public feeling against the trusts was even more inflamed, he showed the courage of his convictions by making a defense of the combinations and a laudation of the State's system of corporation laws the feature of one of his annual messages to the Legislature. 'There is no more occasion for alarm over them than there was for our alarm over the ogres of our childhood days.' . . . "

He was a descendant of Irish ancestors who had come to America in 1756, a son Robert settling in Jersey City during his boyhood. Franklin had entered the Union Army at the age of sixteen and served throughout the length of the Civil War, being mustered out with the rank of lieutenant. In the autumn of 1865 he began the making of varnish in his home city, Newark, which industry had grown under his direction until it was the largest of its kind in this country, with branches in many parts of the Americas and Europe. He was no novice in politics; had served his city on the Common Council, and the State in the Assembly. In 1892 he was made chairman of the Republican State Committee, upon the death of Garret Hobart, becoming his successor as the Jersey representative in the National Committee. He was the active leader of the campaigns which began the Republican régime in the State, and had dared to challenge the party leadership of General Sewell a few years earlier with the intent of getting greater recognition and representation of the northern part of Jersey in Republican counsels and offices. Murphy might well have been Governor of the State before 1902 had he not

yielded place to others in the interests of harmony. A delightful chap, cultured, social, wide-travelled, a philanthropist, affiliated with numerous clubs, societies and organizations covering a wide field of interests. As park commissioner of Essex, he helped greatly in the creation of its magnificent system of parks. In 1900, as Commissioner of the United States to the Paris Exposition, he had won credit for himself and his country. But as a candidate for the Governorship, he had the misfortune to be a practical, successful business man, and New Jersey, for a half century, had never elected, with the exception of a Civil War general, any but lawyers as its Chief Executive. Perhaps there is nothing unusual for a State which is the bedroom, and little else of so many workers in other states, to delegate its governmental (and other) affairs to lawyers.

When the dust of the campaign and the election had settled, Franklin Murphy, the business man, had won by a vote of 183,814 to 166,681 for Seymour, a plurality of 17,133. Straightway there began a series of explanations of the election of the plutocratic varnish maker. There were accusations of too much corporation interference, of bribery, both with little reason; that Boss Smith had knifed Seymour, that the introduction of local affairs in the November election had drowned out the gubernatorial, that Democracy would have won anyway had not the assassination of President McKinley changed the whole atmosphere and discussion of the State campaign. The Republican organizations were very self-congratulatory; the party was now definitely on the top of the political heap and each clique claimed the honors—and the spoils—for having climbed so high. The result was the usual one, over anxiety to hold the spotlight, to grab everything in sight, which led fights between factions and bosses in the party to the weakening of its hold upon the electorate. Lentz, boss of the Essex Republicans, was refused election to the rich office of sheriff; in Middlesex, Boss Strong made the mistake of getting into the Senate; Mark Fagan, just elected the first Republican mayor of Jersey City in years, repudiated Boss Dickinson, the appointee, as Secretary of the State by Governor Murphy. And there were independents, progressives, in large numbers in both parties. The legislatures during Murphy's administration were strongly Republican.

Mr. Murphy was just as thorough an organization man as any, and made many appointments as such, but he must have been well pleased at the partial freedom given him, as Governor, by the bickerings within the ranks of both parties. His business training and unlawyer-like attitude toward precedents came to the surface in the beginning of his reign. His inaugural speech was a brief, direct, crisp speech which outlined the things he hoped to see done, such as stopping the pollution of the Passaic River, amending the election laws so as to make the secret ballot an actuality, the passage of a primary law, safeguarding the State's funds and securing interest upon the same, better disposition of the treasury's surplus, better labor and school legislation, rehabilitation of the National Guard, and the provision of a home for the consumptive poor.

His earliest act as Governor reflected even more of the man of business

than his introductory address. Acting on the notion that officials in corporations were usually expected to be found regularly in their offices, so as to do their work, and forgetting that customs reaching back into the dim distant past made work the duty of subordinates while the heads of the departments drew their salaries and roamed the State building up the party, Murphy set an example which he desired others to follow, by making Trenton his place of residence, and being always on his job and accessible at all times. He even tried to have a "Governor's House" reëstablished, but was unsuccessful. Neither by precept or practice was he able to affect the ancient custom of absenteeism.

The Governor quietly investigated the activities of the departments under his charge and used what power he had to have them run economically and efficiently. Before he left Trenton, the State departments were submitting their books to a State Auditor, an altogether new requirement. The State's funds, which never before had drawn any interest from the banks in which they were deposited, now brought in enough interest to pay the Governor's salary, with four times that amount over. Where most of the Attorney-General's work had been done by a large and expensive group of special counsels, an assistant of modest salary did the most of the legal business. The Governor, believing that the conditions under which factory hands labored and lived should be improved, put the matter up to the State's Factory Inspector, only to find that the latter not only would not do anything about it, but challenged the right of the Chief Executive to interfere in his department. Murphy promptly asked the Legislature to pass a law empowering governors to remove offending officials. Ex-Senator Ward made a hasty departure as Factory Inspector, and Lewis T. Bryant, of Atlantic City, became the head of a thoroughly renovated department of factory inspection (although this came later), and one of the beneficent results was the bringing to an end of child labor in New Jersey. Colonel Bryant proved so remarkably capable that he was kept in the office when, some years later, there was a change in the party control of New Jersey.

In furtherance of Governor Murphy's humanitarian ideas, particularly those dwelt upon in his inaugural, laws were introduced which were the first enacted in Jersey looking to the prevention and cure of tuberculosis. The State Sanitorium at Glen Gardner had its inception in 1902 in a bill passed and the naming of a board of managers, of whom Dr. Charles I. Kipp, recently deceased, was the president, and for whom the mountain on which the sanatorium was built was named. Another move in the same direction was the appointment of a commission charged with the supervision of tenement houses, whereby it was expected that 15,000 dwellings, in which lived a sixth of the State's population, and in which eighty per cent. of the deaths from tuberculosis occurred, might be altered or renovated as to reduce the menace of this disease. The plan proved ineffective; when the owners of 70,000 houses began matching their wits against those of the commission, the whole enactment was made a farce, until legislatures of later years put teeth into the laws.

The making of war upon tuberculosis was but one of several projects in which the Governor was deeply interested; another, in which he eventually became interested and to which he applied the pressure of his position, was somewhat forced upon him. This was the attack made on the educational system of the State, the preparations for which had been made under Governor Voorhees. School legislation always carried political dynamite in it and it was impossible to judge which way the pieces would fly, or whom they would hit when the thing exploded. Murphy, no doubt, preferred not to tamper with educational matters, both because he was a wise politician, and particularly because with so much agitation against corporations, the subject was particularly unsafe at that time. Schools and trusts seemed to become bed fellows for the reason that the corporations were Jersey's chief provider of funds, and schools were the one biggest item of expense. Both were exceedingly fast growing babes.

In 1901 the disbursements for schools almost equalled the total State expenditures for every other purpose, and if the donations made to certain educational institutions and the costs of collecting the school tax be transferred from the State Disbursements to the School Disbursements, as they should have been, the latter far exceeded the former. Yet the Educational Department was like another *Oliver Twist*, calling for more. Meanwhile both the number of corporations taxed in the State, and the sums received had increased by leaps and bounds; in 1901 the amount of tax assessed was nearly double that of 1899, the total being about two and one-third million dollars. The tax on the railroads added another million and a half, the two totalling a sum greater than the whole of the disbursements by New Jersey that same year, exclusive of the school expenditures. The result at the end of Voorhees's administration was a beautiful surplus of more than two million dollars with every prospect of plump increases for a period of years.

The proper thing to do, under the circumstances, was to pass over the surplus provided by one bed-fellow to the other which stood in such great need. But there were two difficulties, from the political point of view, inherent in such a transfer: First, it drew too much attention to the fattest baby, and altogether too much attention already was being given to the corporations, railroads, combinations, trusts; second, there were many petty grafters having access to school funds which were expended as local instead of State matters, and if the State gave great slices of the surplus to the "sacred cause of education" the State would certainly insist on oversight of the uses made of its gift, which would spell the end of local looting and officialdom. It was well realized that New Jersey had fallen behind the procession in her system of education, and in the meagre results produced from large expenditures. It also was well known that this backward condition could be improved by a comparatively simple revision of the school laws and an enlargement of the powers of the State Board of Education. So many toes would be trodden upon in making these simple changes that, since 1874, there had been few legislators or executives who dared suggest giving Jersey's educational system the necessary overhauling.

Governor Voorhees was responsible for the necessity of legislating on the dangerous question during Murphy's term when, in 1898, following an example set by his predecessor, he advocated the revision and codification of the school laws. He pointed out that the last revision had been made in 1874 and that since that time "numerous amendments had been enacted, many of them local and special in character. The administrative system of schools has changed, and separate enactments had been passed to provide for these changes. General laws upon other subjects, and the provisions of different municipal charters, have still further affected and modified the body of school laws, until it has become so confused and complex that it is impossible to give a safe opinion as to the exact provisions of the laws." To remedy this confusion a commission was appointed consisting of Hon. E. C. Stokes, S. St. J. McCutcheon and J. B. Betts to codify and revise school laws and to present a report in the form of a bill which might be acted upon by the Legislature. It was pretty well understood in political and educational circles that the object of this action by Governor Voorhees was the reorganization and rehabilitation, by radical measures if called for, of the State educational system in preparation for the reception of large bonuses from the surplus.

The report of this committee was made during the first year of the Murphy régime, and the discussion of the law introduced took up a great deal of the time of two Legislatures and of a special session. It was opposed by some politicians and teachers, but was passed readily enough only to meet with an adverse decision by the courts, in 1903, to be followed by a hurried patching up of the objectionable features at an extra session. In the reconstructed form the law was one of the most marked advances made in New Jersey education, a potent agent in the regeneration of what was an almost archaic system.

It enforced, more vividly than before, the theory that the schools, though maintained by the money of the local taxpayers, are a State and not a local institution. The act took them out of the surrounding atmosphere of the local officialism, and made a separate corporation of each of the local school boards. These boards, through a board of estimate, were to fix the amount required for school purposes, and the local financial authorities had no choice save to put the requisition into the annual tax budgets. The fear that they might demand more than the localities could afford led to the constitution of the boards of estimates on lines that conserved the local interests. In the bodies of five the mayor and two members of the local finance department were to have seats. The two others were to be members of the local Board of Education whom the mayor had appointed. The inclusion of the two school trustees in the board was thought to be a sufficient guarantee that the demands of the schools would secure reasonable recognition. So as to avoid the entanglement of the school appropriations in the cheese-paring process that attends the annual attempt to adjust the local cast to the department demands upon it,

the new law directed that the Board of Estimate's requisition should be made up two or three months in advance of the make-up of the general local budget. The effect of that provision was to take care of the school teachers before the politicians were allowed to crowd in for their share of the public pelf.

An even more important provision was that empowering the Board of Estimate in each locality to bond the municipality for new schools up to three per cent. of the local ratables. Under that provision, City Superintendent Henry W. Snyder has been able to give to Jersey City a long line of beautiful new school buildings that at last meet the demands for school room. It has enabled City Superintendent Addison B. Poland, of Newark, to work the wonders there that have made the Newark schools a model for the country.

For the rest the act greatly enlarged the powers of the State Board of Education; made it the absolute arbiter as to the character and capacity of the school districts; scooped into the school revenue the \$200,000 per year income from the riparian fund, an allowance from the State's general fund, the product of the State school tax and the local school tax as well, and the railroad tax paid into the State in excess of the one-half of one per cent. which the State reserved for running expenses; authorized the State Superintendent to withhold the State moneys from districts that did not toe the mark of the law; forced connection of the teachers with the Teachers' Retirement Fund; enacted that all school districts should provide ample accommodations for all of school age, which was fixed from five to twenty; reënforced the policy of compulsory education; revived the truant officer, whom the communities with inadequate school room had prudently abstained from appointing, and generally set up a school paternalism over communities and citizens. (William E. Sackett, "Modern Battles of Trenton," Vol. II.)

Direct Primaries—One of the most important political issues with which New Jersey has had to deal was brought before the Legislature with the consent and backing—reluctant, some insist—of Governor Murphy. This was the direct primary problem, the partial solution of which was embodied in a law signed by the Chief Executive in 1903. The enactment was a long stride forward in the State's progress toward self-government. The primaries of that day oftentimes made a farce of the franchise; voters had little to say about for whom they might vote and less assurance that their votes would count as cast. The county committees controlled the whole mechanism of balloting, and these, under the direction of the county leaders, who in turn were at the beck and call of still greater bosses, could be depended to return pre-ordained results with great regularity. Theoretically there was nothing to prevent any number of people from getting together for the purpose of nominating anyone they chose. Did not the Federal Constitution guarantee them this right? But it takes organization to get results, the best organization is certain of winning, and, as a rule, organizers are individuals who create machinery only to serve their own purposes.

Election scandals had featured Jersey politics for years; the more intelligent element in both parties were becoming restive. The so-called independent vote is always large and powerful if aroused. Canny political leaders, good and bad, realized that something must be done or an awakened independent electorate might organize and get in the habit of organizing and voting, which would be very bad indeed for the regulars of the parties. There were also within the ranks of the legislators "new idea," or "progressive," members who must be appeased with the granting of some of the demands they were making. A move in some direction had to be made. Thus was the stage set for passing of a direct primary law, to which Governor Murphy was willing to append his signature.

The first step was taken in the legislation of 1903 by the appointment of a committee consisting of ex-Senator Stokes, George L. Record and Joseph L. Munn to formulate a bill providing for open primaries, "in which party electors could, without the intervention of committee-made conventions, make their own nominations or local officials." Originally the reform was intended to cover practically the whole field of politics from Governor and Congressmen down to the minor officials, but the committee realizing that to take in too much territory was to lose it all, confined the bill coming from their hands simply to the nominations for county and city officials. Granting all due deference and praise to the other members of the committee there was but one who had experience, one who had carried on a long continued fight for such legislation, and he the one who probably worded the measure as it was presented to the Legislature: "I mean," to quote another, "George L. Record, with his splendid equipment of intellect, learning, untiring energy and insight into human nature, a profound student of politics and a natural leader of men."

This fighting gentleman from Hudson had become a member of an independent Democratic organization, in 1892, to contest the control of the party by Robert Davis and Dennis McLaughlin. In the search for weapons he became interested in the direct primary as a means by which party voters, without the intervention of a convention, could nominate officials. He was promised, by Davis, the regular Democratic nomination for Congressman if he would agree to forget all this foolishness and quit the new organization. Record offered a compromise: If, instead of a convention, the party would hold an open primary for the selection of the nominees for Congressman and two county officers whose places were to be filled that year, he would abide by the vote and support the winning ticket. Davis agreed. The local campaign which followed was full of humorous incident, as were the results of the ballot. The regular ticket received 14,000 votes while the Record faction polled but 2,000. Quite certainly there were not 2,000 votes cast in the whole county for anybody. Record abided by the decision, but was convinced that the direct primary, to be efficient, must be brought under the control of the State.

To this end Mr. Record drew what he believes was the first direct primary statute drawn in America, one carrying substantially all the features

of the law under which the State now operates. These features were "that any person might become a candidate in any party on filing with the county clerk a petition signed by a limited number of voters, requesting that the person named be put upon the official ballot as candidate; it provided further that the election officers should act as a primary board, and that both primaries should be held at the same time and place, from one o'clock in the afternoon to nine o'clock at night, and should be surrounded with all of the safeguards of the general election, and that no ballot should be voted except the ballot printed by the county clerk and handed out by the officials, upon which the voter could indicate his choice in a booth with a pencil. This bill provided all the necessary machinery for carrying out the provisions of the bill." (Record.)

Record had little success in getting anyone to take any interest in his measure until he put it before Governor-elect George T. Werts, a skilled politician and a man of great ability in the drafting of bills. Upon being persuaded to read the bill carefully he turned to its author and remarked: "George, that damned thing will actually work." Record recounts, "He then proceeded, to my surprise, to take a keen interest in the measure, he helped me to redraft the bill, making many improvements and suggestions out of his experience, which was so much greater than mine, but not altering any of the essential details. He then induced the late Senator Winton, of Bergen County, a Democrat, to introduce this bill, which was known as the Winton Primary Bill. It occasioned some little discussion in the newspapers, but aroused no interest in the Legislature, and was not reported out of committee." Although backed by Governor Werts and recommended in his first annual message to the Legislature, January, 1893, it bore no fruit at this time in Jersey, but copies of that bill were the model for primary laws in several states, notably Oregon, Minnesota and Wisconsin.

Undismayed, Record turned his attention to other progressive measures, switched his party allegiance, and suggesting action on the question of open primaries to each succeeding Governor, but all to no avail until 1902 and Franklin Murphy, for whom he had stumped the State. A committee appointed by the Governor stood two to one against a direct primary statute, but were willing to report on an official primary, and such a law was passed in 1902 with extreme difficulty, every county chairman of the Republicans and the whole Democratic machine opposing it; it was a compromise measure. The features of the act were: all primaries must be conducted under public supervision by the same officials as those who conducted general elections and all party caucuses were abolished; any person wishing to become a candidate for a delegate to a local or State election could file a petition signed by ten party voters with the county clerk. A day was appointed for the primary in September, which was known as registration day, and the usual election places were provided as places for holding the primary, which was held from nine to one P. M. At this primary any candidate for delegate to a local or State convention could be voted for, if his name had been put upon the ticket printed by the county clerk from the petitions for him.

"Therefore, everybody that wanted to be a delegate had an even chance with any other candidate favored by the organization, so far as the printing of the ballot was concerned and so far as the casting of it was affected."

There was one small insertion into the bill which led to unforeseen and somewhat startling results. This was to the effect that any person filing a petition to have his name on the official primary ballot as a candidate to a local or State convention, could request that the county clerk print on the primary ballot opposite his name the words, "Choice for —— (Governor, State Assemblyman, or any other office for which nominations were to be made)," and under that caption state the name of his choice for that office. This joker, for which Record was undoubtedly responsible, contained the essential idea of the direct primary vote. There were other provisions, good and bad, which did not make the law the most efficient legislation, but it was as good as could be procured at the time, and it did make it possible to fight the political machines, and did make possible a fair count of ballots and a choice of nominees by the voters as a whole. The first important contest under the new act was that made by Everett Colby, who won with the aid of the little joker above mentioned.

Everett Colby, wealthy, socially well connected, ambitious and able, was an Assemblyman in 1902, when Boss Lentz was unwise enough to offer himself as a candidate for sheriff of Essex County, to be emphatically rejected. Colby sought the Speakership of the House, but lost the honor because Lentz used his influence against him. He already had proved very intractable under the direction of the boss who had been instrumental in his election to the Assembly, introducing bills contrary to orders, affiliating himself with the "new idea" crowd, and otherwise showing himself unmanageable politically. He, therefore, was told by Lentz, who had been grooming him for a State Senatorship, and probably to become Governor, that he would not be renominated for even Assemblyman. Colby, considering his political career at an end, joined a New York brokerage firm and planned to drop out of Jersey politics. Record wished it otherwise and pointed out that overlooked insertion in the primary law, the advantage of which Colby could take by forming an organization and having a complete set of delegates to the county convention printed upon the primary ballot, with, opposite the names of these candidates the words, "Choice for State Senator, Everett Colby." The disgruntled Assemblyman jumped at the chance, and, after an exciting tilt, was nominated for the Senate and won in the election. Twelve Colby candidates for the Assembly were named at the same primary, and on election day the Colby forces triumphed almost completely. Only to realize the importance of seeing their own men selected for seats on the county committee prevented the ousting of Lentz, who won the committee chairmanship over Lathrop Anderson, of the new era coterie. Record went into the primaries at this time in Hudson County, but Boss Dickinson was too canny to let the law have its way and calmly stole the primary. Record lost, but the Assemblyman elected under Dickinson's orders leaned heavily to the progressive side so that Record's fight was not without results.

There were other reforms of the election system affected while Murphy was in office, but these were evidences of general dissatisfaction and attempts at change rather than important legislation. The more cynical looked upon them as attempts to muddle the electorate, to make voting more difficult to the ordinary citizen, and thus make it easier for the political leaders to retain control. The Australian ballot device had bewildered many and drove the more backward from the polls. Now this had become familiar and the bosses were looking around for something to puzzle the timid and the foreign element. On the other hand, the reformers desired some method by which, once a citizen had given expression to his wish in an election, that wish might be recorded without fail and not be subject to manipulation. The voting machine, recommended by Governor Werts, in 1893, and by Murphy eleven years later, was seized upon by both reformers and politicians as the thing that was needed. A State Voting Machine Commission was appointed, and \$40,000 was voted to purchase eighty-one mechanical devices of knobs and bars, wheels and springs, clicks and levers, to receive and register ballots. The purchase of 1,500 additional machines was recommended, the total cost of the novelty being estimated at \$500,000. Nearly a half of this large amount was expended before a halt was called, while meantime there was a steady tide of adverse opinion sweeping against their use. In 1908 special votes taken in 215 districts where the machines were in service resulted in 211 voting that they be expelled. In 1909 there were 35 districts, and in 1910, there were 17 who repudiated the device, while in 1911 popular clamor caused the repeal of the law. The chief objection to the machines were that no voter was able to see for himself exactly how he had voted, nor could he be certain that his vote had been correctly recorded and counted.

The attempt to pass a river purification act was but one step in the long journey which legislation made in the remedying of the evils caused by the use of the upper waters of the Passaic and other streams for drinking waters, and the emptying of sewage into the lower portions of the streams. The bill was passed by the Assembly forty-eight to seven, but was turned over to a commission by the Senate, where it lay buried for several years. The story of the "Cleansing of the Passaic" is both long and modern. While under Governor Murphy impetus was given to a movement which eventually accomplished great things, it was little more than an impetus.

The eventful reign of Governor Franklin Murphy was about to end, the Legislature of 1904 was nearing its close, with peace of a sort fluttering its wings, and the election of another Republican Governor and Legislature seemingly assured when the issues of the "new idea" and of equal taxation flared again, and together, into sudden and violent flames, threatening the future of the party in power. A session was just about concluded wherein the perennial bill for the abandonment of the Morris Canal had been squelched, and it was thought by the "regulars" that enough had been done in opposition to the corporations of the State, particularly the railroads. But those of the "New Idea" thought otherwise; one of the principal tenets of this group was the increase of the taxation of railroads until it was on a par with the taxation

of individuals. The securing of a primary law was considered but a prelude to the election of progressives who, among other reforms, would make it possible to collect from the railroads and public utilities much larger sums than ever had been done.


Mark M. Fagan had been elected mayor of Jersey City, the municipality which more than any other suffered from the presence of so much low taxed railroad property within its limits. His abrupt rise from a \$15 a week job at one jump to a \$5,000 position as the executive of an important city is one of the interesting anomalies of American politics; his amazing victory over the Democratic machine of that city—he was the first Republican mayor in years—was another. Fagan became the mouthpiece of the “new idea” element. George Record was the brains of the group, the man of ideas. Everett Colby, just arrived, was the figurehead, the aristocrat of influential connections. There were a number of other names which might be mentioned, but the progressives of that time were but few and had some strength only as they represented the popular mind, and held that power which is that of a compact minority. Opposed to these few were the railroads and corporations of the State, including the Public Service Corporation, which was but a year or so old, and taking an active interest in politics. Then there were the regulars of both major parties.

In 1902, Record, who had become familiar with the injustice of the railroad tax laws while campaigning with Abbett, and had later been the corporation counsel of Jersey City, drew a bill providing that railroad property should be assessed upon the same basis as any other property. But not a member of the Assembly would introduce the bill. In 1904 he succeeded in getting the measure brought before the House, but it was promptly smothered in a committee. Meanwhile the Republicans in the Legislature had been so incensed by the manoeuvres of the Fagan-Record-Colby group that nothing proposed by it received any consideration. The climax and the explosion came just when it was least desired, in the last days of the 1904 Legislature. Mr. Fagan gave out a letter to the press addressed to Governor Murphy, stating the grievances caused by the smothering of the bill by a Republican committee, which was accused of standing for special privileges to the railroad corporations. It called upon him to work for the interests of the people, “and admonished him of the certain fall of his party unless, by the passage of the Jersey City bills, there were signs of a change of heart—and front—by the Senate and House.”

The fat was in the fire, the progressives had thrown down the gage; the letter caused great popular interest. It was recognized that the near future would see great battles over equal taxation, and these under experienced direction on one side and spectacular leadership on the other. As is well known, the railroad taxation bill of 1904, amended a bit, was one of the features of future legislation until the special low rate enjoyed by the transportation systems was eliminated. Since, after its passage, the railroads paid an average of more than \$5,000,000 yearly than before, it shows what losses the State had suffered for years and the stake these corporations had



NEWARK CITY HALL AND ANNEX



PUBLIC BATH HOUSE—CITY OF NEWARK



ESSEX COUNTY COURT HOUSE, NEWARK—Annex in rear



BERGEN COUNTY COURT HOUSE AND JAIL—HACKENSACK

in the long continued fight which they made against any increase in their responsibilities and expenses.

As a bit of a secret, or forgotten history, it may be told on the best of authority that the Fagan "letter" was neither written by him, nor was its delivery placed in his hands. It was intended to be sent directly to the Governor, with the expectation that he would show it to the party leaders, who would offer some form of compromise rather than have it published just prior to a general election. Governor Murphy held a conference with the gentlemen in question, who had agreed that they were ready to appoint a commission the next year looking to the elimination of the railroad privileges. The bearer of the letter, who was neither Mr. Record nor Mr. Fagan, not being satisfied with this reply, gave it to the newspapers for publication.

Fagan organized an Equal Tax Association of Mayors, many of the latter being Democrats; Record addressed audiences all over New Jersey; Colby gathered about him the nucleus of what was to become the "People's Lobby," which proved such a thorn in the flesh to the succeeding Governor. Revolt was in the air and party managers became conciliatory. A commission was appointed during the last days at Trenton to study the problem introduced and to report conclusions to the next Legislature. And so ended Murphy's "business" régime. He did not withdraw from politics, however; in 1908 the former Governor seemed destined to become the running mate of Taft on the Republican ticket. The National Committee was lined up in his favor, Taft regarded the arrangement agreeably, but last minute political exigencies required concessions to New York State, which led to the nomination of James Sherman for the Vice-Presidency.

Governor Stokes—The volcanic rumblings of the spring days of 1904 session, with the attendant appointment of a non-committal committee to investigate and report on some means of adjusting railroad relations to taxation and the reverse, had a marked bearing upon the candidacy and campaign of the autumn. The nomination of Edward Casper Stokes by the Republicans for Governor had been pre-determined upon, but his supposed long connections with "big business"—principally as a banker—his years as first lieutenant-general to Sewell, who was closely tied to the interests of the Pennsylvania Railroad, did not make that nomination so desirable as it had been when he stood aside to permit the selection of Murphy three years back. To many he was too much the friend of the corporations—of this he was to be accused often later—so that his candidacy was considered something of defiance to popular sentiment, particularly as represented by the gentlemen of the New Idea coterie.

Stokes was nominated by acclamation, his name being the only one presented to the convention. The opposition party chose one Charles C. Black, an extreme physical contrast to Stokes, but similar as to his supposed connections with the horrific trusts. In the campaign which followed each party accused the other's candidate of being the "friend of the railroads" and

lauded their own as valiant advocates of equal taxation. Both were either tarred with the same brush, or, as the future disclosed, neither favored the domination of the State by any group of corporations. Stokes won by a vote of 231,363 to 179,919, plurality of 51,644. This was the largest plurality ever given a Governor in New Jersey up to that time, and the third largest in history, the two others being that received by Larson, in 1928, and by Edge, in 1916. It will be remembered that the total number of votes cast in 1928 was very much more than four times that polled nearly a quarter of a century earlier, due to the extraordinary increase in population and the addition of the women's vote. Stoke's achievement stands out in Republican history, and was the high light of that party's control of the State in the period preceding Wilson.

The Governor merited his promotion, for he had been prominent in Jersey politics since 1890, when he was elected to the Assembly. A member of the Senate for two terms, he was chosen its President in 1895. As a member of the House he was active in opposing race track legislation and the coal combine bill, and had introduced bills protective of the interests of labor. Always the student, a marvel of mentality and erudition, he ever had been keenly interested in educational progress; he was elected, in 1889, superintendent of public schools of his district. In the Senate he was chairman of the commission which revised and codified the school laws; was the originator of the principle under which a million dollars and more were annually appropriated from the State's funds for local school purposes. None more than he advocated increases in State appropriations for its education system.

Edward C. Stokes had the misfortune of being born in Philadelphia, but fortunately of parents and ancestors wholly Jersey folk. Nor was he long a resident of the city for his family early moved across the Delaware. The Governor's father and family were Quakers; his mother, Matilda Kemble Stokes, was a Methodist. One must guess from whom the son derived some of his characteristics such as his ready tongue, graceful oratory, and the ability to write brilliant State papers that are literary, if lengthy, models. His last message to the Legislature, while probably the longest of its kind, is one of the most readable and able and valuable, a worthy addition to the political annals of New Jersey. That message was a fitting climax to a term in office remarkable for the importance and the constructiveness of the measures acted upon, their numbers, and for his wise leadership of his party in legislation. A statesman of many years' experience in Jersey politics said, in 1928, that "In Stokes' administration practically all the constructive measures that are in existence in the State today were passed, except the bridges and the tunnels, unless you consider the budget system one, and that was largely begun by Foster Voorhees and Edward C. Stokes when they were in the Legislature."

Railroad Taxation—The issue that came first, if not chronologically, then most surely in the minds of the people, was that of railroad taxation, or "equal taxation," which is the more accurate phrase. The platforms of both

parties had declared for this, the Republican stating "Equal taxation is not only just, but an obligation imposed upon the Legislature by the Constitution"; the Democratic, "We demand equal taxation of all property not used for religious, charitable or educational purposes." Even the methods of accomplishing this, proposed by each, did not differ radically. Both wanted to increase the revenues received by the State, and the railroads were richest of the possible resources as yet only partially tapped. (There also were many and varied ideas extant regarding the division of the plunder.) But the last-minute commission appointed to study the problem with the aid of experts could not agree and made a thrice divided report. "Ex-Governor Werts, Major Lentz and Henry West, the majority of the commission, advised the assessment of the main stems of the roads as units for State purposes. Chandler W. Riker, in one minority report, thought the main stem lands should be assessed separately at figures at which adjoining lands were assessed, and pay at the local rate to the localities. Charles Black, in a second minority report, reached the conclusion that the main stem should be assessed as a unit, and the moneys divided among the localities pro rata, and that the rolling stock and like personal properties of the corporations should be included in the second-class properties." The result was that, even with a Legislature dominantly Republican, it was not possible to get an agreement upon a single measure; a whole flock of equal tax bills cluttered the Senate and the House.

It may be that a few definitions and explanations might clarify the subject of railroad taxation, which is no longer one of present-day interest or nomenclature. A "main stem" was the roadbed traversed more or less continuously by trains. This, since the 1880's, had been considered as coming wholly within the jurisdiction of the State, and had been made to pay a tax of one-half of one per cent. Sidings, railroad yards, buildings of all sorts, were rated in a second-class and paid no general tax. Franchises and other intangible resources, only since Voorhees' times, had become subject to taxation. A State Board of Assessors fixed valuations on all railroad property and determined their classification. As a rule these assessors grouped the first and most of the second-class divisions under the head of "main stem," thereby exempting the railroads from local taxation. The same board were either dependent upon the transportation companies' reports for valuations, or were merely complaisant, so that the railroads were not assessed on a par with the property with which they were surrounded, nor was the rate paid the same as that paid by other property owners. Under such conditions there was nothing approaching an equality of taxation of railroad property with that of other property.

Since the greater part of the valuable properties of the railroads were concentrated about the terminals along the Hudson River—Hoboken, Weehawkin, Jersey City, Bayonne—in Hudson County, and in a lesser measure in Essex County, these sections were the greatest sufferers from the inequalities of assessments and even more from the fact that the taxes paid went not to the city, or district, from whose areas they were derived, but found their

way into the State treasury. How large were these losses have already been indicated in previous paragraphs dealing with Governor Abbott's fight for an increase in tax income from the railroads. The passing of two decades had multiplied these losses. Hudson County was actually paying the bulk of the railroad tax assessed by the State and at the same time having the area of her ratables reduced more and more by the spread of railroad property. Unfortunately, at this time, the county was the main, and almost the only, Democratic stronghold in a Republican New Jersey.

The solution of the problem was not as simple as the statement of it; the practical difficulties involved were too many. The railroads might be made to pay the same rate of tax as other property, but the tax rates were not the same throughout the State. They might be assessed at similar valuations, but counties with five hundred different assessors acting without any uniformity of method had produced great dissimilarities of assessment, and there could be no equality of taxation without an equality of valuation. The Constitution provided that "Property should be assessed for taxes . . . according to true value." There was not a county which lived up to this requirement. Again, even if a just method of taxing the railroads could be arrived at, there was no easy method of dividing the funds received among the sections from which they were derived. How to classify the railroad properties, what to do about placing values on franchises and other intangibles, what to do about rolling stock, how to protect the railroads from being gouged or unfairly treated, these and a hundred other minor problems further complicated the situation. Enough, it is hoped, has been pointed out to explain why legislators were running around in circles and introducing a new bill on each round.

The attack upon the problem was made by advances upon parts rather than upon the whole. In 1905, three bills strove for recognition, one of which was passed, a measure introduced by Duffield, of Essex, which defined and enlarged the items coming under the head of second-class properties. It was passed quickly, signed by the Governor, and was as promptly carried into the courts by the railroads. Then Hillery, of Morris, offered a bill requiring the keeping of all local tax rates below a maximum of \$1.60; this to protect the transportation companies from gouging by districts in which the second-class properties were largely located. The act was repealed, but, at the insistence of Stokes, was replaced by one which increased the figure to a maximum rate of \$2, with an annual reduction of this until it had reached \$1.75. This tax rate limitation law never became popular with tax laying officials.

The first bill laid before the Assembly of 1906 was the Perkins measure, introduced by Randolph Perkins, mayor of Westfield, and majority leader of the House. A lawyer, he had given long consideration to the legal aspects of an act which would equalize the taxing of railroads with that of other properties, one which would hold in the courts. The bill offered followed closely Stokes' ideas, as expressed in his inaugural address, regarding an average tax on the main stems. This average was to be struck by the State Board

of Assessors by the taking of the total of the ratables in all counties and comparing them with the total tax rates. Dividing one into the other would give the rate sought. It was as fair a method of placing taxation on an equal basis as could be devised at that time. One other item of equal importance incorporated in the bill ordered that the franchises of the roads were to be taxed on a par with the roadbeds, or main stems. The measure was keenly debated, but there was little difficulty in getting it passed when brought to a vote.

The effect of this law was to add tremendously to the income of New Jersey and to the burdens of the railroads. Abbett, in 1884, had demanded \$1,000,000 a year from the railroads which had been paying less than \$300,000, and he got it by the expedient of having a rule of thumb tax rate applied to main stems and franchises. By this law New Jersey received from the railroads in 1904 the sum of \$923,826.99. Under the Perkins enactment of 1906, the railway systems were taxed \$3,503,529.70. There was paid in that first year none of the increased amount, the companies delaying until such litigation as they had started had been decided against them.

The problem of dividing the revenue expected was solved by a second Perkins act, which directed that after the usual one-half of one per cent. had been deducted for State general expenses, the remainder was to be devoted to educational purposes. The amounts distributed to each school district were to be proportionate to the value of the railroad property within its limits. The school system was costing New Jersey at that time about \$21,000,000 annually, and made up the largest item in the budget of taxes. The donation of \$2,500,000, or more, per year toward the relief of the taxpayer made the act very popular.

The Duffield measure, covering second-class railroad property, raised the total coming directly to local districts another \$1,200,000. Then there was a franchise tax on public utilities placed during the Stokes administration, so that the equalizing of transportation system taxation with that of ordinary property benefited the taxpayers of New Jersey directly, or indirectly, to the amount of about \$5,300,000. The only item of income comparable was the corporation tax, \$3,515,000, in 1906. No previous piece of legislation had ever produced so much revenue. Today, the Perkins law and its amendments provides an income from railroad taxation of triple the amount it produced the first years of its application, nearly \$18,500,000 in 1928, or more than the school fund, and equal to the roads fund, the two largest items of State disbursements.

The solution, after two decades of discussion of the problem of railroad taxation, was not accepted by the railroads as final. They protested legality of the laws and refused payment of the taxes levied until court decisions should be handed down which left them no way of escape. The matter was decided against the companies, both the Perkins' acts and the Duffield act of 1905 being sustained, thus preserving the principles of the laws and the revenue of both State and municipalities. Meanwhile the fight had been carried on in more subtle ways. The railroads were not without influence or

representatives in the Legislature, however unanimous that body might be in the approval of railroad taxation. A State Board for the Equalization of Taxes was set up in 1905, which soon disclosed the unconstitutional practice of local assessors of appraising property at less than its full value; sixty per cent. was the average for the State. It was meekly suggested that the valuation of the main stem and other properties should be appraised at this percentage, which illegal suggestion no legislator dared consider. Very well then, if such a method be unconstitutional, why not live up to the requirements and force every district of New Jersey to bring its valuations up to what legally they should be. The equalization board so ordered. This hit hardest at Hudson and Essex, and manifestly would mean increased taxes for the residents of these counties, particularly of their large cities, and would reduce the railroad tax. The board ruling was sensible and just, but it became lost in a cloud of objections and talk, and was never enforced.

Another shift of attack: an act was passed appointing county tax boards of three men each appointed by the Governor. The ostensible purpose of these boards was the equalization of the valuations upon which taxes were based. They had the duty and power of reviewing the assessments made by local assessors. The net results of the activities of these boards was the increasing of the amount of taxes paid by individuals and the reduction of taxes paid by the railroads, and no matter how intrinsically righteous was the principle upon which these results were based, they mightily displeased the local taxpayers. The fact that millions had been added to the public revenue was quite forgotten in noting that in 1907, although the valuations of the railroads had been raised from \$194,532,000 to nearly \$200,000,000, the amount of tax paid had gone down nearly a quarter of a million dollars, while that paid by other companies and individual property owners had gone up several millions. What the people wanted was not equality of taxation, but the increased taxation of the railroads and corporations. The shoe somehow had been pulled upon the wrong foot, and it pinched. The county boards were blamed for this painful result. The next Governor, Fort, fulminated against the county boards throughout all the three years of his term; he could not see that they served any good end. Wilson was elected on a platform which contained a broad pledge of the abolition of the county tax boards, but the plank was thrown overboard once he was in office. It was many years before the agitation against these boards died down; they are a part of our scheme of government to this day.

Before the close of Stokes' term as executive there had been appointed, May 15, 1907, a railroad commission, which the Governor said: "Had not only advisory, but definite and far-reaching powers—broader in scope than the powers of similar commissions that are performing useful service in other states. The New Jersey commission has displayed a systematic grasp of its duties, rendered excellent service and instituted many reforms." He failed to state just what it had accomplished and he might have found difficulty in doing so, for the commission only investigated and made recommendations; small attention was paid to its reports. It was intended to

play the part of watch dog over the State's interests versus the railroads, but was so absurdly tied up with red tape and restrictions as to get nowhere, and was absorbed into other commissions three years later.

The shots that tore such great holes in railroad privileges were not the only ones fired at corporations. The State, like most other parts of the Nation, had gone anti-corporation; Theodore Roosevelt and his big stick were the popular heroes. The New Idea element had waxed exceedingly strong in Jersey and Everett Colby was its generalissimo. Roosevelt said to him: "You are the pioneer progressive of New Jersey. . . . Every corrupt boss, every big corrupt financial magnate and, above all, those who seek to perpetuate the rule of business through a combination of what is crooked in business and crooked in politics, recognize in you and the New Jersey progressives, their worst enemies." The patrician, wealthy Colby, who had been elected to the Assembly as a regular, as a "champion of the people," was sent from Essex to the State Senate, the single out-and-out New Idea member of that august body. The third member of the radical triumvirate he, as yet, had failed to achieve a tag, a specialty. Record stood for the direct primary; Fagan had become an equal tax specialist. Colby, in his hunt for an issue, hit upon the "limited franchise."

The Public Service Corporation had been formed a few years earlier, chiefly for the purpose of taking over the surface transportation systems of the larger municipalities and enlarging and electrifying them. The electric trolley car had arrived on the scene only in the late 'nineties, and the early years of the new century had witnessed a remarkable and exceedingly profitable change from the old horse car to the new electrically-driven affair. Naturally, this better and speedier system of getting about cities and to the suburbs filled a deep need in Jersey and was being promoted at a great rate by the Public Service Corporation. It began asking for franchises in various places for the extension of their lines, and asked, as was the custom, for franchises in perpetuity. The attitude taken was that since large sums must be invested in the surface lines, and such sums could be raised only by the assurance of stockholders that possession and profits would extend over a long period, therefore it was but just that the municipality benefited should grant franchises covering a period of many years, or better, have no time limit placed upon them.

Such requests gave the cue for Colby to enter upon the stage with the arresting slogan "None but limited franchises." He held the giving of any perpetual franchise was wrong in principle as they were in practice, and managed to get the Legislature of 1905 to pass a concurrent resolution to that effect. He tried to get through a bill forbidding the granting of perpetual franchises, but was met with a counter proposition of the appointment of a commission to investigate and report to the next Legislature. Duffield suggested the commission and was responsible for naming thirty-three years as a possible limit on franchises. The louder the opposition the greater the strength of Colby, and the more adroit his political moves. He put new life into the Citizens' Union, which in 1902, had started the radical move-

ment. The State Civic Federation, the product of the brain of Reverend Adolph Roeder, was called upon to aid. Colby formed the Limited Franchise and Equal Taxation League, whose membership read like a social register. Then there was the People's Lobby, supported by notables from many fields of endeavor, which put such pressure as they could upon all legislators in the interest of anything the lobby thought desirable, and published the records of all State officials, which was circulated where they could do the most good—or harm.

Everett Colby did not have everything all his own way, nor did he escape a few spatters of mud. It was pointed out that he was one of the Standard Oil Trust, and had introduced bills intended for the benefit of that combination; that one of his most enthusiastic backers was a personal counsel and friend of Rockefeller; that his clamorous objections to the Public Service Corporation was born of the hope that he might succeed Dryden in the Federal Senate. He had been promised that office by Boss Lentz, so it was claimed, and had never taken any stand on the franchise question until that boss had withdrawn that promise. (The Prudential Insurance Company, of which Dryden was president, was the chief, almost the sole, financial backer of the service corporation.)

Colby floated into the Senate on a majority of 20,000, and carried with him a full dozen Assemblymen from his county. The broadest plank of his raft was the promising the prohibition of perpetual franchises. But, it must be recalled, there were even more important parts of his platform, which included all the points insisted upon by the New Idea group, such as the taxing of franchises at their true value, equal taxation of the railroads, the granting of the privilege to the voters of expressing a preference for United States Senator, and the extension of the primary law to provide for the abolition of conventions and the nomination of all candidates by a direct vote. He cut loose with all his might against the "special interests" upon every occasion, both in the Senate and out, and proved a veritable David against a whole battalion of trust Goliaths, although his shots more often stunned than slew.

Colby, with Record, with Fagan, with Martin, with a number of other New Ideaists, wrought marvelously during Stokes' administration. The actual numerical strength of these reformers totalled one in the Senate and possibly fifteen at the most in the Assembly. Bearing this in mind and also that Governor Stokes advocated many of the progressive measures which were passed by the three legislatures of his régime, and that many of the laws enacted were passed by large majorities, it may be said that the "new idea" program was carried out this far: The railroads were taxed more or less on a par with other owners of property, and since, as has been already indicated, a large part of the greatly increased income was devoted to school purposes, it made possible a marked improvement of the State's educational system. A railroad commission was appointed with two of its members anti-corporation in theory. The primary law of Record's was amended so as to allow the nomination by direct vote of all candidates for office except

Governor, Congressmen and Presidential Electors. A franchise law was passed limiting the issuance of these privileges for a period of twenty years, with the possible renewal of the franchise for another by popular vote. Franchises were taxed like other property and thus added almost two-thirds of a million dollars to the public revenue with the promise of increases in the future. Street car lines, for example, were given a graduated tax scale which provided for an increase of taxation as their franchises and earnings increased in value. A State Civil Service Commission was suggested with the intent of extending civil service to municipalities.

None of these progressive measures were as comprehensive in their scope as the above summary might seem to indicate, nor were they completely satisfactory to the makers of the laws or those effected by them. Some of the difficulties of the attempt to equalize taxation have been pointed out, and to the imagination may be left the picture of the disgruntled railroads and corporations and of property owners down to the possessor of a two-room shack who forgot the benefits derived by all in the contemplation of their individual hurts. Then the primary law improvements did not go far enough, although providing for a foundation for a Geran Act. County and State committees were still appointed by a machine, a thing which Colby and his followers failed to take into sufficient consideration. The franchise laws were to undergo several operations and given many a tonic before they grew strong enough to work well. And the civil service and other commissions were little more than names given to ideas which were worked out later.

Colby and the New Idea minority, to whom so much credit has been given for the legislative reforms of 1905 to 1907, met with disaster in 1908, some members falling by the wayside even earlier. The first signs of a downfall were seen in 1907, when the first Assembly in eleven years to have a Democratic majority met. The frightened and ambushed Republicans forgot some of their differences, and thrust aside the reformers to elect a 1908 Legislature almost as dominantly of that party as ever had come to Trenton. Colby lost his Senatorship, both State and prospective Federal, and retired to private life. The most of his immediate lieutenants were displaced. Mayor Fagan, after three years as mayor of Jersey City, was defeated for reelection. For the next three years the New Ideaists were in forced retirement. All of which was not brought about by any great uprising against the reforms they advocated, nor by any renewed vigor of the Republican party, although there was evidence of both. The gentleman reformer seldom constructs an enduring machine or is political mechanic enough to keep it in repair. Then there was the well-known penchant of reformers and Republicans for coming to grips with the liquor interests every time they felt strong and hearty. Colby voted for a law which made possible the closing of saloons on Sunday (although most of his followers in the House voted against it), and he and all of them were straightway repudiated by one group or another.

If Mr. Stokes were to summarize the constructive measures enacted dur-

ing his administration he would undoubtedly add several to the large number we have listed, and enlarge upon others. By way of example, not only were utility corporations compelled to accept franchises for limited periods and submit to regulation and oversight, but such corporations were told that their issuance of securities must be limited to actual values represented. Such a check of over-capitalization was, indeed, a very novel feature in corporation law, and one which gave the companies seeking Jersey charters something to think about. And they did! When New Jersey began making over its corporation laws, an uncertainty was created in the minds of capitalists which showed itself in much seeking of incorporation in other states. That breaking of faith with capital helped many another State to set up in business as a dry nurse of "trusts" and cost New Jersey a pretty penny. The largest increase of incorporations for any year, except the more recent ones, was made in 1902, and the increase in the amount of taxes paid was greater that year than any other of record. The smallest increase ever made came but three years later, and the low mark, except during the World War, for loss in income was made in 1907. A similar reaction followed the passing of the "seven sisters" acts of the Wilson régime, and continued until these obstructions were removed. The records of the State Board of Assessors show that from 1905 to 1920, not only were the number of incorporations fewer than during any other period, but (except for two widely separated years, 1896 and 1924), those fifteen years were the only ones since 1884, when corporation taxation was begun, that for each successive year showed losses in the amount of taxes paid. The sum total was about \$1,150,000, which, while it seems small, actually is not so when it is realized that the gain for the three years prior to the fifteen was more than this total, and the gain for the four years following the fifteen-year period about equalled \$1,150,000. In other words, had corporations gone on in the State without check from legislation, instead of a loss from 1905 to 1920, there might well have been a gain of \$5,000,000. As it was, the amount assessed upon New Jersey corporations was less in 1924 than it was in 1904; Jersey did worse than stand still while other states copied her repudiated laws and established a permanency of legislation as regards corporations which took from her one of her best paying forms of business.

Putting aside the discussion of the "might have been": Under Stokes progress was made in a number of directions so that at the end of his term he could boast: "We have taken steps to control our potable water supplies for the benefit of all our citizens. We are conserving our woodlands and making them a public domain for this and future generations. We have reformed our jury system in the interest of fair trials and surer justice. We have abolished the fee system and turned the revenue of office-holders into the public treasury. We have created commissions to study the problems which affect the well-being and progress of the Commonwealth." These, of course, in addition to those already summarized, and of others which he explained at too great length to be quoted. Some of the latter were the plans for the purification of rivers; inspiring New Jersey to become the

first State to enact laws providing for a general systematic policy for the supervision and instruction of the immigrant. One-fifth of the population of New Jersey, at that time, were foreign-born, and one-third of her voters were naturalized citizens or sons of foreign-born parents. The Jersey schemes of the prompt Americanizing of residents from across the seas were models for similar activities elsewhere in the Nation.

Charity work and public morals, politics and beneficent sanitary and child labor laws characterized Stokes' term of office. The greatest single advance in checking the mosquito pest was made. An unusual number of highways and roads came under the jurisdiction of the State authorities. Then there was the Pure Food Law, which took effect October 1, 1908, one of the best and first among such laws in the country. A simple thing, this law, passed under protest because it interfered with supposedly more important legislation. Miss Alice Lakey, of Cranford, fired by the crusading spirit of her day, by means of the New Jersey Federation of Women's Clubs, brought pressure to bear upon our legislators which could not be withstood. She became a leader in pure food reform movement all over America and gave many of her sex their first taste of political power. Mark Sullivan has a sentence in this connection worth the quoting: "These women, by the support they gave Doctor Wiley, by pressure upon Congress, without votes, without ever thinking they needed votes, did a work greater than anything woman accomplished or attempted during the years after women got suffrage in 1919."

Tucked away in a most out of the way corner of Governor Stokes' last address to the Legislature is the sentence: "The sanctity of the Sabbath has been preserved and recognized in legislation." Whether in later years he thought this a reason for congratulation we can but guess. It may be that he came to agree with Woodrow Wilson that certain matters are wholly moral questions and should not be injected into politics. Stokes' small phrase had reference to the closing of saloons on Sunday and was true, except for the word "preserved." All that had been done under his leadership was to win recognition for the "sanctity of the Sabbath," as affected by the liquor question. A hornet's nest was stirred up which drove many a Republican legislator to cover and helped clear the path for a Democratic Governor and a gradual shift in the Legislature, which eventually changed the color of that body. It was simply another case of the Republican party pothering with the liquor issue to its own downfall. In more recent years three Democratic Governors and Senators have been elected on just this same issue. The story of this particular *faux pas* can better be left for the telling in connection with the Fort and Wilson administrations.

Fort Administration—In the autumn of 1907, John Franklin Fort, Republican, was elected Governor over Frank S. Katzenbach by a plurality of 8,013. The platform of the two parties might, except for recriminations and self-gratulations, have been written by the same man. They were terse, interesting, but presented few issues. Even the campaign did not turn

up anything about which there were sharp differences between the two parties, unless one excepts the "Bishop's Law," with its screenless saloon-on-Sunday feature. The Republican platform contained the plank. ". . . the party has accomplished needed reform in excise legislation and pledges itself to the maintenance of it." The opposition neglected to say anything on the liquor question. All through Fort's campaign attempts were made to draw him out on the subject, but he temporized, at least in the cities. Both he and Katzenbach were men whose lives and political acts could be scrutinized, so that while the campaign was one of personalities rather than of issues, neither could be smirched much by accusations.

That the gubernatorial contest had its excitements and was a genuine battle is revealed by its closeness; a plurality of 52,000 is not cut to 8,000 in three years by any peaceful means. Some of the weak spots in the "Old Guard" Republican party have already been pointed out; its anti-corporation legislation, the New Idea element, the sticking of fingers into the Sunday beer glass. The North and South Jersey political leaders were eyeing each other askance, patronage had not been evenly divided. Dickinson had caused an investigation of Record's connection with the riparian commission; in retaliation Record had brought out facts concerning Dickinson which led to the asking of his resignation as Secretary of State. The Hahn Committee investigators had turned up some scandalous doings by the Republican holders of State offices.

William M. Johnson, former First Assistant Postmaster of the United States under McKinley had been the expected nominee of the party for Governor, but had been unable to accept the honor because of ill health. The names of Judge Gilbert Collins, of Jersey City, an exceedingly popular but busy lawyer; Mahlon Pitney, then and of later fame; Senator Joseph S. Frelinghuysen; Senator Wakelee, of Bergen; Vivian Lewis, a favorite of the Progressives, and others as prominent, had been mentioned, so that it came as something of a surprise when Supreme Court Justice Fort was nominated upon the first ballot. He had been active in Jersey politics for more than a quarter of a century, and had played some conspicuous rôles, but he was something of a reformer and apparently leaned toward the Progressives, and the party organizations were shying off from the New Ideaists that year. The very fact that Record and his followers had promised to rally to Fort's support was considered sufficient reason for the regulars of his party to hold aloof.

Altogether it looked to be the opportune time for Democracy to edge its way into State control, or at least win the chair of the Chief Executive. All that was required was the settling, or the putting aside, of inner circle squabbles by the bosses, a strong pull all together for some reasonably satisfactory candidate, and the day would be won. But James Smith, Jr., preferred former Judge Francis Child; Davis, the Hudson boss, favored Katzenbach; the anti-most-everything set pitched upon J. E. Martine, of Plainfield. Not all of these or a half dozen other names ever came before the convention which nominated Katzenbach on the first ballot. Frank S. Katzenbach was

the first Democratic mayor Trenton had elected in years, which of itself was a feat which made him gubernatorial material. He made a splendid run for the executive office. The tale of the polls shows that he had the support of former Senator Smith and most of the bosses in his party.

Something happened when it came to counting the votes. At first the newspapers printed an announcement of the election of Katzenbach. But this soon was followed by the news of Fort's election by a greatly reduced minority. It was claimed that Katzenbach had been counted out in Hudson and Camden counties. There was also something to be explained in the failure of the Davis Democrats of Hudson to give even a small half of the majority that was expected of them. As for the Legislature it was once more a two to one Republican body, and Fort started out as Governor with his party in full control of political affairs.

John Franklin Fort was the type of man whom the novelist depicts when he desires to portrait a statesman-politician. Big, jovial, the hail-fellow-well-met, serious withal, a churchman, somewhat self-made, bold of speech and action, just the sort of fellow of whom one expects much, the kind that gets things done. In his inaugural and first annual addresses, after abruptly announcing that he hoped for a shorter session and more action, the cutting down of the too numerous commissions and more personal attention by their members to the business for which they had been appointed, he proceeded to outline a program of legislation fully as complete, constructive and progressive as that suggested by his brilliant predecessor or his famous successor. His messages of three years contained proposals which were taken to make up much the platform upon which Woodrow Wilson was elected. Yet near the close of his administration, after a Governor of the opposition party had been elected, chagrined he could but point out: "My views on legislation have been fully expressed in previous messages, and my opinions have not changed. Time and experience have only confirmed me in my views as to the measures heretofore recommended, and there are no suggestions thus made which I would wish to withdraw. My only regret is that the legislation advised was not enacted, and I believe that the result of the election evidenced that the people joined me in that regret. They have forcibly expressed their opinion."

Governor Fort was hampered in nearly everything he attempted. Whether this was due to treachery in his party, as he seemed to think, or to any of a half-dozen other causes, really does not matter now. A thousand bills were passed during his administration, but those that never were passed are among the most interesting. Fort wanted three new departments in the State government: 1. A Department of Corporations so as to relieve certain individuals and commissions of much labor, and mete justice to both corporations and State. 2. A Department of Motor Vehicles, recognizing that that comparatively new means of transportation was to be used largely, would be hard on the highways, and should be made a source of greater revenue. 3. A Department of Collateral Taxes. For three years' running he had the Attorney-General prepare acts covering the above three departments, but the

Legislature refused to make any of them into laws. Fort believed that only by giving the Governor the power to remove inefficient or venal officials could good government be conserved. Nothing was done about it, although Fort's attempts at the enforcement of laws, particularly as regards the excise, were by their failure the proof of the need of such an increase in the executive's powers. Many methods of economy and the reduction of graft were suggested, including a system of the joint purchase of board and institution supplies. The voting machines, being unpopular as then constructed, should either be improved or their use forbidden. New institutions were asked for, notably a building for the insane criminal, and an appropriation for a women's reformatory, the creation of more hospitals for the tubercular. The Governor believed that the State could get along without some of its commissions and the county tax boards. Not a law was passed embodying his ideas, although most of them found their way through the Legislatures of his successor.

He advocated the strengthening of the direct primary laws, and the broadening of their scope, and laws which would punish bribery and any wrong use of the ballot. He was hardly out of office when such measures were taken. So it was with the "blanket ballot" which the former judge harped upon to the dismay of even his friends; the question was dodged, to be taken up and settled in Wilson's day.

Although of little interest now, it is a matter of record that the five proposed amendments to the Constitution, which were submitted to the electorate in 1909, had the approval of the Governor, although not those nearest to his heart. Two of them had to do with improvements in the judicial system and procedure, one recreated the Court of Pardons, the fourth increased the salaries of legislators, the fifth extended the terms of the Governor (to four years), members of the Legislature and other officials, and directed the mode of creating Assembly Districts. All failed of approval, the majorities against each being between 22,667 and 24,866, out of a total vote of less than 80,000.

One of the most persistent and two-fisted fights made by the Governor for any piece of legislation was one for establishment of a public utilities commission with the power, among others, of fixing rates. Fort never lacked the courage of his convictions and doffed his coat and waded in to force the Legislature to fulfill promises made by the platforms of both parties. His own party had declared: "We pledge ourselves to enact a law providing for a commission with ample jurisdiction and powers to enable it to regulate public utility corporations effectively and authoritatively." He accused: "There is absolutely no excuse for not keeping this pledge, except that the corporations to be regulated oppose it. . . . In a most notorious and audacious manner they (corporation lobbyists) entered the Assembly Chamber and tried to defeat *any* public utilities bill." His demand for the passing of such a measure was based not alone upon a solemn promise by his party, but on what he considered to be an immediate necessity of exerting some control over corporations which had absorbed the most of the electric light and gas plants, telephone and express services, and which could do anything

they pleased in the raising of rates, the giving or withholding service, in mergers and similar combinations. The sole statute on the books effecting these corporations was one which forbade the selling of bonds at a less price than eighty per centum of par. The Governor waged warfare in the face of opposition from enemies and colleagues for nearly his whole term in office and achieved a meagre victory. A State Utilities Commission was set up, but one so completely emasculated that the work had to be done over a year later.

This long list of failures to legislate measures advocated by John Franklin Fort is not recorded with the intent to show that he was a failure as Governor. Among the thousand bills enacted during his administration were many of great value; some of these he promoted. He may have been too much of a Progressive in a time when the party bosses were weary of reforms or anything which savored of the novel. His own party thought it wise to appoint a sort of advisory committee to steer him and some of the Republican legislators into old and regular paths. Fort resented this, but could never get anything furthered that this committee decided against—the feeble utility commission measure being an exception. In his appointments, in his associations, in the most of his preachments, Fort was a “regular.” If he failed to get laws passed which he advocated it was simply because the enactments were not desired by the majority in control at that time, and not because of a lack of ability on the part of the Governor or the absence of sense and right in the measures he proposed. The partial list of rejected proposals is here given simply because it reveals something of the spirit and ideas of the time as held by the average politician. It shows something of what they thought, what they wanted, even if it fails to hint of what was in the minds of the average citizen. Even an election usually fails in this, except at unexpected times, and even then there are those to whom a sudden change by the voter indicates only that he wants a change. The Wilsonian victory of the next year has been discounted as being but a spasm of restlessness on the part of the citizenry fostered and manipulated by the Democratic bosses.

On the credit side of the ledger, that is to the credit of Governor Fort, his party or the “organization,” may be placed such measures as one of 1908, which started digging the waterway from Bay Head the length of Barnegat Bay to Cape May, which provided a safe inland course for the smaller boats. Along the Jersey coast is a series of summer resorts which formerly were like scattered unstrung pearls. Through enactments of 1908 and 1909, provisions were made for the string by way of an Ocean Highway from the Highlands of Monmouth County almost to the southernmost tip of New Jersey. The Atlantic Coast Section is one of the greatest assets of the State and it was fitting that its beauty and value should be fostered by the State. The Governor was, in later years, very proud of the part he played in the inauguration of this and other sections of a State-wide good highways system. Also, by the way, he urged getting automobile traffic under control and the taxation of car owners, the work to be done by a department. There were but a few thousand auto-motive vehicles then registered, and discus-

sion was rife whether twelve miles an hour was not too high a speed to be allowed, but Fort believed in the future of the motor car and believed that by 1915 there would be a sufficient number in use to provide a revenue of half a million dollars! "New Jersey has (1909) the finest roads of any State in the Union, and, in proportion to her territory, more than any other State." Why not make this new vehicle pay for their maintenance?

Fort induced the purchase of lands around the State House and made possible its charming setting. He entered into office at a time when an annual surplus of about a million dollars had been converted into a deficit and left the gubernatorial chair with a treasury balance of \$1,609,000. Every Democratic platform since that party had been thrust out of power drew attention to the constantly increasing State expenditures. "Our State is growing fast," said Fort, "and it must expend more and not less." There was criticism that he held up the funds destined to go into the permanent school fund until ways and means could be provided to make up the difference between income and expenditures. It was a method always more or less used in business, and he made small apology for using such a method, in such a critical situation. His reply was to call attention to certain sources of income such as the riparian lands which, during his three-year term, brought in nearly one million dollars, or one-fifth of the total revenue from that source since 1844. Again his cry, "The State is growing," and prices on these lands should be higher, for we will have to meet an increasing demand for what is steadily growing less. The same realization of the great growth of New Jersey was reflected in his forceful backing up of all measures being taken to preserve the potable waters of the State, either those above ground or beneath, from any diversion of them to other states, or from coming into the possession of private companies. "To permit a monopoly of the potable waters by a private company is unthinkable." This stand was taken when the New Jersey Water Company was laying pipes to connect with Staten Island to convey Jersey water, which concern had arrayed in its favor strong military, industrial and political interests. The steal had to be fought off in both Trenton and Washington. The company refused to give up its plans even when the United States Supreme Court handed down the decision that New Jersey had the absolute right to the flow of her streams. The warfare was carried on for several years before a change of administration at Washington to President Taft brought aid from that quarter. The water corporations then turned their attention to the sub-surface waters, which they felt could be sold to anyone anywhere. Governor Fort urged the passing of a law making it a misdemeanor for any person, or company, to participate in any scheme to divert the underground flow to places outside New Jersey. Such a bill was introduced and disappeared in the hands of the Senate committee, from which Fort tried to get it out by persuasion. When he could do nothing by mild methods he sent a special message to the Legislature demanding action, expressing his opinion of the concerns involved and of the legislators who were preventing desirable legislation, in such terms as forced the Legislature to sit up and get busy. This bill, known as the McCran Act, was one of the



NEWARK "FOUR CORNERS"—MARKET AND BROAD STREETS AT A QUIET MOMENT

two which safeguarded the water supplies of the State for future generations. It was thought by experts that this supply, in the northern districts, was many times greater than the demands of any increase in population within a century could be. Only two decades later some of the North Jersey communities were compelled to use great economy in the late summer use of water because a dry month had lowered the available supplies to a dangerous extent.

Governor Fort was blamed for the bringing the liquor question to the surface and thereby lessening the chances of the Republican party in the next gubernatorial election. There actually was no way that he could keep the subject from being discussed. The Anti-Saloon League was always on the job paving the way to prohibition by means of local option. It always had some representative in the Legislature who would introduce its bills. Senator Childs, of Somerset County, offered the league's first measure in 1900; Assemblyman Miller, of Cumberland, introduced a second in 1906. Almost annually thereafter until prohibition became the law of the country, bills sponsored by the league came up for action. Not that there was expectation of getting those bills passed; it was but a means of educating the people and public sentiment, and as such were successful.

The temperance problem was always in the air. Publicity was given every prominent lapse from virtue of the liquor interests, and they were many. There may have been, as Fort insisted, "No sentiment to justify prohibition legislation," but, as he also said, "The enforcement of excise laws has always been as lax as local sentiment seemed to dictate." The occasion of his remarks was the passing of the "Bishops' Law" and the passing to him of the duty of seeing that it was enforced. The law got its name from its origin in a meeting of a religious conference at Trenton, in which two bishops (McFaul and O'Conner) of the Catholic Church and Bishops Line and Scarborough of the Episcopal Church and many other religious leaders participated. They had drawn an act which was offered in the Legislature of 1906, which threw a bomb into the ranks of the liquor men. The provisions of this enactment included the stamping out of the vice-breeding back rooms and the "growler" parade by the imposition of heavy penalties for selling to minors; the making of owners of the places mutually responsible with the holders of the license for infractions of the law; and the requirement of saloonkeepers to uncover their windows on Sunday, to remove all screens that might prevent clear sight into the premises, and established the revocation of the license for violations of any of provisions of the act.

Fort announced that as long as the State was pledged to the Bishop Law, he would do his best to see that it was enforced. There had been, of course, strenuous efforts made to prevent its enactment, and although this failed, a rider slipped in with it that left the enforcement of the "screen" section to local authorities, and "local authorities" seldom ordered any Sunday visibility for saloons, or troubled about seeing such orders carried out, if made. A great many saloon owners did take down their blinds and behaved

well—for a time. In the larger cities the illegal sale of liquors went on as usual, often with a policeman standing in front of the screened front to prevent anyone getting a glimpse of the lawbreakers within. The summer resorts seldom had paid enough attention to the law forbidding Sunday selling to hide its crime behind blinds or closed doors. Atlantic City was the foremost wide-open resort in the United States, and for years had recognized no laws except those of its own making.

Such was the situation when John Franklin Fort, churchman, came upon the scene. There was no possibility of any passage of an act authorizing the sale of intoxicants upon Sunday. There was small possibility of enforcing the laws upon the books in the larger municipalities and the summer resorts. The Governor never had a chance. His hands were tied by preëlection agreements by the party bosses which prevented any effective action. The Atlantic situation was made the crux of the affair. Fort told the Legislature plainly that the executive could do nothing so long as "the existing laws provided no remedy for the willful refusals of officials to obey the laws of the State." It was at this time that he asked for the power to remove recalcitrant officials and was refused by the Legislature. It was at this time also that our present Ambassador to France suggested that Atlantic City be set off as a small principality of itself which should not be held to the laws effective in the State. During the trust-busting era it was considered smart by residents of those states which envied Jersey's fine job as dry nurse to the trusts, to speak of the United States *and* New Jersey. Assemblyman Edge evidently advocated something very like, as the slogan of New Jersey *and* Atlantic City. Fort never succeeded in putting the lid on the shore resorts nor the larger places, and Wilson did not try. Sunday sale of drinkables went on, the "growler line" was shortened, but not ended. The liquor question once more flared up in politics and was the can tied to the Republican party's tail which rattled loudly throughout the next State campaign. The prohibition element looked to the ex-president of a university founded by good Presbyterians.

Governor Fort left Trenton to go forward to further honors, although none so high as the Governorship. His ardor was not quenched nor his courage weakened. He was ever the optimistic "booster" of New Jersey, amazed and proud of "the growth of the State." He had been quoting figures in all of his messages showing the remarkable strides Jersey had taken in agriculture, in industry, in population, in wealth, and in government as it had to do with keeping step with this marvelous advancement. The census returns of 1910 bore out his contention and gave weight to his optimism. The population had gone up from 1900 to 1910 from 1,883,669 to 2,537,167; the capital invested in manufactures from \$477,400,000 to \$977,172,000; their output from \$553,000,000 to \$1,145,000,000; the taxable property from \$864,516,527 to \$2,289,770,280. During Fort's term in office the world famous "tubes" under the Hudson were opened for service and the old-fashioned ferries, no longer able to carry the traffic, were relieved of a great share of their burden. In 1912, a total of 58,000,000 passengers were shut-

tled through the under-water tunnels, and the contiguous counties on the Jersey end grew enormously under the impetus of rapid transit. The surface systems, on the verge of bankruptcy, had millions spent in their rehabilitation and before a decade had passed were earning close to \$35,000,000 annually on fares that were reasonable. New citizens surged into the State; the industries expanded, promoted by closer connections with the greatest markets in the Nation; agriculture profited accordingly, both because of added population and direct and rapid transportation. New Jersey became, indeed, the Garden State, one of the chief manufacturing centers of the country, a prosperous, booming, maturing Commonwealth. Its people also had outgrown the party which had been directing its destinies governmental since 1896, or desired but some new type of candidate for the gubernatorial chair to change their allegiance.

The summer of 1910 saw the stage set in New Jersey for the playing of an extraordinary political drama, the introduction of remarkable men and measures, the emergence of forces which would change the whole future of individuals and movements. Whether this was destiny or luck, the will of the Omniscient "his wonders to perform," or merely the work of the Devil—who can say? Upon this stage strode one who was to become one of the most notable figures in world affairs, sponsored by one of Jersey's most eminent bosses. The audience of this spectacle, whose applause would determine the success or failure of the play and of the players, were the voters of New Jersey who were eager for something new and could be swayed readily by a new face or a well-organized clique. The decade which was coming to an end had been called the era of muck-raking. The washing of soiled linen in public had become a favorite American sport. Everybody and everything were subject to scrutiny and attack; none was immune. The people enjoyed the scandal of it all, but were disgusted and ready to encourage anyone who would offer to do a wholesale job of cleaning up. Reform was in the air; plans were being laid for the readjusting of public and private morals. This was as true of the country at large as of "boss-ridden" New Jersey, "Mother of Trusts," held in "bondage by the corporate interests," to quote terms much used by writers, radicals and New Ideaists.

Some of the political bosses of both parties had been compelled to hunt cover. The State Republican leaders were uncertain which way to turn. Under two of the last three governors they had been "hunting with fox and running with the hares." In other words, they had been shearing the corporations and trying to keep their support. From another standpoint they had been standing with the Progressives in legislation and at the same time putting them out of office. There were too many minorities in politics anyway, and in catering to one it was impossible to suit the other. The party in power is always in the limelight, always in the foreground, tempting the onlooker to shy a brick. The Republicans had been doing some fancy dodging during recent years. Despite all this the party had more than an even chance of keeping itself in control of the State barring some unexpected, unprecedented move on the part of the opposition body.

CHAPTER XLVIII.

THE ENTRANCE OF WILSON UPON THE POLITICAL STAGE.

There are a number of axioms and practices of practical politics which are, to say the least, interesting. For example, that rather cynical one, "when in doubt, do right," or those which have to do with "window-dressing," "give them a good show," or "you must play the game with the gang," and "it does not pay to buck the business interests." The Democratic bosses went to the military for their axiom—"success in attack rests chiefly upon surprise." During the summer rumors began to circulate that former United States Senator James Smith had determined upon the nomination of the president of Princeton for Governor, and that he had arrayed with him Davis, the boss of Hudson County. This was the unexpected, certainly, and also a mistake, apparently. Many had heard of Doctor Woodrow Wilson, but few knew him, and this professor who seldom voted and never had been even distantly interested in Jersey politics, who even then had just shown himself as inept in college politics, was surely no man to be put up for office at such a critical time. Voters never take to the highbrow, nor admire the theorist, nor do they turn out at the polls to vote for a man whose face and life is unknown to them. The county leaders were incensed that Smith should attempt to foist such a candidate upon Democracy. The New Idea minority saw in this recrudescence of Smith a plan to elect one who would be both tool and means by which Smith would dominate legislation to his advantage and that of the "interests." Then there were well known candidates whose followers thought deserving of the nomination. Did not Katzenbach all but win in 1907 over Fort, only the negligence of the Davis machine bringing on defeat?

When the Democratic convention was held in September there were few, if any, of the 1,412 delegates in attendance who favored Wilson; they were either for or against James Smith, in whose hands lay the political fate of the man who was to become the dictator of the world. No other power could have named Wilson for Governor. Colonel George Harvey, editor, publisher, publicity man par excellence, was there, but commanded never a vote; he had suggested Wilson to the big boss. Davis, of Hudson, was expected to deliver the votes from his county; his part was to join forces with the Essex leader. Smith, the "greatest one-man politician in the country," according to Richard Croker, Tammany chieftain, was not certain of being able to control all of the Essex delegates—and did not in the ballot. He stood and seconded the nomination of a man "he had never met," and through the efficiency of his machine brought in a first ballot which stood 749 for Wilson, 374 for Katzenbach, and 210 for Silzer. The convention had been a three man show, with Harvey as the advance agent, Smith as the stage manager, and Wilson the star.

Wilson's First Sponsors—Colonel George McClellan Harvey had known Wilson for a number of years, as a publisher of the latter's books and

articles, as one who had attended the inauguration of Wilson as president of Princeton University in October, 1902. Harvey had come in contact with former Senator Smith, politically, many years earlier when he had been a reporter (1885), as a dress parade colonel on the staff of Governor Robert S. Green (1887), as the incumbent (1891) of the specially made-for-him office of Commissioner of Banking, and off and on since as a magazine and newspaper man, once being connected with one of Smith's Newark papers. He had worked in association with William C. Whitney and Thomas F. Ryan, both close friends of Smith, in the promotion of a trust company or two, and several trolley lines. They had placed him at the head of Harper's when that firm was not prospering financially and had borrowed \$400,000 from J. P. Morgan. The Harvey methods had not brought any noticeable financial improvement, for the Morgan debt had been trebled. The irrepressible, clever Vermonter, with his flair for politics, had kept in touch with Jersey affairs, and his promotion of a Governor and a President may have been a double-barrelled shot intended to improve his situation with the backers of Harper's, by the prestige which such a move would bring. It was then a fad of the heads of the bigger magazines to be President-makers, and none of them had the training and experience in politics which were Harvey's.

James Smith, Jr., big, suave and handsome, with the poise of a dignitary and the bland smile of a child, had started in business as a grocery clerk and risen to a commanding position in the commercial and political life of New Jersey. He was the president of a bank, the head of several manufacturing companies, the publisher of a morning and evening paper; and was a recognized Irish-American leader of the country. He entered politics, as did many of his race, partly for the fun, the sport of it, but mainly for the power it could bestow upon the skilled and the strong. Starting as an alderman in Newark he proved so apt a student of politics as to pass into the post-graduate class of bosses. His ability, in 1892, to swing the Jersey delegation from David B. Hill to Grover Cleveland, showed how quickly he had arrived in State politics. About this same time, he challenged the succession of Governor Leon Abbett to the United States Senate, for the assuring of which Abbett had built a most elaborate machine, and won the honor by the usual scandalous methods of that day. He had not the temperament of the ideal statesman and some of his acts as Senator brought him scathing criticism, notably his alliance with Gorman, of Maryland, in mutilating a tariff bill, and profiting in Wall Street by so doing. This dereliction was held against him in the bitter fight made by Wilson against his election to the Senate.

It is doubtful whether Smith had any thought or desire ever again to be sent to Washington when he advocated the nomination of Wilson for Governor. He was not well, he liked not a bit the life a Senator was compelled to live, neither did he want to spend the money in the costly sport of playing statesman. He assured intimate friends that he was aiming to round out his political days with a winner, preparatory to a definite retirement from the game. Dozens of times he insisted that under no circumstances would he

be a candidate for the United States Senate should the campaign eventuate in a Democratic Legislature. He had picked upon Wilson for his winner upon the recommendation of Harvey. The Princeton professor, if the evidence of his writings and speeches could be accepted, was opposed to anything radical in legislation, held liberal views of excise enforcement, and believed in party organizations. He had gone on record that our system of popular elections could not be operated successfully unless the selection of candidates were left to a few persons who volunteered to make a business of it. "They are the political bosses and managers whom the people obey and affect to despise. It is unjust to despise them."

Books many have been written about Woodrow Wilson, his ideas and his deeds, the bulk of *Wilsonia* is becoming very large and must increase. The tendency, in more recent writings, seems to be in the direction of forgetting the man in the discussion of what he stood for, an unfortunate tendency, for Wilson had so few intimates, so few friends who could with sympathy delineate his characteristics, that there is danger of the human Wilson becoming submerged or hidden under a mass of ideas, arguments, theories, to emerge occasionally only as a misty semi-mythological figure who remade, or unmade, the world. With his relations to the larger history we have little to do in these few paragraphs; nor is there the necessity for recording at great length his legislative activities in New Jersey for these, after all, covered a period of but a few months, the later years of his Governorship having been spent in the preliminaries of a campaign for the nomination by his party for the Presidency of the United States.

The story of the rise of a truly academic man, one who had never attended a public school and, until he was fifty, had lived the cloistered life of the university, but so quickly learned the principles of practical politics that he could use them with a skill which made him the National President, the record of this one phase of his life is not without interest to anyone whatever his attitude towards politics. Wilson said of himself (1902): "I was born a politician and must be at the task for which by means of my historical writing I have all these years been in training." Shortly after he was made president of Princeton University and for some years taught and wrote and printed his speculations in politics. He was naturally a conservative, approved of the things in government as they were, disapproved of the most of the progressive ideas to which he afterward subscribed so ardently as Governor and President; was an admirer of the English methods of administration, and British cabinet ways of initiating legislation. He did not vote, he never had been in the State House until ushered there for his inauguration, confessing at this time that he did not know how to go about appointing his own secretary. There had been little in his academic training to fit him for the actual conflicts of the political arena. He had learned the basis of political strategy as a college professor and university president, a subtle, invidious, ruthless strategy which was later to be grafted on his education in practical politics and enable him to go farther than his instructors believed advisable and square. He acknowledged (1914) that "All the politics that are in me I learned in New Jersey."

Harvey and Smith were pupil Wilson's mentors in the school of politics, but shortly after his nomination for Governor his training in practical politics came into the hands of three instructors: Joseph Tumulty, who had bitterly opposed the nomination; James Nugent, who had preferred another candidate, but had agreed to follow Smith's lead, and a newspaper man who was introduced to Wilson, "This is the Trenton editor who has been making all the trouble for us in your home county." This quartette, in the veins of which the Irish strain ran strong, were closely associated in the campaign for which plans were being laid. The pupil was neither tractable nor inclined to give enough attention to learning his way about. He wanted to hang on to his university job until his instructors and others should assure him of another. He was practically compelled to make campaign speeches or have someone speak in his name, a thing which the cautious doctor did not want to permit. Wilson was taught the rudiments of the political game, who to know and how, what not to say and how to seem to say something without doing so, how to stage a good show, "how to play the game with the gang," and many of the rules of politics. The three were "progressives" more or less by conviction, but would take neither the blame nor the glory for the blossoming out of Wilson the sunflower of them all. Nor would they care to be held responsible for the manner in which the university professor practiced the political methods they taught. They knew that there were certain sound laws in politics which a candidate must recognize and obey to be successful. The future President often broke these laws, but he was the exception to the rule which comes along about once in a century, and won despite ignorance of, or the wilful breaking of, the canons of practical politics; won, often, because he did the wrong thing at the right time. The political education of Woodrow Wilson progressed under a long series of teachers, nearly everyone of whom was discarded at some stage of the process, but the tale of this is outside New Jersey history.

The Trenton Convention—Upon the evening of his nomination for Governor, 1910, the Princeton professor was, as a last bit of dramatics, called from his home to address the convention. Wilson was a thoroughly practiced speaker, at home on the platform as never anywhere else, and by his oratory made a most favorable impression upon the twenty-five hundred gathered within the hall. Very few even knew by sight this cool, calm, plain-garbed man, who almost with his first words said: "I did not seek this nomination, I have made no pledge, given no promises. If elected, I am left absolutely free to serve you with all singleness of purpose. It is a new era when these things can be said, and in connection with this I feel that the dominant idea of the moment is the responsibility of deserving. I will have to serve very well in order to deserve the honor of being its head." He continued in the measured cadences of the skilled orator, interlarded pertinent illustrations with crisp and almost slangy phrases as, "The time when you can play politics and fool the people has gone by; now it is a case of put up or shut up," to its climax: "When I think of the flag which our ships carry, the only touch

of color about them, the only thing that moves as if it had a settled spirit in it—in their solid structure, it seems to me I see alternate strips of parchment upon which are written the rights of liberty and justice and strips of blood spilled to vindicate those rights and then in a corner, a prediction of the blue serene into which every nation may swim which stands for these things.”

His speech caught hold upon the emotions of the crowd. For the moment, at least, they felt that here was their leader; here was the man who would stand for them, the man who would win. They had feared the unknown professor, but before them was a vigorous, upstanding gentleman who had been battered by life but not beaten, a fighter of courage and skill, a personality and a power. Behind him was the background of teacher, writer, historian, and educator. Here was the beginning of the “school-master in politics,” a fighting man that touched the imagination and aroused hope.

He spoke truly when he insisted that he had not given any pledges. It is also true that he never could have been considered for nomination as Governor, or been given it, had it not been for Harvey and Smith. Neither could he have been elected had Smith wished it otherwise. No one more than Wilson realized that political offices were not filled except under the direction of a few volunteers, “the political managers and bosses whom the people obey,” and that election to high office was the result of political organization and their activities. If Smith and Harvey made the mistake of thinking that the Wilson whom they knew from his writings and speeches, would not change under the hurly-burly of a campaign, the fault was theirs. No man is consistent, least of all one who is making the change from theory to practice. Within a few months he had thrown overboard Smith, and had moved a long way from his original conservative position. When accused of inconsistency and lack of good faith, he replied: “I’ll agree not to change my mind, if someone with the power to do so will guarantee that if I go to bed tonight I will get up in the morning and see the world in the same way.”

The campaign had not gone far when Wilson began to show signs of wanting to run with the New Ideaists, a wise political move, since this group controlled quite enough votes to elect if the regular Democratic organization were able to hold their cohorts at the polls. He held himself to be a “Liberal,” an English term which he preferred to the nondescript word “Progressive,” although his preachments had been against the very principles for which the New Idea movement stood. He always seemed able, however, to find some loophole through which to escape from some untenable position, never at a loss for a reason, for a change of base. As some philosopher has said, a knowledge of history is “very convenient to the politician—a plausible parallel makes him surer of his ground.” Once what he said was believed, he was welcomed with open arms by the radicals of New Jersey.

He had to show evidence of a change of heart before there could be any wholesale enlistment under his banner. Vivian M. Lewis had been the choice of the Republicans for Governor. He had a great personal popularity in public work, was recognized as both upright and independent. He had gone



Woodrow Wilson

ahead of his party by insisting that a definite public utility rate-making plank be inserted in the Republican platform. In the committee the ballot stood evenly divided until it came the turn to vote of Charles Coddington, of Union County, personal representative of Lewis, who said that he had been instructed to see that such a pledge be made by the Republicans if Lewis was expected to run as their candidate. This move incurred bitter hostility on the part of the old bosses in the organization and angered greatly the public utility magnates. Former Governor Murphy quit the post of chairman of the State Committee, United States Senator Frank O. Briggs being chosen for the vacant chair. Although a corporation man, made Senator by the usual money-spending system of nominating men for high office, he was known to feel that the railroad domination of his party was ruining it. He had won the mild, almost suspicious, attention of the Progressives of the State, and was expected to receive the bulk of their vote. His campaign attack upon Wilson was made mainly along three lines. Knowing Wilson's predilection for a low tariff, he attempted to inveigle the professor into discussion of this as an issue. He bombarded Wilson with quotations from his own books showing the professor's animosity towards labor unions and certain classes of immigrants of which New Jersey had many among its voters. And he accused Wilson of being the tool of the Democratic bosses and dominated by them.

Wilson refused to discuss the tariff, except in the most general terms. Some of his lieutenants got a certificate of orthodoxy from the president of the State Federation of Labor, who happened to be running on the ticket with Wilson for the Assembly. And Wilson stole Lewis' thunder on the boss question in a way which surprised everyone, most of all the Princetonian. He somewhat horrified his colleagues by an unguarded statement "that he would meet any responsible Republican in debate"; . . . "and I welcome any politician in the State to a debate upon the public platform upon a public question." George L. Record, transplanted Yankee schoolmaster and lawyer, quite the most dangerous man for any Democrat to meet on a platform, jumped to accept the challenge. Here was a contretemps! The fat was certainly in the fire. The whole State sat up and took notice, knowing that fur would fly if the two should meet, and most certainly there were many things which puzzled the people which then would be clarified. Wilson's mentors would not let him be caught in such a trap, even if it was of his own making. The question of a debate was allowed to go by the board, but the Republicans would not permit it to be washed away. The constant prodding of his opponents and the insistence of his managers to keep away from Record got on his nerves and temper. Exasperated, he finally took matters in his own hands and wrote Record that since all his speaking dates had been filled he would debate with him by an interchange of public letters. Record made the best of the situation which was not to his liking (he preferred to get Wilson before an audience) and asked the doctor to specify whether he meant that he would not be bossed by Smith or Davis; also

whether he would fight for laws embodying rate-making clauses for public utilities, direct elections, corrupt practices in legislation, and other progressive schemes then being agitated.

It was the crisis of the campaign. Against the wishes and advice of the most of his associates, Wilson sent to Record a smashing document covering in bold reply the nineteen questions propounded. Mr. Record wanted to know whether Wilson admitted that "the boss system exists as I have described it? If so, how do you propose to abolish it?" In an endeavor to corner the doctor, he named certain bosses and asked whether he included these. It is no longer necessary to quote at length Wilson's replies. They were full and clear and emphatic, statements which denounced the boss system and its bosses, naming Smith, Nugent, and Davis. And further: "If elected, I shall not either in the matter of appointments to office, of assent to legislation, in shaping any part of the policy of my administration, submit to the dictation of any person, or persons, 'special interests,' or organizations." He said that he would welcome advice and suggestions from any citizen whatever his standing, "but all suggestions and all advice will be considered upon its merits and no additional weight will be given to any man's advice because of his exercising, or supposing that he exercises, some sort of political influence or control. I should deem myself forever disgraced should I, in even the slightest degree, coöperate in any such system. I regard myself as pledged to the regeneration of the Democratic party."

The managers of the Wilson campaign, at least Smith, Nugent and Davis, considered this a splendid move on the political chessboard, the putting on of a fine "show" worth the full price of admission. They did not believe that the Princeton professor could mean all he said. The reply to Record ended the campaign and branded Wilson as a genuinely upstanding radical. He won by forty-nine thousand. It was the biggest vote he ever received in New Jersey. The heavy commuter vote, mostly Republican, never supported him in subsequent elections, and he never again got a majority of the votes of the State. One of the surprises of the campaign was the fact that Governor Wilson had carried enough Assemblymen with him to give a majority in the Lower House, which was almost exactly a reversal of the conditions of the previous year, and even more astounding, the Democrats held a very comfortable majority on any joint ballot of the Legislature.

The sweeping victory of the Democrats swept the Governor-elect into a political melée for which he was unready. An amateur in politics, as he acknowledged, he was faced with a dilemma which would have troubled the most experienced politician. Not conceiving of the possibility of the election of a Democratic United States Senator, there was no one in the party who would have his name placed before the preferential primary as a candidate for that office. By persuasion which almost amounted to force, and a trick—the name signed to the petition was not in his writing—James E. Martine, of Plainfield, had stood for the nomination for Senator and received 48,449 votes, three times that of Frank McDermitt, his nearest competitor. Martine, one of the most lovable of men, was an old war horse in politics. For forty

years he had been running for office without a win; he said of himself that he had "run for everything from constable to Congress." No one doubted his loyalty, honesty, and solid worth of character, but there were few who thought that he measured up to the stature required of one who should represent the State in the National Senate.

What was to be done? After all the primary had only been one indicating preference and had suggested a name rather than demanded a nomination. Of 264,000 Democrats who had gone to the primary, only 63,000 had indicated any Senatorial preference; what about the 200,000 who by their inaction had shown that, perhaps, they preferred some one not named? Martine was a "free trader" and did industrial Jersey desire one of that ilk to represent it in Washington? And anyway this was the first primary of its kind and did not mean much one way or another. James Smith had been responsible for the nomination and election of Wilson, and, therefore, also for the capture of the State by his party. Why not, in recognition of his wisdom and work, honor him with election to the Senate, give him the opportunity he desired to prove his worth in that body?

What would Wilson do? Evidently he knew as little about this as any of his friends and it was some time before he indicated which line of action he would take. The primary had made little impression upon Wilson. He voiced a personal preference for a Princeton man, John R. Hardin, one of the great lawyers of New Jersey. Those who had his political education in hand—he had recently made one of the instructors, Joseph P. Tumulty, his secretary—drew his attention to the fact that the Democrats had already decided upon Martine. The independent newspapers had taken a stand on the side of the choice of the preferential primary. Wilson hesitated. Democrats high in the councils of their party pointed out to him the ill effect any break with the progressive independents who had helped elect him would have upon his future in national politics. The Governor came haltingly to the conclusion that he should sustain the choice of the primary.

The Wilson Break With Smith—He visited Smith and Davis at their homes in the endeavor to persuade them to come over to the side of the line to which he had just crossed. Davis, on his deathbed, said he had already entered into a compact to deliver the votes of Hudson County to Smith. The latter took the position that since his health had bettered he felt justified in seeking election to the Senate, and was confident that with the support of Davis he could control the Democratic legislative caucus. On December 9, 1910, Wilson issued a formal statement in which he said:

I know that the people of New Jersey do not desire Mr. James Smith, Jr., to be sent again to the Senate. If he should be, he will not go as their representative. The only means I have of knowing whom they desire to represent them is the vote at the recent primaries where 48,000 Democratic voters, a majority of the whole number who voted at the primaries, declared their preference for Mr. Martine, of Union County. For me the vote is conclusive. I think it should be for every member of the Legislature.

A bitter battle ensued. It was war between old-time popular powerful boss and the latest popular leader. Wilson had his initiation into rough and tumble politics, where everything was ruled fair. The element of religious prejudice was injected, but Wilson by adroit addresses turned this to his benefit. He was a new, a different man from the Princeton Doctor of Philosophy, and amazed his friends by his rugged methods and speeches. He most assuredly had splendid aides in his camp; he always had such during the early years of his political career. As the time approached the caucus, the result was still in the balance. When the caucus could be delayed no longer the voting began, with Martine receiving thirty-three votes; forty-one was necessary to election. On the following day the combined vote of the two Houses revealed a vote of forty for Martine. Before the final ballot was taken, James Hennesey, who was representing the dying Democratic boss of Hudson County, Bob Davis, was persuaded to have the Hudson delegation vote for Martine, and the battle was over. Wilson had downed Smith.

This break with Smith marked the beginning of Wilson's march to the White House. From that time forward he was the most successful amateur politician of his generation—perhaps of all time. His casting aside of the bosses increased his confidence in himself and in the power of his eloquence. He had come down to earth from former academic heights and learned how to fight. Henceforth he was a fighting candidate, taking on all comers. Newspapers of all shades vied with each other in spreading his fame. He was front page news, sharing that desirable position with Roosevelt, Bryan, and the few outstanding picturesque figures of that period. He has passed the test which admitted him into the University of national politics.

Smith had returned to his home before the vote had been cast which elected Martine to replace Kean at Washington. He was not through with politics or done with a hope of serving as New Jersey's United States Senator. In the primaries of 1912 he sought the popular support for that office. There were many other aspirants for the place, but Wilson, still opposed to his former colleague, induced all to withdraw to make way for the selection of Congressman William Hughes, of Paterson. It may be that the Governor, now in the midst of a Presidential campaign, wanted the aid and the publicity, sorely needed just then, which would accrue from his support of a labor candidate, which Hughes was. The Democratic primary showed 55,000 votes for Hughes, as compared with 35,000 for Smith. Frank O. Briggs polled more than 65,000 in the Republican primary, but such choices do not count when the opposition party are in power. For the first time since 1881 New Jersey had two Democrats in the National Senate.

Wilson had the mental inquisitiveness and acquisitiveness of the true scholar and it stood him in good stead as a director of legislation. He had been sitting at the feet of radicals other than those of New Jersey, notably U'Ren, of Oregon, and Bourne, so that his political reformation was progressing at a great rate. He was accused of changing his coat as rapidly as a chameleon; but that is a perfectly justifiable method which that animal uses

for its own safety. Wilson began his reign as Governor with the purpose of being the party leader in more than the customary way. He would act the part of an English Premier, instead of a State Executive. His program of legislation, in brief, included the following measures: A Direct Primaries Act; the Regulation of Public Utilities; a Corrupt Practices Act; and an Employers' Liability Act. Those were not new measures. They had been endorsed in Republican platforms and were variously represented upon Jersey's statute books, but the Governor was to set the blood to moving in their limp bodies and supply backbones. All the might of his office, powers of patronage, and popularity with the electorate were to be exerted in the suasion of a reluctant Legislature.

Legislative Program—A pre-inauguration meeting with leading members of both Houses was held in a New York hotel to outline the program and plan for the enactment of the measures decided upon by the Legislature. George Record took the lead in this conference and presented the essentials of a primary and election law, of a corrupt practices act, as well as recommendations for a public utility bill, fashioned on the Governor Hughes bill of New York, and an employers' liability bill to be based upon a report of recent New York legislation. To Record was allotted the task of framing the primary bill as well as the ballot blanket and corrupt practices measures. The shaping up of the other bills was subdivided. When the newspapers published the prominent rôle played by Record, and partisan sheets began accusing Wilson of surrendering his leadership to Record, the latter was sidetracked temporarily. Record drew up the bills, nevertheless, and they were introduced into the Legislature in just the form in which he had drawn them, the employers' liability bill excepted. A special commission, appointed by the Republican Governor, Fort, framed this measure. Walter E. Edge, the present Ambassador to France, was a member of the commission, and coöperated with Wilson in his legislative program, as did Joseph S. Frelinghuysen, then State Senator and later United States Senator. Edge handled the employers' liability bill in the Legislature, suggested to Wilson the retaining of "a man like Mr. Louis Brandeis" to defend the act from any attempt to have it declared unconstitutional. He deserves the credit which usually is given to Wilson.

The public utility bill was substantially a copy of the Hughes measure. The election bill, drawn by Record, became the keystone of the Wilson arch. Only a man who had spent more than a decade in the study and formulation of such bills could have drawn the voluminous document which included the election laws of a series of years and fitted them, when possible, to the new election machinery. Numerous amendments were tacked to this measure, the danger from which Wilson apparently did not recognize until Record called them vigorously to his attention. It was a much mutilated bill which came up for final passage, and it seemed about to be defeated on the score of its multitudinous flaws. The real basis of the fight made against it was its wholesale wrecking of party organization. "The author of this bill would

wreck the organization which nominated him." Without hesitation, Wilson, who has assumed authorship, replied: "It is true that the organization nominated me, but fortunately it was the people who elected me. Does the gentleman charge that this bill attacks the interests of the people?" Wilson fought valiantly for the bill; in a conference upon the subject he threatened to act beyond all precedent and, as the Democratic leader, go to the caucus, a right which was challenged. Eventually with the Smith forces solidly lined up against the bill and its demise seemingly imminent, Record managed to persuade two Republicans, Assemblymen Jackson and Layden, of Passaic County, who in turn secured another Republican, to vote for the measure. The Geran Bill passed the House by a just one more than the required majority. It was a narrow squeeze. The Republican Senate balked, but saw the light when Record came before a committee appointed by that body to consider the bill, and convinced them that not only was it worthy of support but, and more important to his hearers, that if the Senate did not pass the act Wilson could, with the aid of the Progressives, see to the election of a Legislature which would do so. After Record's argument before the Senate committee Wilson sent for him and thanked him for the help he had given.

While the primary bill was being perfected, Senator John D. Prince, later minister to Denmark and to Serbia, sat waiting for Record to get to work on a corrupt practices act. Prince, eager for the distinction of having such a measure bear his name, had already introduced a bill which was a copy of an English statute. Record had framed his corrupt practices bill on an Oregon enactment. It was a combination of the two, with few amendments, which was passed as the Prince bill. Wilson then delegated Record to see what he could do to help Senator Harry V. Osborne, of Essex, and Frank H. Sommer, long a political associate of Record, frame a public utility act. He had nothing to contribute to the measure as outlined. This bill and the workmen's compensation act went through the Legislature backed by the Wilson punch.

Before the close of the first session of the Legislature under Wilson two other important measures came up for consideration. One had to do with a complete reorganization of the complicated school system, aiming to eliminate political manipulation. In the Governor's message upon the subject he tacked on three paragraphs calling for the enactment of the second, a commission government bill. Backed by the Wilson steam roller, both bills went through a still reluctant Legislature. The municipal commission bill was a favorite of Wilson's imported directly from the West, and was another step taken by the Governor in his endeavor to chase the bosses, no matter how relatively small and unimportant, out of their holes. The act authorized, under certain provisions, the substituting of a set of five ruling commissioners who would assume all the functions and powers and prerogatives of municipal government. This could make over all offices and departments and fill them with their own appointees. They handled the city's expenditures. If their government was sufficiently unsatisfactory, the people had the right of recall. The citizens could also propose ordinances and, if the

commissioners refused to enact them, they could demand a referendum. Commission government is strongly entrenched in the leading cities of New Jersey, however unavailing and costly its first trials proved. Wilson's stand in favor of the initiative, referendum, and recall, attracted attention throughout the United States and added another row to the pile upon which he was climbing to the Presidency. The completion of a remarkable program within a short term, the virility, and advance character of the laws enacted, and particularly the spectacular manner in which Wilson had rushed them through, made him the joy and pride of Jerseymen. Whatever he did was right; whatever he wanted must perforce be given him since he could make no mistakes. If the Jerseyites had been given the power, Woodrow Wilson would have been made the President right then. True, the electorate became a bit thoughtful and had noted a few flaws in the perfect laws promulgated, and in the executive leader, and had cooled a little in their ardor by 1912.

The Governor's method of using the patronage which was his, was another small fly in the ointment. He really was little interested in the matter of State appointments. He turned over to his secretary and fellow instructors a list of all the State appointments that the Governor had to make, with the request that they go over it and suggest names. There was no sense of obligation to those who had rendered political services. Record had given three months to framing and carrying the Wilson legislative program. He might well have been appointed on the Utility Commission, for which his talents best fitted him. Record was made a member of the State Board of Assessors, but not until James G. Blauvelt, an ardent progressive Republican, had not only declined the office, but given Wilson such a talking to as Wilson afterwards remarked was the bluntest he had ever heard, expressing his opinion of the Governor's conduct in taking advantage of Record's experience and help and then being ashamed to reward him for it.

Members of the Princeton faculty received two choice appointments, Professor Henry Jones Ford and Professor Winthrop More Daniels, as Bank Commissioner and Utility Commissioner, respectively. A college friend, Calvin N. Kendall, Superintendent of School at Indianapolis, received a ten thousand dollar berth as Commissioner of Education of the recently reorganized public school system. Wilson, or his friends for him, could play the political game with patronage when policy demanded. He appointed, as a matter of course, the German, Herman Jueller, to a trusteeship of the Trenton School of Industrial Arts. Supreme Court Justice Alfred Reed was retired at seventy-two to make way for Samuel Kalisch, the first Hebrew to be named in New Jersey to the higher courts. Governor Fort had named the first Roman Catholic to the Supreme Court, or Wilson might have done so. In 1912, at the end of the term of Dickinson as Secretary of State, the Governor had to choose between David S. Crater, of Monmouth, and Senator G. S. Silzer as the new incumbent; he tried to placate Monmouth for failing to reappoint O. A. Bogardus to the State Board of Assessors by making Crater Secretary of State, thereby angering Silzer.

Just then Mahlon Pitney resigned the post of Chancellor to become an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, through appointment by President Taft, and Silzer was thought to be in line for the vacated Chancellorship. An exigency of politics gave the Chancellor's desk to Edwin Robert Walker, the Vice-Chancellor, who had been in chancery as a clerk in the office under Henry S. Little of the famous triumvirate of old-time Democratic bosses. Vivian Lewis, Wilson's opponent in the gubernatorial campaign, was appointed Vice-Chancellor and Silzer had to content himself with a commission as prosecutor of the pleas of his county. These were all moves which strengthened Wilson's hold upon the machinery of Jersey politics. He or his friends made others; seven of the Senators who supported his measures received lucrative appointments before the Wilson régime was a thing of the past. The adroit dispensing of patronage was never a strong point of Governor Wilson, it was a phase of politics at which he was never to become adept, a lesson which he never learned well.

After the close of the 1911 session of the Legislature, the Governor was free to help along his Presidential boom and did so to the neglect of the party of which he was the leader. When he came to the next Legislature with another program of reforms to be considered the political complexion had undergone a change; the Senate was Republican by a majority of one, and the House stood thirty-seven Republicans to twenty-three Democrats. Nugent and Smith in Essex County were again in the saddle. The landslide at the polls was supposed to be a popular repudiation of the policies for which Wilson stood. One of the Democratic Senators was adjudged guilty by his Senatorial colleagues of seeking a bribe in connection with a bill he had introduced, but the Senate had been unable to expel him, lacking a two-third majority. The Governor was urged to use his powers to remove the man, but Wilson failed to do so, which neglect was unpleasantly commented upon in the press. The Governor's maladroitness in his use of patronage came in for criticism, the chief accusation being that the executive was using this to promote his Presidential aspirations. The Wilson fame which was waxing great all over the country was waning at home.

There was, however, a ray of light in the darkness. The Democratic Legislature of 1911 had pushed the investigation of election scandals in the southern counties (Atlantic and Camden), disclosing the rottenness which was expected and showing that this was mainly possible through the boss appointment of sheriffs who in turn drew grand jurors who would not indict, thereby assuring protection to any boss-directed political sinner. Wilson described the conditions as "A system of mixed politics and government whose practitioners have been bad men. . . . If the sheriff belonged to a gang the grand jury was depended upon to not go too far. The prosecutor, if he belongs to a gang, will be discreet. The judge may be complaisant." Withoutout going into details: Samuel Kalisch, a Wilson appointee as Supreme Court Justice, on the first day he sat in that court, found a way to deprive the sheriffs of their right to draw venal juries. He revived an old English legal practice of appointing elisors to draw grand juries and



MILITARY PARK AND BROAD STREET, NEWARK
Looking south from the windows of the New Jersey State Chamber of Commerce

appointed two whose names caused a packing of grips by gangsters in preparation for departure to realms unknown. A similar procedure was effective in a northern county (Hudson), and a procession of political criminals was started off to prison. Wilson received the credit for this brilliant move in the destruction of the last outpost of bossism. It was looked upon as another glorious stride made in the freeing of Jersey from despoilers and oppressors. It helped his campaign abroad and at home. It also assured his going before the primaries with no fear of illegal boss interference. Since the discredit of the exposures was against the Republicans, it helped keep enough of them out of the 1913 Legislature to make that body Democratic.

The first trial of the Geran Law performed one of its missions by procuring the choice of Wilson for President, sending a practically solid group of delegates to the National Convention at Baltimore. James Smith, Jr., went as a district delegate. The vote read 48,336 ballots for Governor Wilson; 532 for Champ Clark, and 87 scattering. It just about equalled the number cast for Martine, in 1910, and 13,000 less than that given Roosevelt—Taft getting only about 44,000. In the Presidential election Wilson polled in New Jersey 178,289 out of a total of 462,289. The combined vote of the split Republican ticket amounted to about 235,000. Roosevelt's candidacy saved the day for his Democratic opponent.

All this is somewhat ahead of the New Jersey Legislature of 1912, but because it is national in scope could be summarized at will. There were many important bills brought up at this time and an even larger number of enactments were placed upon the statute books than during the 1911 session. Wilson did not apply himself to the prodding along of legislation as he had done in the first flush of his enthusiasm the previous year. He was busy elsewhere, and to Judge William P. Martin, of Essex County, was delegated the task of making an analysis of the pending legislative measures. The judge also wrote many of the Wilson veto messages.

The foremost question of the session was the attempt to complete legislation long before begun to abolish railroad grade crossings. The issue was acute, especially in such cities as Paterson and Passaic, where the main tracks of a railroad then ran—and still do—through the middle of the streets in the business section. Foster Voorhees, in 1895, introduced a bill requiring the railroads to elevate their tracks in Newark and Jersey City; in both places the Pennsylvania system had already begun the work of so doing. It was only by the aid of this railroad that the bill was enacted that year. Later there was considerable, almost continuous, agitation for the wiping out of every grade crossing. The main difficulty was the determining of whether the railroads should pay all of the expenses involved, or whether it should be shared by the locality involved. During the Wilson régime both parties inserted planks into their platforms approving of the elimination of the grade crossings; there only remained the passing of a measure which would do it.

Senator Pierce, of Union County, and Assemblyman McCran, of Passaic

County, each introduced bills to this end in their Houses. It was a composite of these two measures which finally came up for enactment. The bill was modeled after a Connecticut statute adopted two decades earlier, but was more drastic since the New Jersey bill required that one crossing must be removed annually for every thirty miles of track. The Connecticut statute was more elastic in that it permitted the State authorities to exercise discretion when the financial condition of the companies did not warrant such removals. No discretion was provided in enforcement of the New Jersey law. There was a determined effort made to defeat the bill on the part of the railroad lobby, which announced that such legislation would cripple all the railroads in the State and bankrupt some. A State organization of mayors was just as diligent in their lobbying, and often both had to be driven from the floors of the legislative chambers.

Wilson had been busy with his campaign, but was believed to favor the measure. He suddenly projected himself into the *melée* by announcing that the bill was too drastic, that he would veto it if it came into his hand. The bill was passed, nevertheless, and Wilson did as he said he would. In the message which accompanied his veto he pointed out that such a statute would seriously embarrass the railways, and that the matter had better be left to the Utility Commission to care for. "In this way," said the Governor's veto, "all the results that could possibly be attained by the present bill would be attained without the risk and perhaps the discouragement and discredit of attempting a thing, in itself inequitable and impracticable." The message was a condensation and adaptation of advice railroad officials had showered him with. As the message was opened in the Senate Chamber there fell from the bill a letter written by a railroad man to the Governor embodying arguments identical with the Wilson veto. The *faux pas* was never used against Wilson in his Presidential campaign.

The Legislature determined to override the Governor's veto as both parties were pledged to such legislation. Since that Legislature was Republican it no doubt thought it would be an effective means of showing up the "Champion of the People" as a slave of the corporation and pose themselves in the limelight in an anti-monopoly rôle. The bill was reënacted. To get the immediate glory when it would do the most good to the Republican cause, the statute was acclaimed a law and its enforcement demanded. But the railroad attorneys forestalled this, getting a decision in the courts that conditions arising out of a twelve-day adjournment of the Legislature had rendered the reënactment of the measure illegal, veto or no veto. The bill was reintroduced by Senator Pierce and reënacted, with the alteration that only the dangerous grade crossings were to be eliminated, such crossings to be abandoned at the rate of thirty miles a year. If a municipality asked for the removal of a crossing it is required to pay fifteen per cent. of the costs. Governor Wilson signed this bill. One still must use great care in some of Jersey's busiest streets, particularly in Passaic and Paterson, for the railroad trains still scurry down them on the ground level.

The legislative session was relatively and practically barren in reforms.

With the Republicans in control too much energy was wasted in personal hostilities. Toward the end the Republican members issued a statement declaring that the public business was sadly demoralized and the responsibility for this condition blamed upon the Governor. Wilson's tart reply read, in part:

The statement that I have by frequent absences from the State in any degree neglected my duties as Governor, is absolutely false. No important matter of business has been allowed to fall in arrears in my office. . . . Almost all the bills of capital consequence were reserved until the last. Among them none were more conspicuous than those which attempted to break down at one point or another the best legislation of the session of 1911 to the maintenance of which both parties were explicitly pledged in the campaign of the autumn of 1911. . . . This, that, and the other door of loose practice was deliberately opened. It was my duty to stand guard against these things and I have done so. Against the bills to this effect which have passed over my veto, I wish to utter my earnest protest in the name not only of party obligations—an obligation fairly resting upon both parties—but in the name of the people of the State. The session has been fruitful of nothing so much as of legislation tending to impair rather than to increase the efficiency of the laws of the State.

In a justification of his failure in 1912 to follow his practice of the previous year, of prodding the Legislature by special messages, Wilson declared:

I did not deem it wise or courteous to avow, as the session advanced, by reported messages that the great matters were to be ignored and that the whole force of the session was to be spent upon measures of another sort and of questionable expediency. If the session has been barren and disappointing, as it has been, the people of the State will know where to bestow the blame.

If the Governor's hands had been tied by the Republican Legislature of 1912 they were certainly cut free by the shift in the character of the Legislature of 1913. Accompanying his election as President a landslide had swept the State's officers into the Democratic column. The Senate now consisted of twelve Democrats to nine Republicans; the Assembly stood fifty-one Democrats to eight Republicans. Never in the history of the State had a Legislature been so overwhelmingly Democratic. Never had a Democratic leader in the executive's chair contemplated a political situation so much to his liking. There were several reform measures with which Wilson had hoped to climax his administration, and now, if ever, he had his chance. He was not satisfied with the makeshift method by which Judge Kalisch had clipped the wings of the high-flying sheriffs and deprived them of some of their political powers. Wilson advocated an enactment which would strip them entirely of all jury drawing prerogatives. Then, since he had declared himself to the Nation as emphatically in favor of the initiative, referendum and

recall as efficient and necessary adjuncts to government, he felt that only by a revision of the Constitution of New Jersey by a popular convention could these and his other favorite reforms be incorporated into the government of the State. Lastly, he had been so continually criticized, especially by Roosevelt, during the Presidential campaign, of having failed in two years to curb the operations of the corporations chartered in his State, that he was determined to show America what a thorough job he would make of "trust-busting." And he had all the prestige of the highest office which is the gift of the country to help him overawe the legislators of a comparatively small State.

He had the electorate with him in his attack upon the jury system. Just so long as boss-chosen sheriffs could pick jurors pledged to do the bidding of the bosses for or against any person coming before them, there could be no assurance of justice, nor honesty in politics. The method proposed by Wilson to overcome a well-known defect in our judiciary system was to give the power to draw grand juries to the judges. But this proposition came at a time when the people were restive under the too great powers of judges and were demanding that the recall of judges by popular vote should be incorporated in National and State law. A judge could be just as much of a tool of a boss as a sheriff, and since there were fewer of them, more easily controlled. They already had the power "to set aside or reduce jury awards against big corporations; and under a law enabling them to revise jury lists, they already practically could dominate the presentments of grand inquests and verdicts of petty panels. The trend of the sentiment of the hour was to restrict their prerogatives rather than extend them as Governor Wilson proposed to do with the revival of the judge-made jury commission scheme." Many a grand juror, whose character as a high-class, honest citizen had never been impugned, had meekly writhed under the scathing arraignment of a judge, and felt that already the court had rather too much and too offensive power. One Joseph Salus, foreman of an Atlantic County Grand Jury, with intent not above suspicion however, had dared to tell the judge that he had no more right to tell a jury what it should do than the jury had to tell the court what he should do. And many of the justices of the higher courts concurred in this opinion.

There were, of course, many reasons why an increase in the powers given the judges was unpopular in Jersey, but these did now weigh heavily with the Governor. He wanted to break forever bossism, and could not see that smashing the jury system might not be as effective in accomplishing this as he hoped. Assemblyman Zisgen, of Bergen, introduced a bill embodying the ideas suggested, but all the persuasive eloquence of Wilson could not get a majority for it. Then it was proposed that an elective jury commission to appoint juries be established, but since the sheriff was an elected officer, why replace one elective official with another? Then the Zisgen bill was amended to substitute the Governor for the "judges" of the measure. But the legislators recalling the ruthless manner of Governors like Abbett and others—

perhaps Wilson himself—were unready to increase the altogether too great prerogatives of the executive.

The bill was tabled. The Governor sent a warning message, but without result. An amended measure was suggested which would authorize the Governor to appoint in those counties which, in a popular referendum, voted for the proposed method of jury drawing. Wilson urged the removal from the bill of the referendum amendment, telegraphing to Senator Davis, the Democratic leader in the upper chamber: "I feel very strongly our party's unequivocal commitment to jury reform and that the terms of the referendum in the present bill are a virtual nullification of the reform. Can we not give the people what they demand without qualification?" The Senate did as the President-Governor wished, but the House returned the measure in its original amended form. A special session of the Legislature was called in May, where the Governor's Jury Commission was the subject for consideration, but that body was interested neither in this nor the granting of more powers to the Governorship. Then someone suggested that the Chancellor be given control over juries, but the Assembly would not enact any measure which would not give the people a chance to say what they wanted, which after all was supposedly at the base of most of Wilson's reform measures. Worn out by the opposition the Governor gave up the fight. A compromise Chancellor bill was passed with the popular referendum feature intact. Late in 1913 a vote was taken and to the surprise of legislators and the people themselves, the statute was carried by a majority of more than 30,000. Ten days later Supreme Court Justice Swayze declared a State-wide referendum in legislation unconstitutional and set the law aside.

Chronologically, the attempt made by the Governor to pass legislative law for a popular convention to draw a new Constitution marks the end of Wilson's activities in New Jersey as its executive and Democratic leader. He wanted to gather together all the reforms which he felt were peculiarly his own into a form which could not be changed at the will of succeeding legislatures. The ripping to pieces of the Constitution and its patching together with his specialties was the method he determined to use. The "State Convention" feature of the Geran Act was a means ready at hand to procure the desirable constitutional changes; and he had persuaded the convention to declare for a popularly elected constitutional convention. Here was his chance to make an integral part of New Jersey government most of the measures he had advocated, more particularly the initiative, referendum and recall plan of rule, and also to introduce the apportionment of State Senators in accord with population by districts instead of by counties.

The dual-legislative system of government was undergoing, in the United States, one of those sporadic series of criticisms, such as break out every so often in Great Britain in the House of Lords, and in sections of the British Empire which still retain Senates. There were none, as with the English Dominions, who advocated the obliteration of Senates, but it was the trend of the times in America to make population the basis of Senatorial representation. Wilson's inclusion of this notion foreordained his effort at recon-

struction of the State Constitution to defeat. It had been New Jersey, in 1788, which had been largely instrumental in making the basis of representation in the United States Senate by states instead of by people. This same principle had been introduced in the home government and had been adhered to in the Constitution of 1844. Since that time constitutional conventions and commissions had been hedged in with pledges and enactments which precluded even the consideration of any change from the county representation to that of population. Since constitutional legislation had to go through the Senate, the millenium had not been reached when Senators could be expected to cut their own throats.

But the Governor had apparently created a millenium, for he had Senatorial backing in the unanimous insertion of a constitutional convention plank into the State platform. For the purpose of making effective that unanimous proposal, bills were introduced into the Legislature calling for such a convention. The Senators, upon second thought, were no longer enthusiastic for any change which would give the political control in their chamber to a few counties in the northern part of the State. It was questioned whether the Legislature had any right to maltreat the ancient Constitution. Attorney-General Edmund Wilson gave as his opinion that "the Constitution itself provided the only means of its renovation, by amendments ratified by two legislatures and then by the people." Charles Hennessy, Assemblyman from Bergen, thinking otherwise, introduced a bill for a popularly chosen convention in which each county would be represented by as many delegates as its population entitled it to. The measure was battered about and mutilated in both chambers before coming up for passage in a final form which had the popular clause elided. It received a fat majority in the Assembly. In the Senate only four Senators voted for it. And that ended that; the Constitution escaped having any patches plastered on its ragged garments. The defeat of the measure was just another straw showing how the wind had changed as regards Wilson's influence in Jersey governmental affairs.

Wilson had chafed under the criticism heaped upon him during the Presidential campaign because he had talked much about curbing the trusts and had not done so as the Governor of New Jersey. With a Legislature overwhelmingly Democratic he started in to repair this omission and, succeeding, vastly increased his reputation throughout the Nation as a courageous opponent of corporations and "Big Business" which then dominated politics, in the East, at least. That in clipping the wings of the trusts he cut great slices off the income which New Jersey was deriving from corporation taxes and the filing of charter receipts did not interest the country at large, except those states that took advantage of the setback given Jersey's wholesale business in charters by enacting laws similar to those repudiated by the Wilson legislation. Prior to the Governor's attack, New Jersey had received from corporations a total of nearly \$35,000,000, the filing fees aggregating another \$4,500,000. The annual income from both sources was about \$3,000,000.

Wilson had become increasingly radical. He had threatened certain heads of corporations that if they did certain things he would see that they were "hanged higher than Haman." The phrase "personal guilt" was often on his lips. On one occasion he had declared: "There is only, historically speaking, one possible successful punishment of abuses of law, and that is, that when a wrong thing is done you find the man who did it and punish him. You can fine all the corporations there are and fine them out of existence, and all you have done will be to have embarrassed the commerce of the country. You will have left the men who did it free to repeat it in other combinations." Brave words these, phrases which demanded brave deeds. The President-elect, when on the trail of something he was determined to hunt down, had a chilly courage and disregard of consequences to others which slashed its way to the kill.

Upon his return from Bermuda, where he had been recuperating from the labor of the national campaign, he called in Chancellor Walker and Bennett Van Syckel, a retired Justice of the Supreme Court, for the purpose of framing a series of seven regulatory laws largely patterned after the California corporation statutes. These were introduced into the Legislature and, while opposed, were passed almost without amendments. They were known as the Seven Sisters laws and were extremely broad and inclusive in their definitions of trusts and what trusts must not be or do in New Jersey. The penalties attached to the laws were heavy and personal. A corporation breaking them could not only be deprived of its charter, but the directors and officials were liable to prosecution and punishment. They were probably the most comprehensive anti-corporation measures of that day, and enlarged the definition of the term "trust" beyond any held previously. The business interests of America sat up and took notice, since Wilson was soon to be the President of the country. The labor interests becoming frightened, thinking that the unions might come under the classification of trusts and, therefore, open to prosecution, sought assurance that the Seven Sisters laws would not be applied to them. Wilson is supposed to have given the required assurance, at Washington, not in New Jersey, that they would not be. He was reported as "ready to sign an Act of Congress forbidding the use of a trust prosecuting fund in the prosecution of the labor trust, *i. e.*, the American Federation of Labor."

The legislators of New Jersey were exceedingly worried as to the future of the State corporation charter business. Some of the Senators predicted that all the laws would do would be to destroy that business. And that is just about all that happened. Other states, notably Delaware, copied out the attractive features of the former Jersey corporation laws and reduced its filing fees and annual franchise taxes. The hegira of the big industrial corporations from New Jersey soon began. They surrendered their charters, packed up their belongings and reincorporated in Delaware. The number of new incorporations diminished greatly. In 1914, for the first time since franchises had been taxed, the total in the State showed a loss. In the

amount of the taxes assessed on miscellaneous corporations there was a steady decline, beginning with 1914, which continued annually until 1920.

No sooner was Wilson out of office than a system of tinkering with the corporation laws began. On April 9, 1920, the Democratic Governor, Edwards, signed bills which had passed the Legislature, repealing all of the Seven Sisters laws which had not heretofore been amended. Just how much Jersey lost by the enactments can only be estimated; it ran well into the millions. The Wilson laws never had any judicial interpretation, so that in addition to the number of companies which left the State there was an unknown number who dared not incorporate in it because they could not know how the Seven Sisters might act under provocation. It was the stability of the Jersey corporation laws, as much as their liberality, which had attracted big industrial concerns. The repeal of the Seven Sisters laws coincided with an enactment of the Legislature of a law permitting corporations to issue stock with no par value, also with the abolition of the National Capital Issues Committee established during the World War. New Jersey's charter business promptly began to pick up. From \$78,023 in 1915, the filing fees went up to \$366,175 in 1920 and, by 1924—a poor year—had reached \$445,458. Since 1924 no year has passed which failed to show an increase in the number of corporations and the amount of taxes received by the State.

In reviewing the important measures enacted during the Wilson régime and pointing out some of their effects upon Jersey's citizenry and upon the destiny of the State, there had been no intentional overlooking of many other enactments of marked value. They are too many to receive individual attention. During the last session of the Legislature, 1913, laws were placed upon the statute books, to quote from the Democratic platform of that year: "Laws for the safeguarding of railroad travel, for the strengthening of the school laws, for instructions to school children to prevent accidents, for the pensioning of widows and their children, for the correction and curbing of corporation abuses within the State, for the abolition of grade crossings, for the regulation of motor vehicle traffic, for the establishment of a uniform system of weights and measures, for agricultural demonstrations throughout the State, for the extension of the employers' liability act to municipal and State employees, for the semi-monthly pay to municipal and State employees, for the establishment of a State Department of Records and Archives, for the use of the public school buildings for public gatherings, for the contract system of prison labor, for the establishment of a board of parole for prisoners, besides many other equally important and equally progressive measures."

A similar, if not so long, list might be made of the enactments of the first year, that first of two Democratic legislatures which were ready to do the Governor's will.

If into this brief account of the accession of the Princeton professor to the Governor's chair, and of some of the things he did while in it, there have crept in phrases which apparently show a lack of admiration, if there are comparisons and criticism seemingly invidious, they may be discounted. Few

but that can subscribe to the admiration of Wilson's leadership: "We endorse his administration as Governor of this State. Under his guidance progressive legislation, for which the people of our State have been seeking for years . . . was enacted, and we are now enjoying the benefits flowing from these legislative acts." The intention has been to look upon the legislation enacted under Wilson as one would look upon that of any other Governor. There has been also the attempt to indicate some of the progress made by this political pilgrim during the early marches of that pilgrimage. No statesman is born full fledged; even the greatest have to grow. An occasional failure to choose the easiest method of doing things, a certain lack of adroitness, at times, is to be expected in one who is still a student. Pointing this out does not imply that knowledge and skill will not be acquired nor that inherent greatness will not out. Did not Joseph R. Grundy, Republican Senator from Pennsylvania, say of Herbert Hoover, prior to his inauguration, that he "never ran for even the office of dog catcher and doesn't know anything at all from experience what legislation means"?

Wilson held on to the Governorship until four days before he left Trenton to be inaugurated as President. A few days before his departure, the Legislative Correspondents' Club held its annual dinner, at which Wilson relaxed and had a thoroughly gay time. At the first of these functions that he attended he had a very bad evening. A vaudeville actor resembling his political enemy, Smith, was made up as an exact counterpart of the old Jersey boss and was seated directly within the line of Wilson's vision. He was plainly disturbed and did not wholly regain his composure even when the pseudo-Smith was revealed in his true colors. But there were no unhappy incidents at the dinner given the last week of Wilson's New Jersey official life. On the last Saturday morning of February the Governor surrendered the seal of the State to James F. Fielder. Wilson seldom returned to the scene of his early political struggles. And thus passed from the New Jersey State House a great Governor, the first to be installed as the President of the United States.



CHAPTER XLIX.

FROM WILSON TO THE PRESENT.

The political history of the fifteen years following the Wilson administration is quite as full of incident as any other like period and more important, if for no other reason than that New Jersey grew immensely in population, industry and wealth. The cost of government increased beyond all expectation, the bonded indebtedness swelled to mammoth proportions because of conditions growing out of war, and of modern demands for highways, institutions, developments. Jersey has been doing things on a scale in the last decade beyond the conception of legislators of twenty years ago. Politically the atmosphere has been electric, what with governors and legislatures of different persuasions, the introduction of the prohibition question, the entrance of women into the political arena. There is more history being made than could be printed within many volumes. But this section has already exceeded its allotted space, and only a few of the events of the last decade and a half can be mentioned, some of the legislation summarized, and the Governor and leaders of this period be briefly introduced.

Under the reconstructed primary laws the first tryout in the nomination of a gubernatorial candidate, 1913, was for the purpose of selecting one who should succeed Wilson, the prime mover of that law. Taking into consideration the various other progressive enactments which were intended once for all to make bossism a thing of the past, it was exceedingly interesting to sit in the gallery and see how the whole matter would work out. The primary would be free for all with the best man winning. There might be too many candidates, of course, but that would only make it the more exciting. The winner of the primary of the Democratic party was the almost assured next Governor. It soon became apparent that there would be a three-cornered race in the Democratic primary. It had been taken for granted that Mayor H. O. Wittpenn, the grocer boy who had beaten the undertaker's assistant, Fagan, to become temporarily boss of Jersey City, would be a candidate for Governor. By reason of his legislative following, he had been an important factor in helping the original Wilson program to success, and the Governor had written to him, "Your generous friendship for myself and your aid, again and again rendered in effective fashion, have won not only my deep admiration, but my appreciation." He had compelled the Governor to come to terms with him as boss of Hudson County, since the death of Davis, to get its delegates to the Baltimore Convention, and had demanded patronage at times. Wittpenn was a thoroughgoing progressive and seemingly just the natural one to step into Wilson's shoes at Trenton, but this did not appeal especially to the President-elect. There was a threatened rival for the candidacy in Katzenbach, who, in 1910, had captured the entire convention of Wilson's home county, and this had never been forgiven. Katzenbach was induced to stand in the primary to end the feud between Edwards

and Wittpenn. Then there was Edward I. Edwards, afterwards United States Senator and New Jersey's Governor. He was, at this time, State Comptroller, but was seeking to become the State Treasurer. Edwards had always been on friendly terms with the Governor, but had gone out of his way to hold up Wilson's pay checks when the latter had been out of the State and Senate presidents were acting governors. Probably this was also not forgiven. At any rate Wilson used the power of his position to keep Edwards out of the treasurership, giving as his reason the fact that he felt "strongly indeed that it is unwise and inexpedient that a banker should be elected to the post of Treasurer of the State, no matter what his personal integrity." Wittpenn, reluctantly, had aided the Governor in defeating Edwards, and the latter, therefore, was determined to have it out with the Jersey City mayor, and did so by suggesting the nomination of James I. Fielder, the Acting Governor.

Wilson had his own ideas, and four months after leaving the State, declared himself against a three-cornered fight and that it would be wise for Jersey democracy to support Fielder. "I am sure," he wrote to Wittpenn, "you will not think that the conclusion I have come to as the leader of the party is in any way a subtraction from my cordial personal regard or from my acknowledgment of the distinguished services which you have rendered the party." In the primaries which followed, Fielder was nominated for Governor by the Democrats with a majority over Katzenbach of 45,299, and the indefatigable Edward Casper Stokes, regular of regulars, was nominated by the Republicans. After it was all over the electorate sat back in their chairs and wondered whether the bosses really had been stripped of all their power, or whether the primaries, after all, were not something of a "hands of Esau and voice of Jacob" affairs. One thing was certain, the primaries had added greatly to the cost of standing for office, both to the candidate and to the State.

Fielder as Governor—In the November election Fielder won over Stokes with a plurality of 32,886, but with a minority of all the votes cast. The totals were: Fielder, Democrat, 173,148; Stokes, Republican, 140,298; Colby, Progressive, 41,132; Reilly, Socialist, 13,977; Mason, Prohibitionist, 3,427; Butterworth, Socialist-Labor, 2,460; Dwyer, Independent, 875. Evidently there were to be more numerous candidates under the primary system. The Democratic party was also able to retain their control over both Houses of the Legislature, but with smaller majorities; in the Senate this was reduced to one, in the House the number stood thirty-seven Democrats to twenty-three Republicans. To save repetition, let it be recorded here that beginning with 1915, down to the present, 1929, the Republicans have always held majorities in both Houses, except for one 30-30 Assembly.

Mr. Fielder had a difficult job ahead of him as Governor. His own party were none too well satisfied with the way in which legislation had gone during the last few years. The Progressives who had lined up with Wilson had come for the most part from the Republican forces; they were now

herding by themselves and were sufficient in number to decide elections, should they cease becoming a separate party and swing to the foe. The Republican leaders were finding that inter-party quarrels only served to keep them away from the feed-bin, and were showing a tendency towards getting together, which portended a sweep of the Legislature and perhaps the winning of the next gubernatorial election. It was Fielder's job to be party leader in the pre-Wilsonian political fashion of being a fence-builder instead of a premier. He must conserve the strength of the State Democracy; hold fast to that which had been gained both as regards offices and reforms. It was a thankless and difficult task for anyone to undertake. But he was a good man for the job as was realized by the Senate which had chosen him for their President, knowing that he was to become the Acting Governor.

James Fairman Fielder is a native of Jersey City, the descendant of Hollanders. The families of both parents were well known in the religious and political circles of the State. The Governor, a graduate of Columbia University Law School, had been admitted to the bar in 1888, and taken to politics as a duck does to water. He was a member of the Assembly from Hudson County in 1903 and 1904, and in 1907 was elected to the Senate. He was reelected to this body in 1910 by the largest majority of votes ever given to a State Senator from his county, and, in 1913, was unanimously elected President of the Senate, and thus in line for the Governorship, which Wilson must lay down. When the latter resigned he was so pleased with his successor that in his last message to the Legislature he said: "May I not in closing express the satisfaction I feel in the knowing that when I lay down the duties of Governor I shall leave them in the hands of Senator Fielder, a man of proved character, capacity, fidelity and devotion to the public service, a man of the type to which the people of this State desire their public men to conform." Mr. Fielder is now a Vice-Chancellor, appointed and sworn into office, December 1, 1919. He was reappointed in 1926.

Governor Fielder showed himself a conservative radical from the first, starting his régime with a cautious inaugural address which discussed mainly such non-partisan legislation as a short session, the introduction of fewer bills, the enactments of fewer laws, and the passage of bills earlier in the session. (He realized, perhaps, that he was going to use his veto power early and often.) He suggested, as every new Governor did, a decrease in governmental expenditures, and a lessening of the number of officials, commissions, and the like. There was an Economy and Efficiency Commission about ready to report their findings and suggestions on the latter subject. He expatiated at length upon the necessity of paying more attention to the needs of the penal and other institutions of the State, of agriculture, decreased taxes, and freer home rule, all measures about which there could be little controversy since both parties had for years included such planks in their platforms.

More boldly he asked that the reforms in the jury system, which had come up for decision while he was Acting Governor, be established more clearly, including the passing again of the Chancellor-Sheriff Act without a referendum; that the county tax assessors be brought more fully under the

control of the State Board of Taxation; that the Hillery Maximum Tax Act be repealed—this was a measure passed for the protection of the railroads when equal taxation laws brought these corporations on a par with the other taxpayers of Jersey. A repeal of the law might displease the railroads, but it would give greater freedom in the raising of money by municipalities, which would please those who handled the funds. Fielder advocated an easing up on taxes assessed against bank and trust shares. He also tried to persuade the Legislature to leave the primary and election laws to stand as they were until they had been fully tried out.

At the end of a year a Democratic Legislature and Governor could "point with pride" to the passing of laws which effected the long delayed reform of the jury system of New Jersey; an increase in State income by the imposition of taxes upon the estates of deceased persons; the repealing of the Hillery Maximum Tax Law; and slight improvement in bookkeeping at the State House; in the improvement of preferential primaries in counties and municipalities, in labor legislation, in the amount donated to the Agricultural College and Experiment Station. There had also been a reduction in the volume of legislation, and arrangements had been perfected for the clearer wording and probable legality of laws passed by the establishment of a Legislative Reference Bureau in the State Library and the appointing of an expert bill-drafting advisor in the Attorney-General's department. Provisions had been made for the submittal to popular vote of certain proposed amendments to the Constitution.

The amendments in question were voted upon October 19, 1915. Both parties favored giving the people the chance to decide them. The first, relating to giving to women the right of suffrage, was overwhelmingly voted down, the majority in a comparatively small vote being 51,108. The second, relating to easier methods of amending the Constitution, was lost by half the majority against the first. The third, providing for the permitting of excess condemnation of land for public improvement, also went by the board. New Jersey voters have a habit of being exceedingly conservative when constitutional amendments are submitted to them. Whatever is, is best left as it is, seems to be the principle which actuates their voting. In the four special elections held in New Jersey since 1897 for the adoption of amendments to the Constitution, only one of the many submitted has been accepted. This was the zoning amendment and the sole survivor in 1927.

The Governor was somewhat surprised to have his economy suggestions taken seriously, and not in the way he intended the innocuous suggestions to be considered. There were no laws passed or measures, worth the mention, taken to cut down governmental expenses, or to reduce the number of officials and boards. On the contrary, all were increased; the appropriation of laws called for more than ever before. Instead of action there was the usual pot calling the kettle black. The Democrats accused the Republicans of starting it all away back in 1894 when that party first took over the management of the State. Sixteen successive Republican legislatures had increased the Jer-

sey Treasury expenditures more than \$3,000,000. The Republicans pointed out that the State expenditures had increased that much in the last four years and that, while they had turned over to Wilson's administration a free balance of \$1,600,000, the treasury, on November 1, 1913, showed a free balance of but \$300,000. The acrid discussion was chiefly pre-campaign blustering. The truth of the business was that while the population had almost doubled since the 'nineties, and valuations and the sources of income had multiplied more than this, the State expenditures had not increased in proportion to either of these two factors. Too much money was being spent for what the State got in 1894, and too much was being expended similarly in 1914. Endless bickering as to whom, or what, was responsible could not offset the facts. Governmental expenses were to increase; how great should be that increase a few years later few imagined. The business before the Legislature then, and always was, as a later Governor was to suggest in phrases which, boiled down, meant: "Quit worrying about increased expenditures and give your attention to more business-like ones, while you work for a greater income."

At the polls, in 1914, the control of the Legislature was taken out of the hands of the Democrats and has since remained so, the result showing in the next session of eleven Republicans in the Senate to ten Democrats, and in the Assembly thirty-eight Republicans to twenty-two Democrats, the disproportion increasing until 1919. In the same landslide the Republicans had carried eight out of twelve Congressional districts, which gave the Democratic leaders at Washington something to think about with another Presidential election staring them in the face. For the remainder of his term, Governor Fielder was shorn of his power, except as he exerted it with the threat and use of the veto.

As always, with a change of the party in power, there was a great deal of tearing down to do in officialdom, in the repeal of laws, in the preparation of the soil for another crop of the "ins," conditions which do not make for much progressive legislation.

At the end of his administration the Governor could show few results of which he was proud. A large free balance remained in the treasury in place of a deficit, but he could take only the credit of having suggested that such a balance should be provided. There had begun those tinkering with the Seven Sisters laws which was to eventuate some years later in their virtual repeal. The Economy and Efficiency Commission had reported and measure were passed which had yet to prove whether they would be either economical or efficient. A law providing for a central purchasing bureau was expected to save \$200,000 to the taxpayers. There was also a budget system inaugurated which would enable the people to know in advance the items of State expense, the reasons therefor, and give the taxpayers the opportunity to express their judgment of the merits of the expenditures proposed. This was a development, or expansion, of the Requisition Act of 1914, as was also the Purchase Act. Provisions for an increase of the State income on any large scale were somewhat lacking. If Mr. Fielder's admin-

istration lacked outstanding features he, at least, can hardly be held responsible with a complete loss of the Legislature, the absorption of the Progressives with their ideas by the Republicans, and the prospect of war engaging the attention of a State which held views opposite to those promulgated by his party.

The election of 1916 was another of those "crucial" affairs very disturbing in its results to the Democratic party at home and in the Nation. Wilson saw "portents in the sky" when Jersey went Republican in 1914. With the Bull Moosers having made their last stand and hovering once more in the shadow of the elephant, it was somewhat problematical whether the President could be reëlected. The vote of every State was valuable, few more so than his home State Jersey, not only because of its electoral ballots, but as complimentary to the professor who had been graduated from its politics to the Presidential chair. He, therefore, desired to put his best foot forward there and intended, at one time, to have his Secretary of War, Lindley M. Garrison, enter the primaries as a candidate for Governor. The Secretary had taken little part in Jersey politics, but had made a favorable impression by his campaign speeches for Wilson. His elevation to a seat in the cabinet had given him a standing which would prove very effective in a State gubernatorial fight. But Garrison, probably the most aggressive member of the cabinet, had spoken out of turn in joining Roosevelt in urging Congress to come out with a definite preparedness policy; and in urging, for that matter, Wilson to get out in the open and compel Congress to legislate for preparedness just as he had compelled Jersey legislatures to do his bidding and had forced Congressional action in a tariff bill, the Federal Reserve measure and other enactments. Wilson and Garrison really were but little apart on their ideas of preparedness, but the President liked to do his own talking and liked not at all to have his hand forced under any circumstances. Garrison faded out of the picture right then as a gubernatorial candidate in New Jersey.

George L. Record had announced his candidacy for the Governorship, and Wilson, with Tumulty, swung their influence in his favor, or partially so. Mr. Record, because of his invaluable services in framing many of the outstanding governmental measures in Jersey which had brought natural fame to the President, was in line for reward. It had been proclaimed by the newspapers that he would be appointed to the Federal Trade Commission by Wilson. But the President changed his mind and, after trying unsuccessfully to get another approved by the Senate for the post, appointed former Governor Fort. Record, in the most sporting fashion, took his let-down quietly and won the admiration of all who knew him, including the President. Upon his issuing a statement that he would stand for the nomination for Governor in the Democratic primary, Wilson and Tumulty, at the suggestion of the Trenton editor, James Kerney, enlisted Charles R. Crane to come to the aid of Record. Crane agreed to subscribe \$7,250 to have a booklet containing Record's views printed and sent to each one of New Jersey's 510,000 registered voters.

A United States Senator was to be elected in 1916 to fill the place then occupied by James E. Martine. Now Martine had been somewhat neglected at Washington by the President and treated shabbily in the matter of New Jersey appointments, although he held his office there as a result of the effective support Wilson had given him against Smith by insistence that the preferential primary returns should decide the action taken by the Legislature. Martine, whose bluff honesty often got him into tight quarters, had not seen fit to back in the Senate some of Wilson's nominations and was, therefore, booked by the President to go. The President, therefore, came out in support of John W. Westcott, then Attorney-General of the State, who had made speeches nominating Wilson, both at Baltimore and St. Louis.

In the Republican camp the State Senators, Austen Colgate and Walter E. Edge, came before the primary seeking the nomination for Governor; and former Governor Murphy and Joseph S. Frelinghuysen were out for nomination to the United States Senate. Governor Murphy, by name and deed already figured largely in this chapter. Mr. Frelinghuysen had been in Jersey politics since 1902, first as an unsuccessful candidate for Senator, to which office he was elected in 1905 and 1908, being President of that body in 1910, serving several times as Acting Governor in the absence of Governor Fort. He was well known for his part in securing enactments of benefit to agriculture, education, and civil service laws. He had fathered the automobile law which bore his name, one of the most efficient enactments of its day. He was President of the State Board of Agriculture, President of the State Board of Education, of which he had been a member since his appointment in 1911 when the board was created.

Austen Colgate, head of the Colgate Soap Company, had been one of the New Idea men who had created such a stir in the State before joining up with the more recently organized Progressive party. As more than forty thousand Progressive votes had been cast in the previous Presidential election, he was thought to have a splendid chance in the gubernatorial primary. Colgate had shown his metal in the New Idea battles, as an Assemblyman from Essex, in 1906, 1907, 1908, and a member of the Senate since 1911. Walter E. Edge had held all sorts of political offices, and was at this time the Senator from Atlantic County. He came to the primary with a long record of accomplished legislation which he had either originated or promoted such as the Workmen's Compensation Act, one of the first practical working laws of its kind in this country, and other labor legislation. Senator Edge, as the head of the Economy and Efficiency Commission, helped frame legislation eliminating political commissions, the consolidation of various boards and departments, about the first effective attempt to put through such legislation. He sponsored the bills and fought them through in spite of bitter opposition. The budget system and the Central Purchase Act, of the Fielder administration, rightly were credited to him, and he also introduced an enactment to do away with the costly and practically useless State census. He came to the primary with big guns, and provided the campaign which followed with a vote-winning slogan: "A Business Man with a Business Plan."



JOURNAL SQUARE IN JERSEY CITY

The handsome, broad, high bridge over the Pennsylvania Railroad is a link in the Hudson Boulevard that extends the entire length of Hudson County

The Edge Administration—The results of the primary elections can be briefly summarized. Edge won over Colgate by a small majority with the former Progressives solidly behind the soap manufacturer. Mayor Wittpenn, perennial candidate for Governor, won the Democratic favor above Record by an overwhelming majority, itself an evidence of to what party the progressives had flown. Martine had a plurality of 21,334 over Westcott, while Frelinghuysen beat out Murphy for the Republican nomination for United States Senator. In the elections of November, Edge won with a plurality of 69,647 from Wittpenn; Frelinghuysen was sent to Washington with a plurality over Martine of 74,696. President Wilson lost the State to Charles E. Hughes, recently, 1930, appointed Chief Justice of the United State Supreme Court—by a plurality of 57,964. Had not a political blunder given California by the barest majority to Wilson, it might well have been the fortune of New Jersey to have made another than its former Governor the Nation's war President.

The slogan under which Walter Evans Edge had compaigned proved to be no empty phrase. His program consisted of a pledge to apply ordinary business principles to the thirty-million dollar business of the State of New Jersey. To quote his own language:

I believe the Governor of the State should be the business manager of the State's varied interests; that the Legislature, as representing the various county interests, should be the board of directors; that the people should realize that they are the stockholders owning collectively the business of New Jersey, and that the business of New Jersey, speaking from the material standpoint, consists of all the natural resources, such as coast lines, river lines, harbor facilities—developed or undeveloped—forests, streams, minerals, and all the assets which Nature has provided. . . .

The State's business also includes the opportunity—nay, imposes the obligation—to provide for and alleviate the distress of unfortunates and dependants, and through wise legislation and properly conducted institutions, to correct, so far as is possible, those evils responsible for this problem. . . .

The entire proposition, whether the material or social side, is one requiring business judgment and business organization.

The Governor purposed the bringing together in a close knit corporation the various commissions and boards, Legislature, with members from each to make up a kind of cabinet, "to meet, consult and devise during the nine months that the Legislature" was not in session, what should be done in the three months when that body met at Trenton. Both his definition and plans were interesting and promised much. In the two years he was at the head of the corporation more common-sense business-like legislation was placed upon the statute books than had characterized any similar period in a great many years.

Walter Edge was a student of high rank in two of the most difficult professions, journalism and politics, one might say he was a post graduate in both schools. His education began when he left the public schools and became a "printer's devil" in the old "Atlantic Review" of Atlantic City. When sixteen he had a job in an advertising agency, specializing in the business of the local hotels. To make a tall story short, although starting without funds he, after two years, acquired the agency, and built of it an advertising concern handling business from not only all sections of the United States, but through established offices in London, Paris, Berlin, and elsewhere abroad. He bought a newspaper which was nothing but a hotel organ and made it the leading news medium of Atlantic City. He absorbed another sheet and made this the afternoon edition of his "Atlantic City Daily Press." As success came more and more his way he began to have his fingers in all sorts of industrial and financial pies.

Mr. Edge learned his politics as he had his business, from the bottom up. He was first one of the minor employees of the New Jersey Senate. In 1897, 1898, 1899, he served as Journal Clerk of the Senate; from 1901 to 1905 he was secretary of that body. He entered the Assembly, in 1909, by an unexpectedly large majority, and was made floor leader the first year. Elected to the Senate, in 1910, he became majority leader of that body two years later, and was President of the Senate in 1915. Some of the outstanding measures promoted by Senator Edge already have come in for mention. It may be repeated that it was he who introduced the budget bill, aimed to systematize New Jersey's finances and make the Governor the responsible head of the fiscal system.

Entering upon his term as Governor he paid little attention to customs and precedents and went ahead as one who had a big job to do in a short while. In the second paragraph of his inaugural address he optimistically remarked:

I believe it will be possible, with your earnest coöperation, to effect at least five big legislative accomplishments this year:

First—A thorough reorganization of our road department, including a modern State Highway System.

Second—Home rule for our cities to that degree which is permissible under the Constitution and consistent with sound government.

Third—The increase in the franchise tax on public utilities companies as provided for in our platform.

Fourth—Additional consolidations of the State departments or boards or other activities in the interest of greater economy and increased efficiency.

Fifth—A solution, officially endorsed and officially authorized, for our prison and institutional problems, so that the way may be paved for genuine penal and institutional reform through feasible development of the State-use and colony idea.

Twelve months later the Governor could show an organization completed for the administration of the State Highway System, but facing the necessity of curtailing expenditures because of labor and excessive prices for materials growing out of war conditions and requirements. The power of home rule in municipalities had been greatly extended, but there was still much to do. The term "local option" had come to mean something very different from the excise. The public utilities corporations, over-taxed by war conditions, were not interfered with greatly, the franchise taxes being increased from two to five per cent. The consolidation of State agencies, begun a year previously, progressed at a good gait. To accomplish the many things required of the State in the Nation-wide preparations for war, many commissions and boards of individuals had to be appointed. Lastly—two commissions were busy investigating the penal and correctional institutions and State institutions other than these.

Of course, the original "big five" legislation made up only part of the year's enactments. Equalization of taxes was given a helping hand; appropriations for a new normal school were made; the Civil Service System was overhauled, and, notwithstanding the unexpected emergency war expense, the treasury had a larger free balance than it had shown in several decades. But in everything and everywhere in the legislative activities of that time, war was the word ever upon the lips and engaging the attention. It gave State affairs a tremendous setback; costs mounted beyond all reason. Important projects had to be given up to engage upon that greater project, war.

Walter Edge will be remembered in Jersey history as our war Governor. The State needed a big man and had one. There was an increased demand for food with a decrease in the number of producers who were being called into the army or were engaged in other occupations. The Governor mobilized 50,000 home gardeners and 5,000 high school students to help remedy an acute situation, and to bring home to youth what war involved of activities other than fighting. Encouraged by the administration home guards and similar organizations were formed to replace the National Guard and other military units. The Governmental machinery was set to work at getting all that could be gotten from agriculture and industry; with home defense; with State coöperation; with the Conscription Act; with the care and maintenance of cantonments in Burlington and Bergen counties; with the fraternal supervision of Jersey troops wherever they might be, and particularly troops from various states at Camp Dix at Wrightstown.

New Jersey increased her National Guard from 4,500 men to 15,000 and included the formation of important new units, inspired by the Governor who, at the time, was making the Little White House in Sea Girt his headquarters. Under the Selective Service law, New Jersey registered 754,594. The State is credited with 200,000 men in the various branches of national service. It was exceedingly difficult to provide the machinery to carry on the many new activities required of a non-military government and State. Governor Edge put in an exceedingly busy year. And when the armistice had been signed he engaged at once in a campaign for the proper appreciation

and care of those who had gone from civil life at the call of their country and were now about to return. A great deal of the legislation of the later period of the Edge administration had to do with measures growing out of the conditions brought on by war.

Edge was our war Governor, and a right good one, but that phase of his career to him was relatively unimportant. Many have asked him what he considered the outstanding feature of his term as Governor. His reply has been: "The inauguration of the State Highway System, the Delaware River Bridge, and the Hudson River tunnels, and the coördination of all departmental activities in the Department of Institutions and Agencies." He has a hatred of war, for its senseless destruction and waste, that disinclines him to value highly his manifold activities as a war governor. The constructive is more to his taste, and whatever one may think of him as the Republican boss of the State, it seems likely that future historians will agree that his use of his political power eventuated to the great and permanent benefit of New Jersey.

Upon the death, in 1918, of William Hughes, our United States Senator, Governor Edge appointed, on February 23, David Baird to serve until the next election, as required by the Constitution. Without opposition in the primary, Senator Baird was nominated and in the election of November 5, 1918, was elected over Charles O'Connor, Democrat, to fill the short term ending March, 1919. At the Republican primaries of September, 1918, Governor Edge was nominated for the full term in the United States Senate to succeed Baird, receiving a very large majority over George Record and Edward W. Gray. The Democratic primary was one of those affairs which fail to indicate any real choice on the part of the voters. With four standing for the nomination, George M. LaMonte received little more than a quarter of the votes cast, his plurality over the nearest two competitors being only about six hundred and fifty each. Governor Edge was sent to Washington for six years, receiving in the general November elections a plurality of 25,279 over LaMonte. He resigned his Jersey Governorship May 16, 1919. Senator Edge was reëlected, in 1924, to the Federal Senate, defeating his Democratic opponent, Mayor Frederick W. Donnelly, of Trenton, by a plurality of 276,986. In 1930 he was honored by President Hoover with the appointment to the American Embassy at Paris, France.

Ambassador Edge is the first Jerseyman to represent his country in dealings with France since William L. Drayton was sent there in 1861 by President Lincoln. It will be recalled that Colonel George Harvey was sent to London by President Wilson. President Harrison sent William Walter Phelps to Germany, and President Cleveland appointed Theodore Runyon to succeed Phelps. In the whole history of the Nation there have been but six Jerseymen filling important diplomatic posts in Europe. Walter Edge became the seventh.

Although having no pertinency just here, it is worthy of record that New Jersey has given the National Government a most famous President and six Presidential cabinet officers. Chronologically and curiously, the first

three were Secretaries of the Navy: Samuel L. Southard, 1823-29; Mahlon Dickerson, 1834-38, and George M. Robeson, 1869-77. F. T. Frelinghuysen was Secretary of State, 1881-85; John W. Griggs, Attorney-General, 1898-1901; and Lindley M. Garrison, Secretary of War, 1913-16.

William N. Runyon, Republican, was Acting Governor from May 16, 1919 to January 13, 1920, when he resigned so as to be eligible to go before the party primaries as a candidate for Governor. Coming events had again cast their shadows before them, when the Democrats in the Assembly pulled up even with the opposition, which had held a majority since 1915. Walter Edge had made a fine Chief Executive and there was general satisfaction over his promotion to the National Senate, but the majority of the voters in the State were manifesting a growing discontent under Republican rule. The idea of the "Business Governor" were all right in theory, but in practice they cost money, particularly his highway, Hudson River Tunnel and Delaware River Bridge propositions. The administration had wound up with a whacking big net balance in the treasury, but the debt of the State had increased and so had the taxes. Edge had introduced a bill whereby the funds for the highway system were to be secured by bonds, but this had been lost in the Legislature and in its stead a commission had been appointed to look into the whole matter of borrowing and taxation as the means of raising funds whereby the cost of present improvements might be placed as a burden upon the citizenry of the future. Meanwhile a State tax had been laid. The Republican Legislature was satisfied to wait to hear what the commission would report, but the man in the streets wanted immediate action which would cut his taxes. A case of eat the cake and still have it was the common ideal.

Then the Republican legislators had permitted the public utilities, by a zoning scheme, to raise street car fares on certain lines to seven cents, And that raised a howl in the larger municipalities. It will be remembered that one of the most disgraceful of New York mayors won and held his position with the slogan, "I'll give you a five cent fare." Since the voters of New Jersey had rejected an amendment of the State Constitution to permit the women to vote, the Republican party leaders were turning a chilly shoulder to advocates of women's suffrage, although there was pending an amendment to the United States Constitution which would grant to the opposite sex suffrage.

Worst of all the XVIIIth Amendment to the Federal Constitution, prohibiting traffic in liquor, proposed in 1917, had been declared ratified January 16, 1919, and was to go into effect a year later. New Jersey was one of the three states in the Union which had dissented, Rhode Island and Connecticut being the others. The amendment started as a war measure under New Jersey's own Democratic contribution to the Presidency. The State, it is true, had repudiated him prior to the promulgation of the amendment, but with its well-known predilection of the Republican State party for taking the wrong political turn on the liquor question, it had come out, reluctantly, but definitely, for the enforcement of the XVIIIth Amendment in New Jersey.

As a reward of their inept temerity, for the next nine years it was to have the pleasure of having Republican legislatures listen to the messages of three Democratic Governors, and look on while they used their patronage where it would do the Republicans the most harm.

Both parties went into the gubernatorial primaries in 1919 uncertain as to whom they wanted as standard-bearers. The Republicans realized that they needed a very strong man. Runyon, as Acting Governor, was in line for the nomination, but the results of the primary with four standing, gave the nomination to Newton Albert Kendall Bugbee, of Trenton, a man prominent in the affairs of his city and one who had been influential in the Republican victories of 1916 to 1918. He had been elected in a joint meeting of the Legislature to the State Comptrollership in succession to the man he was to have as his opponent in the coming campaign. The Democratic primary resulted in the nomination of Edward I. Edwards, then a State Senator from Jersey City. He had won by a substantial plurality over his associate in many a political battle, James R. Nugent, chief of his party in Essex. The plurality in question was 12,649; Edwards' own county gave him a plurality of nearly 21,000; Essex gave Nugent a plurality of something over 11,000. The total vote of the primary was about half that cast in the later election.

Edward I. Edwards—For the main points in a Democratic platform and campaign, all that was required were the statements that the party in power had been extravagant, that it had not produced out of its hat the splendid highways promised, that it was still on the fence as regards women's suffrage, and that it had gone dry. The last point was all that was really required to lose the campaign, and the one most used against the Republicans. All the eastern part of the United States became interested as Edwards and his corps of speakers and writers outlined the methods he would use in holding up the enforcement of prohibition in New Jersey, were he elected. There were a great many people in the country who had voted to ratify the XVIIIth Amendment with the hope that for his one ballot two might be registered against it. All eyes were upon Edwards and how he would save his State, and show thus the way to other states, to prevent the saddling upon the people a restriction for which they were not ready. The campaign was full of fireworks and when the lights were out and the sticks had come to earth again, behold the Republican plurality of close to 70,000, the greatest ever won by any Governor in history (prior to 1928), had shrunk and changed to a plurality of 14,510.

Governor Edwards was no novice in the political game, either in or out of office. He had been elected, by the Legislature, in 1911, as State Comptroller, and reelected in 1914, serving for six years in all. He was a good banker and comptroller. Something has already been written about his tilt with Wilson over the State Treasurership, when the Governor opposed him and threw the weight of his influence on the side of Edward E. Grosscup, who was elected. The fight had not been in the open, but was forced out when Edwards accused the Governor of cowardice in not telling the public

what he had told him about his constant loyalty to Wilson. The reply given out was that a banker ought not to be treasurer of the State. The upshot of this was Edwards joining forces with Nugent in the nomination of Fielder for Governor, and, as we have seen, by one of those kaleidoscopic shifts in politics, Edwards was the opponent of Nugent in the primary which nominated him for his present office.

Mr. Edwards, after his retirement from the Comptrollership in 1917, was quiescent for less than a year before returning to public life as the Senator from Hudson, November 5, 1918. It was from the vantage point of being on the inside that he fought so tellingly in his campaign for Governor. Never either the great orator or debater, he, nevertheless, knew his own mind and could make what he thought clear to others. With the courage of conviction, which was never questioned, he went about his discouraging task of being the executive in a State government which was of the opposite party. His appointments were held up in the Senate; he could get only such legislation as the Republicans cared to dole out to him. However clearly and urgently he might declare his wishes, they could but fall on dull ears. He defined his attitude upon the question of the Eighteenth Amendment, as soon as he was inducted into office. He felt that the election had indicated that Jerseyites were not in favor of surrendering to the Federal Government the power of regulating the exercise of their personal liberties. It was his conviction that the prohibition amendment had been illegally foisted upon the people of the State, that the amendment itself was unconstitutional, and he wanted, until its legality had been established, that by legislation Jersey should refuse to be bound by the amendment. As already noted, New Jersey was not among the forty-five states which had ratified the amendment.

The United States Supreme Court handed down the decision that "the XVIIIth Amendment is operative throughout the entire territorial limits of the United States and it binds all legislative bodies, courts, public officers and individuals within those limits." The Republican party declared for impartial enforcement of the Amendment and the laws relating thereto. Edwards, as the mouthpiece of his party, attacked the Volstead Act, the activating law behind the amendment, from every angle and declared for its modification. Back came the Republican Legislature with the Van Ness Act, passing it over the veto of the Governor, which gave prohibition agents the power of search, seizure, arrest and fine or imprisonment without trial by jury. A mighty howl went up that this contravened all constitutional rights, and was a most horrific statute generally. And so the fight went on through the whole of the Edwards administration, accomplishing nothing more important than to stick a label on the Republican party of the State which it has yet to erase. The populous districts opposite New York and Philadelphia are anti-prohibition in sentiment and practice. One has estimated the production of home brew in the northern counties to equal the production of the famous breweries of that region in the pre-Volstead days.

Edwards went after the Highway Commission as he promised he would,

and finally removed all of the commissioners, naming others of his own choice, a somewhat drastic act, since there were no accusations of graft, incompetency, or even of negligence, except that brought about by its members being an unpaid force and, therefore, giving only part time service. The Legislature squared the account by naming new members of the Interstate and Tunnel Commission. This was possible under the provisions of the so-called tunnel ripper bill which quite aroused the ire of the Governor, who had vetoed it on its original passage. Very little else of the Edwards' program even came up for consideration in the Legislature, and aside from the few things mentioned and certain measures looking to the payment of the State's debt to its more than 100,000 soliders of the World War, public utilities restrictions, the putting before the people of bond, bonus, and women's suffrage proposals, some feeble civil service and equalization of taxation gestures, the three years of legislation under Governor Edwards lacked outstanding features for which he was directly responsible. More than a thousand laws were added to the statute books during these three years. Of paramount importance was the compact between the states of New Jersey and New York which resulted in the "Port of New York Authority," a commission with the manifold duties and responsibilities of coördinating, extending and developing to the limit the facilities of the Port of New York, and also oversight of the building of bridges between the two states.

Governor Edwards was nominated in the Democratic primaries of 1922, without opposition, for United States Senator. Joseph S. Frelinghuysen was out to succeed himself at Washington. The campaign was fought out on the wet and dry question, with Frelinghuysen voting to seat in the National Senate the scandalous Truman Newberry, of Michigan, who had spent such an enormous sum to gain that seat, counting heavily against him. The Governor won by a heretofore unprecedented plurality of 89,133. It may be forgotten by many that Governor Edwards had the support of Jersey Democracy at the Presidential nomination convention at San Francisco, in 1910, to head the national ticket. If he received but few votes from any other State, it at least did honor to a native son of Jersey.

Judge George S. Silzer, in 1922, was elected Governor over his Republican opponent, the former Acting Governor William N. Runyon, who had been more successful in the primaries than four years before. The handsome plurality of 43,894 given the popular judge was an encouraging increase over the 14,510 of Edwards' and was evidence of a growing desire, or hope, for some way out of the "dry" slough of despond. The campaign was waged like the former one upon the liquor question or, as the Democratic candidate put it, "Whether we should have Prohibition, with all its attending evils, or Temperance, with all its attendant blessings." A favorite quotation of Judge Silzer came from the immortal writer of the Declaration of Independence, who said on one occasion: "No nation is drunken where wine is cheap; and none sober where ardent spirits are substituted as a common beverage. Wine is in truth the only antidote to the bane of whiskey!" To which Silzer

joined the suggestion, "We might well include a light wholesome glass of beer, with what he said of wine." The paramount issue of the campaign was the enforcement of the Volstead Act, with both candidates unequivocal in their attitudes. The electorate showed its mind decisively; down with Volsteadism. The five-cent street railway fare, equitable taxation, State highways, tunnels and bridges, and the endeavor to place the blame for the high price of coal, were subsidiary matters discussed in the campaign, but played but minor rôles in the election.

Judge Silzer had been knocking at the door of politics for higher recognition for some time. In the caucus at which Professor Woodrow Wilson was nominated for Governor, his name had been mentioned and he had received 210 ballots, consisting mainly of the solid vote of his own county, Middlesex, and of Passaic and Bergen. His platform at that time was anti-bribery in elections. He gave his support to Wilson, faithfully, and was in line for some of the more prominent offices in the patronage of Governor Wilson. But there were other aspirants, and they won. He wanted to be Secretary of State, but the Governor appointed David Crater, of Monmouth County. Just then the resignation of Chancellor Mahlon Pitney to become a Justice of the United States Supreme Court, left open a place for the disappointed Middlesex statesman. But Wilson gave the place to another and instead appointed Silzer prosecutor of pleas of his own county, in which office he served until 1914, when he was made a circuit judge by Governor Fielder. In 1915 he was again reappointed by Fielder for the full term of seven years. He resigned his judicial position to accept the nomination for Governor.

Every man appreciates the honor of being elected by the people to high office, but it is doubtful whether Judge Silzer enjoyed being the executive of New Jersey with almost unanimously opposition legislatures to face. The one hope of his party was to hold fast what they had gained upon a question which could not serve forever, prohibition, until new issues could be found which could swing the Assembly elections its way. Governor Silzer, the suave, easy-going, skilled politician, was the man for the job. He made and held friends; he was very persuasive where force could not avail; his experience and training as lawyer, judge and politician fitted him well for the task of raising new issues should they be needed to take the place of prohibition when this question had been worn threadbare, or the Republicans became wise enough to swing along with the popular trend.

Governor Silzer walked warily as a Governor, keeping off thin ice as well as one could. He used the veto power, which was his, somewhat ferociously, but did it in a manner which drew attention to himself and his party as martyrs for great causes, victims of the unreasoning persecution of unprincipled foes. The Governor sent his thoughtful, well-conceived and worded messages to the Legislature, covering every problem or issue which could be dug up. Taxation had been an issue as long as there had been a State, but Silzer revived it and tried to set the people to doing something more than grin and bear their taxes. The regulation of public utilities was a perennial

subject for discussion. Good roads, labor legislation, and prohibition were of more recent rise. Then there were the problems growing out of the abandonment of the Morris Canal, the potable water problem—present and future—lower priced coal and the “high cost of living,” and the development of the Port of New York was of immediate interest.

There was enough dynamite packed in these issues to engage the wary attentions of a wiser body of legislators than has ever yet been elected. Silzer simply took these from which to make a running start. His regular and special messages uncovered more things for the Republican Legislature to do than the three could have handled properly in nine years. The suggestions of his messages were not merely words, nor were his proposals neither pertinent nor feasible. The embryo of much of what is called present-day legislation may be found in his almost forgotten documents. As one said of him, “He had so little to do except sign vetoes that he could spend his time thinking out schemes for others.” At any rate, Governor Silzer quietly and persistently opened up new fields of endeavor for the party in power. If they paid no attention to what he wrote, his revenge came in floods of criticism he let loose on those who were doing things—making laws rather than proposing them. From one standpoint the Democratic party in New Jersey held the enviable position of sharing in none of the responsibilities of government and yet having such a mouthpiece as the Governor to proclaim abroad the delinquencies and the failings of its opponents.

Silzer could act, when free to do so, with courage and severity. There was a trolley car strike in 1923 which tied up the traction lines in one hundred and forty-two municipalities. The efforts of the Public Utility Commission to restore service were futile. The Governor, pointing out that the right of the people to that service was clear, directed the Attorney-General to apply for a mandatory injunction. Within two weeks the cars were running again, and on most of the lines the five-cent fare was restored. The “Jitney” bus had a deal to do with both breaking the strike and reducing the fares. In so doing, a new mode of urban transportation and a new problem were introduced. The motor bus proved too successful and many electric lines since have been driven out of business. The problem involved was solved by subjecting motor competition to regulation.

Silzer, when it suited his purpose, never lacked the courage to do a bit of “ripping” of commissions or boards. He completely made over the Highway Commission, took certain legislative prerogatives into his own hands, and then boldly asked that more powers of appointment and discharge be placed in the hands of the executive. He was a leader of his party, at that time, with all due allowance given to the rise of Frank Hague, mayor of Jersey City, and the present Democratic boss of New Jersey.

When all is summed up, Governor Silzer throughout his administration sat and held the reins while a runaway Legislature had its own way. To the credit of the Republicans went all that was accomplished during the three years. Its representatives at Trenton carried through in splendid shape the good roads program, they made possible the completion of the tunnel under

the Hudson, and had the Delaware Bridge well under way. A popular vote of 1924—412,825 to 110,318—gave the commission another \$8,000,000 to complete the tunnel. Bridges were projected at Bayonne, Elizabeth, Perth Amboy, and the Hudson River. New Jersey was getting transportation-wise. The Port of New York and the Port of Camden Authorities had their duties and powers increased. Many public works and improvements of great magnitude were inaugurated. If the bonded debt was run up to nearly \$70,000,000, the strictly governmental finances were in good shape, there being an ample surplus. Never had so much been spent upon education in the State; incidentally, the Teachers' Pension and Annuity Fund had been placed upon a sound basis. The institutions of the State had been enlarged and consolidated and better managed than for years, and this in spite of a contrary vote of the people on bonding to improve and increase the number of such institutions. It was an enactment of 1923 establishing the "Half Mill Tax," bringing in annually about two and one-half million dollars, which made possible the expansion of this phase of the government's work. This tax measure, in the face of much Democratic criticism, has been passed by every Legislature since 1923.

The Port of New York Authority was a part of the "port" agitations which rose to such heights in most of the larger coastal cities after the World War. To make a super port of New York City's waters required agreement with, and support of, New Jersey. The movement may be said to have started in the latter-mentioned State in 1916, when New Jersey started action before the Interstate Commerce Commission over the question as to whether freight rates to Jersey rail ends should not be lower than to New York City destinations. The commission decided that the harbor should be treated as a whole and not split into parts. As a sequel to this decision the Port of New York Authority was born. Under Governor Edge, Jersey joined with New York in a bi-state commission, which studied all the problems involved and reported that a Port Compact, or Treaty, which they formulated, should be adopted by both states. This treaty was accepted by both legislatures on April 30, 1921, and affirmed by Congress. What is known as the Comprehensive Plan was approved by the states and Congress in 1922. The treaty created the Port of New York Authority as a public corporation representing the two states. The plan outlined the development of the port as a whole, particularly in reference to its freight, and provided in a general way for the protection of the port from rivals, for the upbuilding of the port, and the removal of handicaps. The details of the plan are too numerous for even the listing, but they cover about all the works required and contingencies which may arise; changes and additions may be made at any time.

The Port District is administered by the Port of New York Authority, under powers described in the treaty: "The Port Authority shall constitute a body, both corporate and politic, with full power and authority to purchase, construct, lease and—or—operate any terminal or transportation facility

within said district; to make charges for the use thereof; for any of such purposes to own, hold, lease and—or—operate real or personal property, to borrow money and secure the same with bonds or by mortgages upon any property held or to be held by it." The Authority cannot take any public property, neither can it pledge city or State credit, impose taxes or levy assessment for benefits. It has to finance itself by the sale of its own securities. The personnel of the port body consists of three commissioners from each State; Governor Silzer served for five years on the Authority and was its chairman. The staff of the organization has been headed for some years by John E. Ramsey and includes many prominent engineers and experts.

Something of the importance of the Port Authority may be understood when one realizes that the Port of New York includes an area of almost 1,500 square miles, with a waterfront of 483 miles in length. Measured around the piers, the sides only, the total length is 633 miles, of which New Jersey has 206 miles. It is estimated that 75,000,000 tons of freight annually move in or out of the port by rail, and 40,000,000 by steamship. The value in 1925 of the water borne commerce in a year was more than eight billion dollars. The population of the district is approximately 9,000,000, and the commission does the work which would require more or less of close to two hundred municipalities included in the district. The region has in it more manufacturing industries than Chicago, Philadelphia, St. Louis and Cleveland combined.

Governor Silzer departed from Trenton leaving a heritage of a reasonably well consolidated Democratic machine, a number of issues on which to wage a campaign, and quantities of arraignments of the Republican Legislature for their sins of omission and commission. But when, in 1925, it came time to nominate governors and other officials, and write party platforms, live issues were lacking; on most of the vital propositions the two parties were in practical agreement. The Republican Legislature had attained some of the wisdom of the burned child, and discreetly ignored prohibition by the simple expedient of interring all wet measures in committees. The question of paramount interest was whom Senator Edge and Frank Hague would have nominated by the primaries, and which machine would prove more powerful in the election.

Governor A. Harry Moore—The primaries of June 16, 1925, resulted in the nomination by the Republicans for Governor of Arthur Whitney; the Democrats chose A. Harry Moore. As usual the Democratic primary registered a much smaller number of votes than the Republican. In the election of November the Democratic nominee received a plurality of 38,428. For the statistically inclined there follows some figures of primaries and elections of this period. The United States Senatorial primary of 1924 reads: Edge, Republican, 247,858; Kean, Republican, 183,886; Donnelly, Democrat, 114,023, of which 43,943 votes were cast in Hudson County. In the election, Senator Edge totalled 608,020 and Donnelly 331,034, Hudson being the only county giving him a plurality (24,281); Edge received larger pluralities

than this in Essex, Bergen, Passaic, Union and Camden. In the Presidential elections of 1924, the Republican vote was 675,162; Democratic 297,743, Hudson by barely ten thousand was the sole Democratic county. Now for the State elections of 1925, whose figures have been already listed. Three counties gave pluralities to make up the net of 38,428: Passaic, 2,370; Middlesex, 3,201, and Hudson, 103,995. Now compare this with the returns of 1928. Hamilton Fish Keane, who had been badly defeated in the primaries of 1924, was the Republican nominee in 1928 and was elected to the United States Senate with a plurality of 233,129 over Edward I. Edwards, who won only a single county, Hudson (55,139). For Governor, Morgan F. Larson, Republican, over William L. Dill, Democrat, was given a plurality of 152,277. Hudson, with 52,543, and Passaic, with 1,215, were the only counties piling up Democratic pluralities. The pluralities of both counties had been reduced a half, while the total vote in the State had increased about 900,000 to 1,500,000.

In drawing references from the above statistics consider the implications of these also: The polls of 1928 showed that Hudson and Essex counties combined held more than one-third of the votes in New Jersey; with Bergen and Passaic, the four counties had more votes than the combined numbers of the seventeen other counties. Lastly: In 1925, Hudson County contained one-third of the Democrats in Jersey; in 1928 just a shade less. Jersey City contains more than half of the population of Hudson County and Mayor Frank Hague is the absolute Democratic ruler of Jersey City, and, therefore, of Hudson County; and, therefore, . . . what?

A. Harry Moore enlivened what might have been a dull campaign with his vigorous advocacy of modification of the Volstead Act, criticisms of the Anti-Saloon League, and discussions of taxation, Department of Institutions, the coal trust, and partisan legislation. Fully as interesting was his attitude towards labor enactments, the humanitarian duties of the State and the development of recreational centers and State parks. The basis of the most of his messages to the Legislature are to be found in his campaign speeches and those of his lieutenants.

The Governor looked at life from the standpoint of a man who had risen from humble circumstances to high preferment. Of Scotch-Irish parentage, a native of Jersey City, he overcame great obstacles to become a lawyer, graduate of the New Jersey Law School, member of the bar in 1922. His political education was gained in a rough and tough school, the Democratic machine of Jersey City. In 1908 he was secretary to Mayor Oscar Wittpenn, in which capacity he served until 1911, when he was named as city collector.

Shortly after the Walsh Act introduced commission government and was adopted by Jersey City. In 1913 some ninety-two candidates stood for nomination to commissionerships in an elimination primary. Frank Hague, Mark M. Fagan and A. Harry Moore emerged from the lot as three of the ten nominees and won election over the Wittpenn regulars. Moore became Director of Parks and Public Property, serving until 1924, when he was made Director of Revenue and Finance. In all elections to succeed him-

self he received increasing majorities, being top man in both the 1921 and 1925 elections.

As a commissioner he became something of a national figure as a promoter of welfare movements in his city. "He established playgrounds and recreational centers where none existed before, formed athletic leagues for both winter and summer sports, and established a successful program of park construction that brought Jersey City to a foremost place in this respect throughout the country. Not content with his development plan for the youth of the city, Moore found time to enlarge upon a scheme of municipal expansion that included many new residential and commercial centers, not the least important of which was the new shore front improvement on the westerly side of the city that is destined to create a vast area of development for commercial activity. He is also father of the 'covered cut'—a link in the State Highway vehicular tunnel plan."

Governor Moore's record as the Chief Executive of New Jersey is too much a matter of recent newspaper history to need relating. One who should know best has summarized the outstanding events of his administration in 1926, 1927 and 1928 as follows:

Uniform Traffic Act.

Veto power over acts of New Jersey members of the Port Authority.

Financing and starting of the Hudson River Bridge.

Completion and opening to the public of the Holland Tunnels.

Completion and opening to the public of the two bridges between Staten Island and New Jersey.

Completion and opening of the Camden-Philadelphia Bridge.

Starting of Bayonne and Staten Island Bridge.

Strengthening of the banking system through branch banks.

Giving Attorney-General power to examine stock issues and take action against those who attempt to float fake securities.

Increasing number and efficiency of State troopers.

Transfer Inheritance Tax Act.

Establishing a complete highway system for the State, and providing funds for its construction.

Zoning Amendment to the Constitution.

Defeat of all other Constitutional Amendments.

Repeal of several hundred old statutes.

State building code applied to theatres, grand stands, etc., which heretofore were built in outlying districts without regard to safety, because of lack of local building restrictions.

Permitting towns to join with each other in construction of water and sewage systems and sewage disposal plants.

Adding Air Unit to the National Guard.

Construction of a new State Building adjoining State House.

Normal School for Hudson County.

Establishment of Small Claims Courts, to enable tradesmen to collect bills without turning them over to lawyers or collection agencies.

Increasing dower and courtesy rights.

Workmen's Compensation Law.

Giving towns right to acquire lands for airports.

Thorough canvass of crippled children of the State; and providing that doctors shall report crippled children who come under their care. Plans for their care, education and vocational treatment.

Commission to report on marsh lands in North Jersey; their proper development.

Commission to fix status of Rutgers College and its relation to the State.

Commission to make survey of education in New Jersey.

Commission to study question of tangible personal property tax, with a view to relieving that assessment.

Commissions to study Mechanics' Lien and Mortgage laws, with a view to simplifying the practice.

Lessening beach pollution through strict enforcement of rules of War Department.

Governor Larson—In 1928 Morgan F. Larson, Republican, was elected Governor over William L. Dill, Democrat, by a vote of 824,005 to 671,728 as has already been related. Governor Larson, of Perth Amboy, is a native of that city. He is a civil engineer and financier. He has served his city and county a total of thirteen years as engineer; was elected to the State Senate in 1921, 1924, 1927, being majority leader of that body in 1925, and President of the Senate for the 1926 session. While there he sponsored bills for the expansion of the State Highways System, the New York-New Jersey bridges, and many other important projects.



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